Judgement Consolidated Appeals from three judgments and decrees of the High Court (April 3, 1907, December 5, 1907, and December 18, 1908), of which the first affirmed a judgment and decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Bhagalpur (February 12, 1906), and the second and third reversed judgments and decrees of that Court (August 19, 1907, and August 6, 1908). The appeals raised important questions as to jurisdiction in suits in respect of land situated in the Sonthal Parganas. On December 21, 1896, a mortgage for Rs.3,50,000, with interest at the rate of 7 ½ per cent, per annum, was executed by the members of a Hindu joint family, consisting of the appellants in the first appeal (hereinafter called the mortgagors), in favour of the respondents in that appeal (hereinafter called the mortgagees). The mortgage was the last of a series of mortgages, a large part of the amount secured being made up of interest and compound interest upon the amounts advanced under the previous mortgages. The land mortgaged was chiefly situated in the Sonthal Parganas, in which district the mortgagors resided, but a part, stated in the judgment of the High Court to be about a third in extent, was within the local jurisdiction of the Bhagalpur Court. The mortgage was executed at Bhagalpur, and provided that it might be enforced in the Bhagalpur Court. On June 20, 1904, the mortgagors instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur to recover the amount due under the mortgage in respect of principal and interest by sale of the mortgaged properties. The mortgagees raised various defences, upon which issues were framed. Two only of these issues are material to the present report, namely, (a) whether the Bhagalpur Court had jurisdiction in the suit, and (b) whether the mortgagees were precluded by s. 6 of Bengal Regulation III. of 1872 from recovering compound interest or interest exceeding in amount the principal advanced. The Subordinate Judge, by his judgment delivered on February 12, 1906, found on all the issues in favour of the mortgagees, and made a decree for payment and for sale in the event of nonpayment. The mortgagors appealed to the High Court on several grounds, but at the hearing of the appeal the argument on their behalf was confined to the issue (b) above stated. The mortgagors appealed to the High Court on several grounds, but at the hearing of the appeal the argument on their behalf was confined to the issue (b) above stated. The High Court (Harington and Mukharji JJ.) on April 3, 1907, dismissed the appeal. With reference to s. 6 ofRegulation III. of 1872 the learned judges held themselves bound by an unreported decision of the High Court to the effect that the words therein, " Court having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas," meant a Court situated in that district and constituted under the Regulation, and did not include a Court situated outside, but exercising jurisdiction to order the sale of mortgaged property situated within that district. This judgment was the subject of the first of the present consolidated appeals. The second and third appeals were from two judgments of the High Court in favour of the mortgagees (reversing the Subordinate Judge) and were respectively with regard to the amount of interest recoverable under the decree of the Subordinate Judge as drawn up, and as to the right of the Subordinate Judge to draw up a final decree absolute for sale differing in terms from the preliminary decree. The mortgagors by their case upon appeal to His Majesty in Council, as to the first appeal, contended only that the mortgagees were precluded by Bengal Regulation III. of 1872, s. 6 (as explained by s. 5 of Bengal Regulation V. of 1893), from recovering " compound interest arising from any intermediate adjustment of account " and from recovering for interest a sum exceeding the original loan. At an early stage of the argument on behalf of the appellants the question was raised whether the Subordinate Judge at Bhagalpur had jurisdiction with regard to land in the Sonthal Parganas and the hearing was adjourned at the request of the respondents counsel. The statutory provisions more particularly relevant to the argument, except s. 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882(Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 19, provides ".... If the immoveable property be situate within the limits of different districts, the suit may be instituted in any Court, otherwise competent to try it, within whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate."), are set out in the judgment of their Lordships. Lowndes, for the appellants in the first appeal (the mortgagors). If the immoveable property be situate within the limits of different districts, the suit may be instituted in any Court, otherwise competent to try it, within whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate."), are set out in the judgment of their Lordships. Lowndes, for the appellants in the first appeal (the mortgagors). Unless s. 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, applies to the Sonthal Parganas, the Bhagalpur Court has no jurisdiction in a suit with regard to land situated partly in the Sonthal Parganas and partly in the Bhagalpur district Ram Ratan v. Lalta Prasad. (( 1895) I. L. R. 17 Allah. 