JUDGMENT Chitty, J. - This suit was filed by Sri Lal on the 26th June 1912 against Arjun Das and his brothers for a declaration that he was entitled to a half share in several businesses, that the businesses should be dissolved and accounts taken. On 14th July 1913 all matters in dispute in the suit were referred to the arbitration of Daulatram Chokhani and Shib Prosad Garodia, and they were directed to make their award within ten weeks from the date of the delivery to them of the said order. The arbitrators were unable to proceed with the matter at once and so the ten weeks elapsed without an award being made. On the 5th January 1914 I made an order allowing the arbitrators until 28th February 1914 within which to make their award. By a slip in the said order, instead of the word "make" the word "file" was used, but that appears to me to be a matter of little importance. The order purported to be one under Sch. II, para. 8, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and the word should undoubtedly have been "make." The arbitrators held numerous meetings and eventually on 28th February 1914, the last day for making their award, they drew up and signed an award in Hindi. The 28th was a Saturday, and the award could not be filed on that afternoon. Accordingly on the Sunday the arbitrators saw Babu Debi Prosad Khaitan and asked him whether it would not be better that the award should be submitted to the Court in English. Babu Debi Prosad Khaitan accordingly put into formal English the Hindi award, which was read out to him by Shib Prosad Garodia. He did this partly on the Sunday and partly on Monday the 2nd March 1914. Though not a literal translation, the English award reproduces the Hindi award clause for clause and term for term. On 2nd March 1914 the arbitrators and the parties were all present in Babu Debi Prasad Khaitan's office when the English award prepared by Babu Debi Prosad Khaitan was signed by the arbitrators, as was also the letter from the arbitrators to the Registrar forwarding the award. In that letter they stated, "we met and signed our award on the said 28th day of February, but the same could not be filed in Court on the said day being a Saturday. In that letter they stated, "we met and signed our award on the said 28th day of February, but the same could not be filed in Court on the said day being a Saturday. We understand that the time to file the award having thus expired, the parties are going to apply to the Court for leave to file the same." On the advice of Babu Debi Prosad Khaitan an agreement was drawn up on an eight-anna stamp paper and signed by the parties on that day. It was to this effect--"We agree on and to the terms set forth in the award made by Babus Daulatram Chokhani and Shib Prosad Garodia which has been fully explained us, and further agree not to raise any objections thereto as to its validity whether on the grounds of expiry of time or otherwise howsoever." The Plaintiff Sri Lal being dissatisfied with the award at first took up the position that he signed that agreement without knowing its contents and without understanding to what he was putting his name. That contention has been expressly withdrawn by his counsel and the Plaintiff now admits that when he signed that document, which was explained to him by Babu Debi Prosad Khaitan, he knew its contents and understood what he was doing. This, however, did not prevent him from taking steps at once to object to the award as having been filed out of time. I have before me three matters--(1) a petition now by the Plaintiff that the award may be set aside as having been filed out of time, (2) a petition by the Defendants that, if necessary, the time may be extended and that the Plaintiff may be at liberty to file the award, and (3) the Defendants' application that judgment be passed in accordance with the award. Plaintiff's counsel admits that there are no merits whatsoever in his client's contention. He could hardly do otherwise, as a more shameless attempt to get out of his agreement on a highly technical point can hardly be conceived. The Plaintiff relies upon the case of Shib Krishna v. Satish Chandra I. L. R. 38 Cal. 522 (1911) in which Mr. Justice Harington held that the Court had no power to extend the time for filing an award, which had already been made before the application was presented. The Plaintiff relies upon the case of Shib Krishna v. Satish Chandra I. L. R. 38 Cal. 522 (1911) in which Mr. Justice Harington held that the Court had no power to extend the time for filing an award, which had already been made before the application was presented. The learned Judge relied upon the case of Har Narain Singh v. Bhugwant Kuar I. L. R. 13 All. 300 : s. c. L. R. 18 I. A. 65 (1891), but that was a case decided under the CPC of 1882. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that an award made out of time was invalid and that the arbitrators by such effluxion of time were functi officio. In so doing they followed the express words of sec. 521, which ran that "no award shall be valid unless made within the period allowed by the Court." With all respect to the learned Judge who decided the case in Shib Krishna v. Satish Chandra I. L. R. 38 Cal. 522 (1911) it appears to me that he did not give sufficient weight to the change which was made in the wording of sec. 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, in enacting para. 15 of the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As para. 15 runs, it appears to me to leave a discretion to the Court in deciding whether an award shall be set aside on the ground of its having been made after the expiration of the period allowed by the Court. I feel some doubt, therefore, whether the decision in Shib Krishna v. Satish Chandra I. L. R. 38 Cal. 522 (1911) is correct in law. Sec. 148 of the present Code is in no way restricted, nor indeed is paragraph 8 of the second schedule. It might, therefore, be argued not without reason that they ought not to be restricted in the manner there held. It is, however, unnecessary to decide that point, because I am unable to see how in the face of his agreement of 2nd March 1914 the Plaintiff can possibly contend that he is not bound by this award. His objection is highly technical and it may be met in various ways. It may be said that that agreement operated as a fresh submission to arbitration and acceptance of the award as signed on that day by the arbitrators. His objection is highly technical and it may be met in various ways. It may be said that that agreement operated as a fresh submission to arbitration and acceptance of the award as signed on that day by the arbitrators. It might also be said that it was a lawful adjustment of the suit which might be enforced by a decree against the Plaintiff under the provisions of Or. XXIII, r. 3. It might further be said that the Plaintiff is precluded from putting forward his present objection by the concluding words of his agreement not to raise any objection to the award or to its validity whether on the ground of expiry of time or otherwise howsoever. The difficulty might again be got over by directing that not the English award but the Hindi award which is in identically the same terms though not in the same language should be filed as the award of the arbitrators. It appears to ma quite unnecessary to go through these formalities. It is abundantly clear that an award was made within time. The arbitrators decided to have the award drawn up in English, but before doing so they took an agreement from the parties not to raise any objection to this being done. I must, therefore, dismiss the application of the Plaintiff Sri Lal with costs and pass a decree in terms of the award.