JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of the learned officiating Additional Sub-Judge of Birbhum, dated the 15th February 1912, reversing the decision of the Munsif, first Court of Bolpur. The suit was brought by the Plaintiffs, claiming through one Srimati Sindhubala Debi, who was the widow of one Mohesh Chandra Mukerjee, for an one-half share of the estate of Mohesh Chandra and the sole, question that we have got to decide in this case is what is the true construction of the Will of Mohesh Chandra. Mohesh Chandra made his Will on the 30th August 1884. There are first the usual recitals and then the Will runs in the following terms : "I bequeath to both of you," that is, his widow Srimati Sindhubala and Srimati Mstarini, the daughter of his late brother, "by this Will the rest of the properties and also the properties that will exist after the death of my niece (brother's daughter) Srimati Tincouri Debya out of the properties given to her.'' Then follow these words :-- "You will become entitled to sell or make a gift or heba, etc., in respect of the said properties and hold and enjoy the same." Now, pausing here for a moment, let us see what is the nature of the interest that Sindhubala and Mstarini, the present Appellants before us, took under the terms of that gift. It seems to me that it is impossible to say that a person to whom a property is given with power to sell, make a gift or heba, etc., and I presume, to do anything else he likes with--has an interest less than an absolute interest in the property. Those words in the Will cannot be given effect to except by holding that Sindhubala Debi and the Defendant Mstarini Debi took an absolute interest in the property. Then comes the clause that has given rise to this litigation. "If, by the will of God, one of you should die before the other." Now, what was the testator contemplating when he said ''if one of you should die before the other?" What the testator was contemplating when he provided that, if one of them should die before the other, must have been some period which he had in view. "If, by the will of God, one of you should die before the other." Now, what was the testator contemplating when he said ''if one of you should die before the other?" What the testator was contemplating when he provided that, if one of them should die before the other, must have been some period which he had in view. The only period that is possible to give effect to on this Will is the period of distribution, that is, if one should die before the estate is liable to be divided between the two ladies. So far as I can see, on the wording of this Will, it is impossible to hold that the testator had in view the contingency of one of the ladies' dying before the other, which obviously must happen at some time. Then the testator provided that in that event ''whoever will survive will hold and enjoy the whole of the property as malik." The learned Sub-Judge in the Court below has held that that clause applies only in the case of the death of, one of the residuary legatees in the lifetime of the testator, that is, before the period of distribution. That is clearly provided for in sec. 111 of the Indian Succession Act which applies to Hindu Wills and that rule in sec. 111 of the Indian Succession Act is an absolute rule of construction. It is not a rule of construction like the rule in Home v. Pillans which may be contradicted by other evidence appearing on the face of the Will. The rule laid down in sec. 111 of the Indian Succession Act is a statutory rule of construction which the Courts are bound to follow. It is quite true that, in this case, if one applies the rule laid down in Home v. Pillans, one arrives at the same result. There is nothing in this Will to show that the testator meant death after the period of distribution. The ordinary rule of construction where the testator has given an absolute gift to a legatee and then has made a gift over simpliciter on a contingency of death is that he was referring to death before the period of distribution. There is nothing in this Will to show that the testator meant death after the period of distribution. The ordinary rule of construction where the testator has given an absolute gift to a legatee and then has made a gift over simpliciter on a contingency of death is that he was referring to death before the period of distribution. That rule has been established and in spite of the elaborate argument's addressed to us by the learned Vakil for the Appellant, I still remain unconvinced that the rule has been departed from in this country. This case falls within sec. 111 of the Indian Succession Act and the widow Sindhubala not having predeceased her husband and having survived the period of distribution, in my opinion, took an absolute interest under the Will. I therefore agree with the judgment of the learned Sub-Judge in the Court below and think that the present appeal ought to be dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at one gold mohur. Richardson, J. I agree.