JUDGMENT 1. These appeals are directed against the decree in a suit for damages, instituted by the proprietors of an estate against their lessees on the ground that the estate has been sold for arrears of revenue by reason of the default of the lessees to pay the revenue they had undertaken to deposit. The claim was valued at over Rs. 17,486. The Subordinate Judge has given the Plaintiffs a decree for Rs. 4,000. The Plaintiffs as well as the Defendants have preferred appeals against this decision, the former on the ground that they were entitled to a larger sum than what has been decreed by the Subordinate Judge, the latter on the ground that the claim is wholly unfounded and should have been dismissed. The facts essential for the appreciation of the questions raised before us may be briefly narrated. On the 11th February 1892, one Kuranmoni Dasi, now represented by the Plaintiffs, granted a putni lease to Safiannessa, wife of the first Defendant in respect of an one-third share of estate No. 126 on the revenue-rolls of the Collector of Dumka in the District of Sonthal Parganas. A bonus of Rs. 5,000 was paid by the lessee, and the annual rent was fixed in perpetuity at Rs. 318-9-8. The lessee was directed to pay into the Collectorate, instalment by instalment, out of the annual rent, a sum of Rs. 308-9-8 which was the annual revenue fixed for the one-third share. The lessee was further directed to pay the balance, Rs. 10, direct to the lessor. The details of the instalments in which the Government Revenue for the one-third share was payable, were specified as follows in a schedule to the lease : -- March Rs. 118 0 0 June 85 0 0 September 22 0 0 January ,, 83 9 8 Total ,, 308 9 8 The sum of Rs. 10 was, according to the direction given in another schedule, made payable in four equal instalments in months of Jaistha, Aswin, Pous and Falgun. The estate, it may be added, though it stood on the revenue-roll of the Collector of Dumka included four villages in the District of Murshidabad. 10 was, according to the direction given in another schedule, made payable in four equal instalments in months of Jaistha, Aswin, Pous and Falgun. The estate, it may be added, though it stood on the revenue-roll of the Collector of Dumka included four villages in the District of Murshidabad. As regards the portion included within the Sonthal Parganas, a separate account had been opened, during the year 1881-82, in respect of an one-third share which belonged to one Krishna-sundari Choudhurani and subsequently passed into the hands of Harekrishna Saha whose name was substituted in the register during the year 1888-89 (Ex. 23). Consequently, in 1892 when Kuranmoni Dasi granted the putni lease, there was a separate account for an one-third share in the name of Harekrishna Saha and the balance (two-thirds share) owned by her constituted the residuary share. In respect of the villages included in the District of Murshidabad the position was similar. There was a separate account for an one-third share in the name of Harekrishna Saha; the balance (two-thirds) which constituted the residuary share, stood in the names of Sasadhar Ghose, Banku Behary Choudhuri and Harihar Das; Kuranmoni Dasi acquired by purchase the share of Banku Behary Choudhuri and got herself registered for a five-twenty-fourths share before the lease was granted. The position, consequently, was that the shares held by Kuranmoni Dasi in the residue of the two portions of the estate, were not identical in extent. From the materials on the record, it has not been found possible to determine the basis on which the Government revenue payable by her was calculated to be Rs. 308-9-8. This much is known that there was a re-distribution of the revenue (Ex. 14), and the instalments of the revenue were fixed as follows for the residuary share on some date not definitely ascertained but presumably subsequent to the creation of the putni : -- 28th June Rs. 91 8 5 28th September ,, 24 11 11 12th January ... ,, 53 8 2 28th March ... ,, 172 2 1 Total ,, 341 14 7 It will be observed that by the re-adjustment of the revenue the amounts of the different instalments and the ratio of each instalment to the aggregate sum, were varied. 91 8 5 28th September ,, 24 11 11 12th January ... ,, 53 8 2 28th March ... ,, 172 2 1 Total ,, 341 14 7 It will be observed that by the re-adjustment of the revenue the amounts of the different instalments and the ratio of each instalment to the aggregate sum, were varied. On what principle, this was done has not been ascertained, but, we know that Kuranmoni Dasi lost an one-sixth share by an adverse decision in a suit by Anukul Chandra Choudhuri. It also appears from Ex. 23 (copy of an extract from the D. Register of the Collector issued on the 8th May 1908, after the revenue sale) that the residuary shares, at that time, in the two portions of the estate were different (namely, one-half in the Sonthal Parganas portion and five-twenty-fourths in the Murshidabad portion). This may possibly account for the re-distribution of the revenue. In any event, it is indisputable that by the putni lease the lessee undertook to pay into the Collectorate a sum of Rs. 308-9-8 annually in four specified instalments. On