JUDGMENT 1. These appeals are directed against the decree in a suit for a perpetual injunction to restrain the lessee of a coal mine: in three respects. On the 14th December 1906, the Plaintiff granted a lease of the disputed mine for a term of 999 years to one Ghanasyam Das Agarwalla, the father of the first four Defendants in this litigation. On the 3rd July 1911 and 15th February 1912, these Defendants transferred their interest in the mine by two conveyances executed in favour of the fifth Defendant Ramjas Agarwalla, who had mines in the immediate vicinity towards the east and northwest. On the 2nd August 1911, the Plaintiff instituted the present suit for a perpetual injunction to restrain the purchaser Defendant in three respects, namely, first, that he may not connect the disputed mine with the adjacent mines; secondly, that he may not raise the coal from the demised mine through the pits of his mines; and, thirdly, that he may not ever cut off or change the form or diminish the thickness of the pillars of coal delineated in the working plan of the demised mine. The Plaintiff alleged in the plaint that the conveyances had been executed by the first four Defendants in favour of the fifth Defendant with a view to enable the latter to injure him by an improper working of the mine; he further asserted that, there was a conspiracy amongst the Defendants, who had threatened to cause him loss. The Defendants denied the truth of these allegations. With regard to the three grounds specified for the grant of an injunction, the fifth Defendant in particular stated that he was not bound to have a boundary wall of coal between the demised mine and the adjoining mines owned by him, that he had never intended to raise the coal of the demised mine through the pit of another colliery and that it would as a matter of fact be very costly and inconvenient for him to raise the coal except through the pits of the colliery in suit, and, finally, that he was not bound to maintain the pillars in their present condition., but that it was his interest to keep them strong enough so that the surface might not sink and damage the works. The Subordinate Judge has granted an injunction on the first two grounds and has refused an injunction on the third ground. This decree has been assailed both by the Plaintiff and the Defendant. On behalf of the Plaintiff it has been argued that an injunction should have been granted with regard To the maintenance of the pillars. On behalf of the Defendant, it has been contended that no injunction should have been granted, as the suit is premature and as the lessee is not bound to leave a boundary wall of coal to separate the demised mine from the adjacent mines and is also entitled to carry the coal from the demised mine in any manner he chooses. The questions which emerge for consideration may, consequently, be enumerated as follows :-- namely, first, is the claim for perpetual injunction premature and, if so, to what extent, and, secondly, if the suit is not premature, what are the respective rights and obligations of the lessor and lessee in respect of the maintenance of a boundary wall of coal, the preservation of pillars of coal, for the protection of the surface, and the mode in which coal may be raised out of the demised mine. Before we examine these questions, it is necessary to state that no oral evidence was given by the parties, and no attempt was made by the Plaintiff to establish the allegation of conspiracy amongst the Defendants or of the threats held out to damage the property. We must consequently proceed on the facts admitted in the pleadings. The first question for consideration is, whether, as alleged by the Defendant, the suit is premature. It is well settled that a man who seeks the aid of the Court by an injunction must show that the act complained of is in fact a violation of his right or is at least an act which, if carried into effect, will necessarily result in a violation of the right. The mere prospect or apprehension of injury or the mere belief that the act complained of may or will be done is not sufficient. As Lord Brougham said in Earl of Ripon v. Hobart 3 My. & Ke. 174; 41 R R. 40 (1834). The mere prospect or apprehension of injury or the mere belief that the act complained of may or will be done is not sufficient. As Lord Brougham said in Earl of Ripon v. Hobart 3 My. & Ke. 174; 41 R R. 40 (1834). proceeding upon practical views of human affairs, the law will guard against risks which are so imminent that no prudent person would incur them, although they do not amount to absolute certainty of damage; it will go further according to the same practical and rational view, and balancing the magnitude of the evil against the chances of its occurrence, it will even, provide against a somewhat less imminent probability in cases where the mischief, should it be done, would be vast and overwhelming. To succeed in such an action, the Plaintiff must show a strong case of probability that the apprehended mischief will in fact arise [Attorney-General v. Manchester Corporation [1893] 2 Ch. 87, 91], or in the words of Fitz Gibbon, L.J., in Attorney-General v. Rathmines (1904) 1 I. R. 161., the law requires proof by the Plaintiff of a well founded apprehension of injury, proof of actual and real danger [Attorney General v. Nottingham Corporation [1904] 1 Oh. 673.]