Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (October 29, 1913) affirming a judgment and decree of that Court in its original civil jurisdiction (April 22, 1913). The respondent G. Narayaniah, having by agreement given the custody and bringing up of his two minor sons to the appellant, revoked the agreement, and in October, 1912, instituted a suit against her in the District Court of Chingleput by a plaint claiming (1.) a declaration that he was entitled to their guardianship and custody; (2.) a declaration that the appellant was not entitled, and in any case was unfit, to have the charge and guardianship of them ; (3.) a direction to the appellant to hand them over to him, or to such other person as to the Court should seem fit. The circumstances under which the suit was instituted, so far as they are material to the decision, appear fully from the judgment of their Lordships. At the date of the commencement of the suit the minors were resident in England, and with the exception of a period between September, 1911, and February, 1912, they had not resided within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Chingleput since September, 1910. The suit was transferred from the District Court into the High Court by an order made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, 1865, and was heard by Bakewell J. The learned judge delivered judgment on April 22, 1913, in favour of the first respondent (plaintiff). He was of opinion that any delegation of guardianship by a father was revocable, and an agreement to the contrary void ; he therefore held that the first respondent was entitled to revoke the authority given to the appellant, and he further held that the first respondent was not unfit to be guardian of his children. A decree was accordingly made which, after declaring that the minors were made wards of the Court, appointed the first respondent the guardian of their persons and ordered that the appellant should on or before May 26, 1913, hand over the custody of the boys to him as their guardian. The elder of the two boys attained eighteen years of age a few days after this decree was made. The present appellant appealed and obtained a stay of execution with regard to handing over the boys until after the hearing. The elder of the two boys attained eighteen years of age a few days after this decree was made. The present appellant appealed and obtained a stay of execution with regard to handing over the boys until after the hearing. The High Court in its appellate jurisdiction first heard arguments upon the question whether Bakewell J, had jurisdiction to make the decree, and on this question delivered a preliminary judgment. The learned Chief Justice, after stating that, under the Indian Majority Act, 1875, s. 3, and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, s. 52, the effect of the decree was to extend the minorities of the boys until they attained twenty-one, held that the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, did not take away any common law or equitable jurisdiction in relation to minors and guardians which was vested in a District Court at the time when the Act came into force, and that, notwithstanding clause 20 of the Letters Patent of 1865, the jurisdiction of the High Court in the suit was the same as if the suit had been instituted in that Court. He was consequently of opinion that the jurisdiction of the High Court was not restricted to that which might have been exercised by the District Court if the suit had not been transferred under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of 1865. The learned Chief Justice further held that the words " within the Presidency of Madras" in clause 17 of the Letters Patent of 1865 merely limited the territorial jurisdiction and did not qualify or restrict the powers of the High Court with regard to the guardianship of minors. In his view the jurisdiction which the High Court at Madras possessed in connection with the estates and persons of minors was the jurisdiction which in England could be exercised by the Lord Chancellor, acting for the Sovereign as parens patriae, when the Supreme Court in Madras was instituted; and that if the domicil and residence of the father within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in England would have been sufficient to give that Court jurisdiction in England, as in his view was the case, the same facts mutatis mutandis were sufficient to give jurisdiction in that suit to the High Court at Madras. Oldfield J., while agreeing with the effect of the learned Chief Justices judgment, look a somewhat different view. Oldfield J., while agreeing with the effect of the learned Chief Justices judgment, look a somewhat different view. He was of opinion that even if the plaint in the suit could be treated as a petition under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, it should not be so treated in the present suit, as there was a possibility that the appellant would suffer prejudice from that course. He held that the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, did not bar any remedy or jurisdiction existing at the date of the Act, though they might have fallen into disuse in the Madras Presidency, but that upon a transfer to the High Court under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of 1865 it was clear that, under clause 20, the powers of the trial judge were only those of the District Court at Chingleput. The learned judge, however, after considering the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, held that under those provisions Bakewell J. had jurisdiction to make the decree appealed from. The appeal to the High Court is reported at 15 Madr. L. T. 1. The appeal was subsequently heard upon its merits and judgment thereon was delivered on October 29, 1913. The learned Chief Justice, after considering the evidence, agreed with Bakewell J. that certain allegations made by the respondent were false, but stated that, after anxious consideration, he had come to the conclusion that the Court ought not to disturb the order of the learned judge appointing the respondent guardian and directing that the boys should be handed over to him. Oldfield J., for reasons separately stated, concurred. The sons applied to the Judicial Committee and obtained leave to be joined as parties to the appeal to their Lordships, and they were accordingly joined as respondents. Younger, K.C., Sir