Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 8, 1910) reversing a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Ghazipur (December 18, 1908). The suit was brought by the appellants for the redemption of two mortgages, one dated September 16, 1887, in favour of the first respondents deceased husband, and the other dated January 6, 1891, in favour of the first respondent. The mortgagor under both the mortgages was Radha Kishan Singh, one of the respondents. The mortgaged properties consisted of certain villages which belonged to a joint Hindu family of which the mortgagor and his descendants were the members. The appellants claim to redeem was based upon two subsequent transactions with respect to portions of the properties mortgaged and affecting only the equity of redemption. The first of these transactions was a possessor mortgage of a portion of the properties, made on July 4, 1894, by Radha Kishan Singh to Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram, under whom the appellants claimed; the second was a sale to the same persons of other portions of the properties by one Mahpal Singh, another member of the said joint family to whose share they had been allotted. Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 216 ( 1913- 1914) Sheo Shankar Ram V. Jaddo Kunwar 77 In 1895 the first respondent (her husband being then dead) brought suits against Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram, and obtained a decree for foreclosure of one of the mortgages and a sale decree in respect of the other mortgage. These decrees were made absolute, Hira Ram and Dhundha Rain taking no steps to redeem. The appellants in May, 1908, instituted the present suit to redeem the two mortgages of 1887 and 1891, claiming, in effect, that in the matter of the mortgage and sale of the equity of redemption Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram acted on behalf of a joint Hindu family in which they (the appellants) were co-sharers, and that not having been parties to the suits in which the foreclosure decrees were obtained, they (the appellants) were not bound thereby. The Subordinate Judge, by his judgment delivered on December 18, 1908, held that the appellants were joint with Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram, and that the mortgage and purchase were effected by them on behalf of the joint family. The Subordinate Judge, by his judgment delivered on December 18, 1908, held that the appellants were joint with Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram, and that the mortgage and purchase were effected by them on behalf of the joint family. He found that the first respondent had no notice, actual or constructive, of the appellants interest, but that the latter, not having been parties to the suits in 1895, were entitled to redeem so much of the properties as were comprised in the mortgage and sale to Him Earn and Dhundha Earn. Upon appeal to the High Court, this judgment and the consequent decree were reversed. The learned judges (Tudball and Chamier JJ.) held that one of the appellants not having been born at the date of the decree in the 1895 suits was not entitled to redeem, and that two other of the appellants, the sons of Hira Earn and Dhundha Earn respectively, were bound by the decrees against their father. With reference to the other appellants (including the first appellant) they held that, Hira Earn and Dhundha Earn being the managers of the appellants joint family, the decrees for foreclosure and sale were, under the circumstances of the case, binding upon the members. De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the appellants. The appellants, not having been parties to the suits in 1896, are not bound by the decrees then made and are entitled to redeem. The manager of a Hindu joint family is not in the same position as a trustee in English law. A Hindu joint family cannot be treated as a "person" within s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, so as to make it unnecessary to join all the members as parties. [SIR JOHN EDGE. That section does not apply since it was found in India that the mortgagee had no notice of the appellants interest in the property.] The decision in Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh (( 1911) L. R. 38lnd. Ap. 45.) is distinguishable, since it dealt with a suit brought by a managing member under a contract made by him on behalf of the joint family. An authority in the manager to give up a right should be less readily implied than one to make a binding contract. It is only in exceptional cases that the managing members represent the family and can be sued as its representatives. An authority in the manager to give up a right should be less readily implied than one to make a binding contract. It is only in exceptional cases that the managing members represent the family and can be sued as its representatives. [Kashinath Chimnaji v. Chimnaji Sadashiv (( 1906) I. L. R. 30 Bomb. 477, at p. 485) was referred to]. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Lowndes, for the respondents, were not called upon. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MOULTON. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature of the North-Western Provinces, Allahabad, which reversed a decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Ghazipur. The matter in issue is whether the plaintiffs or some of them are entitled to redeem the mortgaged properties in suit, or whether they are bound by certain foreclosure decrees dated Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 216 ( 1913- 1914) Sheo Shankar Ram V. Jaddo Kunwar 78 March 27, 1895, which were followed by orders absolute dated April 3, 1897, upon which possession was taken in August, 1897. So far as is necessary to make clear the question in issue, the facts of the case are as follows. The first and principal respondent, Musammat Jaddo Kunwar, was the mortgagee of certain properties under a mortgage dated September 16, 1887, and of certain other properties by a mortgage of January 6, 1891. In 1895 she brought suits to foreclose those mortgages. But in the interval Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram, members of a joint Hindu family, had acquired interest in the mortgaged properties partly by purchase and partly by obtaining a usufructuary mortgage. Both these interests were of course subordinate to the mortgage to Musammat Jaddo Kunwar. Although Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram acquired these interests in their own name, they were in fact acquired by them on behalf of the joint family although the respondent Musammat Jaddo Kunwar had no notice of this fact at any time material to the question in this action. Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram were made parties to the foreclosure actions by Musammat Jaddo Kunwar as parties interested in the mortgaged properties, and the foreclosure decrees were pronounced against them. They did not make any attempt to avail themselves of their right to redeem, so that the order absolute was pronounced against them. Hira Ram and Dhundha Ram were made parties to the foreclosure actions by Musammat Jaddo Kunwar as parties interested in the mortgaged properties, and the foreclosure decrees were pronounced against them. They did not make any attempt to avail themselves of their right to redeem, so that the order absolute was pronounced against them. They were at the time of acquiring the properties and also at all material times in the foreclosure suits the managers of the joint family and they acted as such, both in acquiring the properties and in abstaining from redeeming them. The appellants, the plaintiffs in this suit, are other members of the joint family, and they claim that they, as such members, were interested in the mortgaged properties at the time of the foreclosure suits, and that they ought to have been joined therein as parties, and that inasmuch as they were not so joined the foreclosure decrees do not bind them, and they are entitled now to redeem. The Subordinate Judge found in their favour on this point of principle, but held that they were entitled to redeem their own properties only and not the entire properties comprised in the said mortgages. On appeal to the High Court of Judicature it was held that they were bound by the foreclosure decrees on the ground that the joint family was effectively represented in the suit, and that in such case the Court is not bound to set aside the execution proceedings where substantial justice has been done merely because every existing member of the family was not formally a party to the suit. There seems to be no doubt upon the Indian decisions (from which their Lordships see no reason to dissent) that there are occasions including foreclosure suits when the managers of a joint Hindu family so effectively represent all other members of the family that the family as a whole is bound. It is quite clear from the facts of this case and the findings of the Courts upon them that this is a case where this principle ought to be applied. It is quite clear from the facts of this case and the findings of the Courts upon them that this is a case where this principle ought to be applied. There is not the slightest ground for suggesting that the managers of the joint family did not act in every way in the interests of the family itself, and no question arises under s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, because the mortgagee had no notice of the plaintiffs interests. Their Lordships have, therefore, no hesitation in deciding that there is no reason for interfering with the decision of the High Court. They will, there fore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should he dismissed, and that the appellants should pay the costs.