. The Plaintiff must show the existence of an intention on the part of the Defendant to do the act complained of: but direct evidence of such intention may be unnecessary if a man insists on his right to do or begins to do or threatens to do or gives notice of his intention to do an act which must, if completed, give a ground of action. As was observed by Wood, V. C., in Tipping v. Eckersly 2 K. & J. 264 (270) (1655)., the Court may interfere by injunction whether the Defendant has or has not actually committed the breach in respect of which the interference of the Court is sought for. In a case of contract, it is enough if the Defendant claims and insists on a right to do the act, although he has not already done it modo et forma, as alleged. To the same effect is the observation of Jessel, M. R., in Cooper v. Whittingham 15 Ch. D. 501 (1880). In a case of contract, it is enough if the Defendant claims and insists on a right to do the act, although he has not already done it modo et forma, as alleged. To the same effect is the observation of Jessel, M. R., in Cooper v. Whittingham 15 Ch. D. 501 (1880). : wherever an act is illegal and is threatened, the Court will interfere and prevent the act being done, and as regards the mode of granting an injunction, the Court will grant it either when the illegal act is threatened but has not been actually done, or when it has been done and seemingly is intended to be repeated. Of similar import is the observation of Mellish, L. J., in Hext v. Gill L. R. 7 Ch. App. 699 (711) (1872)., which arose in connection with the exercise of mining rights : where persons claim to have the right to do a thing even though saying they have no present intention of doing it, it is idle for them to say that they do not threaten to do the thing, and to contend that they are not proper parties to a bill for a declaration of right and for an injunction. The same principle has been affirmed in numerous judicial decisions, amongst which may be mentioned : Attor-ney-General v. Forbes 2 My. & Cr. 132; 45 R. R. 15 (1836)., Shafts v. Balckow & Co. 34 Ch. D. 729 (1887)., Carleton v. Coleman. [1911] 1 K. B. 783, Thornhill v. Weeks [1913] 1 Ch. 438 (444) and Pots v. Levy 2 Drewry 272 (279); 100 R. R. 131 (1854). Tested in the light of these principles, it is plain that as the Defendant claims a right to take away the entire coal, the Court is competent to grant an injunction, if it is established that what the Defendant asserts he has a right to do, would constitute a breach of contract between the lessor and the lessee. As regards the mode of removal of the coal, however, the Defendant asserts that he never intended to take it out of the mine, through a pit in his own colliery, and that it would, indeed, be needlessly expensive and inconvenient to do so. The Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to prove that he has any ground for an injunction in this respect. The Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to prove that he has any ground for an injunction in this respect. The suit cannot consequently be deemed premature in respect of all the reliefs claimed, though the objection may hold good with regard to one of them. 2. As regards the first ground on which an injunction is sought, the Subordinate Judge has held that the Defendant is bound to leave a barrier of coal between the demised mine and the adjoining mines, on the principle that a lessee who removes a barrier between the demised mine and an adjoining mine is, as was ruled in Marker v. Kenrick 13 C. B. 188 (1853) prima facie guilty of waste. That doctrine has no application to the circumstances of the present case. No doubt, the owner of a lower mine must, if he wishes to guard against the natural flow of water from the mines of his neighbour, have a barrier in the upper part of his mine to pen back the water: Marker v. Kenrick 13 C. B. 188 (1853), Mex-borough v. Bower 7 Beav. 127 (1843) and Baird v. Williamson 15 C. B. N. S. 376(1863) and the lessee may be held liable for damage done by breaking down the barrier between the mines : Llynvi v. Brogden L. R. 11 Eq. 188 (192) (1870). In the present case, the lessee is entitled under the lease to remove all the coal of the demised mine; but he undertook to manage the work according to the prevailing practice with special care and expertness. It has not been suggested that the Defendant has acted in breach of this covenant. It is not necessary for our present purpose to determine whether a lease of all the coals in certain lands, without any stipulation as to barriers, entitles the lessee to work the minerals so as not to leave a barrier to prevent the invasion of water from an adjacent mine, but there is authority for the proposition that in such a case the lessee