JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - The only point that calls for our decision in this appeal is whether an application for an order absolute for sale of a decree nisi, dated the 28th of September 1898, is barred by limitation. The actual date of the application of the order absolute for sale does not appear from the paper-book, but it is admitted that the application was made after the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, came into operation. 2. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, repealed secs. 85 to 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and in lieu thereof enacted the provisions contained in Or. XXXIV in the First Schedule to the Code with reference to suits relating to mortgages on immoveable property. 3. Prior to the Code of 1908, it had been established by the decisions of this Court that, there was no period of limitation within which a Plaintiff was bound to apply for the order absolute for sale in a suit brought for sale of the mortgaged property. Thus in the case of Tiluck Singh v. Pursotum Pershad (1), Prinsep and Ghosh, JJ., decided that an application under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to have a mortgage decree for sale made absolute was not governed by Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, and that the article was limited to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judges towards the close of their judgment made the following remarks : '' We may further observe that no final order for sale having been passed, the suit may properly be regarded as being still pending.'' Art. 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 is in identically the same terms as Art. 178 of the Act of 1.877. 4. The question for our decision depends on whether the provisions of Or. XXXIV of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply so as to take away a vested right which the Plaintiff had of applying to have the decree for sale made absolute. 5. The Allahabad High Court has laid down in the case of Kaunsidla v. Ishri Singh (2), that the effect of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, did not take away the vested right that a party had to apply to have his decree for sale made absolute. 6. 5. The Allahabad High Court has laid down in the case of Kaunsidla v. Ishri Singh (2), that the effect of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, did not take away the vested right that a party had to apply to have his decree for sale made absolute. 6. A contrary view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Datto Atmaram v. Shankar Dattatrya (3). 7. But with all respect to the learned Judges who decided that case it seems to me that they founded their judgment on a misreading of the judgment of Jenkins, C. J., in the case of Amolak Chand Parak v. Sarat Ch. Mukerjee (4). 8. Moreover, we have the recent decision of a Special Bench of this Court in the case of Gopeshur Pal v. Jiban Chandra (5) which laid down that a right of suit is a vested right and that it is an established Exiom of construction that though procedure may be regulated by the Act for the time being in force, still the intention to lake away a vested right without compensation or any saving is not to be imputed to the legislature unless it be expressed in unequivocal terms. 9. Applying those principles to the case before us, I think the learned Judge in the lower Appellate Court came to a correct decision. 10. The present appeal therefore fails and ought to be dismissed with costs. Richardson, J. I agree.