JUDGMENT Fletcher. J. 1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Deoghur, dated the 5th of July 1911. The Plaintiff brought this suit for declaration of his title in a share in a certain mauza (Sankari) and for the registration of his name in the settlement records in respect thereof. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable. It appears that many years ago the Rohini ghatwals granted 25 villages as khorposh sikmi ghatwali tenures to the junior members of the family. In course of time these 25 villages were divided amongst the various junior members and it is Common ground that Barras Deo, the common ancestor of the parties, held an 8 annas share in the Mauza Sankari. 2. Subsequently settlement proceedings were held under the provisions of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation (Reg. III of 1872). Barras Deo was then dead. The record-of-rights was published on the 13th of May 1904. 3. The entry so far as relates to the 8 annas share of Mauza Sankari was taken before the Commissioner. 4. The dispute before the Commissioner was between Peary Deo, one of the descendants of Barras Deo, on the one hand and certain other members of the family on the other hand. 5. The Commissioner by his order, dated the 31st of October 1907, directed that' the name of Peary Deo should be entered on the record as a khorposhdar and sikmi ghatwal of the 8 annas share of Mauza Sankari : according to the reasons given by the Commissioner he came to this conclusion on the ground that " Peary Deo is the principal representative of the descendants of the 3rd son of Parsi by that wife ", that is Barras Deo. 6. Peary having been recorded in respect of the 8 annas in Mauza Sankari, the Plaintiff has brought this suit for declaration of his title and amendment of the record-of-rights. 7. The case has been argued before us solely on the question as to whether the present suit is maintainable having regard to the provisions of Eeg. III of 1872. Sec. 11 of the regulation enacts that except as provided by sec. 7. The case has been argued before us solely on the question as to whether the present suit is maintainable having regard to the provisions of Eeg. III of 1872. Sec. 11 of the regulation enacts that except as provided by sec. 25A no suit shall lie in any Civil Court regarding any matter decided by a Settlement Officer, but the decisions and orders of Settlement Officers shall have the force of a decree of Court. By sec. 12, Settlement Officers are given jurisdiction to inquire into, to decide and to record "any other landed rights to which by law or custom of the country or any tribe any person shall have a legal or equitable claim ". 8. Sec. 14 provides that the Settlement Officer is to give notice that he is about to prepare a record-of-rights so that all persons may bring forward their claims. The Settlement Officer is however directed by the section to enquire into, settle, and record all rights or claims even though such claims or rights are not urged before him. 9. In addition, there are the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) and (3) of sec. 25. Those provisions so far as it is necessary to state them for the present purpose make the record-of-rights. conclusive proof of the rights and customs therein recorded and prohibit the record from being re-opened until a fresh settlement is made without the previous sanction of the Local Government. On these sections, I think, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is absolutely excluded except in cases specially provided for in sec. 25A of the Regulation. Now in order that the Plaintiff's case should fall within the provisions of sec. 25A, it is essential for the Plaintiff to show that he is a zamindar or other proprietor. It is not suggested that the Plaintiff is a zamindar. Is he then a proprietor ? The Regulation itself contains no definition of a proprietor. But when we consider the nature of the interest claimed, I think that the Plaintiff is not a proprietor. 10. The Plaintiff's claim is to a share of a sikmi ghatwali khorposh grant. Rent in respect of this is payable to the ghatwals, and no land-revenue is payable direct to the Government, nor is it suggested that the land is free from the Government revenue. 11. 10. The Plaintiff's claim is to a share of a sikmi ghatwali khorposh grant. Rent in respect of this is payable to the ghatwals, and no land-revenue is payable direct to the Government, nor is it suggested that the land is free from the Government revenue. 11. Such an interest in land does not, in my opinion, come within the description of a right of ? a zamindar or other proprietor ?. 12. I think, therefore, that the Subordinate Judge came to a correct conclusion in, dismissing the Plaintiff's suit on the ground that it is not maintainable. The only remedy the Plaintiff has is to apply to the Government under sec. 25 of the Regulation to direct the revision of the record-of-rights. It would appear from the Commissioner's judgment that he decided in favour of Peary Deo on the ground that he was "the principal representative of' the descendants" of Barras Deo. The contest before the Commissioner was between Peary on the one hand as the principal descendant of Barras Deo and other members of the family on the other hand. It was nowhere suggested in the judgment of the Commissioner that he meant to give Peary Deo as ?the principal representative of the descendants? the whole of the 8 annas in Mauza Sankari to the exclusion of other descendants of Barras Deo. However that may be, that will be a matter for the consideration of the Government, if the Plaintiff applies to them to direct the revision of the record under sec. 25. So far as our duties are concerned, all that we can say is that the present suit cannot be maintained in a Civil Court. 13. The present appeal therefore fails and must be dismissed with costs. 14. This judgment will also govern Second Appeal No. 201 of 1912, which will also be dismissed with costs. Richardson, J. I agree for the reasons indicated by my learned brother. The Plaintiff cannot succeed in this suit without re-opening the record-of-rights. Under the provisions of the Regulation, therefore, the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to give him the relief for which he seeks.