Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1914 DIGILAW 116 (ALL)

Har Narain v. Har Prasad

1914-04-08

BANERJI, RICHARDS

body1914
JUDGMENT : 1. The only question in this appeal which arises out of a suits for sale upon a mortgage is whether the appellant has priority over the plaintiffs. The mortgage in favour of the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title was made on 4th July 1872. In 1891 the mortgagor executed a simple mortgage in favour of one Janki Prasad for Rs. 116. The property hypothecated in that mortgage was the property comprised in the earlier mortgage of 1872 and some other property. 2. Out of the consideration for the mortgage of 1891 Rs. 100 was left in the hand of Janki Prasad for payment of a still prior usufructuary mortgage of 1866. This mortgage was discharged out of the consideration for the mortgage of 1891. Janki Prasad brought a suit upon his mortgage, obtained a decree and in execution thereof caused the property mortgaged to him to be sold and the appellant Har Narain purchased it. He contends that he has priority over the plaintiffs by reason of Janki Prasad having discharged the earlier mortgage of 1866. It has been held by this Court in several cases and also by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the question in a matter of this kind is one of intention, i.e., whether it was the intention of the parties that the prior mortgage should be kept alive for the benefit of the subsequent transferee of the property who discharged it. 3. In the absence of clear and express evidence the presumption will be that the intention was to keep up the prior mortgage for the benefit of the transferee. In the present case however it seems to us that the intention, so far from being that of keeping up the prior mortgage, was to extinguish it. The prior mort gage of 1866 was a usufructuary mortgage. Janki Prasad took a simple mortgage which included other property and as soon as the prior mortgagee was paid up the mortgagor and not Janki Prasad took possession of the mortgaged property, so that it cannot be said that he stepped into the shoes of the prior usfructuary mortgagees. Under these circumstances the appellant is not entitled to claim priority over the plaintiffs and this appeal must fail. We accordingly dismiss it with costs including fees on the higher scale. We extend the time for payment to six months from this date.