is relieved, by implication, from an obligation to leave a barrier as protection against the invasion of water : Wemyss v. Hopes Trust Fac. Col 161, Wark v. Bargaddi Goal Go. 18 Dun 172; 3 Mac H. L. C. 467 1856) and Mundy v. Ratland (23 Ch. D. 81 (1882). Col 161, Wark v. Bargaddi Goal Go. 18 Dun 172; 3 Mac H. L. C. 467 1856) and Mundy v. Ratland (23 Ch. D. 81 (1882). It is plain that, in any view, it is not obligatory upon the lessee to leave a barrier of coal merely to prevent communication with adjoining mines, and this is the sole object with which the Plaintiff seeks an injunction against the Defendants. Reference may, in this connection, be made to the tenth paragraph of the lease, by which the lessee undertook riot to cut the coal so as to overleap the boundaries of the land settled with him; obviously no question of trespass into the mine of an adjoining owner could arise, unless, the parties contemplated that the lessee Was entitled under the lease to work the minerals right up to the extremity of the boundary of the demised mine. We hold accordingly that the injunction granted by the Subordinate Judge which restrains the Defendant from breaking through the existing barrier of coal cannot be supported. 3. As regards the second ground on which the injunction is sought, the Subordinate Judge has held that the Defendant is not entitled to raise coal from the demised mine through the pits in his own mine. The question has turned out to be of practical importance to the Plaintiff under somewhat exceptional and possibly unforeseen circumstances. The lessee of the demised mine is bound under the lease to pay the lessor a royalty of 6 annas per ton, on all coal raised from the mine and despatch by railway or sold at the mouth of the pit, subject to the payment of a minimum annual royalty of Rs. 960. The original lessee had no other land in the neighbourhood, and could work the mine only through pits sunk therein. The Defendant transferee, however, holds other mines in the vicinity, on the condition of payment of only a fixed dead rent without royalty on the output of the coal. The position, consequently, is that if the Defendant raises, through the pit of his own colliery, coal from the demised mine, separate accounts must be kept of the coal raised from the different sources. The Plaintiff apprehends that the Defendant will pass off the coal raised from the demised mine as coal from his own colliery and thus deprive the Plaintiff of his legitimate royalty. The Plaintiff apprehends that the Defendant will pass off the coal raised from the demised mine as coal from his own colliery and thus deprive the Plaintiff of his legitimate royalty. The Plaintiff contends that in these circumstances, the Defendant should not be allowed to raise coal from the demised mine through the pit of his adjacent mine or in other words to work the demised mine by instrokes as it is technically called. The question raised is by no means free from difficulty and is not covered by any authority precisely in point, The right of instroke is the right of conveying minerals leased, to the surface, through a pit or shaft in an adjoining mine; it is the converse right to that of outstroke, which is the right of conveying minerals from an adjoining mine to the surface through a pit or shaft in the mine leased. As regards these rights, it has been held that a lessee is prima facie ntitled to work by instroke but not by Outstroke: Wheatley v. Ramage 10 W. R. (Eng.) 315 (1862), Lewis v. Fotherjill L. R. 5 Ch. App. 103 (1869), Jegon v. Vivian L. R. 6 Ch. App. 742 (1871), Duke of Hamilton v. Graham L. R. 2 Sc. and Div. 166, Ramsay v. Blair 1 App. Cas. 701 (1876) and Mungle v. Young 10 Mac 901;6 S. L. R. 217 (1869). This doctrine is defended on the principle that by instroke working the lessee puts his own property to a legitimate use as a roadway by conveying through it the minerals leased, and it matters not to the lessor how the minerals in the mine leased are excavated, provided, as a well-known author adds, the royalty account of the two mines are kept separate: (Stewart on Mines, p. 11.5). 4. The question, however, has arisen, as the reports show, only in connection with the right of the lessor to compel the lessee to sink a pit or shaft in the demised mine, and it has been ruled that if the lessor desires to deprive the lessee of his right of instroke working, he must do so by clear and unambiguous provision, making it obligatory on the lessee to sink pits or shafts : James v. Cochrane 7 Exch. 170; 8 Exch. 674 (1863). 