483.) The Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, does not apply as a whole in the Sonthal Parganas. The reasoning of Wilson J. to the contrary in Sorbojit Roy v. Gonesh Prosad Misser (( 1884) I. L. R. 10 Calc. 761) is unsound. The Civil Procedure Code, 1859, provided by s. 385 for power to extend its application to scheduled districts by notification in the Gazette, and it was so extended by a notification dated August 19, 1867. By s. 3, sub-s. 2, of Regulation III. of 1872, however, no Act other than those specified in the schedule, which does not include the Code of 1859, is to apply in the Sonthal Parganas. This sub-section must be taken as repealing the notification of 1867. The Codes of 1877 and 1882 are specifically made not to extend to scheduled districts; they cannot, therefore, be so extended by reason of the provision that any previous notification referring to the Code of 1859 is to be read as though applying to those Codes. The partial applications of the Code of 1882 to the Sonthal Parganas by s. 10 of Regulation V. of 1893 and by s. 2, sub-s. 2, of Regulation III. of 1872 do not assist the respondents since that application refers only to suits filed in the Courts of the Sonthal Parganas. The partial application by Regulation V. of 1893 shews that the Code as a whole does not apply. Even if, however, the Code of 1882 applies generally in the Sonthal Parganas, jurisdiction in respect of suits as to land in that district is expressly confined by s. 5 of Regulation III. of 1872 to the settlement officers Courts established under the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, until the land is settled and the settlement notified. Even if, however, the Code of 1882 applies generally in the Sonthal Parganas, jurisdiction in respect of suits as to land in that district is expressly confined by s. 5 of Regulation III. of 1872 to the settlement officers Courts established under the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, until the land is settled and the settlement notified. There does not appear to have been a notification, but the onus of proving that there was one is on the respondents. [Bengal Regulation V. of 1893, ss. 7, 8, and 9, were also referred to.] If, however, the Bhagalpur Court had jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 19, or otherwise, still the law to be applied was the law of the Sonthal Parganas, including s.6 of Regulation III. of 1872, which limits the interest recoverable and applies to the facts of this mortgage. The Bhagalpur Court, if it had jurisdiction, was " a Court having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas " within s. 6. The Court was asked to make a decree for sale of the mortgaged land, including that in the Sonthal Parganas, and under s. 223 of the Code it would have power to enforce its decree by sale Maseyk v. Steel & Co. (( 1887) I. L. R. 14 Calc. 661.); Shurroop Chunder Gooho v. Ameerrunnissa Khatoon.(( 1882) I. L. R. 8 Calc. 703.) Even if the parties could effectively choose Bhagalpur as their forum, that choice would not alter the law to be applied Hamlyn &Co. v. Talisker Distillery. ([ 1894] A. C. 202.) The liitation of the interest recoverable in the Sonthal Parganas is a protective provision and a matter of public policy and cannot be waived by a mortgagor. [Ram Chandra Marwari v. Rani Keshobati Kumari (( 1909) L. R, m Ind. Ap. 85.) was also referred to.] Sir R. Finlay, K.C., De Gruyther, K.C., and Dunne, for the respondents (the mortgagees). The Bhagalpur Court had jurisdiction in the suit under s. 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. The argument in support of the mortgagees contention on this point divides itself into two heads. First, s. 5 of Regulation III. of 1872 does not apply to the suit. Before the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, that district was subject to the ordinary law in India. The argument in support of the mortgagees contention on this point divides itself into two heads. First, s. 5 of Regulation III. of 1872 does not apply to the suit. Before the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, that district was subject to the ordinary law in India. The intention of that Act was to establish special Courts to deal with small causes in which the amount in dispute was less than Rs.1000, and it provides that suits in which more than that amount is in dispute shall be determined as theretofore. This arrangement was continued by s. 3 of Regulation III. of 1872. Sect. 5 did not have the effect of excluding from the jurisdiction of the Courts established under the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871, suits relating to land where the matter in dispute was over Rs.1000. At any rate it did not have that effect with regard to suits to enforce a mortgage. The object of s. 5 was to enable the settlement officer to have a free hand in settling who were entitled to be entered on the record. It applied only to such matters as a settlement officer would ordinarily deal with. [Regulation III. of 1872, ss. 3, 5, 6,11,12, 13,14, and 26, Bengal District Gazetteer, vol. xxii., pp. 58 and 214, Hunters Imperial Gazetteer of India ( 1881), vol. viii, p. 178, and Directions for Revenue Officers, p. 21, were referred to.] Secondly, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, as a whole applies in the Sonthal Parganas. The Code of 1859 was extended to that district, under the provision contained in s. 385, by notification of August 19, 1867. Under the terms of the Codes of 1877 and 1882 that notification was effective to extend those later Codes Sorbojit Roy v. Gonesh Prosad Misser. (I. L. R. 10 Calc. 761.) There was also power under the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, s. 3, to extend the operation of the Code to the Sonthal Parganas, though it is not clear whether there was any notification under that section. The decision in Ram Ratan v. Lalta Prasad (I. L. R. 17 Allah. 483.) is distinguishable since it related to the Tarai and turned upon the language of the regulation relevant to that district. The question of jurisdiction was not raised either in the argument before the High Court or by the appellants case upon the present appeal. The decision in Ram Ratan v. Lalta Prasad (I. L. R. 17 Allah. 