JUDGMENT : 1. The case for the plaintiff-respondent in this appeal was as follows. She stated that on the 12th of July 1907 she sold to Mihi Lal and Thakur Das certain immoveable property for the sum of Rs. 900, that the vendees agreed in the sale-deed that they would not partition the share purchased without the consent of the plaintiff and that they also would not interfere with her retention of the post of lambardar, that the two vendees represented to her that the value of the concession they had made in regard to partition and lambardari was at least Rs. 250 and asked her to forego that sum in their favour out of the purchase-money. She agreed to this and remitted Rs. 250, though at the time of the registration the admitted receipt of the full Rs. 900, that Thakur Das and Mihi Lal subsequently applied for partition of the Bhare, that she objected and after appeals to the Collector and the Commissioner the application for partition was dropped, that after the death of Thakur Das, who died childless, Mihi Lal had now applied for partition and the Revenue Court, having acquiesced, it was being carried out. She, therefore, sued, primarily, for an injunction against Mihi Lal to restrain him from proceeding with the partition and in the alternative she claimed the sum of Rs. 250, stating it to be unpaid purchase-money. The Courts below have found the facts in favour of the plaintiff and they have granted her a decree for Rs. 250 plus interest from the date of the sale, recoverable as unpaid purchase-money, by sale of the property in question. The defendants have come here in second appeal. They plead that the sum of Rs. 250 was in no way unpaid purchase-money, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the money as such, that portion of the contract relating to the right of partition was contrary to public policy and as such void and, therefore, not enforceable and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything at all. Stress is laid on Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. Section 28, in my opinion, hardly applies. Section 23 possibly may apply. It is quite clear to me that the claim for Rs. 250 can in no way be a claim for unpaid purchase-money. On the plaintiff's own showing the purchase-money was Rs. Stress is laid on Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. Section 28, in my opinion, hardly applies. Section 23 possibly may apply. It is quite clear to me that the claim for Rs. 250 can in no way be a claim for unpaid purchase-money. On the plaintiff's own showing the purchase-money was Rs. 900, but owing to the persuasion of the vendees she actually remitted Rs. 250 out of the consideration for the property, in view of the fact that the vendees had agreed to the two conditions mentioned. This is equally clear from the fact that the plaintiff has stated that her cause of action arose not on the date of the sale but on the date on which Mihi Lal applied to the Revenue Court for partition and the Revenua Court passed an order in his favour. There cannot be the slightest doubt that if Mihi Lal had not applied for partition, this suit would never have been brought. I note here that the prayer for injunction was dismissed by the Court below and it is not pressed in this Court. On the facts found it is clear that if the contract be not void then the plaintiff is merely entitled to recover damages for the breach of the contract. 2. In regard to the contract itself, so far as it relates to the partition it is pleaded that such a contract is contrary to public policy, as it is a limitation of the right of ownership which passed under the sale-deed. Looking at the matter from all points of view, it seems to me that the meaning of the parties was only this much that in the life-time of the plaintiff the vendees would not apply for partition except with her consent. No right was absolutely given up, and I am not prepared to hold that such a contract is against public policy and, therefore, void. 3. It is a condition which would not be binding on the heirs of the vendee but as against Mihi Lal, I think the condition is binding. The suit was instituted as against him and the plaintiff, in my opinion, was clearly entitled to a decree for compensation. 4. The question remains as to the proper measure of that compensation. 3. It is a condition which would not be binding on the heirs of the vendee but as against Mihi Lal, I think the condition is binding. The suit was instituted as against him and the plaintiff, in my opinion, was clearly entitled to a decree for compensation. 4. The question remains as to the proper measure of that compensation. On the facts found by the Court below, it is clear that the parties themselves had fixed the value of the right at Rs. 250 and that sum, in my opinion, will be a proper measure of the damages sustained. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to a decree for that sum, but she is not entitled to a decree for sale nor is she entitled to interest for any period prior to the breach of contract. I, therefore, allow the appeal to this extent that I modify the decree of the Court below and give the plaintiff a simple money-decree for that sum of Rs. 250 plus interest at 6 per cent, per annum from June 25th, 1912, upto the date of payment. In so far as the Courts below are concerned the plaintiff will have her costs in both those Courts. In so far as this Court is concerned the parties will pay their own costs.