JUDGMENT Carnduff, J. - These appeals are preferred against three preliminary decrees for the partition of certain lands in the District of Mymensingh as appertaining to Pargana Pukhuria, of which the parties are the joint proprietors. Pargana Pukhuria was partitioned by the Collector in the year 1839, when four separate estates were formed and allotted as follows :-Tauzi No. 132 to the Plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest : Tauzi No. 6100 to the predecessor of the second Defendant : and Tauzis Nos. 4806 and 5513 to the predecessor of the other Defendant. A considerable quantity of land in this pargana, was, however, either jungle or submerged at the time, and this was, and apparently had to be, excluded from the partition. It consists of parcels in a large number of different mauzas, in which the nature and extent of the interest of the respective parties vary. As a rule the parties are the superior landlords, the Plaintiff's share being ten annas, the first Defendant's two annas, but in some mauzas the shares are different-in Mauza Sailarkhanda the Plaintiff and the first Defendant own eight annas each, the second Defendant not being a coparcener at all, in another mauza a twelve-anna share is monopolised by an idol, and in a third, the parties are talukdars. In three of the mauzas the lands are becoming culturable and the allegation of the Plaintiff is that they are being taken possession of in a haphazard way as opportunity arises, and quarrels and obstacles to improvement have been the consequence. The Plaintiff, therefore, sought, by means of these three suits, to have all the joint lands in the three mauzas partitioned between herself and her co-sharer. To this, the second Defendant has raised no objection, but the first Defendant has, on the ground that separate suits for the partition of portions of the ijmali lands are not maintainable, and that one suit ought to have been brought for the partition of all the ijmali lands in the pargana which were omitted from the Collectorate partition of 1839. There were other points raised : but that is the main point, and it is the only one with which we are concerned in these appeals. 2. Mr. There were other points raised : but that is the main point, and it is the only one with which we are concerned in these appeals. 2. Mr. Caspersz, on behalf of the Appellant, contends that the general rule is that a joint owner cannot claim a partition of the joint property without bringing the whole of it into hotchpot, so that all the equities between the parties may be considered and settled and the matter may be dealt with once for all. And he further urges that the institution of suits for partition piecemeal involves multiplicity of actions and offends against the provisions of Or. 2, r. 1, of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of the appeal reliance is placed on several reported cases. 3. In Jogendra Nath v. Jugobudhoo I. L. R.14 Cal 122(1886), it was held (Petheram, C. J., doubting, but following authority) that a suit will not lie for partial partition. But the property here was the joint property of a Hindu family, and as the learned Vakil for the Eespondent admits, the application of the general rule in such a case can hardly be denied. But that even then there may be an exception is shown by the next ruling, on which the learned Counsel for the Appellant relies, that in Punchanan v. Shib Chandra I. L. R. 14 Cal. 835 (1887), in which Trevelyan, J., while mentioning the general rule against partial partitions, nevertheless entertained a suit for the partition of so much only of a Hindu joint estate as lay within the original jurisdiction of this Court. 4. In Jogendra Nath v. Baldeo I. L. R. 35 Cal. 968 (1907), Mookerjee and Caspersz, JJ., observed that a co-owner cannot enforce a partition of a part only of the common lands leaving the rest undivided, and the entire property must be included in the partition. But the observation was incidental and parenthetical, the suit before the Court being one for the recovery of joint possession of some lands which had accidentally, as in this case, been excluded from the partition of the holding to which they appertained. 5. But the observation was incidental and parenthetical, the suit before the Court being one for the recovery of joint possession of some lands which had accidentally, as in this case, been excluded from the partition of the holding to which they appertained. 5. In Fuzlur Rahman v. Fayzer Rahman 15 C. W. N 677 at p. 679 (1911), Chitty and N. R. Chatterjea, JJ., expressed the view that there is " no distinction in principle between partition of joint property under Hindu or "Mahomedan Law," and held that it was inexpedient to allow a suit for the partition of a portion only of joint property. But here their Lordships were dealing with family property, and, no doubt, very much the same considerations arise whether the joint family is Mahomedan or Hindu. 