JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the Defendant against an order by which the Court of Appeal below has refused to re-hear the appeal heard ex parte in his absence. The suit was for recovery of arrears of rent; the claim was valued at less than Rs. 100 in the Court of first instance and was dismissed on the merits. The Plaintiffs appealed against this decree of dismissal. At the hearing of the appeal, the Respondent was not represented and the appeal was decreed ex parte. He then made an application under Or. 41, r. 21, of the CPC to have the appeal re-heard in this presence. The Court refused the application. The present appeal is directed against that order. The first question for consideration is, whether the appeal is competent. Under sub-sec. (2), sec. 143, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the CPC applies to all suits between landlord and tenant subject to any rules made by the High Court under sub-sec. (1) and subject also to the other provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act. On behalf of the Appellant it has been argued that the order in question is open to appeal under Or. 43, r. 1, cl. (t) of the Code of Civil Procedure. But before this contention can be accepted, we must examine, whether there is any provision of the Bengal Tenancy Act which bars the right of appeal. In our opinion, sec. 153 is clearly a bar. That section provides that an appeal shall not lie from any order passed, whether in the first instance or on appeal, in any suit instituted by a landlord for the recovery of rent, when the order is passed by a Subordinate Judge and the amount claimed in the suit does not exceed Rs. 100, unless the order has decided one or more of certain specified points. It is not suggested" that the order against which the present appeal has been preferred decides any question of this character. The point for consideration therefore reduces itself to this :--Is this an order passed in a suit instituted by a landlord for recovery of rent? The learned Vakil for the Appellant has not disputed that the term '' suit '' includes the appellate stage. The point for consideration therefore reduces itself to this :--Is this an order passed in a suit instituted by a landlord for recovery of rent? The learned Vakil for the Appellant has not disputed that the term '' suit '' includes the appellate stage. This indeed is clear from the decision in the case of Gagan Ghand v. Caspersz 4 C. W. N. 44 (1897), and Batasa Sarkar v. Jaitt Bewa 3 C.W.N. 62n(1899). In fact it has been held in the case of Shyama Churn v. Debendra Nath I. L. R. 27 Cal. 484 : s. c. 4 0. W. N. 269 (1900), that the term " suit " includes even the execution-proceedings based on the final decree made in the suit. It has been argued, however, that an application to re-hear an appeal is not an application in the suit, but is an extraneous proceeding which, if granted, in effect revives the appeal. In our opinion, there is no force in this contention, and the application to re-hear the appeal is clearly an application in the suit. This view is supported by the decision, in the case of Acha Mian v. Durga Charan J.L.K. 25 Cat. 146 : s. c. 2 C. W. N. 137 (1897) where it was held that an application to review an order made in a suit is a proceeding in the suit itself. The case before us is obviously very much stronger. Finally, we have been invited to contrast the language of cl. (t) of r. 1 of Or. 43 with that of cls. (c), (d) and (n) and to lipid that the absence of the restrictive words "in a case open to appeal " from cl. (t) supports the right of appeal claimed by the Appellant. But this contention is obviously fallacious : the crucial point of the matter is that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 143 of the Bengal Tenancy Act which makes Or. 43, r. 1, cl. (t) of the CPC applicable, makes it applicable subject to the operation of the restrictive provision of sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 2. It follows that this appeal must be deemed barred under sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and consequently dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at one gold mohur.