JUDGMENT : 1. This is a suit to obtain a declaration that certain plots of land (Nos. 1042 and 1044) were the property of the plaintiffs. It appears that the defendants, alleging that the plaintiffs were their tenants, brought a suit for ejectment in the revenue Court. The present plaintiffs in answer to that suit, pleaded that they were proprietors, and under Section 202 of the Tenancy Act, the then defendants were directed to establish their right in the civil Court by a regular suit. Hence, the present suit by the plaintiffs. It may be noted that originally the plaint covered a claim to plots other than 1042 and 1044 also, but by a subsequent amendment, to avoid the plea of misjoinder, the claim was limited to these two plots, and both parties are agreed that whatever declarations are to be made in this case may be limited to those plots and that the decree of the Court below, which erroneously included other plots, should be amended accordingly. 2. In the present suit the defendants in the revenue Court now claim a declaration of their right to these plots. Both the Courts below have found that their title has been fully made out and have granted them a decree. In appeal however the point pressed for consideration is that the matter is barred under S. 233(k), Act 3 of 1901. It appears that the names of the plaintiffs were recorded as tenants only of plots 1042 and 1044. One Mohan Lal, a purchaser of a share of the village, applied for the partition of his share. To that proceeding all the recorded co-sharers were made parties, but as the present plaintiffs were not the recorded co-sharers in the mahal they were not made parties to these proceedings. 3. The revenue Court therefore behind their back proceeded to make the partition and assigned these plots to one of the parties in the partition proceeding. It is urged that the plaintiffs, though not the recorded co-sharers, should have come forward to assert their right and to have claimed a proprietary interest in these plots, and having failed to do so they are now precluded from setting up their title under S. 233(k), Act 3 of 1901. It is urged that the plaintiffs, though not the recorded co-sharers, should have come forward to assert their right and to have claimed a proprietary interest in these plots, and having failed to do so they are now precluded from setting up their title under S. 233(k), Act 3 of 1901. Under Section 110 of the Land Revenue Act, on an application being made for partition by a recorded co-sharer, the Collector is required to issue a proclamation calling on such of the recorded co-sharers of the mahal as have not joined the application to appear before him and to state their objections, if any, to the partition, under S. 111 of the same Act any recorded co-sharer may object to the partition, and if the objections of such recorded cosharar raise a question of proprietary title, the Collector is authorized to try the question himself as a civil Court or to require any party to have the question determined by a competent civil Court. It may be noted that it is only a recorded co-sharer to whom notice is given and who alone is competent to coma in the revenue Court to object to the partition. In this case the present plaintiffs were not recorded co-sharers; no notices therefore of the proceeding were given to them: they could not be made parties to the proceeding and they could not be heard by that Court in support of their objections. That being so, in my opinion, they were not bound by the result of the partition proceedings. They could not be affected by a judgment in a case between other parties. It is however urged that the present plaintiffs ought to have still gone up to the partition Court and asked that Court to stay partition pending an application by them for the entry of their names, which ought to have been made by them in the revenue Court. I am not aware under what provision of law these defendants could restrain the revenue Court from going on with the partition proceedings. The Court was not bound to stay its hand. It is not certain whether the revenue Court would have recorded their names even if an application for that purpose had been made, and the chances are that they would have been referred to a civil Court to establish their rights. The Court was not bound to stay its hand. It is not certain whether the revenue Court would have recorded their names even if an application for that purpose had been made, and the chances are that they would have been referred to a civil Court to establish their rights. If the contentions of the learned vakil for the appellants is correct, even if these men had gone and brought a suit in the civil Court and finally established their rights, the partition made in the revenue Court behind their back would still have been binding on them. Reliance has been placed up on the provisions of Section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act, of 1901. Under that section no person can institute any suit or other proceeding in the civil Court with respect to matters specified in that section. Among the matters so (specified is the following in Cl. (k), viz. partition or union of mahals except as provided in Ss. Ill and 112”. This is not a suit or any matter which could have been adjudicated upon under these two sections, and I think the prohibition refers to the case of persons who were parties to the partition proceedings, or who should have been made parties thereto, and whose claims could have been heard under Ss. 111 and 112 of that Act. It would be reading the section much more widely if the prohibition was read so as to include cases of persons who were not, and could not be made parties to those proceedings. An unreported case, Mt. Tarifan v. Fateh Din, Since reported in 15 I.C. 685 by Chamier, J., has been relied upon in support of the contention. So far as I am able to consider the judgment in that case it seems to proceed upon the special circumstances of that particular case. I think the decision in the case of Khasay v. Jugla, [1906] 28 All. 432 : (1906) A.W.N. 79. applies to the circumstances of this case. The same view was taken in the case of Awadh Behari Lal v. Ishri Prasad, [1907] 4 A.L.J. 662 : (1907) A.W.N. 172. I am unable to follow Mt. I think the decision in the case of Khasay v. Jugla, [1906] 28 All. 432 : (1906) A.W.N. 79. applies to the circumstances of this case. The same view was taken in the case of Awadh Behari Lal v. Ishri Prasad, [1907] 4 A.L.J. 662 : (1907) A.W.N. 172. I am unable to follow Mt. Tarifan v. Fateh Din (1) already referred to, as, in my opinion the facts of the two cases are not parallel and in any case the ruling is contrary to the cases cited by me and is not based upon a correct interpretation of the provisions of S. 233(k). 4. I dismiss the appeal with costs, subject to this order that the decree will be amended in the manner indicated by me, and limited to plots 1042 and 1044.