Erie Richards, K.C., and R. W. Turnbull, for the appellant. The jurisdiction possessed by the High Court in the suit by reason of the transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of 1865 was limited by clause 20 to the powers possessed by the District Court in which the suit was instituted. But the District Court had no jurisdiction in the suit. The jurisdiction possessed by the High Court in the suit by reason of the transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of 1865 was limited by clause 20 to the powers possessed by the District Court in which the suit was instituted. But the District Court had no jurisdiction in the suit. Its only powers in relation to guardians and wards were those given by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and by s. 9, sub-s. 1, of that Act an application with respect to the person of a minor must be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. It is clear that the youths were not ordinarily resident in the Chingleput district. Further, the powers under the Act can only be invoked by petition and subject to the requirements of s. 10. The provisions of the Act of 1890 are exhaustive and constitute a code, superseding any other remedies theretofore possessed by the District Court Sham Lal v. Bindo (( 1904) I. L. R 26 Allah. 594.); Ghasita v. Wazira. (( 1896) 32 Punjab Record, 41.) The decision to the contrary in Sharifa v. Munekhan (( 1901) I. L. R. 25 Bomb. 574.) is wrong. So also is that in Krishna v. Reade (( 1885) I. L. R. 9 Madr 31.), and that case is also dstinguishable since it was decided under the Act IX. of 1861, which was not a consolidating Act like that of 1890. [The following sections of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, were referred to ss. 1, 2; s. 4, sub-ss. 4 and 5; ss. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 39, and 52.] The Act of 1890 being exhaustive, the High Court had no jurisdiction by reason of the Letters Patent of 1800 and 1865. But even if the High Court had jurisdiction outside that given by statute, the order made was not in accordance with the principles regulating the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Court of Chancery in England. It is contrary to those principles to appoint a father as guardian of his own children, nor should the order have been made, seeing that the elder boy would have attained his majority within a few days of the decree. It is contrary to those principles to appoint a father as guardian of his own children, nor should the order have been made, seeing that the elder boy would have attained his majority within a few days of the decree. Further the Court had no jurisdiction to make a decree which altered the status of the sons, as to the duration of their minority, without their being represented before the Court, nor was there any power to make a mandatory order against the appellant. [Lyons v. Blenkin ((1821) Jacob, 245.), Rex v. Gyngall ([ 1893] 2 Q. B. 232.), In re Agar-Ellis (( 1883) 24 Ch. D. 317.), Ex parte Mountfort ((1808) 15 Ves. 445.), Barnardo v. Ford ([ 1892] A. C. 326.), In re Hope (( 1854) 4 D. M. & G. 326), and In re Willoughby (( 1885) 30 Ch. D. 324.) were referred to.] The view of Oldfield J. that there was jurisdiction under s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is erroneous, since the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, constitutes an exhaustive code in relation to guardians and wards. Munrc, L.A. (who appeared with Sheldon and W. Ingrain for the intervening respondents) stated in reply to the Lord Chancellor that he had personally satisfied himself that the boys earnestly desired not to return to India. Kenworthy Brown, for the first respondent. If the suit filed in the District Court was a competent suit the High Court, upon the transfer, had jurisdiction to make the order. The suit in the District Court was competent since, as appears from the plaint, the primary issue was as to the effect of the letter of March 6, 1910, and the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that he was still the guardian of the infants and to an injunction. The defendant resided within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the District Court and had removed the infants therefrom. The District Courts have jurisdiction under the Madras Act III. of 1873, s. 12, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 9, over all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, except those of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. The District Courts have jurisdiction under the Madras Act III. of 1873, s. 12, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 9, over all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, except those of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. If the present suit is not among the suits and proceedings here referred to, the law gives no remedy to a father whose children have been wrongfully detained from his custody under the circumstances of this case. The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, gives no remedy, since the infants were not ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction of any District Court. The judicial decisions in India support the view that that Act is not exhaustive, but merely creates a summary procedure applicable to a restricted class of cases; it did not exclude any previous existing jurisdiction. If the District Court had any jurisdiction in the suit the objection to the order transferring it to the High Court fails, and that Court, having the suit properly before it, was entitled and bound to treat it as if it were an original suit on its file, subject to clause 20 of the Letters Patent; that clause, however, does not exclude the application of the independent jurisdiction of the High Court. The appellants argument gives a too restricted effect to clause 17, which, rightly construed, gives to the High Court as wide a jurisdiction in respect of infants as that of the Court of Chancery. [In re Hope (4D.M.& G. 328.) was referred to.] The jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of infants is not confined to infants of European extraction nor to infants within the Presidency town. The findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below shew a clear case for the exercise of the jurisdiction in the interests of the minors. The rival views as to their interests were fully placed before the Court, and the judgments shew that those interests were treated as the predominating consideration in the case. The omission to inquire into the personal preferences of the youths ought not, in the circumstances, to vitiate the proceedings. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON. The omission to inquire into the personal preferences of the youths ought not, in the circumstances, to vitiate the proceedings. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON. This is an appeal from an order made by the High Court of Madras in its appellate jurisdiction on October 29, 1913, confirming with a variation as to costs a decree of Bakewell J. in a suit in which G. Narayaniah (the present respondent) was plaintiff, and Annie Besant (the present appellant) was defendant. The decree declared that J, Krishnamurti and J. Nityananda, the sons of the plaintiff, were wards of Court and that the plaintiff was guardian of their persons, and ordered the defendant to hand over the custody of the wards to the plaintiff as such guardian. The facts which gave rise to the action were as follows The plaintiff is a Hindu residing at Madras. He is a Brahmin, but is not well off, having an income of some 1601. per annum only. He was for many years a member of a society called the Theosophical Society, of which the defendant was president, and was well acquainted with her. He had two sons, J. Krishnamurti and J. Nityananda, born respectively on May 11, 1895, and May 30, 1898. Early in 1910 the defendant offered to take charge of these sons and defray the expense of their maintenance and education in England and at the University of Oxford. The plaintiff thought it desirable to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded of giving his sons a Western education, notwith standing it would entail a loss of caste. He accordingly accepted the defendants offer, and by a letter to the defendant dated March 6, 1910, affected to appoint the defendant to be guardian of their persons and authorized her to act as such from that time forward. In their Lordships opinion the principles on which the legal effect of such a letter falls to be determined do not admit of dispute. There is no difference in this respect between English and Hindu law. As in this country so among the Hindus, the father is the natural guardian of his children during their minorities, but this guardianship is in the nature of a sacred trust, and he cannot therefore during his lifetime substitute another person to be guardian in his place. There is no difference in this respect between English and Hindu law. As in this country so among the Hindus, the father is the natural guardian of his children during their minorities, but this guardianship is in the nature of a sacred trust, and he cannot therefore during his lifetime substitute another person to be guardian in his place. He may, it is true, in the exercise of his discretion as guardian, entrust the custody and education of his children to another, but the authority he thus confers is essentially a revocable authority, and if the welfare of his children require it, he can, notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, take such custody and education once more into his own hands. If, however, the authority has been acted upon in such a way as, in the opinion of the Court exercising the jurisdiction of the Crown over infants, to create associations or give rise to expectations on the part of the infants which it would be undesirable in their interests to disturb or disappoint, such Court will interfere to prevent its revocation Lyons v. Blenkin. (Jacob, 245.) Shortly after the respondent accepted her offer the appellant took charge of the boys, and they have since been in her custody and she has defrayed the expense of their maintenance and education. In February, 1912, they left India in her company and, after staying with her for some time in Sicily and Italy, finally accompanied her to England, where she left them under the charge of Mrs. Jacob Bright, having made arrangements for their having a course of tuition such as would enable them to enter the University of Oxford. Though the respondents confidence in the appellant appears to have been shaken some time previously for reasons to which it is unnecessary to refer, he assented to, or at any rate acquiesced in, the departure of his sons in her company for Europe. Nevertheless on July 11, 1912, he wrote the appellant a letter cancelling his previous letter of March 6, 1910, demanding that his sons should be restored to his custody, and threatening proceedings if that demand were not complied with. Nevertheless on July 11, 1912, he wrote the appellant a letter cancelling his previous letter of March 6, 1910, demanding that his sons should be restored to his custody, and threatening proceedings if that demand were not complied with. The appellant, who had returned to India, refused to comply with the demand, and the respondent thereupon commenced a suit in the District Court of Chingleput, in the Madras Presidency, asking to have it declared that he was entitled to the guardianship and custody of his sons, and that the appellant was not entitled, or in any case was unfit, to be in charge and guardianship of such sons, and for an order on the appellant to hand over such sons to the respondent or such other person as to the Court might seem meet. In their Lordships opinion this suit was entirely misconceived. It was not, and indeed could not be, disputed that the plaintiff remained the guardian of his children notwithstanding that he had affected to substitute the defendant as guardian in his place. The real question was whether he was still entitled to exercise the functions of guardian and resume the custody of his sons and alter the scheme which had been formulated for their education. Again, it was not and could not be disputed that the letter of March 6, 1910, was in the nature of a revocable authority. The real question was whether in the events which had happened the plaintiff was at liberty to revoke it. Both questions fell to be determined having regard to the interests and welfare of the infants, bearing in mind, of course, their parentage and religion, and could only be decided by a Court exercising the jurisdiction of the Crown over infants, and in their presence. The Dist. "ct Court in which the suit was instituted had no jurisdiction over the infants except such