483.) is distinguishable since it related to the Tarai and turned upon the language of the regulation relevant to that district. The question of jurisdiction was not raised either in the argument before the High Court or by the appellants case upon the present appeal. It, therefore, should not be entertained by the Board The Tasmania (( 1890) 15 App. Cas. 223, at p. 225.); Pleiades (Owners of) v. Page. ([ 1891] A. C. 259.) If it is necessary for the mortgagees to prove notification in order to establish the jurisdiction, then the principle laid down in those cases applies. The limitation of the interest recoverable, imposed by s. 6 of Regulation III. of 1872, does not apply to a suit in the Bhagalpur Court. That Court did not become "a Court exercising jurisdiction in the Son that Parganas " merely because part of the land subject to the mortgage was situated in that district. The sale of the land under the decree of that Court would be effected by the Court having local jurisdiction. The observations in Maseyk v. Steel & Co. (I. L. R. 14 Calc. 661.) were explained in Gopi Mohan Roy v. Doybaki Nundun Sen. (( 1891) I. L. R. 19 Calc. 13.) [Vaughan v. Weldon (( 1874) L. R. 10 C. P. 47.) was also referred to.] Sect. 6 does not prevent the execution in the Sonthal Parganas of a decree obtained elsewhere including compound interest. Further, Regulation III. of 1872 was issued by the Lieutenant-Governor in his executive capacity and has no operation outside the Sonthal Parganas Cowells Courts and Legislative Authorities in India, p. 113; Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871, s. 12; Gazetteer for Sonthal Parganas, ch. 13, p. 297. In any case the mortgagees were entitled to a decree for the full amount enforce able by sale of the lands in the Bhagalpur district and for a lesser amount enforceable in the Sonthal Parganas. Lowndes in reply. The effect of the proviso in s. 2 of the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, as to suits where over Rs.1,000 was in dispute is not to remove those suits from the jurisdiction of the special Courts, but merely to indicate what law is to be applied to them Dungaram Mar wary v. Rajkishore Deo. (( 1890) I. L. R. 18 Calc. (( 1890) I. L. R. 18 Calc. 133.) The Bhagalpur Court, if it had jurisdiction, was "a Court exercising jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas," and s. 6 of Regulation III. of 1872 applies. The law as laid down in Maseyk v. Steel & Co. (I. L. R. 14 Calc. 661.) as to the Court which exercises jurisdiction under s. 19 of the Code of 1882 decreeing a sale in the other district has been applied in a large number of cases, e.g., Kartick Nath Pandey v. Tilukdhari Lall (( 1888) I. L. R. 15 Calc. 667.); Tincouri Debya v. Shib Chandra Pal Chowdhury (( 1894) I. L. R. 21 Calc. 639.); Jagernath Sahai v. Dip Rani Koer. (( 1895) I. L. R. 22 Calc. 871.) Regulation III. of 1872 has not a merely local effect, as contended, since under (Imperial) 33 & 34 Viet. c. 3, s. 1, it had, upon publication with approval, the like force as if made by the Governor-General. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MOULTON. In this case their Lordships have to deal with three consolidated appeals from decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, arising out of a mortgage suit filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Bhagalpur in Bengal. The first and principal appeal is from the decree of the Subordinate Judge enforcing the mortgage, which was affirmed on appeal by the High Court. Subsequently to making that decree the Subordinate Judge made two orders varying the same, both of which were on appeal set aside by the High Court. From these two orders of the High Court appeals have been brought by the respondents to the main appeal, and they constitute the second and third of the consolidated appeals. The mortgage bond to enforce which the action was originally brought, was a bond for Rs.3,50,000, dated December 21, 1896, in favour of Suraj Narayan Singh, the father of the principal respondent, and secured on lands situated in the Sonthal Parganas and elsewhere. The mortgagors were members of a joint Hindu family. Inasmuch as no question arises in this appeal as to the parties to the present action being the proper parties, it will be convenient to call the appellants in the principal appeal the mortgagors, and the respondents the mortgagees. The mortgagors were members of a joint Hindu family. Inasmuch as no question arises in this appeal as to the parties to the present action being the proper parties, it will be convenient to call the appellants in the principal appeal the mortgagors, and the respondents the mortgagees. The bond sued on was the last of a series of bonds for increasing amounts. The total of the principal amounts advanced was, according to the statements in the plaint, Rs.2,85,903 1 9. But the total claim of the mortgagees at the date of the suit was Rs.5,36,038 11 10, the balance being made up of interest which was charged according to the provisions of the different bonds, the rate under the bond in suit being 7 ½ percent, per annum with annual rests. By far the greater portion of the mortgaged properties was situated in the district of the Sonthal Parganas, and the mortgagors resided in that district. The remainder of the mortgaged property was situated within the local jurisdiction of the Bhagalpur Court. The bond in suit was executed at Bhagalpur and contained a stipulation that the mortgagees might enforce it in the Bhagalpur Court. The suit was commenced on June 20, 1904. The plaint shews that it was an ordinary suit to enforce a mortgage. Written statements of defence were put in by various defendants and various issues were raised and decided by the Subordinate Judge at the trial. Most of these relate to matters no longer in dispute. The only issues that remain for their Lordships decision in this appeal turn on the fact that the mortgagors reside and the chief part of the property is situate in the Sonthal Parganas, so that it is not necessary further to refer to the other issues. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge, which is dated February 12, 1906, was in favour of the mortgagees on all issues. On the appeal to the High Court the argument seems to have been confined to the sixth issue, which was in the following terms " Are the plaintiffs precluded from claiming compound interest, or interest exceeding the amount of the principal advanced under Regulation III. of 1872? " The High Court found in favour of the mortgagees on this issue, and from that decision the first of the present appeals is brought. of 1872? " The High Court found in favour of the mortgagees on this issue, and from that decision the first of the present appeals is brought. But at the hearing before the Subordinate Judge an issue was raised as to the jurisdiction of the Court of Bhagalpur to entertain the suit, and this point has again been raised in the argument before their Lordships. Seeing that it is a question of jurisdiction, and depends on no disputed facts, their Lordships are of opinion that they cannot decline to entertain it, although it is not specifically raised on the appeal, more especially as it necessarily presented itself in the argument. The position of the Sonthal Parganas is very peculiar. They are under separate and special legislation, which differs widely from the legislation applicable to the rest of Bengal. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has the power to vary that legislation from time to time by notifications published in the Calcutta Gazette, under and according to provisions appearing in the regulations relating to the district as will presently be more particularly referred to. At the hearing of the appeal it was found that the documents in the record did not adequately inform their Lordships of the relevant notifications which had thus appeared in the Calcutta Gazette, and, accordingly, it was arranged that the parties should supplement the record by putting in copies of such notifications as they thought material. These were furnished to their Lordships in December last, and they affect to an important degree the matters in issue, and more particularly those that turn upon the settlement of the lands to which the mortgage bond relates. In order to make clear the legal questions that arise in this appeal, it is necessary to explain the nature and sequence of the legislation relating to the Sonthal Parganas The special legislation for the Sonthal Parganas commences by an Act of the Governor-General of India in Council, No. XXXVII. of 1855, which was passed on December 22, 1855. In order to make clear the legal questions that arise in this appeal, it is necessary to explain the nature and sequence of the legislation relating to the Sonthal Parganas The special legislation for the Sonthal Parganas commences by an Act of the Governor-General of India in Council, No. XXXVII. of 1855, which was passed on December 22, 1855. Its full title is "An Act to remove from operation of the General Laws and Regulations certain districts inhabited by the Sonthals and others and to place the same under the superin tendence of an officer to be specially appointed for that purpose." The preamble of the Act recites that the general regulations and Acts of Government then in force in the Presidency of Bengal were not adapted to the uncivilized race of people called Sonthals, and it was therefore deemed expedient to remove from the operation of such laws certain districts. It then proceeded to enact by clause 1 as follows " The districts described in the schedule to this Act are heeby removed from the operation of the General Regulations of the Bengal Code and of the Laws passed by the Governor-General of India in Council except so far as is hereinafter provided and no law which shall hereafter be passed by the Governor-General of India in Council shall be deemed to extend to any part of the said districts unless the same shall be specially named therein." This is subject to a proviso which is not material to this case. The Act then proceeds to carry out its main object by the following enactment "The said district shall be placed under the superintendence and jurisdiction of an officer or officers to be appointed in that behalf by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. .... The administration of civil and criminal justice ....are hereby vested in the officer or officers so appointed." This language is perfectly general in its character, and under it the whole administration of civil justice became vested in the officer or officers so appointed. But there follows a proviso to which frequent reference was made in the argument. .... The administration of civil and criminal justice ....are hereby vested in the officer or officers so appointed." This language is perfectly general in its character, and under it the whole administration of civil justice became vested in the officer or officers so appointed. But there follows a proviso to which frequent reference was made in the argument. It reads as follows "Provided that all civil suits in which the matter in dispute shall exceed the value of Rs.1000 shall be tried and determined according to the General Laws and Regulations in the same manner as if this Act had not been passed." The interpretation of this provision is a matter of great difficulty. Two rival interpretations naturally suggest themselves. The one is that the officers exercising the jurisdiction shall do so in accordance with the general laws and regulations, so that the rights of the parties are unaffected by the provision, although they are to be pronounced upon by a different judicial tribunal. The other is that not only the laws that govern rights, but also the procedure to enforce those rights, shall remain unchanged. Now it must be observed that this is a proviso and not an exception, and accordingly, taken in connection with the general language of the previous portion of the clause, the former of these two interpretations is the one that commends itself to their Lordships, so that it must be construed as providing that the special officer or officers shall try such suits, but that in trying and determining them they shall observe the general laws and regulations obtaining in Bengal, which but for the Act would have applied