JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal by a decree-holder whose application for execution has been dismissed by the Court below as barred by time. The decree under execution is one for costs passed by this Court in appeal on 19th March 1907. An application was made to the proper Court on 8th April 1909, to execute this decree by attachment of a decree held by this judgment-debtor against some other person which was under execution in the same Court. Incidentally a question has arisen in argument, whether in computing the subsequent period of limitation this should have regard to the provisions of the present Limitation Act 9 of 1908 or to the Act previously in force, namely Act 15 of 1877. The present Limitation Act came into force on 1st January 1909 and the application of 8th April 1909 was a good application for execution within time under the previously existing law. I feel no hesitation therefore in holding that future period of limitation, reckoned from 8th April 1909 or from subsequent date, must be calculated subject to the provisions of the present Limitation Act 9 of 1908. 2. The application now before the Court is one of 15th April 1912. By this application the decree-holder no longer desired to proceed with the attempt to realize his money by executing the decree in favour of his judgment-debtor which he had attached. He asked for a transfer of his own decree for execution to another Court, in order that he might there execute it against the property of his judgment-debtor within the jurisdiction of this other Court. 3. An order of transfer was granted; but the Court to which the decree was transferred has dismissed the application for execution on ground that the application for transfer, dated 15th April 1912, was itself barred by limitation, being an application to a Court to take a step-in-aid of execution of a decree made more than three years after the date of the decree and not saved by any of the other provisions of Article 182, Sch. 1, to the present Limitation Act. In appeal the decree-holder contends that limitation is saved by Cl. (6), Article 182, aforesaid. Let us go back to the application of 8th April 1909, and take note of the fact that this was made more than one year after the date of the decree sought to be executed. 1, to the present Limitation Act. In appeal the decree-holder contends that limitation is saved by Cl. (6), Article 182, aforesaid. Let us go back to the application of 8th April 1909, and take note of the fact that this was made more than one year after the date of the decree sought to be executed. A notice had therefore to issue to the judgment-debtor under the provisions of O. 21, R. 22 of the CPC, and on that same day, namely 8th April 1909, the Court passed an order that notice should issue. 4. A notice was eventually drawn up on 27th April 1909 and it bears the signature of the presiding officer of the Court over that date. The notice fixed 10th May 1909 for the appearance of the judgment-debtor, and an endorsement on the back shows that it was actually made over to a ministerial officer of the Court for service on 4th May 1909. It was eventually returned unserved, endorsed with a report to the effect that the period allowed for service was so short, in view of the distance which had to be covered in order to effect service, that the serving officer had made no attempt to achieve that object, but merely returned the notice with a request that the Court should fix a fresh date. After receipt of this report there was a fresh order passed by the Court, which is to be found in the order sheet under date 1st May 1909. This order is to the following effect: “Notice returned unserved. Therefore let fresh notice issue fixing 7th June.” In compliance with this order a fresh notice was drawn up which bears the signature of the presiding officer of the Court over date 19th May 1909, and the endorsement shows that in was made over to a ministerial officer of the Court for execution on 21st May 1909. Apparently the issue of this fresh notice was overlooked in the Court below, for it is not referred to in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. The finding of the Court below is that the date of issue of notice referred to in Cl. (6), Article 182, Sch. 1 to the Lim. Act, means the date of the order of the Court directing notice to issue and in this case means 8th April 1909. The finding of the Court below is that the date of issue of notice referred to in Cl. (6), Article 182, Sch. 1 to the Lim. Act, means the date of the order of the Court directing notice to issue and in this case means 8th April 1909. On this finding has been based a decision that the present application for execution, dated 15th April 1912, is barred by limitation, under the provisions of Act 15 of 1877, where Article 179, Cl. (5), Sch. 2, corresponds to Article 182, Cl. (6), Sch. 1 of the present Act, there was much difference of opinion in the various High Courts as to the meaning of the expression “the date of issuing notice under Section 248 of the CPC.” used in the former Act. The Allahabad High Court consistently maintained “that the date of issuing the notice must be taken to be the date of the Court's order directing notice to issue.” This was held in