the 11th January 1908, the representatives of the original lessee paid into the Collectorate a sum of Rs. 42-8-0 instead of Rs. 83-9-8. The result was that on the 20th March 1908, the residuary estate was sold for an arrear of Rs. 39-1-9 and passed into the hands of one Reajuddin. The lessees were not prejudiced by this sale, because under sec. 54 of Act. XI of 1859 the purchaser acquired the share subject to all encumbrances. The Plaintiffs, who had acquired the proprietary interest by purchase from Kuranmoni Dasi on the 14th January 1897, however, lost their right in the estate. Consequently they commenced this action for recovery of damages against the representatives of the original lessee Sufiannessa, namely; her husband and four sons. They resisted the claim as entirely unfounded; they denied that there had been any default on their part and asserted that the purchase at the revenue sale had been made by the maternal uncle of the Plaintiffs on their behalf and for their benefit. The first Defendant further alleged that at the time of the default, if any, he had no subsisting interest as lessee, as he had many years before transferred his right by gift to his sons. The first Defendant further alleged that at the time of the default, if any, he had no subsisting interest as lessee, as he had many years before transferred his right by gift to his sons. The Subordinate Judge did not frame any issues before the trial commenced, and, when he formulated the points for decision in his judgment, did not specify the special ground of exemption urged by the first Defendant, although he alludes to it in his summary of the pleadings. The Subordinate Judge has held that the Defendants defaulted to pay the Government revenue, that the estate has been sold and has passed into the hands of a stranger, that the Plaintiffs have suffered loss thereby, but that their claim is exaggerated. In this view he has partially decreed the suit. On behalf of the Defendants, this decree has been assailed substantially on four grounds: namely, first, that there was no default on their part, as they had deposited whatever they were bound to pay into the Collectorate on a true construction of the lease; secondly, that if it be assumed that there was default on their part, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages, as they might and should have saved the estate from sale by payment of the arrears; thirdly, that the first Defendant is not liable for the default, if any; and, fourthly, that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to more than Rs. 500 which was fixed in the lease as the maximum amount of compensation payable in the event of sale of the estate by reason of the failure of the lessee to pay the Government revenue. On behalf of the Plaintiffs, the decree of the Subordinate Judge has been assailed on the ground that the damages have been calculated on an erroneous basis, and that they are entitled to the full sum claimed. The grounds urged in the appeal by the Defendants must obviously be examined first. 2. In support of the first ground, it has been urged that, upon a true construction of the lease, the lessees were bound to pay into the Collectorate, not Rs. 308-9-8 in the instalments mentioned, but only such sum as might, from time to time, be fixed as the revenue payable in respect of the share covered by the lease. 2. In support of the first ground, it has been urged that, upon a true construction of the lease, the lessees were bound to pay into the Collectorate, not Rs. 308-9-8 in the instalments mentioned, but only such sum as might, from time to time, be fixed as the revenue payable in respect of the share covered by the lease. Reference has, in this connection, been made to the fact that from January 1897 to January 1908, the lessees remitted to the Collectorate Rs. 42-7 annas 12 gundas on account of the January instalment. Reliance has also been placed on the principle that in the construction of ambiguities in an ancient instrument, reference may be made to contemporaneous usage, as indicated in the cases of Waterpark v. Fennell 7 H.L.C. 650 (685) (1859), Deo v. Ries 8 Bingham 181 (1832) and Chapman v. Bluck 4 Bingham N.C. 187, 195 (1838). In our opinion there is no foundation for the contention of the Defendants. The terms of the lease are perfectly plain. The rent for the lease is fixed at Rs. 318-9-8. The lessor directs the lessee to pay into the Collectorate, on her behalf, a definite sum of Rs. 308-9-8, instalment by instalment, the balance of Rs. 10 to be paid to the lessor in four equal instalments. No doubt, the sum directed to be deposited in the Collectorate is described as the Government revenue; but it does not follow from this description that the lessor directed the lessee to deposit in the Collectorate only such sum as might, from time to time, be determined as the Government revenue. If the sum required to be deposited in the Collectorate had been regarded as variable, the sum payable to the lessor would also be variable, inasmuch as the rent was constant. If the contention of the Defendants were well-founded the covenant in the lease would have been differently framed. As the true effect of the language used