equally in the Sonthal Parganas. It would seem, however, that the other view has been taken in India (see the judgment in Sorbojit Roy v. Gonesh Prosad Misser (I. L. R. 10 Calc. 761.).) Subsequent legislation has, however, rendered it unnecessary, so far as the decision in this case is concerned, to decide what would be the state of things if this regulation were still in force unmodified by any other statutory enactments. The territorial definition of the Sonthal Parganas was originally to be found in the schedule to this Act; but by Act X. of 1857 a new schedule was substituted therefor. The territorial definition of the Sonthal Parganas was originally to be found in the schedule to this Act; but by Act X. of 1857 a new schedule was substituted therefor. The judgment of the High Court finds that two-thirds of the mortgaged properties are situated within the district described in that schedule, and it would seem that this estimate may be assumed to be approximately correct for the purposes of this appeal. The next Act in chronological order to which it is necessary to refer is the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859. The Sonthal Parganas are not specially named in that Act, and therefore it did not prima facie apply to them; but, nevertheless, we must have regard to the language of s. 385 of that Act, which reads as follows " This Act shall not take effect in any part of the territories not subject to the General Regulations of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, until the same shall be extended thereto by the Governor-General of India in Council or by the local Government to which such territory is subordinate and notified in the Gazette." Although the words "Sonthal Parganas" do not appear in this section the district falls under the description there appearing. Accordingly we find that by a notification on August 19, 1867, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1861, was applied to the Sonthal Parganas subject to certain provisions, restrictions, and exceptions which are not relevant to the matters of this suit. It is not necessary to decide what was the precise effect of this notification. It can hardly have been intended that it should apply to the Courts held by the officers appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in those suits in which they were not required to try and determine the case according to the general laws and regulations prevailing in Bengal. But with regard to civil suits in which the matter in dispute exceeded the value of Rs.1000, it would seem to have settled the doubt as to whether they were cognizable by ordinary civil Courts duly established with jurisdiction within the Sonthal Parganas, because it will be found that the fact that such jurisdiction exists in such Courts is recognized in subsequent legislation. In the year 1872 a new regulation was passed for the Sonthal Parganas. In the year 1872 a new regulation was passed for the Sonthal Parganas. It is entitled the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, and by s. 2 it is directed to be read with Act XXXVII. of 1855 and Act X. of 1857 before referred to. Sect. 3 reads as follows "Subject to the provisions of this Regulation, the regulations and Acts mentioned in the schedule annexed to this regulation, or such portions of them as are unrepealed, shall be deemed to be in force in the Sonthal Parganas. No other regulations or Acts shall be deemed to be in force in the Sonthal Parganas, except so far as regards the trial and determination of the civil suits mentioned in s. 2, Act XXXVII. of 1855, in which the matter in dispute exceeds the value of Rs.1000, when such suits are tried in the Courts established under Act VI. of 1871." It further provides that the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal may by notification in the Calcutta Gazette add to or take away from the list in the schedule. To arrive at the true meaning and effect of these provisions it is necessary to bear in mind that at the date of this regulation the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1861, applied to the Sonthal Parganas by virtue of the notification of August 19, 1867. But the schedule to the regulation does not contain the Civil Procedure Codes of 1859 and 1861, nor have they ever been added to the above list by any notification of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal as above described. It follows that these Civil Procedure Codes were thereafter applicable in the Sonthal Parganas only so far as concerns the trial and determination of civil suits in which the matter in dispute exceeded the value of Rs.1000 when such suits were tried in the Courts established under Act VI. of 1871. So far as such suits were concerned there is nothing in this clause of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation to alter the effect of the notification of August 19, 1867, which applied to them the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 as amended in 1861. Act VI. of 1871 is known as the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871. It is not in the scheduled list. Act VI. of 1871 is known as the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871. It is not in the scheduled list. But it was passed at a date when the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1861, was in force in the Sonthal Parganas, and it would seem as though the wide provisions of the clauses in those Codes giving jurisdiction to Civil Courts must be taken to have given to the Government power to appoint judges under it within the Sonthal Parganas, inasmuch as s. 4 of the Sonthal Parganas Regulation, 1872, provides as follows " The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal may, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, invest any competent officer in the Sonthal Parganas with the powers of any Civil Court established under Act VI. of 1871, and may exclude the whole or any part of the said Parganas from