JUDGMENT : 1. This is a simple case. The plaintiffs are the owners of certain land, in respect of which they entered into a contract of tenancy with the defendant in the year 1897. The contract was for nine years certain, and at a yearly rent. On 9th July 1912 the plaintiffs served the defendant with a month's notice to quit, and on his failure to comply brought the present suit. The plaintiffs have fallen between two stools, because they were not quite clear in their own minds whether they were suing for ejectment after forfeiture of the lease for breach of express conditions, or whether they were suing in virtue of their intrinsic right as lessors to get rid of a tenant with whom they were no longer satisfied. 2. The question of the alleged forfeiture has been considered by the Courts below and I agree with them that the plaintiffs were not entitled to eject on the ground of forfeiture. Apparently some buildings had been constructed on the land in suit in contravention of the terms of the lease, but the forfeiture has been waived by a subsequent acceptance of rent. There is no reason to suppose that rent was accepted in ignorance of what the tenant had been doing. Nor can I accede to the contention that the plaintiffs are entitled, without obtaining the ejectment of the defendant, to obtain an order for the removal of the constructions complained of. Their remedy is to get rid of the defendant. 3. The important point argued before me is that the possession of the defendant from the year 1906 onward has been that of a tenant holding on after the expiration of the term of his lease. It is contended that the nature of the tenancy would then be determined by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that under the circumstances of this particular case the defendant would become a lessee holding from month to month and the contract of lease would be terminable on 15 days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. I think this contention is not fairly open to the plaintiffs. They expressly described the defendant as holding on from year to year under the terms of the original contract of lease after the period prescribed by that lease had expired. I think this contention is not fairly open to the plaintiffs. They expressly described the defendant as holding on from year to year under the terms of the original contract of lease after the period prescribed by that lease had expired. I hold that the tenancy is a tenancy from year to year and is terminable only by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy. This remedy is still open to the plaintiffs; but the present suit has been misconceived and brought upon an inadequate cause of action. This appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed with costs.