JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the respondents to set aside a sale, made by their brother Sardar Singh and their mother Kaunsilia, of a 16 biswansi, 13 kachwansi, 5 nanwansi share in a village and for possession of the property. 2. The share in question is part of a 1 biswa, 19 biswansi, 15 kachwansi, 4 tanwansi, 2 nanwansi share in the village, which was the joint property of the three brothers and their father, who died many years ago when all three brothers were minors. During their minority their mother Kaunsilia mortgaged a 1 biswa, 15 biswansi, 13 kachwansi share to one Raghunath Singh and placed him in possession. In 1895 after the eldest brother Sardar Singh had attained full age, he and his mother sold the share now in suit to the aforesaid Raghunath and a man named Subadar Singh. The mortgage-money was paid off out of the usufruct by June, 1909, and the two purchasers then took possession as such of the share which they had purchased. 3. The present suit was instituted in August, 1912. The plaintiffs-respondents say that they did not get to know of the sale till August, 1911, and they suggest that the purchasers, who are represented in this suit by the appellant Kalyan and another, fraudulently concealed the fact of the sale from them. 4. It has been found by both Courts below that no legal necessity for the sale has been established by the purchasers' representatives. The only question for decision is whether the Courts below were right in holding that the suit was brought within time. It has been found, and it is now admitted, that both the plaintiffs-respondents attained majority more than three years before the suit. 5. If, as contended by the appellant, Article 44 of the first Schedule to the Limitation Act applies, then the suit is plainly barred by limitation unless the case is saved by S. 18 of the Act. Both Courts below have held that the suit is governed, not by Article 44, but by Article 144 and is within time, because the possession of the purchasers did not become adverse till 1909, when the mortgage was cleared off. Both Courts below have held that the suit is governed, not by Article 44, but by Article 144 and is within time, because the possession of the purchasers did not become adverse till 1909, when the mortgage was cleared off. The plaintiffs-respondents have treated the mortgage as binding upon them as they were entitled to do [see Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali, (1912) 13 I.C. 976 : 34 All. 213 : 39 I.A. 49 : 15 O.C. 49 (P.C.).] and, therefore, possession of the purchasers did not become adverse to them till the mortgage was cleared off. If Article 144 applies the suit is well within time. 6. I am unable to accept the contention that Article 44 applies to this suit. When the sale was made, Mt. Kaunsilia was not guardian of the property of the plaintiffs-respondents [see Gharibullah v. Khalak Singh, (1903) 25 All. 407 : 30 I.A. 165 (P.C.). The property was part of the joint family property of the plaintiffs and their brother, Sardar Singh. Mt. Kaunsilia must, I think, be disregarded altogether. She had no right whatever to deal with the property of the family after Sardar Singh came of age. Regarded as a sale by her alone, the sale was void altogether and Article 44 does not apply to such a case [see Sham Chandra Dafadar v. Gadadhar Mandal, (1911) 9 I.C. 377.]. The sale should, I think, be regarded as having been made by Sardar Singh and even if it be assumed that he was karta of the family, he was not guardian of the property of his brother within the meaning of Article 44. This Article has never been applied to a suit to set aside a sale by a karta of joint family property. Nor, as far as I am aware, has Article 91 ever been applied to such a case as this. It appears to me that the relevant Article is 144, that the prayer in the plaint that the sale may be set aside is probably superfluous and that the suit is well within time. The appeal is dismissed with costs.