JUDGMENT : 1. This is a second appeal in a suit which has arisen out of the following circumstances. In the year 1897 an occupancy tenant gave a mortgage, with conditional sale to a mortgagee, of one plot of land forming part of his occupancy tenure. That tenant is now represented by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 in the present suit. The mortgagee is represented by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. A foreclosure suit was brought against the tenant by the mortgagees, and it was decreed by the 13th April 1905. Final decree was obtained, was put into execution and the mortgagees-decree-holders obtained possession through the Civil Court on the 14th January 1912. To none of these proceedings was the plaintiff or his representative a party. The present suit was brought on November 15th, 1912, by the zemindar against the occupancy tenant and the mortgagees-decree-holders. The following reliefs were asked for: that it may be declared that all proceedings taken in regard to the mortgage, the decree and the obtaining of possession were null and void as against the plaintiffs and, secondly, that the occupancy tenants and their transferees be dispossessed and the plaintiffs put into possession. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Munsif who decreed it. On appeal the only point argued before the Court below was one of jurisdiction. The Court below treated the case in a peculiar manner. The point before it was only one of jurisdiction. 2. It actually held that the suit was one under S. 31, clause 2, which is mentioned in group (c) of Schedule IV of the Tenancy Act of 1901 and as in that Schedule the period of limitation for such a suit is one year calculated from the date in which the illegal transfer was made and as the suit has been brought more than twelve years from the date of the original mortgage, it was barred by limitation. The argument before me is that Section 31 of the Tenancy Act does not govern the present suit at all, that the Revenue Court has no power to declare a decree of the Civil Court to be null and void, that Section 31 does not cover or include those transfers which are declared to be illegal by Section 20, clause 2, or Section 21 and that the case is one which is cognizable by a Civil Court and is well within the period of twelve years. In the alternative I am asked to grant to the plaintiffs a declaration that the Civil Court decree and all proceedings taken thereunder are null and void as against the plaintiffs and not binding upon them, this being a declaration which the Revenue Court would have no authority to grant. 3. This is asked with a view to enable the plaintiffs to take further proceedings in the Revenue Court for ejectment of the opposite party. It seems to me that the suit as brought, in so far as the relief in ejectment is concerned, is clearly a suit contemplated by Section 31 of the Tenancy Act. At the time when the mortgage was made, i.e., in the year 1897 the old Rent Act was in force, but even under that Act the transfer was illegal and could have been set aside. The present suit, if it had been brought before Act II of 1901 came into force, to obtain this relief, would have been brought in the Civil Court. But Act II of 1901 has clearly in view of Sections 20, 21, 31 and 167 removed a suit of this nature from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and has placed it under the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court. The illegal transfers contemplated by Section 31 of the Tenancy Act clearly so include and cover the illegal transfers mentioned in Sections 20 and 21. Some stress is laid on the use of the word ‘voidable’ in Section 31. It conflicts, in one sense, with the meaning of Sections 20 and 21. But it seems to me that it is quite clear that the word ‘voidable’ is used in a wrong sense in Section 31, The object of that section is simply to state the methods in which a zemindar may avoid the result of a void transfer made by a tenant. But it seems to me that it is quite clear that the word ‘voidable’ is used in a wrong sense in Section 31, The object of that section is simply to state the methods in which a zemindar may avoid the result of a void transfer made by a tenant. It points out that the zemindar may sue for cancellation of the same, though it seems difficult to understand why a void transfer should require cancellation; it also enables him to eject both the tenant and the transferee. Personally I have no doubt whatever that if an illegal transfer of any description whatsoever is made by a tenant at the present time, the landlord if he wishes to interfere in the matter must do so by a suit brought in the Revenue Court in terms of Section 31 of the Tenancy Act. It is clear, therefore, that the present suit in so far as it seeks the ejectment of the transferors and the transferees, is a suit which can only be brought in the Revenue Court and the Court of the Munsif had no jurisdiction whatsoever to deal with that portion of the case. In a suit of that description moreover, an appeal does not lie to the Civil Court but to the Revenue Court (vide Schedule IV of the Act). Otherwise if the appeal had lain to the Civil Court, the question of jurisdiction would have fallen to the ground in the Court of Appeal. 4. There remains the question of the declaration that the decree and possession thereunder are null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. This, in my opinion, is correct. Section 20, clause 2 of the Tenancy Act clearly states that the interest of an occupancy tenant is not transferable in execution of a decree of the Civil Court. Also where the interest of the tenant is not transferable, Section 21 states that he shall not be competent to transfer his holding or any part thereof otherwise than by sub-lease as hereinafter provided. On behalf of the respondents it is urged that to grant to the plaintiffs this declaration will be of no use because, if they go to the Revenue Court now to seek ejectment they will be met by the bar of limitation. The plaintiff came into Court within twelve months of the delivery of possession by the Civil Court. On behalf of the respondents it is urged that to grant to the plaintiffs this declaration will be of no use because, if they go to the Revenue Court now to seek ejectment they will be met by the bar of limitation. The plaintiff came into Court within twelve months of the delivery of possession by the Civil Court. It is quite possible that the Revenue Court may treat that delivery of possession as an illegal transfer in execution of a decree of the Civil Court and may possibly grant to the present appellants the whole of the period which has been occupied in the present litigation, on the ground that they have bona fide brought their suit in ejectment in a wrong Court. It is quite possible that the Revenue Court may, therefore, hold that there is no bar of limitation. It is not for me to lay down for the Revenue Court what it ought or ought not to do. But in view of this possibility and in view also of the fact that the mortgage, the decree and delivery of possession were all contrary to law, I think I shall be justified in granting to the plaintiffs at least the declaration which they seek. It may possibly be of considerable use to them in the Revenue Court. The grant of the declaration is a matter of discretion. It was clearly asked for by the plaintiffs in their plaint. In the result the suit so far as it is a suit for ejectment, must fail on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. In so far as the suit is one for declaration, that the decree and proceedings taken in execution thereof are all contrary to law, null and void and not binding on the plaintiff, I think the suit should be decreed. I, therefore, allow the appeal to this extent that I grant to the plaintiffs the declaration that I have just set forth above. The rest of the claim stands dismissed. The parties will pay and receive costs in all Courts in proportion to failure and success. Costs in this Court will include fees on the higher scale.