JUDGMENT : 1. In November 1874 the predecessors-in-title of the respondents made a simple mortgage of three groves and a house in favour of a joint family of which the appellant is now sole survivor. In November 1877 there was due upon the mortgage a sum of Rs. 571. One of the mortgagors then sold one of the groves to the mortgagees for Rs. 130, and on the same date the mortgagors and mortgagees appeared before a revenue Court and presented petitions setting out that it had been arranged that the mortgagees should be placed in possession of the other two groves for ten years and receive the profits thereof in lieu of interest upon Rs. 441, the amount then remaining dues, and that if within one year after the expiry of the ten years the mortgagors failed to redeem the property, the mortgagees should be entitled to foreclose in lieu of the sum of Rs. 441 (bazorie arzi haza baibat kamil bad mead kara lewe). Possession was delivered to the mortgagees accordingly and they have remained in possession ever since. The present suit is for recovery of Rs. 441 by sale of the two groves, on the basis of the original simple mortgage. 2. The first Court decreed the claim holding that the petitions of 1877 and the delivery of possession effected in pursuance thereof were not intended to supersede the simple mortgage, but were merely intended to provide for the payment of the interest. 3. On appeal the Subordinate Judge held the original mortgage had been superseded by the proceedings taken in 1877, which amounted to a usufructuary mortgage of the two groves, or rather of the trees in the groves, and, therefore, no suit could be maintained upon the original mortgage. In my opinion it is clear that the proceedings of 1877 were intended to supersede the simple mortgage. 4. In the first place, it was obviously intended that the house should thenceforth be released from the mortgage; next, the passage quoted above from the petitions shows that the parties intended that in event of the mortgagors failing to redeem, the mortgagees might claim foreclosure on the basis of the petitions; and lastly, on any construction of the petitions the right to sue on the simple mortgage was suspended for a time at all events. 5. 5. The Transfer of Property Act had not been passed when the proceedings of 1887 were taken, but the Registration Act of 1871 was in force and the question arises whether the petitions which were intended to effect the usufructuary mortgage, ought to have been registered. 6. For the reasons which I gave in Bharosa v. Sikdar , A.I.R. 1914 All. 555 (2) : 27 I.C. 97., I am of opinion that they ought to have been registered and cannot be held to have effected a usufruotuary mortgage if the property mortgaged was immovable property, within the meaning of the Registration Act, and the value of the interest exceeded Rs. 100. 7. The Subordinate Judge held that the parties intended to mortgage the trees only, and not the land on which they stood. If this view is correct, a question would arise whether the nim, mahua ahd mango trees could be regarded as standing timber but, in my opinion, the intention was to mortgage the rights and interests of the mortgagors as grove-holders. The mortgagees were to take posssession of the land and enjoy the income of the groves as grove holders. According to the decision of Richards, C.J., and Banerji, J., in Sheo Naik Ram v. Sheo Ram , A.I.R. 1914 All. 162 : 23 I.C. 963. what was mortgaged was immovable property and not merely rights in standing timber, even if all the trees in the groves could be regarded as timber trees. The interest intended to created admittedly exceeded Rs. 100 value. For these reasons I hold that the proceedings of 1877 did not opera to create a usufructuary mortgage the groves, and consequently took effect only as an arrangement for the payment of the interest. The result that the appellant is entitled to ??? as he did, upon the original ??? mortgage. 8. I allow the appeal, reverse the ??? of the lower appellate Court a remand the case to that Court to restored to the pending file and disposition of on the merits according to ??? Costs of this appeal to be costs in the cause.