Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (March 12, 1912) partly affirming and partly reversing a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur (April 3, 1911). The suit was brought by Bhaiaji Thakur, since deceased and now represented by the appellants, under the following circumstances. The sebaiti of a certain Hindu temple was vested in Brahmin families known as Pandas, who were entitled to share in the daily surplus offerings to the idol, after the discharge of the expenses of the worship. One Pratipal Thakur was a sebait and, as such, was entitled to a 3 annas 6 pies share in the surplus offerings. He died in 1851, and was succeeded by his widow Grihimoni Thakurani (hereinafter called Grihimoni). In 1874 she mortgaged to the respondent twenty-one bighas of land appertaining to the temple, and in 1875 sold to the respondents father eleven bighas of land, which had belonged to her husband. It was found by the Subordinate Judge that the mortgage did not include her share in the temple offerings and that the alienations were not made from necessity. In 1880 the respondent obtained a money decree against Grihimoni upon the mortgage. In execution of that decree there was sold in 1891 the " income of the muth .... to the extent of 3 annas 6 pies, which belongs to the judgment debtor," and it was purchased by the respondent, who was put into formal possession thereof on November 20, 1892. The respondent was by his caste precluded from holding the office of sebait. In 1892 Grihimoni and Bhaiaji Thakur (now represented by the appellants) instituted a suit to set aside the sale, on the ground, among others, that the offerings were not alienable. Two Courts held that Bhaiaji Thakur could not be a party and the High Court allowed the suit to be withdrawn, with leave to bring a fresh suit. In 1895 Grihimoni alone brought a fresh suit to set aside the sale, alleging fraud. This suit was dismissed by the High Court in 1898 on the ground that the sale could only be set aside under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. Grihimoni died in 1900 and Bhaiaji Thakur succeeded, as next reversionary heir, to the estate of Pratipal Thakur. This suit was dismissed by the High Court in 1898 on the ground that the sale could only be set aside under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. Grihimoni died in 1900 and Bhaiaji Thakur succeeded, as next reversionary heir, to the estate of Pratipal Thakur. On January 28, 1910, Bhaiaji Thakur instituted the present suit praying for (a) a declaration that he was entitled to the eleven bighas of land and to the 3 annas 6 pies share in the surplus offerings, (b) a declaration that the respondent had no title thereto, (c) a decree for possession, (d) mesne profits and other relief. Both Courts found in the plaintiffs favour as to the eleven bighas of land and no question arose upon the appeal with regard thereto. With regard to the share in the offerings the respondent pleaded that the suit was barred by res judicata and by limitation. The Subordinate Judge, by his judgment delivered on April 3, 1911, held that the share of the temple offerings could not be attached or sold in execution; he held that the suit was governed by art. 124 of Sched. I. of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, but that it was not barred as it was brought within twelve years after the death of Grihimoni. He also held that the suit was not barred as being res judicata having regard to the suits in 1892 and 1895, and made a decree in the plaintiffs favour. The respondent appealed to the High Court. That Court (Coxe and Imam JJ.) reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge with regard to the temple offerings. The learned judges held that the dismissal of the suit brought by Grihimoni in 1895 was binding upon the reversionary heirs inasmuch as she fully represented the estate, and a decree against her as sebait would bind her reversionary heirs. They also held that the suit was barred under art. 124, on the ground that the respondent had been in adverse possession of the share of the temple offerings since 1892 and the suit was commenced in 1910. The appeal to the High Court is reported at I. L. R. 39 Calc. 887. Dunne and Dube, for the appellants. The High Court was wrong in holding that the suit was barred by res judicata and by limitation. The appeal to the High Court is reported at I. L. R. 39 Calc. 887. Dunne and Dube, for the appellants. The High Court was wrong in holding that the suit was barred by res judicata and by limitation. The suit is not one to recover an hereditary office and art. 124 has no application. What was sold was merely the share in the surplus offerings. The respondent did not and could not acquire the sebaitship since he was precluded by caste from performing or providing for the worship. Even admitting that a sebait represents the idol, the possession obtained by the respondent was adverse to the widows possession but not adverse to that of Bhaiaji Thakur, since his right did not accrue until the death of the widow. Under art. 140 time only runs against the reversioner from the date when his estate falls into possession. PrO8iinno Kumari Debya v. Gobal Chanel Baboo (( 1875) L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 145.) is distinguishable as in that case the money was borrowed for the purpose of the temple, but in the present case there is no evidence that that was so. The decision in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Vela Pandaram (( 1899) L. R, 27 Ind. Ap. 69), which was relied on by the learned judges in the High Court, is also distinguishable. In that case what was sold was the property of the idol which was not alienable; what was sold in the present case was the debtors interest in the surplus. The respondent did not hold adversely to the reversioner to that interest. Lowndes, for the respondent. It was admitted below that art. 124 applied, the only question argued being at what date the time began to run. Under the explanation to that article, the time began to run from the date when the profits were first received by the respondent, namely, in 