in the lease is perfectly clear, no reference is permissible to the conduct of the parties. The principle upon which the Defendants relied was thus formulated by Sugden, L.C., in Attorney-General v. Drummond 1 Dr. & War. As the true effect of the language used in the lease is perfectly clear, no reference is permissible to the conduct of the parties. The principle upon which the Defendants relied was thus formulated by Sugden, L.C., in Attorney-General v. Drummond 1 Dr. & War. 353 (368) (1842) : "One of the most settled rules of law for the construction of ambiguities in ancient instruments is that you may resort to contemporaneous usage to ascertain the meaning of the deed; tell me what you have done under such a deed, and I will tell you what that deed means." To the same effect is the observation of Lord Brougham in the same case in the House of Lords : "Contemporaneous usage is a strong ground for the interpretation of doubtful words or expressions." [Drummond v. Attorney-General 2 H.L.C. 837 (861) (1849).] But this doctrine has no application where the deed is neither ancient nor ambiguous. This is clear from the observation of Cran-worth, L.C., in Sadlier v. Biggs 4 H.L.C. 435 (458) (1853) : "if there is a deed which says, according to its true construction, one thing, you cannot say that the deed means something else, merely because the parties have gone on for a long time so understanding it." Equally emphatic is the statement by Halsbury, L.C., in North Eastern Railway v. Lord Hastings (1900) App. Cas. 260 "the words of a written instrument must be construed according to their natural meaning and no amount of acting by the parties can alter or qualify words which are plain and unambiguous." It is worthy of note that the acts and conduct of parties on which reliance was placed in the case just mentioned, extended over a period of forty years. Lord Davey in the same case adopted a similar view, and referred in support to the speech of Lord Watson in Trustees of Clyde Navigation v. Laird 8 App. Cas. 658 (673) (1883). To the same effect are the observations of Shadwell, V. (sic) in Monro v. Taylor 8 Hare. 51 (56) (1850) and of Lindley, M.R., in Lord Hastings v. N.E. Railway (1899) 1 Ch. 656 (663). Consequently even if it be assumed that the Government revenue for the one-third share covered by the putni is Rs. 243-12-1, payable in four instalments in June, September, January and March, in the sums of Rs. 65-5-0, Rs. 17-6-3, Rs. 51 (56) (1850) and of Lindley, M.R., in Lord Hastings v. N.E. Railway (1899) 1 Ch. 656 (663). Consequently even if it be assumed that the Government revenue for the one-third share covered by the putni is Rs. 243-12-1, payable in four instalments in June, September, January and March, in the sums of Rs. 65-5-0, Rs. 17-6-3, Rs. 38-3-8 and Rs. 122-13-3 respectively, the mere fact that the Defendants have for eleven years made deposits accordingly, cannot in any way affect the question of construction of the lease and of their liability thereunder. We hold accordingly that the Defendants were bound under the lease to deposit Rs. 308-9-8 annually in the Collectorate, and that the sum payable in January 1908 was Rs. 83-9-8. As the Defendants deposited only Rs. 42-8-0 on account of that instalment, there was default in the payment of Government Revenue. The first ground urged by the Defendants consequently fails. 3. In support of the second ground, it has been contended by the Defendants that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages as they might and should have saved the estate from sale by payment of the arrears. To justify this argument, it is necessary to establish that the Plaintiffs were aware that default had been made by the Defendants, but this has not been proved. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs must have known of the default, because as the, Defendants themselves had in previous years deposited only Rs. 42-8-0 for the January instalment, the Plaintiffs themselves must have, year by year, deposited in that month Rs. 11-0-2, or otherwise the estate would have been sold for Government revenue. This argument is wholly fallacious. In the first place no direct evidence is produced to show that the Plaintiffs ever deposited Rs. 11-0-2 for the January instalment; if such payment had ever been made, evidence could easily have been produced from the Collectorate. In the second place the mere fact that the Defendants had on previous occasions deposited in January less than the amount of the instalment fixed for that month and that the estate had not been sold notwithstanding such circumstance, does not necessarily show that the Plaintiffs must have deposited Rs. 11-0-2 to make up the deficiency in that instalment. The estate may not have been sold for various other reasons. The Defendants did, as a matter of fact, pay into the Collectorate Rs. 11-0-2 to make up the deficiency in that instalment. The estate may not have been sold for various other reasons. The Defendants did, as a matter of fact, pay into the Collectorate Rs. 252-8-4 annually during many years, which would be sufficient to meet the annual demand for revenue, Rs. 243-12-1, and cesses Rs. 8-8-10. Moreover, the residuary