JUDGMENT Carnduff, J. - The question raised by the second appeal is as to the effect of the improper reception of inadmissible matter in evidence. The Plaintiff suing on a bond, endeavored to save the bar of limitation by proving payment of interest by the Defendant in Faridpur on the 15th December 1907. The Defendant in reply produced what is called a certificate which he swore he had received from the hands of the manager of the Pegu Club, and which apparently showed that he was in the service of that club in Rangoon on the date mentioned. The Court of first instance believed the Plaintiff's witnesses, and, holding that the certificate was "not duly proved," refused to "attach any importance to it." The suit was accordingly decreed. The lower Appellate Court, on the contrary, considered the "Plaintiff's evidence " discrepant," and "not at all very satisfactory," and held, referring to sec. 67 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, that there was "sufficient proof" of the certificate. In this view the learned District Judge reversed the decree and ordered the dismissal of the suit. 2. The precise point arising in connection with the so-called certificate does not seem to have been appreciated by either Court. It does not turn on whether it was shown to be genuine or not, but on whether it could be admitted in lieu of the evidence of the writer himself. It is to my mind perfectly clear that it could not, and, indeed, no attempt has been made to show us that it could u/s 32 or any other section of the Evidence Act. The District Judge was, therefore wrong in taking it into consideration at all. 3. It was argued, however, that its improper reception is not necessarily fatal, and reference is made to sec. 167 of the Evidence Act. But I think that we could not with safety attempt to apply that provision in the case before us : for the learned District Judge has not told us, and it seems to me to be absolutely impossible for us to say, how far he was influenced by the certificate. No doubt, he begins his judgment by disparaging the Plaintiff's witnesses, and goes on to deal with the certificate. No doubt, he begins his judgment by disparaging the Plaintiff's witnesses, and goes on to deal with the certificate. But the very fact that he found it necessary to overrule the Munsif on the point affords ground for the argument that he must also have found that it was necessary to rely on the certificate, or, in other words, that he could not have decided the case as he did without it. Moreover, it would seem that the certificate, if relied upon to prove its, contents, was a most damning piece of, evidence which was really conclusive against the Plaintiff, and it may well be that, with it in his mind, the learned District Judge could not help approaching the evidence of the Plaintiff's witnesses without an amount of distrust and suspicion that rendered it impossible for him to believe their evidence. In fact, it would seem to be impossible to rely upon the certificate without rejecting the oral evidence. 4. I think therefore that this appeal must be allowed, the decree of the lower Appellate Court discharged, and the case remanded to it for a fresh decision after eliminating the certificate. 5. The costs of this hearing will be the costs in the cause. Richardson, J. I agree that the certificate was inadmissible in evidence and that in the circumstance there must be a retrial.