1892. Art. 140 does not apply to affect the limitation under art. 124, and it has no application to the present suit as the case made by the appellant, both below and by his case upon appeal, was that the respondent was a trespasser from the first and not merely that the appellant was entitled as reversioner. It was held by a Full Bench in Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty (( 1868) 9 Suth. It was held by a Full Bench in Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty (( 1868) 9 Suth. W. R. 505.) that an alienation by a sebait is binding upon the reversionary heirs. That decision was under the Limitation Act, 1859, but art. 124 of the Act of 1908 is an exact parallel to the provisions of the Act of 1859 and excludes the application of art. 140. The respondents title was adverse to the reversioner because with regard to a sebaitship a Hindu widow gets a different interest from that which she has in respect of other property. She represents the idol and cannot alienate, even from necessity Shivagunga Case (( 1863) 9 Moo. Ind. Ap. 539, at pp. 603, 604.); Pydigantam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik (( 1904) I. L. R. 28 Madr. 197.); Partab Narain Singh v. Trilokinath Singh. (( 1884) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 197.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. The appellants here are the heirs and legal representatives of one Bhaiaji Thak ur, now dead, who was the plaintiff in the suit in which this appeal has arisen. Bhaiaji Thak ur was a sebait of an ancient temple of Mahadeoji, called the Singheswar temple, which is situate in Mauza Gouripur, otherwise Singhaswarpur, in the district of Bhagalpur. Bhaiaji Thak ur became a sebait of the temple on the death in 1900 of one Musammat Grihimoni, who was the widow of one Pratipal Thak ur. Pratipal Thak ur had been a sebait of the temple, and until his death had been, as such sebait, entitled to receive a 3½ annas share of the daily surplus income from the offerings to, after defraying the expenses of, the temple; on his death his widow Musammat Grihimoni succeeded to his sebaitship and accordingly became entitled to receive the same share of the daily surplus income from the offerings. The right to this 3½ annas share came to Bhaiaji Thakur on the death of Musammat Grihimoni as the next reversionary heir under the Hindu law to the sebaitship. The sebaits of the temple are Brahmin Pandas who, as sebaits, have to perform, or to provide for the performance of, the sacred worship or puja of the deity at the temple. The sebaits of the temple are Brahmin Pandas who, as sebaits, have to perform, or to provide for the performance of, the sacred worship or puja of the deity at the temple. Jharula Das, who is the defendant to the suit and the respondent to this appeal, is by caste a Beldar, and, as a Beldar, is not competent to perform, or to provide for the performance of, the sacred puja to the deity at the temple, and consequently was incapable of acquiring or holding the office of a sebait. In 1880 Jharula Das obtained a decree for money on a mortgage which had been granted by Musammat Grihimoni. In execution of that decree Jharula Das in 1891 caused the 3½ annas share of Musammat Grihimoni to be put up for sale, and at the sale on November 20, 1891, purchased the share. Jharula Das on February 8, 1892, obtained a certificate of sale in which the property which he had purchased was described as the " income of the muth of Sri Singheswarthanji Mahadeo, which muth is situated in Mauza Singeswarthan, pargana, Nisankhipur Kburha, to the extent of 3 annas 6 pies, which belongs to the judgment debtor, within the jurisdiction of the Madhepura Sub-registry Office, Bhagalpur Collectorate." In November, 1892, Musammat Grihimoni and Bhaiaji Thakur brought a suit against Jharula Das to have the sale to him of November 20, 1891, set aside. That suit was by the permission of the Court withdrawn by Musammat Grihimoni and Bhaiaji Thakur with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action. In 1895 Musammat Grihimoni brought a fresh suit against Jharula Das to have the sale set aside on the ground that the decree and the order for sale had been fraudulently obtained by Jharula Das. The suit of 1895 was dismissed on appeal on the ground that her proper remedy was by an application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, to dispute the validity of the sale, and consequently that the suit did not lie. Their Lordships fail to understand how s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1832, could have applied to a suit which in effect was brought to set aside the decree of 1880, and the order for sale, on the ground that Jharula Das had obtained them by fraud. Musammat Grihimoni died in 1900. Their Lordships fail to understand how s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1832, could have applied to a suit which in effect was brought to set aside the decree of 1880, and the order for sale, on the ground that Jharula Das had obtained them by fraud. Musammat Grihimoni died in 1900. On January 25, 1910, Bhaiaji Thakur brought the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur and claimed possession of certain lands and mesne profits and a declaration that he was entitled to receive the 3½ annas share of the net income from the offerings to the temple with other reliefs. In his written statement the defendant Jharula Das alleged, so far as is now material, that Bhaiaji Thakur was bound by the decree which dismissed Musammat Grihimonis suit of 1895, and that the decision in that suit operated on the principle of res judicata to defeat the claim in respect of the 3½ annas share. At the trial a defence that the suit was barred by limitation was raised. As to the defence of res judicata the Subordinate Judge rightly held that the decision in Musammat Grihimonis suit of 1895 did not operate as a bar to this suit. On the question of limitation the Subordinate Judge found that Jharula Das had not purchased the right of sebaitship, but the Subordinate Judge held that the appropriation by Jharula Das of the 3½ annas share of