share would not be sold under sec. 13 of Act XI of 1859 unless there was an arrear upon the entire estate; for if there is over-payment in respect of any share, another share actually in default does not run the risk of a sale if the deficiency in the one account is made up by the surplus in the other. Then again, the Collector is not bound to bring the estate or a share thereof to sale whenever there may be a default. We find as a matter of fact from Ex. 18 that this very estate had been in default on more than one occasion previously and yet was not brought to sale. We hold accordingly, that the Defendants have failed to show that the Plaintiffs had on any previous occasions supplemented their payment of Rs. 42-7-12 in January by a payment of Rs. 11-0-2. It cannot consequently be said that the Plaintiffs were aware in January 1908, that they were expected to pay Rs. 11-0-2 and that if such payment was not made by them, the estate would be sold. It is further worthy of note that as the Defendants made the deposit on the day previous to the last day of payment, the Plaintiffs could not very well receive information in time to enable them to make a supplementary deposit; and after the expiry of the last date, the payment would be useless, unless the Collector could be induced to accept the payment. On the other hand, there is ample evidence to show that the Defendants wore aware that the sale would be held for arrears of revenue. On the 14th February 1908, their muktear Bahuballabh Mitra, who had discovered that the estate was in default, applied to the Deputy Commissioner in anticipation of the sanction of his principals, for leave to deposit the arrears due (Ex. 5). This application was granted (Ex. 19); but although he wrote to the Defendants and asked them to send the money, they refused to comply, (Ex. 5). This application was granted (Ex. 19); but although he wrote to the Defendants and asked them to send the money, they refused to comply, (Ex. 7) on the ground that they were not bound to pay the arrears and that their putni rights would not be affected by the sale. The muktear protested against the adoption of this course (Ex. A). But the Defendants adhered to their decision and allowed the estate to be sold. In these circumstances, the conduct of the Defendants, is open to the legitimate comment that they should have apprised the Plaintiffs that the estate was in default and was about to be sold. It is probable that if the Plaintiffs had been informed in time, they would have taken steps to save the estate by the payment of the small sum due Rs. 39-1-9 (Ex. 20), and in view of the favourable order recorded by the Deputy Commissioner on the 15th February 1908 (Ex. 19), the sale would have been averted. The position consequently is that the Defendants deliberately allowed the estate to be sold and never intimated the danger to the Plaintiffs who were ignorant that default had been made by their lessees. The contention that the Plaintiffs could have saved the estate thus turns out to be unfounded, and there is no room for the application of the doctrine that a Plaintiff is not entitled to damages for breach of contract when by the use of reasonable precautions he might have avoided loss (Sedgwick on Damages, secs. 201-205); consequently no question arises in what way their right to recover damages would have been affected if it had been shown that they did not save the estate, though they had the opportunity to do so. The second ground taken by the Defendants must be overruled. 4. In support of the third ground urged by the Defendants, it has been contended that the first Defendant cannot be held liable, as he had no subsisting interest in the putni and consequently no obligation thereunder at the date of default. This point was taken in the joint written statement filed by the first four Defendants and is mentioned by the Subordinate Judge in the summary of the pleadings given in his judgment. But the question is not included in any of the four points formulated by him for decision. This point was taken in the joint written statement filed by the first four Defendants and is mentioned by the Subordinate Judge in the summary of the pleadings given in his judgment. But the question is not included in any of the four points formulated by him for decision. No issues were raised in this case before the commencement of the trial. This was clearly not the right course to pursue, as questions of some complexity were in controversy between the parties. We are consequently left in some uncertainty as to whether the special ground of exemption claimed by the first Defendant was really pressed in the Court below, but there are circumstances which tend to support the view that the point was not seriously pressed, and they may be briefly summarised. In the first place, the point is not mentioned by the Subordinate Judge as one of the questions for determination. In the second place, the point was taken in a joint written statement and the Defendants were throughout represented by the same pleaders, although if the point was pressed, there would clearly be a conflict of interest between the first Defendant and his sons (the other Defendants). If the point was