JUDGMENT : 1. Sheikh Rajab Ali and others, the plaintiffs in this case, are co-sharers and lessees in the village of Mir Ahmadpur. They represent thus altogether (i.e., in their capacity as co-sharers and as lessees from other co-sharers) a ten annas interest in the village. The co-sharers of the remaining six-annas interest in the village, nor their lessors in respect of the interest held by them as lessees, are parties to this suit. The defendants are old occupancy tenants of the village which is joint and undivided. They are thus-the tenants of the entire body of co-sharers owning the full 16-annas interest in the village. 2. In the abadi of the village there is a plot of waste land bearing No. 637, which, of course, is the common property of all the co-sharers. The plaintiff's case is that in this plot of land a portion (the boundaries of which are set out in the plaint) has been in the exclusive possession of the plaintiffs. 3. They allege that the defendants have, recently entered upon this portion of land, and constructed certain temporary structures. They have put up certain cattle troughs, sheds, sugarcane presses, and the usual machinery for expressing, boiling and concentrating sugarcane juice on the said land, and are using it for the said purpose. As these acts have been done without the consent of the plaintiffs, they sue for the possession of the land, the removal of the said constructions, etc., and for the injunctions set out in the plaint. 4. The defence to the suit is that by village custom the defendants, who are old sugarcane cultivators of the village, are entitled to use this plot of land for the purpose of expressing and boiling the sugarcane juice and cognate purposes. These operations follow the reaping of the sugarcane harvest, and the tenants are entitled to use this plot of land for the said purpose. The only other defence that calls for notice here is the plea that the plaintiffs cannot maintain this suit without impleading the other zamindars of the village. 5. The Court of first instance held that the defendants had not proved the alleged customary right claimed by them, and their act of entering upen the said land was an act of trespass, which any of the co-sharers of the village could sue to prevent. It decreed the claim in full. 5. The Court of first instance held that the defendants had not proved the alleged customary right claimed by them, and their act of entering upen the said land was an act of trespass, which any of the co-sharers of the village could sue to prevent. It decreed the claim in full. On appeal the learned District Judge, after carefully examining the evidence on the record came to the conclusion “that the defendants have established a customary right of using the land in suit for pressing and boiling sugarcane by Erecting temporary buildings for several years past.” He also was of opinion that the plaintiffs could not maintain this suit without joining the other co-sharers of the village and that the suit was therefore had for nonjoinder of parties. He therefore set aside the decree of the Munsif and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim. 6. The plaintiffs have preferred this appeal against the said decree. It has been argued on their behalf that the customary right claimed by the defendants has not been made out, and cannot be given effect to in law, and that the plaintiffs alone were entitled to maintain this suit, which was for the ejectment of trespassers from their lands without impleading the other co-owners. It was also urged that the tenants could not acquire the right claimed which was of the nature of an easement as against their landlords, the zamindars. 7. The right claimed by the defendants in this case is not a right of easement claimed by the owner of a dominant tenement against a servient tenement. It is a claim of the nature of a customary easement of the class referred to in Section 18 of the Easements Act of 1882, and recognised in numerous cases, both in this country and in England: see Mounsey v. Ismay, [1865] 34 L.J. Ex. 52 : 3 H. & C. 486 : 11 Jur. (n.s.) 141 : 12 L.T. 27 : 13 W.R. 521, Ashraf Ali v. Jagan Nath [1884] 6 All. 497 : (1884) A.W.N. 186., Mercer v. Denne, [1905] 2 Ch. 538 : 74 L.J. Ch. 723 : 93 L.T. 412 : 3 L.G.R. 1293 : 21 T.L.R. 763 : 70 J.P. 65 : 54 W.R. 303. It is very similar to the right claimed in the case of Ilahi Bakhsh Khan v. Din Muuhammad, [1897] 14 P.R. 1897. 497 : (1884) A.W.N. 186., Mercer v. Denne, [1905] 2 Ch. 538 : 74 L.J. Ch. 723 : 93 L.T. 412 : 3 L.G.R. 1293 : 21 T.L.R. 763 : 70 J.P. 65 : 54 W.R. 303. It is very similar to the right claimed in the case of Ilahi Bakhsh Khan v. Din Muuhammad, [1897] 14 P.R. 1897. In that case the defenders claimed a right to dry tobacco on certain lands adjacent to the place where they had set up mills for grinding snuff. It was found that the land had been used for that purpose for more than twenty years by the defendants, and that a drying ground in the immediate proximity of the mills was essential to their use. The Court held that such user conferred on the defendant a right to use the land for the Slid purpose. On the findings of the learned Judge the defendants have mile out the claim to the customary easement set up by them, and the suit was rightly dismissed on that ground. 8. In the view that I have taken of the first point it is unnecessary to decide the second paint, viz. whether the plaintiffs have a right to sue without joining the other zamindars as parties to this suit. The question is one on which the decisions are by no means uniform. The only effect of accepting this plea is to relegate the plaintiffs to another suit with the necessary array of parties. Now that the matter has been tried out between the plaintiffs and the defendants the parties to the suit will at any rate be bound by this decision. I therefore prefer to rest my judgment on the first ground alone. It has not been urged that the customary right claimed is unreasonable or that the use, that the defendants are making of the land, is excessive or unreasonable or unnecessary and not essential to the cultivation of the sugarcane crop. The crushing of the sugarcane and the expression and boiling of the juice is last of the agricultural operations incidental to the cultivation of sugarcane and the right claimed here is enjoyed by the tenants unopposed wherever the relations between the landlords and the tenants are on the usual footing of cordiality. 9. I therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.