JUDGMENT 1. The question involved in this Rule is whether an appeal lies against an order filing an award in an arbitration without the intervention of the Court after a decree is made upon the award That art appeal lies against an order filing the award is not, and cannot be, disputed having regard to the express terms of cl. (f) of sec. 104 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is contended, however, on behalf of the Opposite Party that an appeal lies only so long as no decree is passed upon the award, but that where the order is followed by a decree before the appeal is filed, the appeal is incompetent, and reliance is placed upon the provisions of sec. 21, cl. 2, of the Second Schedule, and upon certain decisions of this Court. Now, sec. 21 of the Second Schedule provides that when the Court is satisfied as to the matters stated in that sec ion it shall order the award to be filed and shall proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, that a decree shall follow upon the judgment, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except in so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award. 2. The section does not deal with the right of appeal from an order filing an award which is provided for by sec. 104, cl. (f), but it is contended that because a decree, if made in accordance with the award, is final, no appeal lies against the order filing the award if the appeal is not filed before the decree is made. But if the argument of the Opposite Party is well-founded, it would be in the power of the Court making the order filing the award to deprive the complaining party of his right of appeal against the order, by making a decree promptly, although the party may have thirty days or ninety days (as the case may be) within which to file his appeal against the order. It is suggested that the party against whom the order is made should ask the Court not to make the decree until he prefers his appeal against the order. It is suggested that the party against whom the order is made should ask the Court not to make the decree until he prefers his appeal against the order. But the section directs the Court to proceed to pronounce its judgment according to the award after ordering the award to be filed and lays down that a decree shall follow the judgment. The Court thus has no option but to pronounce judgment and make a decree and we do not think the Legislature intended to make the right of appeal against an order filing the award, expressly given by sec. 104, cl. (f), depend upon the fact whether a decree is or is not made upon the award before the appeal against the order is filed. 3. The argument based upon the finality of the decree may equally apply to a case where a decree upon the award is made, subsequent to the filing of an appeal, against the order directing the award to be filed and we are of opinion that the argument is not well-founded. 4. Reliance is placed, however, on certain observations made by some of the learned Judges in the Full Bench case of Jannky Nath v. Brojo Lal I. L. R. 33 Cal. 757 : s. c. 10 C. W. N. 609 (1906). The Full Bench had to consider the question whether an appeal lay from an order passed under sec. 526 of the old Code (Act. XIV of 1882) directing the filing of an award and Maclean, C. J., and Ghose, J., were of opinion that a bare order passed by the Court under sec. 526 directing the filing of an award is appealable, but that when a decree has been pronounced by the Court affirming the award it is not appealable. It is contended on behalf of the Opposite Patty that the present Code merely formulates the opinion there expressed and that no appeal lies against the order after the decree is made. 5. It is not profitable to discuss the reasons which led the learned Judges to make the observations on a consideration of the provisions of the old Code. It is contended on behalf of the Opposite Patty that the present Code merely formulates the opinion there expressed and that no appeal lies against the order after the decree is made. 5. It is not profitable to discuss the reasons which led the learned Judges to make the observations on a consideration of the provisions of the old Code. That Code did not expressly give any appeal against an order filing the award whereas the present Code expressly gives a right of appeal from such order, and if it were contended to take away the right of appeal from such an order as soon as a decree is prepared in accordance with the award, we would have expected the Code to provide that no appeal shall lie against such an order if the appeal is not preferred before the decree is made. 6. Besides, the matters to be considered in an appeal against an order filing the award are totally different from the matters to be considered in an appeal against the decree based upon the award. An appeal will lie against the decree only if, and in so far as, it is not in accordance with or is in excess of the award. A decree may be perfectly in accordance with the award, but a party may have good grounds for complaint against the order filing the award, and we are unable to hold that although a party is expressly given a right of appeal against such an order, such right is taken away as soon as the Court makes a decree in accordance with the award. 7. Reference was also made to that class of cases where it has been held that it is not open to an Appellant to challenge the correctness of an interlocutory order or preliminary decree without preferring an appeal against the final decree, where (as explained in subsequent cases) the final decree has been made before the appeal against the interlocutory order or (sic) nary decree has been (sic) analogy of these cases (sic) a case like this. The (sic) decision in that class of (sic) Appellant could have (sic) Tiff is not clear Page No. 383 final decree, whereas a decree based upon an award is not appealable where such decree is in accordance with the award. 8. The (sic) decision in that class of (sic) Appellant could have (sic) Tiff is not clear Page No. 383 final decree, whereas a decree based upon an award is not appealable where such decree is in accordance with the award. 8. Lastly, it is contended that the Appellant himself treated his appeal as being one against the decree itself. It is pointed out that full Court fee upon the value of the suit was paid upon the memorandum of appeal, and a copy of the decree was filed along with it. It appears that the Munsif overruled the objections to the award and by his order, dated the 28th July 1911, directed that the award be filed in Court, and that a decree be passed according to the award. The decree was signed on the 3rd August and the appeal was filed on the 28th August. The appeal was described as an appeal from the decision of the Munsif, dated the 28th July 1911. It seems that the Petitioners paid full Court-fee and filed a copy of the decree because a decree had already been made. There is however nothing to show that the Petitioner acquiesced in the decree, on the contrary the record shows that his pleader refused to sign the decree. The grounds of appeal were directed against the validity of the order directing the award to be filed and we do not think that under these circumstances the Petitioner lost his right of appeal against the order directing the filing of the award, merely because he erroneously paid the full Court-fee and filed a copy of the decree. In the case of Shib Kristo v. Satish Chandra (sic) Cal. 822 (1912) to which reference was made, the appeal was directed solely against the decree itself and not against the award and the learned Judges obtained that had the order appealed from Tiff Not clear Page No. 384 (sic) passed under rule 15 it (sic) necessary to consider (sic) lay against such an (sic) Patent. 9. In two cases in this Court, an appeal was held to lie against an order directing the award to be filed notwithstanding that a decree had been made in accordance with the award. See Ganesh v. Malida 13 C. L. J. 399 (1911), and the unreported case of Sabitri v. Promoda App. from Or. 9. In two cases in this Court, an appeal was held to lie against an order directing the award to be filed notwithstanding that a decree had been made in accordance with the award. See Ganesh v. Malida 13 C. L. J. 399 (1911), and the unreported case of Sabitri v. Promoda App. from Or. No. 96 of 1913, decided by Mookerjee & Beachcroft, JJ., on the 21st April (1913). In the latter, there was an appeal against the order directing the award to be filed and a Rule was obtained to set aside the order and the decree consequent thereon. The order filing the award was set aside on appeal and the following order was passed in the Rule. "The Rule is made absolute and the decree which has been drawn up on the basis of the order now set aside, will stand cancelled." It does not appear however whether the question raised in this Rule was argued in those cases. 10. The decree based upon the award is no doubt final if it is in accordance with the award, but the validity of the decree depends upon the validity of the order directing the award to be filed, and if the latter is set aside, the decree must be declared inoperative. We are of opinion that an appeal lay against the order of the Munsif directing the award to be filed, and we accordingly set aside the order of the Court of Appeal below, and direct that Court to hear the appeal according to law. The Petitioners are entitled to costs of this Rule, which we assess at 2 gold mohurs.