urged and prevailed the whole of the liability under the claim of the Plaintiffs would be thrown upon the sons to the exclusion of their father. A similar observation applies to the proceedings in this Court; here also the ground is taken in a memorandum of appeal presented jointly on behalf of the Defendants, who are all represented by the same counsel and vakil. In the third place, (he evidence was not directed to the elucidation of this special defence. The whole of the evidence on the record bearing on this point consists of casual statements by Bahuballabh Mitra, the muktear of the Defendants who was called by the Plaintiffs to depose to a very different matter, and Bajruguddin, a servant and relation of the first Defendant. Even the time of death of Safiunnessa and the date of the alleged gift by the first Defendant were not set out in the written statement. In this Court, it has been mentioned that, as recited in a conveyance executed by the fifth Defendant on the 18th November 1910 (Ex. Even the time of death of Safiunnessa and the date of the alleged gift by the first Defendant were not set out in the written statement. In this Court, it has been mentioned that, as recited in a conveyance executed by the fifth Defendant on the 18th November 1910 (Ex. 4), Safiunnessa died on the 8th May 1895 and the first Defendant made a gift of the one-fourth share inherited by him by a registered deed, dated the 25th August 1895. The recitals, however, are plainly no evidence of the facts mentioned, and if the first Defendant seriously maintained in the Court below that he had divested himself of all right in the putni, the original deed of gift should have been produced and proved. Furthermore, it would be necessary to establish under the Mahomedan law that a valid gift was effected by delivery of possession, for, under sec. 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, the registration of the deed of gift in accordance with sec. 123 cannot make up for the want of delivery of possession required by the rules of Mahomedan law Mogulsha v. Mahamad Saheb ILR 11 Bom. 517 (1887), Ismal v. Ramji ILR 23 Bom. 682 (1899) and Vahazullah v. Boyapati ILR 30 Mad. 6(sic)9 (1907).] A question might also arise as to the validity of a gift of an undivided share in property capable of division [Mumtaz Ahmed v. Zubeida L.R. 16 IndAp 205 : s.c. ILR 11 All. 460 (1889), and Ibrahim v. Saiboo L.R. 34 IndAp 167: s.c. ILR 35 Cal. 1; 11 C.W.N. 973 (1907).] Finally, evidence of actual possession and enjoyment, subsequent to the date of the alleged gift, would have a material bearing on the determination of the question, whether the gift by the father to his sons was intended to be real and operative or was a sham transaction. From this point of view, the circumstance that the name of the second Defendant alone appears in connection with various transactions relating to the putni would require explanation. The fact that, immediately after the institution of this suit and shortly before the written statement was filed, the second Defendant on the 1st May 1911, conveyed to his father the first Defendant one-fourth share in the putni for an ostensible consideration of Rs. 3,000 (Ex. B) may also have an important bearing on the subject. The fact that, immediately after the institution of this suit and shortly before the written statement was filed, the second Defendant on the 1st May 1911, conveyed to his father the first Defendant one-fourth share in the putni for an ostensible consideration of Rs. 3,000 (Ex. B) may also have an important bearing on the subject. No trace of these questions, however, can be found in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, and the evidence requisite for their determination is conspicuous by its absence. The legitimate inference is that the special ground now urged on behalf of the first Defendant, though mentioned in the written statement, was not seriously pressed at the trial. The third ground taken in support of the appeal preferred by the Defendants must be overruled as untenable. 5. In support of the fourth ground taken by the Defendants, it has been contended that upon a true construction of the putni lease the Plaintiffs are entitled at most to Rs. 500 as damages, that in any event the sum decreed by the Subordinate Judge is excessive, and that he should not have allowed interest on the compensation decreed at 12 per cent. per annum. Those contentions must be considered along with the argument advanced by the Plaintiffs in support of their appeal, viz., that the Subordinate Judge has under-estimated the damages sustained by the Plaintiffs by the loss of their estate. It is necessary to bear in mind that the putni included only a portion of the residuary estate which has been sold for arrears of revenue; and that the part outside the putni was in the direct possession of the Plaintiffs. To measure the loss sustained by the Plaintiffs, it is necessary to determine the market value of the residuary share which would be necessarily dependent upon the annual income derivable there from. The Plaintiffs in their plaint relied for this purpose upon the returns filed by themselves under the Bengal Cess Act, 1880. These papers have