the jurisdiction of any of the Courts established under the said Act now having jurisdiction therein." But while it is evident that the Government by this section left it to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to decide in future whether Courts established under the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871, should retain jurisdiction within the Sonthal Parganas, it had already made up its mind that such should not be the case with suits relating to lands pending the completion of the settlement which they proposed forthwith to make of all the lands situated in the Sonthal Parganas. This is made clear by s. 5, which reads as follows " Till such time as a settlement of the whole or any part of the Sonthal Parganas shall be made under the rules hereinafter provided, and the said settlement shall be declared by a notification in the Calcutta Gazette to have been completed and concluded, no suit shall lie in any Court established under the said Act VI. of 1871 in regard to any land, or any interest in or arising out of any land, or for the rent or profits of any land, or regarding any village-headship or other office connected with the land, except as hereinafter provided; but such suits shall be heard and determined by the officers appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal under section 2 of the said Act XXXVII. of 1855, or by the settlement officers hereinafter mentioned, according as the said Lieutenant-Governor shall from time to time direct." Then follows a proviso by which the officer empowered to try a suit may transfer it to a Court established under the said Act, and thereby give to the Court jurisdiction to try it. No question, however, under this proviso, arises in the present case. The critical question in this suit is as to whether s. 5 excludes from the jurisdiction of Courts established under the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871, suits relating to land where the value of the matter in dispute is more than Rs.1000. Their Lordships are of opinion that to this question only one answer can be given. The language of the section is so wide and so peremptory that it gives to the officers therein mentioned sole and exclusive jurisdiction in all suits in regard to any land, or any interest in or arising out of any land, or for the rent or profits of any land. To make the meaning clearer and to render the language more emphatic, it is expressed both in the positive and in the negative form. On the one hand it provides that " no suit shall lie in any Court established under the said Act 6 of 1871 in regard to any land, &c," and on the other hand it provides that such " suits shall be heard and determined by the officers, &c." It is impossible not to give to such language the full effect of creating an exclusive jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that no action relating to land in the Sonthal Parganas can be brought otherwise than before such officers so long as s. 5 is in force with respect to the district in which that land is situated. There is no difficulty in comprehending the motives for such legislation. The section shews that a settlement of the lands was in contemplation, and evidently the aim of the provision was to prevent any clash of jurisdiction between different Courts in matters relating to land until such time as the Government proclaimed the settlement to be completed—a very intelligible policy when it is considered that on the results of such suits between individuals might depend the entries which must be made in the settlement records. The object of the regulation being thus to throw the whole of the jurisdiction in suits relating to land into special Courts established in and for the Sonthal Parganas, and provision being made for extending that exclusive jurisdiction to all suits, one has to consider the meaning and effect of s. 6, which is the ection upon which the rights of the parties in the present suit depend. That section, so far as is material, reads as follows "All Courts having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas shall observe the following rules relating to usury, namely, (a) . . . . No compound interest arising from any intermediate adjustment of interest shall be decreed; (b) the total interest decreed on any loan or debt shall never exceed one-fourth of the principal sum, if the period be not more than one year, and shall not in any other case exceed the principal of the original debt or loan." The respondents sought to establish that the phrase "all Courts having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas" meant Courts locally situated in the Sonthal Parganas, and dealing with matters purely local. Their Lordships cannot accept this interpretation. The words are definite and precise, and must be applied in their natural signification. It was urged that, taken literally, they would apply to everything done by a Court having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas, whether the matter related to those districts or not, inasmuch as the language used makes the application of the enactment depend on the Court and not on the matter in dispute. But this is to ignore the fact that the regulation is only applicable to the Sonthal Parganas, and that, therefore, it would not apply to Courts having jurisdiction wider than these local limits when such Courts were dealing with matters relating solely to other parts of India. The enactment, therefore, applies to Courts having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas, and acting under and by virtue of such jurisdiction. The importance of this section is very great. The enactment, therefore, applies to Courts having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas, and acting under and by virtue of such jurisdiction. The importance of this section is very great. It is a protective section clearly dictated by the fundamental consideration to which reference has already been made, and which led to