6. In Satya Kumar v. Satya Kishore 10 C. L. J 503(1909), Mookerjee and Vincent, JJ., held that although there cannot be a partial partition by suit," partial partition by private arrangement is allowable. But once more the property dealt with was that of a joint Hindu family. 7. In Monsharam v. Ganesh Chandra 17 C. W, N. 521 at p. 522 (1912) Mookerjee and Beachcroft, J., remarked that, " when the Plaintiff sues for partition of a part of the joint property, it is open to the Defendant to take exception to the scope of the suit and to insist upon the inclusion of all the properties jointly owned by the parties." But the precise point before the Court was whether a person holding property jointly with another is precluded by sec. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, corresponding with Or. 2, r. 2, of the present Code, from suing for a partition of it by reason of its having been the subject-matter of a previous partition-suit between the parties. 8. These are the strongest cases on the side of the Appellant. on the other side there are Padmamoni v. Jagadamba 6 B L.E. 124 (1871), Ram Mohan v. Mulchand I. L. R. 28 All. 39 (1905) and Abul Faiz v. Asita Mohan 12 C.W.N. 640 (1908). 8. These are the strongest cases on the side of the Appellant. on the other side there are Padmamoni v. Jagadamba 6 B L.E. 124 (1871), Ram Mohan v. Mulchand I. L. R. 28 All. 39 (1905) and Abul Faiz v. Asita Mohan 12 C.W.N. 640 (1908). In the first of these, Phear, J., laid it down that one of two co-heiresses to a joint Hindu family property is not obliged to include in her suit the whole of the property, but may confine it to the portion which she is desirous of having partitioned, although it is open to the defence to show that the portion ought not to be divided or could not properly be divided, and that a fair and equitable division could, not be made without bringing in all the joint property. In the second, the Allahabad. High Court expressed entire concurrence with the view of Phear, J., held that the purchaser of certain shares in two shops was rightly decreed partition of the share purchased by him in one of them, and observed that " there is nothing to preclude one of the joint owners of several items of property from seeking a partition of one of such items." In the third, this Court followed the Allahabad. Court and ruled that one of the co-owners of an estate could sue for the partition of the chaukidari chakran land appertaining to one mauza in the estate. 9. In the result, I think that the learned Counsel for the Appellant has not been able to establish the broad proposition for which he contends, and that the rule to be applied is much more elastic. Indeed, what we have to consider in cases of this kind, under sec. 37 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, is justice, equity and good conscience; and these seem in this case to lie entirely on the side of the Plaintiff. So far as appears, the Eani has brought her suits in respect of the only ijmali lands regarding which any difficulty has so far arisen, and a suit in respect of the others might be premature and infructuous. For there is nothing to show that other lands not included in the partition of 1839 have emerged and become culturable or capable of partition, and the suggestion that there may be such other lands is a mere surmise. For there is nothing to show that other lands not included in the partition of 1839 have emerged and become culturable or capable of partition, and the suggestion that there may be such other lands is a mere surmise. A fortiori, there is no substance in the contention that the Rani may be in possession of more than her fair share of culturable lands in other villages, so that, without bringing all into hotchpot, she cannot establish her right to a particular share in the lands which have become culturable in the three mauzas-Char Magura, Mirzapur and Sailarkhanda. And, as regards the apprehension as to multiplicity of suits, there is really no foundation for the objection if we look at the facts in connection with, say, appeals Nos. 1687 and 1991 relating to Char Magura and Sailarkhanda. In the former mauza the Rani has ten annas, the second Defendant two annas, and the Appellant four annas. In the latter the Eani holds eight annas and the Appellant holds the other eight. If one suit were brought in respect of both mauzas, there might no doubt be one preliminary decree, but the final decree would depend on the results of two. entirely distinct enquiries by the Commissioner appointed to effect the partition. 10. On the whole, I am of opinion that the Appellant is merely obstructive, that there are no merits in his appeals, and that they should be dismissed with costs. Richardson, J. I agree