been rightly discarded by the Subordinate Judge, because, under sec. 95 they cannot be used as evidence in favour of the persons who filed them, or of their representatives in interest. The Plaintiffs had, consequently, to fall back upon their collection papers, which, if produced and found trustworthy, would be the most valuable evidence on this matter. These papers have been rightly discarded by the Subordinate Judge, because, under sec. 95 they cannot be used as evidence in favour of the persons who filed them, or of their representatives in interest. The Plaintiffs had, consequently, to fall back upon their collection papers, which, if produced and found trustworthy, would be the most valuable evidence on this matter. But they were produced only in respect of the villages in the District of Murshidabad, and even these are obviously unreliable. There is no evidence to show that rent was ever actually realized for the amounts mentioned in the collection papers, and the officer who produced them merely stated that they had been prepared from other collection papers which were not produced. As regards the villages in the district of Sonthal Parganas, no collection papers have been produced; this omission justified the adverse comment of the Defendants that the papers were held back, because they would not support the exaggerated claim made by the Plaintiffs. Instead of these papers, extracts from a record-of-rights prepared under Reg. III of 1872 and published under sec. 24 on the 27th July 1905, have been produced; the entries therein, however, are not conclusive. Besides the fact that they were liable to be challenged after publication by the parties affected, there is nothing to show that the rents payable by the actual occupants of the soil were received by the proprietors; there might be intermediate tenure-holders who hold under rent-paying or rent-free grants and intercept a considerable proportion of the rent. In these circumstances, the, only material on which the damages can be calculated is that afforded by the putni lease. We are not prepared to accept the contention of the Defendants that the Plaintiffs are limited to a maximum sum of Rs. 500. The clause upon which reliance is placed provides that in the event of sale of the estate for arrears of revenue brought about by the default of the lessees, the lessors would be entitled to fifty times the annual profit of Rs. 10 reserved in their favour. This clause must be read along with the previous clause that the lessee would have a separate account opened in respect of the one-third share covered by the putni. 10 reserved in their favour. This clause must be read along with the previous clause that the lessee would have a separate account opened in respect of the one-third share covered by the putni. The parties contemplated that if this was carried out, the only loss which the lessors could suffer by the default of the lessee would be the sale of the one-third share and a consequent loss of Rs. 10 annually. It was from this point of view that the measure of damages was taken to be the capitalized value of the annual rent reserved at fifty years' purchase. What has happened, however, is, that the separate account has not been opened, and by the default of the lessees the whole of the residuary share has been sold. Consequently the measure of damages is the loss actually sustained by the Plaintiffs. Now, the putni lease recites that the gross income of a one-third share of the estate is Rs. 888. Consequently the income of the one-sixth share outside the putni is Rs. 444. If we deduct from this amount 10 per cent. for collection charges, 10 per cent. for vacancies, and also the road-cess payable, there is left a net income of Rs. 341. To this must be added Rs. 318, the net income from the one-third share covered by the putni. This makes a total income of Rs. 659, from which a deduction of Rs. 343 must be allowed for Government revenue. The capitalised value of the balance (Rs. 316) at fifteen years' purchase gives Rs. 4,740 as the value of the residuary share, which fetched at the Revenue sale Rs. 2,600. Consequently the damages sustained by the Plaintiffs may be estimated approximately at Rs. 2,000. There is no reason why the Plaintiffs should be allowed interest on this sum at more than 6 per cent, per annum. The (result is that the appeal by the Plaintiffs (No. 200 of 1912) is dismissed with costs, while the appeal by the Defendants (No. 136 of 1912) is allowed, and the decree of the subordinate Judge discharged. The Plaintiffs will have a decree for Rs. 2,000 with interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from the 13th January 1908 (the date from which title vested in the purchaser), to the date of realisation. The Plaintiffs will have a decree for Rs. 2,000 with interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from the 13th January 1908 (the date from which title vested in the purchaser), to the date of realisation. In appeal No. 136 of 1912, as also in the Court of first instance each party will have costs in proportion to his success. A self-contained decree will be drawn up which will specify the sums payable to each party by his opponent under this order.