JUDGMENT : 1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen relates to an estate which was recorded in the name of one Chandrika Dube and after his death in the name of his widow, Mt. Anurani. Upon the death of Mt. Anurani in the year 1900, the patwari submitted a death report stating that her daughter, Mt. Jagrani, the present plaintiff, was her heir and that her name ought to be entered in the revenue papers. An objection was preferred by Mulai, the son of one of the brothers of Chandrika Dube. The dispute was compromised by Jagrani and Mulai (who was the father of the defendants-respondents) on 12th February 1901. By this compromise Jagrani withdrew her claim and consented to the entry of the name of Mulai in the place of Anurani. It may be mentioned that Mulai's contention in the revenue Court was that the family was joint and that he alone was entitled to the property in question. The revenue Court passed an order directing the name of Mulai to be entered in accordance with the compromise. The plaintiff brought the present suit for recovery of possession of the property of which Mulai was, and after him the defendants have been in possession since the year 1901. She denied having entered into the compromise, asserted that she knew nothing as to the terms of it and that a fraud had been practised on her, and alleged that her father was separate and she was entitled to his property upon the death of her mother. The defendants on the other hand relied on the compromise, repeated their assertion as to the family having been joint and stated that the plaintiff was unchaste and was not entitled to inherit her father's property. The Court of first instance found that the family was separate, but it was of opinion that the compromise was made by the plaintiff with full knowledge of it, that it was binding on her, that there was consideration for it and that the defendants had discharged debts due by Chandrika Dube and Anurani. That Court dismissed the suit. The decree of the Court of first instance was affirmed in appeal by the learned Judge. He was of opinion that the compromise was admissible in evidence, he was further of opinion that the compromise was binding on the plaintiff. 2. That Court dismissed the suit. The decree of the Court of first instance was affirmed in appeal by the learned Judge. He was of opinion that the compromise was admissible in evidence, he was further of opinion that the compromise was binding on the plaintiff. 2. Upon the first point, I think the decision of the learned Judge is right. The petition presented in the mutation case only informed the Court of the compromise which the parties had effected. 3. That petition did not require to be stamped or registered as a transfer of interest in immovable property. The case is similar in some respects to that of Kokla v. Pearey Lal , [1916] 35 All. 502 : 21 I.C. 29.. 4. On the second point, viz., whether the plaintiff was fully cognizant of the terms of the compromise and of its effect upon her interests, the finding of the learned Judge is not very satisfactory. What the learned Judge says is this: “The revenue Court, however, was satisfied that she agreed. Her father-in-law and his brother undoubtedly sanctioned her action and she signed the paper.” Whether the learned Judge in making the above remarks only meant to refer to what had taken place in the revenue Court or to find that with the advice of her father-in-law and his brother the plaintiff had entered into the compromise with full knowledge of what she was doing and what its effect would be upon her interests, is not very clear. The learned Judge does not in distinct terms find against the plaintiff on this point on the strength of the evidence adduced in the case. It will, therefore, be more satisfactory to have a clear finding from him on this point. Furthermore: it Chandrika Dube was separate the plaintiff would ordinarily be his heir after the death of her mother. If she agreed to give up her interest there must have been some consideration for the relinquishment of her rights. The Court of first instance found that there was consideration for such relinquishment. This finding of the Court of first instance was disputed in appeal in the Court below, bub the learned Judge came to no finding in regard to it and he deemed it necessary to discuss the point. The Court of first instance found that there was consideration for such relinquishment. This finding of the Court of first instance was disputed in appeal in the Court below, bub the learned Judge came to no finding in regard to it and he deemed it necessary to discuss the point. In my opinion for a satisfactory decision of this case, it is necessary to have findings from the Court below on the following issues, which I refer to that Court under O. 41, R. 25 of the CPC.: (1) Did the plaintiff enter into the compromise of 12th February 1901 with full knowledge of its contents and of its effect upon her interests after obtaining proper advice in regard thereto? (2) Was there any, and if so what, consideration for the said compromise? (3) Was the property in suit the separate property of Chandrika Dube or was it the property of a joint family of which he and Mulai were members? (4) Did the plaintiff become unchaste before the death of her mother? 5. The Court will try the above issues on the evidence already upon the record. On receipt of its findings the usual 10 days will he allowed for filing objections. 6. On receipt of the findings, his Lordship delivered the following. JUDGMENT 7. Upon the first issue referred to the Court below its finding is that Mt. Jagrani, the plaintiff, entered into the compromise with full knowledge of its contents and of its effect upon her interests after obtaining proper advice in regard thereto. On the second issue it finds that there was consideration for the compromise, though it was not as adequate as it should have been. Upon these findings, which are findings of fact, the plaintiff's appeal must fail. I accordingly dismiss it with costs.