a series of cases, the last of which appears to be that of Jumai Kanjar v. Abdul Karim Khan, [1908] 30 All. 536 : 5 A.L.J. 524 : (1908) A.W.N. 245 : 4 M.L.T. 446.. There has been a change in the wording of the law, the expression used in Article 182, Cl. (6), of Sch. 1 to Act 9 of 1908 being “the date of issue of notice.” The argument for the respondent before me is that these words imply no alteration in the law and no determination one way or the other of the question on which various High Courts had differed. One commentator has expressed the opinion that the change in the wording was intentional, its object being to set at rest the controversy on which various High Courts had previously been divided. If this view is correct then I can only suppose that “the date of issue of notice” was intended to mean the date borne by that paper itself, over or under the signature of the presiding officer of the Court, just as the “date of issue” of a currency note, for instance, is the date appearing on the face of the note itself. I incline to the opinion that this view is correct, though I am not aware that there has been any reported decision in favour of it. I incline to the opinion that this view is correct, though I am not aware that there has been any reported decision in favour of it. On this view the application of 15th April 1912 is within time, either from the date of the notice first issued or from the date of the subsequent notice. I do not think, however, that it is really necessary to the decision of this appeal for me to determine this point. It seems to me that, even if it be held that there has been no change in the law and that the older decisions of the Allahabad High Court are still binding in spite of the apparent change in the language of the statute, in this particular, case the Court's order of 18th May 1909, directing a fresh notice to issue and fixing a fresh date, is quite sufficient to afford a fresh starting point for limitation. 5. I am prepared to dispose of this appeal on this ground alone; but it is perhaps expedient that I should notice a further point which has been discussed before me. I have already pointed out that the application of 8th April 1909 was for the execution of the present decree by attachment of a decree in favour of the present judgment-debtor. The learned Subordinate Judge who decided this case, does not seem to have had produced before him all the records which have been before me produced at the hearing of this appeal. I have found in one of these records an application, as to the existence of which the learned Subordinate Judge expresses himself as doubtful, dated 14th September 1909, by which the present decree-holder moved the proper Court to execute the decree in favour of his judgment-debtor, which he had attached. The question is, whether this application would in any case be sufficient to save limitation under Cl. (5), Article 182, Sch. 1, of the present Lim. Act, apart from any question as to the applicability of Cl. (6) of the same article. In Lachman v. Thondi Ram, [1885] 7 All. 382 : (1885) A.W.N. 64. an application very similar to this one of 14th September 1909, was held to be sufficient to save limitation. There is, no doubt, a distinction between the two cases. Act, apart from any question as to the applicability of Cl. (6) of the same article. In Lachman v. Thondi Ram, [1885] 7 All. 382 : (1885) A.W.N. 64. an application very similar to this one of 14th September 1909, was held to be sufficient to save limitation. There is, no doubt, a distinction between the two cases. The application dealt with in the reported case was one which, besides asking for the execution of the decree in favour of the judgment-debtor which had been attached, contained a definite prayer that any money thus realized might be credited in favour of the decree-holder on his original decree. The question to my mind is whether a prayer to that effect should not be taken as implied in the very nature of an application like this of 14th September 1909, where the applicant is not the decree-holder under the decree sought to be executed, but a judgment-creditor of that decree-holder who had taken the decree in execution of his own decree. To my mind the decision of this appeal does not turn upon this point; but, if I were obliged to decide this appeal on this point alone, I should be inclined to hold that limitation was saved by this application of 14th September 1909. A contrary decision would involve a curious anomaly which the learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment seems to contemplate with unconcern, that it might be open to the present decree-holder to proceed with the execution of the decree which he had taken in attachment even though his own decree had in the meantime become barred by limitation. I am content, however, to base my decision upon the finding that this application of 15th April 1912, was within time under Article 182, Cl. (6), Sch. 1 of the present Lim. Act. 6. I accept this appeal, set aside the decision of the Court below and return the record to that Court directing it ta re-admit this application on to its file of pending execution cases and to proceed with it according to law. The appellant will get his costs of this appeal.