JUDGMENT 1. It appears that a sale held in the year 1900, in execution of a decree at which the decree-holder was the auction purchaser, was afterwards set aside on the 29th June 1907. The decree-holder was in possession of the property sold from November 1900, to June 1908. On the 10th May, 1909, the Applicant in the present case purchased the property from the judgment-debtor together with the right to sue the decree-holder for mesne profits in respect of the period during which he had been in possession. On the 2nd April 1910, the Applicant presented the application for mesne profits out of which this second appeal has arisen. The Courts below have concurred in treating the application as an application under sec. 144 of the present CPC and have accordingly given the applicant a decree for mesne profits to the amount of Rs. 1,350. The Appellant before us is Dino Nath Das, the decree-holder auction purchaser. 2. Now, in the first instance, it is quite clear that whatever may have been the power of the Courts to entertain this application, it is not one authorized by the terms of sec. 144. Sec. 144 begins "When and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution...." But here no restitution was sought in respect of any decree which had been varied of reversed and sec. 141 of the Code does not make sec. 144 applicable to execution proceedings [Beni v. Pran 15 C.L.J. 187 (1911)]. Inasmuch however, as the Respondent obtained an order in his favour in the Courts below purporting to be made under sec. 144 of the Code, and inasmuch as a determination tion of a question arising under sec. 144 is a decree by force of the definition clause in sec. 2, the Respondent cannot be heard to say that the present appeal is incompetent. The fact, therefore, that the Courts below had no jurisdiction under sec. 144 to entertain the application does not help the Respondent. 3. 144 is a decree by force of the definition clause in sec. 2, the Respondent cannot be heard to say that the present appeal is incompetent. The fact, therefore, that the Courts below had no jurisdiction under sec. 144 to entertain the application does not help the Respondent. 3. Before we deal with the ground of appeal on which the Appellant principally took his stand, we may premise that the Appellant did not press the objection that a right to sue for mesne profits is not transferable and was willing to concede for the purposes of this case that a Court might have some inherent power to entertain an application of this kind. We are not concerned therefore to dispute the view taken upon the latter question in the case to which we have already referred. Nor is it necessary for as to consider whether the application is one which does or does not fall within the scope of sec. 47. Assuming that it falls within that section, it still remains that the relief sought is dependent upon the supposed inherent powers of the Court to grant relief of this kind by way of restitution in the course of execution proceedings. 4. Now the only objection that was insisted upon was the objection that in any view of the matter the Courts below erred in awarding mesne profits for the whole of the period during which the Appellant was in possession. The contention was put in this way that if a suit had been instituted for mesne profits on the date on which the application was made, then under Art. 109 of the Limitation Act, the Applicant as Plaintiff would have been debarred from recovering mesne profits for any period in excess of three years from that date, and no inherent power of the Court -- assuming any inherent power to exist -- can entitle him to mesne profits for a longer period. This reasoning is supported by the case of Safaraddi v. Durga (2) and in our opinion ought to prevail. 5. This reasoning is supported by the case of Safaraddi v. Durga (2) and in our opinion ought to prevail. 5. Assuming, therefore, without deciding that the first Court had inherent jurisdiction to award mesne profits upon the application presented by the Respondent, it either had no power, or it was an improper and unsound exercise of judicial discretion, to award mesne profits for a period in excess of the period for which mesne profits could have been obtained by suit. The result is that the decree appealed from must be modified by declaring that the Respondent is entitled to mesne profits only for the period between 2nd April 1907 and June 1908. The amount awarded by the Courts below will be diminished accordingly. The parties will receive and pay costs in this Court and the Court below in proportion to their success or failure.