170; 8 Exch. 674 (1863). and the obligation to sink a pit, where not expressly laid on the lessee, is not one readily inferred : Wheatley v. Westminster Brymbo Coal Co. L. R. 9. Eq. 538 (1869). The question of the exercise of the right of instroke has not been, so far as we have been able to discover, raised and considered under circumstances similar to those of the present case, viz., where there are pits on the mine demised and the lessee holds adjacent mines under conditions substantially different from those on which the demised mine has been transferred to him. It may be a question of some nicety, whether, in circumstances like these, the Court should assume that the parties intended that the lessee should possess the right to Work by instroke. It is perfectly plain that, in the present case, the original parties to the lease did not contemplate the contingency which has happened and did not make provision therefor in the contract. There would, consequently, be a presumption of right in the lessee to work in the most advantageous way, subject to his not committing a fraud on the lessor. One position is thus obvious, viz., that if it be assumed that the lessee has the right to work by instroke, he cannot be permitted to exercise that right fraudulently to the detriment of his lessor, and if it were established that he has fraudulently passed off coal raised from the demised mine by instroke as coal of his own colliery, the Court would not hesitate to grant an injunction to restrain him from a repetition of the fraudulent act. No such attempt at fraud has ever been sought to be proved. On the other hand, the Defendant in the ninth paragraph of his written statement distinctly stated that the apprehension of the Plaintiff was entirely unfounded, that he had no intention to work by instroke, and that it; would, as a matter of fact, be needlessly expensive and inconvenient for him to carry the coal out of the demised mine through the pits of the adjoining mines. In these circumstances we are of opinion that the injunction granted, by the Subordinate Judge to restrain the Defendant, from working the mine by instroke cannot be sustained. 5. In these circumstances we are of opinion that the injunction granted, by the Subordinate Judge to restrain the Defendant, from working the mine by instroke cannot be sustained. 5. As regards the third ground, on which the injunction is sought, the Subordinate Judge has held that the Defendant cannot be directed to maintain the pillars in their present shape and size. The Plaintiff contends that the injunction, in this respect, has been improperly refused. We are of opinion that there is no foundation for this contention. Prima facie, the owner of the surface has a right of support, and the lessee is not entitled to work the mine so as to cause a subsidence : Dugdale v. Robertson 3 K. and J. 695; 112 R. R. 349 (1857), Eadon v. Jeffcock L. R. 7 Exch. 379 (1872), Hunt v. Peake Johnson 705(1860), Davis v. Treharne 6 A. C. 460 (1881), Butterknowle v. Bishop [1906] A. C. 305., Manchester v. New Moss [1908] A. C 117, London and N. W. Railway Co. v. Hornby Park Coal Co. [1910] A. C. 11., Butterly v. New Hucknole [1910] A. C. 385 and Rowhotham v. Wilson 8 H. L. C. 360 (1860). This right to support will be protected by an injunction, if the Court is satisfied that injury is imminent and certain to result from the Defendant's acts : Barley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell 11 App, Cas. 145 (188), Birmingham Corporation v. Allan 6 Ch D 287 (1877). and Sidons v. Short 2 C. P. D. 577(1877); the Court will also interfere by injunction when the Defendant claims the right to do acts which must inevitably cause a subsidence : Proud v. Bates 34 L J. Ch. 412 (1865), Hext v. Gill L. R. 7 Ch. App. 699 (711) (1872), Attorney-General v. Conduit Colliery Co. [1896] 1 Q. B 314. and Helton v. Gramille Cr.& Ph. 297; 54 R. R. 297 (1841), In the case before us, there are no materials to show that the Plaintiff has the right to the surface, and till such right has been established, he would have no right to claim protection against subsidence of the surface. [1896] 1 Q. B 314. and Helton v. Gramille Cr.& Ph. 297; 54 R. R. 297 (1841), In the case before us, there are no materials to show that the Plaintiff has the right to the surface, and till such right has been established, he would have no right to claim protection against subsidence of the surface. Assuming however that the Plaintiff has right, in the surface, there is no evidence to show that the pillars need be maintained in this present size and number to prevent subsidence, and in view of the statutory rules for the working of mines, it is extremely improbable that the Defendant could alter the pillars in such a way as to endanger the surface. The Defendant further protested in the twelfth and thirteenth paragraphs of his written statement that he had no intention to alter the pillars in such a way as to cause a subsidence of the surface, for the obvious reason that such subsidence would mean destruction of his works. We are of opinion that, the Subordinate Judge has rightly refused to grant an injunction in this respect. The result is that, the appeal by the Plaintiff (No. 340 of 1912) must be dismissed, the appeal by the fifth Defendant (No. 314 of 1912) allowed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge discharged. The suit will stand dismissed with costs in both Courts payable by the Plaintiff to the fifth Defendant alone. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at five gold mohurs in each appeal.