jurisdiction as was conferred by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. By the 9th section of that Act the jurisdiction of the Court is confined to infants ordinarily resident in the district. It is in their Lordships opinion impossible to hold that infants who had months previously left India with a view to being educated in England and going to the University of Oxford were ordinarily resident in the district; of Chingleput. It is in their Lordships opinion impossible to hold that infants who had months previously left India with a view to being educated in England and going to the University of Oxford were ordinarily resident in the district; of Chingleput. Further a suit inter partes is not the form of procedure prescribed by the Act for proceedings in a District Court touching the guardianship of infants. It is true that the suit was subsequently transferred to the High Court under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, 1865, but the powers of the High Court in dealing with suits so transferred would seem to be confined to powers which but for the transfer might have been exercised by the District Court. Again, the relief asked for was a mandatory order directing the defendant to take possession of the persons of the infants in England, bring them to India, and hand them over to their father. Considering the age of the infants any attempt on the part of the defendant to comply with this order would, if the infants had refused to return to India, have been contrary to the law of this country, and would have at once exposed the defendant to proceedings in this country on writ of habeas corpus. No Court ought to make an order which might lead to these consequences. The most which a Court of competent jurisdiction in India could do under circumstances such as existed in the present case was to order the defendant to concur with the plaintiff as the infants guardian in taking proceedings in this country to regain the custody and control of his sons. The difficulties and anomalies of the procedure adopted by the plaintiff are well illustrated by the history of the proceedings. After the transfer to the High Court, issues were settled in the ordinary manner. There was no issue as to whether it was or was not desirable in the interests of the infants that they should give up all idea of a Western university education and return to India. It was urged that the High Court did in fact consider their interests. If it did so, it must have been upon evidence admitted as relevant on other issues, and it is by no means apparent that, had a proper issue on the point been directed, further evidence would not have been available. It was urged that the High Court did in fact consider their interests. If it did so, it must have been upon evidence admitted as relevant on other issues, and it is by no means apparent that, had a proper issue on the point been directed, further evidence would not have been available. At any rate, on such an issue, the necessity of the infants being properly represented before the Court, and of ascertaining what they themselves desired, could hardly have been overlooked. At the trial of the action some difficulty appears to have been felt by reason of the facts (1.) that the suit was not such as to make the infants wards of Court, and (2.) that the elder infant would within a very short time attain his majority according to Hindu law. The trial judge sought to overcome those difficulties (1.) by declaring the infants wards of Court, and (2.) by taking advantage of s. 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, as amended by s. 52 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and declaring under s. 7 of the latter Act that the plaintiff was their guardian so as to prolong their minorities until they attained respectively the age of twenty-one years. It was hardly contended that any such order was competent to the District Court in the suit in question. It is alleged, however, that; when once the suit had been transferred to the High Court, the High Court had a general jurisdiction over infants which they could exercise at pleasure, and that the directions in question were properly given by virtue of such general jurisdiction. It is to be observed, however, that whatever may have been the jurisdiction of the High Court to declare the infants to be wards of Court, an order declaring a guardian could only be made if their interests required it, and, as appears above, they were not before the Court, nor were their interests adequately considered. And, further, no order declaring a guardian could by reason of the 19th section of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, be made during the respondents life unless in the opinion of the Court he was unfit to be their guardian, which was clearly not the case. Since the appeal has been presented the infants have obtained the leave of the Board to intervene therein and be heard by counsel. Since the appeal has been presented the infants have obtained the leave of the Board to intervene therein and be heard by counsel. Counsel on their behalf have appeared before their Lordships Board and stated that the infants do not desire to return to India or abandon their chance of obtaining a university education in this country. The order of the High Court directing the defendant to take them back to India cannot be lawfully carried out without their consent or without an order from the Court exercising the jurisdiction of the Crown over infants in this country. It is and always was open to the respondent to apply to His Majestys High Court of Justice in England for that purpose. If he does so, the interests of the infants will be considered and care will be taken to ascertain their own wishes on all material points. Their Lordships do not consider it desirable to express any opinion of their own on questions with which only the High Court in England can deal satisfactorily. It is enough to say that the order made by the trial judge in India as varied by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction cannot stand, and their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the same ought to be discharged, and the suit dismissed with costs both here and in the Courts below, but without prejudice to any application the respondent may think fit to make to the High Court in England touching the guardianship, custody, and maintenance of his children.