the Sonthal Parganas being put under separate and special legislation, namely, that " the general regulations and Acts of Government now in force in the Presidency of Bengal are not adapted to the uncivilized race of people called Sonthals, and it is, therefore, expedient to remove from the operation of such laws" the districts known as the Sonthal Parganas. The provision, therefore, is not one of procedure but of sub stance, and so far as the Courts having jurisdiction within the Sonthal Parganas are concerned it places all contractual stipulations as to compound interest in a position of non-enforceability, and limits statutably the total interest which can be decreed on any loan or debt. The application of these provisions to the facts of the present case will be considered later. The next Act in chronological sequence to which reference was made in the argument is Act XIV. of 1874, known as the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874. This is an Act for the purpose of removing doubts as to what Acts or Regulations are in force in parts of British India, which have never been brought within or have from time to time been removed from the operation of the General Acts and regulations and the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts of judicature. These parts of British India are termed in the Act "scheduled districts." They are all set out in Sched. I. to the Act, and amongst them are to be found the Sonthal Parganas. The scheme of the Act is peculiar. It is expressly made to apply to all parts of British India other than the scheduled districts. But it is provided that it shall come into force in any scheduled district upon the issue of a notification under s. 3 of the Act with regard to such district. The scheme of the Act is peculiar. It is expressly made to apply to all parts of British India other than the scheduled districts. But it is provided that it shall come into force in any scheduled district upon the issue of a notification under s. 3 of the Act with regard to such district. In such case the local Government may with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council by notification in the Gazette of India, and also in the local gazette, declare (among other things) what enactments are actually in force in any of the scheduled districts, and every such notification shall be binding on all Courts of law. During the argument counsel for the parties were not in agreement as to whether any notification under this Act had been issued applying to the Sonthal Parganas; but, from the subsequent information supplied to their Lordships, it would appear that no such notification has been issued, and therefore that the provisions of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, have never been applied to them. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss further the provisions of this enactment. The next Act which requires to be noticed is the Civil Procedure Code, 1877. It repeals Act VIII. of 1859 and Act XXIII. of 1861, which constituted the then existing code of civil procedure. Sect. 1 reads as follows "This Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure and it shall come into force on the first day of October, 1877. This section and section 3 extend to the whole of British India, The other sections extend to the whole of British India except the scheduled districts as defined in Act No. XIV. of 1874." The relevant part of s. 3 reads as follows "The enactments specified in the First Schedule hereto annexed are hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the third column of the same schedule. But when in any Act, regulation or notification passed or issued prior to the day on which this Code comes into force reference is made to Act VIII. of 1859, Act XXIII. But when in any Act, regulation or notification passed or issued prior to the day on which this Code comes into force reference is made to Act VIII. of 1859, Act XXIII. of 1871, or the Code of Civil Procedure or to any other Act hereby repealed, such reference shall so far as may be practicable be read as applying to this code or the corresponding part thereof." The effect of these sections is to make the notification of 1867 relative to the application of the then existing Codes of Civil Procedure to the Sonthal Parganas read as though it applied to the Civil Procedure Act, 1877. But it will be remembered that such application had been restricted by the Sonthal Parganas Regulation of 1872 to suits brought for amounts above Rs.1000 in courts established under Act VI. of 1871. The combined effect of these provisions must be to make the Civil Procedure Act of 1877 apply in the Sonthal Parganas only to suits so brought. The next Act is the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. In everything that is material to the present appeal this is identical with the Civil Procedure Code, 1877. It took the place of that Act in the Sonthal Parganas to the extent that such Act was in force therein, that is to say, for suits brought for amounts above Rs.1000 in Courts established under Act VI. of 1871. We now come to Regulation V. of 1893, the short title of which is the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation, 1893. It made important changes in the administration of civil justice in the Sonthal Parganas. By s. 5 it added to the two classes of special Courts theretofore existing in the Sonthal Parganas, named the Courts of settlement officers and the Courts of officers appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal under s. 2 of the Regulation of 1855, a third class, namely Courts established under Act XII. of 1887, known as the Bengal United Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which is an Act which has taken the place of Act VI. of 1871 (which has been repealed), and all references to the last-mentioned Act must now be read as referring to it. of 1887, known as the Bengal United Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which is an Act which has taken the place of Act VI. of 1871 (which has been repealed), and all references to the last-mentioned Act must now be read as referring to it. These definite provisions entirely remove the difficulties as to the jurisdiction within the Sonthal Parganas of Courts appointed under the Bengal United Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, or its predecessor, the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871. It remains to see what suits are put within the cognizance of these Courts. By s. 9 the jurisdiction of a judge of one of these Courts extends to " suits of which the value exceeds Rs.1,000 and which are not excluded from his cognizance by the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, or by any other law for the time being in force.” Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that these words of exclusion refer to s. 5 of the Regulation of 1872, which excluded from the cognizance of any such Court suits relating to land, the settlement of which had not been finished and duly notified, and placed them exclusively in the hands of settlement officers or officers appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal under s. 2 of the Regulation of 1855. This exclusive jurisdiction is therefore maintained, and suits in regard to land which is not in districts that have been notified as being completely settled are not within the cognizance of the ordinary Courts, no matter what may be the value of the matter in dispute. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to examine further into the jurisdiction of Courts established under these provisions, because the Court of Bhagalpur, in which the present action was brought, is not one of such Courts. The result of this examination of the Acts and regulations applicable to the Sonthal Parganas is that at the date when this suit was commenced no suit could lie in any Court established under Act VI. The result of this examination of the Acts and regulations applicable to the Sonthal Parganas is that at the date when this suit was commenced no suit could lie in any Court established under Act VI. of 1871, or under the Act which has taken its place, namely, the Bengal United Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, in regard to any land or any interest in or arising out of any land, or for the rent or profits of any land, but such suits must have been brought before settlement officers, or Courts of officers appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal under s. 2 of the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855, and the Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation Act, 181)3, Part 11., so long as the land had not been settled and the settlement declared by a notification in the Calcutta Gazette to have been completed and concluded. And, further, that whatever be the Court that has jurisdiction to decide cases within the Sonthal Parganas, and is exercising that jurisdiction, it must observe the two rules relating to usury above referred to. It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain what was the exact position (so far as settlement is concerned) of the land included in the mortgage bond at the date of the commencement of the action in which the present appeal is brought, namely, June 20, 1904. The information supplied to their Lordships by the parties as to the notifications appearing in the Calcutta Gazette shew conclusively that, although portions of the lands mortgaged had been settled, and notification had been duly made that such settlement had been completed, at dates prior to the institution of the suit, other portions were not so settled. It is clear, therefore, that the suit came within the provisions of s. 5 of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872, relating to the exclusive jurisdiction of officers appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, or by settlement officers, inasmuch as it related to land which had not been settled, or the settlement of which had not been declared by a notification in the Calcutta Gazette to have been completed and concluded. The Court of Bhagalpur had, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and this appeal should be allowed. Reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents on the stipulation in the bond that the mortgagees might enforce it in the Court of Bhagalpur. The Court of Bhagalpur had, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and this appeal should be allowed. Reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents on the stipulation in the bond that the mortgagees might enforce it in the Court of Bhagalpur. Their Lordships are of opinion that this has no effect. That Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, which, beyond question, was a suit in regard to land in the Sonthal Parganas, and that being so the parties could not give it the necessary jurisdiction by consent. To do so would be to nullify the express prohibition of s. 5 of the Sonthal Parganas Regulation, 1872, which was binding on any Court having jurisdiction in the Sonthal Parganas in the exercise of that jurisdiction. Their Lordships are also of opinion that, apart from the question of jurisdiction, any Court dealing with the subject- matter of the suit would be bound to give full force and effect to the provisions of s. 6 of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872, relating to usury, and therefore to have refused to decree any compound interest arising from any intermediate adjustment of interest, or an amount of total interest exceeding the principal of the original debt or loan. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, and the action dismissed with costs in both Courts. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal. The two subsidiary appeals fall with the dismissal of the action, and the costs connected with them will form part of the costs of the whole proceedings, which the respondents must bear.