JUDGMENT : 1. The point raised in this appeal is a simple one. Mt. Waliunnissa was in prossession of her late husband's estate as security for her unpaid dower debt at the time when her husband died. She has executed a deed of gift, which purports to be a gift of the estate left by her late husband, in favour of the defendant appellant Mohammad Husain who is her son. The plaintiffs-respondents are sisters of the defendant. Mt. Waliunnissa having died since, the plaintiffs sue the recover possession of their shares by inheritance in the estate of their late father, together with the cancellation of the transfer, in favour of the defendant in so far as that transfer affects their shares. The claim has been decreed by both the Courts below. 2. In second appeal to this Court three points are raised by the memorandum of appeal, but the first and third of these have not been pressed. The plea on which the appeal is pressed is that the right of Mt. Waliunnissa to continue in possession until her dower debt was satisfied was a transferable right, and must be presumed to have been transferred by her to the defendant. From this it is contended that, though the plaintiffs may be entitled to a declaration of the invalidity of the transfer in so far as it affects their shares, they are not entitled to possession as against Mohammad Husain, the transferee of Mt. Waliunnissa. The argument is based principally upon the case of Ali Bakhsli v. Alldhdad Khan, [1910] 32 All. 551 : 6 I.C. 367., and upon certain folder cases reported in Vols. 1 and 2 of the Agra Law Reports, one or two of which are referred to in the judgment in Ali Bakhsh v. Allan dad Khan. 3. With regard to these Agra cases, I am content to say that they are all cases in which the widow who had made the transfer complained of was still alive. 4. The Courts held that the husband's heirs were entitled to a decree declaring the nullity of any transfer purporting to be made by the widow while in possession in lieu of her unpaid dower debt, but they could not recover possession of the estate itself or of any share therein, during the lifetime of the of the widow without first paying the balance of her dower debt. I think this is undoubtedly the effect of the rulings in question, and I have noticed the point more particularly because of a plea which was taken in argument with regard to a certain expression used in the case of Mohomed Ussudoollah Khan v. Ghaseea Beebee, 1 Agra H.C.R. 150.. It was there noted that what the widow had alienated was not her dower with its security, but the property itself, and that the heirs were only entitled to recover possession by payment of the debt during her lifetime or on her death. The interpretation sought to be put upon these words is that the learned Judges who decided that case intended to hold that the heirs could only recover possession on payment of the dower debt, either to the widow during her lifetime, or to the heirs of the widow after her death. It would almost seem as if some such meaning had been put on this expression by the learned Judge who delivered the judgment of the Court in Ali Bakhsh v. Allahiad Khan, but I do not think that there can be any real doubts as to the meaning of the context in which they occur. The learned Judges intended to say that the heirs could not in any case get possession against the widow during her lifetime, without paying the arrears of the dower debt. They went on to say that the said heirs “may be entitled” (the expression is hypothetical because they were discussing a point which was not strictly before them for decision) to recover possession during the lifetime of the widow by payment of the dower debt, or they might have a good claim to reenter into possession without such payment on the death of the widow. However this may be, I do not think the old cases relied on by the appellant really help him. 5. I should be content moreover to base my decision entirely upon the language used in various parts of the judgment in the case of Ali Bakhsh v. Allahdad Khan by the learned Judge who delivered the judgment of the Court in that case. The whole point of the appeal is that the appellant claims to be the transferee of Mt. Waliunnissa's right to hold possession of the entire estate of her late husband until her dower debt is satisfied. The whole point of the appeal is that the appellant claims to be the transferee of Mt. Waliunnissa's right to hold possession of the entire estate of her late husband until her dower debt is satisfied. The answer to this plea is simply that he holds no deed transferring to him any such right. The deed in his favour is simply a transfer of the estate as such. It was pointed out in more than one case that such a deed does not operate as a transfer of whatever rights the widow may herself possess, for the simple reason that her right to possession over the property depends upon her right to the dower debt, and she must transfer this debt along with the security held by her for the said debt in order to, make any effective transfer. This is pointed out in the case of Ali Bakhsh v. Allahdad Khan. Even in the case of Ali Muhammad Khan v. Azizullah Khan, [1883] 6 All. 50 : (1883) A.W.N. 204 in a passage which is quoted with approval ab p. 574 of the ruling in Ali Bakhsh v. Allahdad Khan (1), it is pointed out that a deed which on the face of it purports to be an out and out transfer of a portion of her late husband's estate by a widow in possession of the same in lien of arrears of her dower, contains on the face of it nothing to show that she had also conveyed to the vendee her right to the dower. It is sought to rest this appeal on the general principle that a person transferring certain property must be deemed to transfer whatever interests he has therein on the date of the transfer, but there seems to me to be abundant authority for the proposition that this doctrine does not cover the particular case now under consideration. The right of a Mohammedan widow to remain in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of unpaid arrears of her dower debt is a right of a peculiar nature, and it has been laid down that it can only be transferred along with the dower debt itself. There has been, in my opinion, no such transfer in the present case. This appeal therefore fails and I dismiss it with Costs.