the surplus income from the offerings to the temple practically amounted to a dispossession, and treating Bhaiaji Thakurs suit, so far as it related to the 3½ annas share, as a suit for the establishment of his right to sebaitship and for recovery of the profits of that office, and having found that Musammat Grihimoni had died in 1900, he applied art. 124 of the Second Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and decided that the suit had been brought within time. On April 3, 1911, the Subordinate Judge gave to the appellants here, who had been brought on the record as the representatives of Bhaiaji Thakur, who had died, a decree for possession of the land claimed, for possession of the 3½ annas share of the net income from the offerings to the temple, and for mesne profits subsequent to the institution of the suit. From that decree of the Subordinate Judge Jharula Das appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal. The High Court in the appeal upheld the decision of the Subordinate Judge so far as it related to the land claimed and to mesne profits in respect of the wrongful possession by Jharula Das of that land, and to that extent by their decree affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge. With that part of the decree of the High Court this appeal is not concerned. Those learned judges of the High Court, considering that art. 124 of the Second Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, applied to the claim in respect of the 3½ annas share of the surplus daily income from the offerings to the temple, and being of opinion that the twelve years period of limitation provided by that article began to run in 1892, when Jharula Das first began to appropriate to his own use the income of the 3½ annas share, decided that the claim in respect of the3½ annas share was barred by limitation. They also held that the claim to the share was barred by the principle of res judicata, arriving at that decision apparently on the view that the dismissal of Musammat Grihimonis suit of 1895 extinguished the claim of the sebait to the 3½ annas share. Accordingly, the High Court by its decree of March 12, 1912, set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge so far as it related to the claim to the 3½ annas share and the profits of that share. From that decree of the High Court the present appellants have appealed to His Majesty in Council. The defendant Jharula Das has not appealed. On the hearing of this appeal, the contention that the dismissal of Musammat Grihimonis suit of 1895 extinguished the right of the sebaits to the 3½ annas share, and that the claim in respect of that share was res judicata, was very properly abandoned; it was untenable. But it was strongly contended on behalf of the respondent that the claim in respect of that share came within art. 124 of Sched. I. of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and was barred by limitation. But it was strongly contended on behalf of the respondent that the claim in respect of that share came within art. 124 of Sched. I. of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and was barred by limitation. It is not necessary for their Lordships to consider whether, if that article applied, the twelve years period of limitation began to run in 1892 or on the death of Musammat Grihimoni in 1900, as they are of opinion that art. 124 does not apply in this case. Bhaiaji Thakurs suit was not a suit for possession of an hereditary office. Jharula Das had not taken possession of an hereditary office. The office of sebait of the temple was an hereditary office which could not be held by any one who was not a Brahmin Panda. Jharula Das was not a Brahmin Panda, he was of an inferior caste, and was not competent to hold the office of sebait of the temple, or to provide for the performance of the duties of that office. The appropria tion from time to time by Jharula Das of the income derivable from the 3½ annas share did not deprive Musammat Grihimoni, or, after her death, Bhaiaji Thakur, of the possession of the office of sebait, although that income was receivable by them in right of the sebaitship. The right to the office of sebait did not arise from, or depend upon, the receipt of a share of the surplus daily income from the offerings to the temple, although the right to receive daily a share of the net income from the offerings to the temple was attached to and dependent on the possession of the right to the sebaitship. Unless the sebaits received their share of the daily net income from the offerings it does not appear how the ministrations of the temple could be provided for. By adversely taking and appropriating to his own use a share of the surplus daily income from the offerings Jharula Das acquired no title and no right to a share of that income. On each occasion upon which Jharula Das received and wrongfully appropriated to his own use a share of the income to which the sebait was entitled Jharula Das committed a fresh actionable wrong in respect of which a suit could be brought against him by the sebait. On each occasion upon which Jharula Das received and wrongfully appropriated to his own use a share of the income to which the sebait was entitled Jharula Das committed a fresh actionable wrong in respect of which a suit could be brought against him by the sebait. But it did not constitute him the sebait for the time being or affect in any way the title to the office. The appellants here are entitled to have the decree of the High Court so far as it relates to the 3 ½annas share and to the costs in the High Court and in the Court of the Subordinate Judge varied by setting aside that part of the decree of the High Court which relates to the 3 ½ annas share and those costs, and by giving them a decree for all the costs in the High Court and in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and a declaration that Bhaiaji Thakur was at the date of the suit entitled to the 3 ½ annas share of the net daily income of the offerings to the temple. Their Lordships will advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondent must pay the costs of the appeal.