Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (March 23, 1910) affirming a judgment and decree of the District Court of Balaghat (February 26, 1907). The suit was instituted by the appellants, three brothers, to recover possession of immovable property which they claimed as reversionary heirs, according to the Mitakshara law, of one Lakshman Rao. As appears from the pedigree set out in the judgment of their Lordships, the appellants, claiming through their mother Rangoobai, were sixth in descent (counting in the usual way, namely, including both first and last as a degree) from Timaji Pant, the grandfather of Lakshman Rao. The respondents (defendants) were the husband of Lakshman Kaos deceased daughter and their son. 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 121 It was admitted in the present appeal, though it had been otherwise contended by the respondents in India, that the family of Timaji Pant was governed by the Mitakshara law. The sole question for determination accordingly became whether or not the appellants were within the limits of heritable bandhus recog nized by that law. The learned District Judge upon this question held that the appellants, claiming through their mother and being sixth in descent from the common ancestor Timaji Pant, were outside the limits of heritable bandhus recognized by the Mitakshara law and had no claim ; he, therefore, dismissed the suit. The appellants appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, which, by its judgment delivered on March 23, 1910, affirmed the decision of the District Judge. De Gruyther, K.C., and Parikh, for the appellants. The appellants are entitled under the Mitakshara, c. II., s. 6, to the inheritance claimed. The word " sapinda " in that passage means blood relation of whatever degree. The word is first used in the Mitakshara in a generic sense for purposes of inheritance, meaning simply blood relation. It is also used in a specific and restricted sense in three connections, namely, (1.) marriage prohibition, (2.) stradh, and (3.) impurity ; these uses of the word, however, are exceptions and do not control its general meaning as a blood relation. In the text of Manu (c. IX., v. 186, Sir William Jones translation), " to the nearest sapinda the inheritance next belongs," the Mitakshara assigns to " sapinda" the meaning blood relation. In the text of Manu (c. IX., v. 186, Sir William Jones translation), " to the nearest sapinda the inheritance next belongs," the Mitakshara assigns to " sapinda" the meaning blood relation. The sapinda relationship under the Mitakshara is based upon consanguinity and not upon religious merit Mitakshara, Achara-kanda, c. III.; G. Sastris Hindu Law, pp. 52—58 ; Sarvadhikaris Hindu Law of Inheritance, ed. 1882, p. 605 ; Bannerjees Hindu Law of Marriage, ed. 1879, p. 60; West and Buhler’s Hindu Law, vol. i., p. 120; and Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand.(( 1880) I. L. R. 6 Calc. 119, at p. 124.) The rules of inheritance under the Mitakshara are not based upon the right to offer funeral oblations as is the case under the Dayabhaga Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 7 and p. 678. Colebrookes translation of Mitakshara, c. II., s. 5, which connects sapinda with funeral oblations, is incorrect Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbhai.(( 1876) I. L. R. 2 Bomb. 388, at p. 431) In Mitakshara, c. IL, ss. 5 and 6, " sapinda " is used in a restricted sense with regard to funeral oblations and in reference to the gotra only. Even within the gotra the right of inheritance is not limited to sapindaship in the narrow funeral oblation sense Gridhari hall Roy v. Bengal Government. (( 1868) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 448.) [Reference was also made to Yajnavalkya, c. I. (52.) and (53.) and c. II. (57.) to (61.); Mandlik, pp. 345 and 391; Vyavastha Chandrika, p. 193 ; and Sastris Viramitrodaya, pp. 156 and 199.] Both Courts below, relying on Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand (I. L. R. 6 Calc. 119.) and Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram (( 1894) I. L. R. 22 Calc. 339.), held that the limitation in the case of marriage applied to inheritance. But different authorities give different degrees of prohibition in the case of marriage and they are in many instances affected by local usage and caste custom Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 103; Mandlik, pp. 410—416 and 425; Sastris Hindu Law, pp. 70, 93 and 94. A rule of inheritance, however, must be fixed and invariable. Further the prohibitions as to marriage are in their nature inapplicable to inheritance, and if applied to inheritance they lead to absurd results. 410—416 and 425; Sastris Hindu Law, pp. 70, 93 and 94. A rule of inheritance, however, must be fixed and invariable. Further the prohibitions as to marriage are in their nature inapplicable to inheritance, and if applied to inheritance they lead to absurd results. For instance in the present case they would not exclude the appellants sons even though the appellants themselves be excluded. Also, relying upon the two last cited cases, both Courts held that there must be mutuality of sapindaship between a claimant and the propositus, but the only authority upon which this rule of mutuality was founded is Sarvadhikaris Hindu Law of Inheritance, p. 569, where Visvesvara Bhatta and Ballam Bhatta are cited. These two commentators upon the Mitakshara cannot override its doctrines, and moreover their works are not authorities in the Benares school, to which the parties belong West and Buhler, p. 17; Morleys Digest, vol. i., int., pp. 201, 205, 221. If, however, it be held that according to the Mitakshara bandhu relationship is limited, the question arises, what is the limit ? If there is any limit it is seven degrees whether the claim is through the father 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 122 or the mother. The Mitakshara in c. II., s. 5 (6.), lays down a limitation of seven degrees in the sapinda relationship in the same gotra, but lays down no limit in a different gotra. If any limitation is to be imposed in the latter case it should be that specifically laid down in the former, and not five degrees Mussamat Umroot v. Kalyandas ((1820) 1 Borr. R. 284, at p. 314.); G. Sastris Hindu Law, p. 74; and West and Buhler, p. 489. The decision in Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand (I. L. R. 6 Calc. 119.) is not an authority for the application of prohibited degrees, as the position of F in the table given in the judgment was not for decision. In Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram (I. L. R. 22 Calc. 339.) the question of degrees never arose. [Parot Bapalal Sevakram v. Mehta Harilal Surajram (( 1894) I. L. R. 19 Bomb. 631.) and Venkatagiri v. Chandru (( 1899) I. L. R. 23 Madr. 123.) were also referred to.] Lowndes, for the respondents. In Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram (I. L. R. 22 Calc. 339.) the question of degrees never arose. [Parot Bapalal Sevakram v. Mehta Harilal Surajram (( 1894) I. L. R. 19 Bomb. 631.) and Venkatagiri v. Chandru (( 1899) I. L. R. 23 Madr. 123.) were also referred to.] Lowndes, for the respondents. The contention of the appellants in both Courts in India was that bandhu relationship through the mother extended to seven degrees. The argument that there was no limit was not raised there, nor apparently has it been put forward in any reported case. It is based on a fallacy. The Achara-kanda says that all sapindas are blood connections, and from this it is attempted to deduce that all blood connections are sapindas. Chapter II. of the Mitakshara, which deals with inheritance in ss. 5 and 6, draws a clear distinction between sapindas and samanodakas, shewing that the former are a limited class. In s. 5 (5.) and (6.) of that chapter gotraja sapindas are limited to seven degrees; in s. 5 (3.), where bandhus are explained as bhinna-gotra sapindas, the word "sapinda" must be at least equally limited. Colebrookes translation of s. 5 (5.) leaves the words "a saptamat” in the Sanskrit original untranslated (see Jollys Tagore Lectures 1885, pp. 209, 210). The true limit in the case of relationship through the mother is five degrees. It is settled law that the meaning of sapinda-relationship in matters of inheritance under the Mitakshara law is to be found in the Achara-kanda, which says that it is based upon blood connection. The same passage of the Achara-kanda, which is dealing with the prohibited degrees of marriage, lays down that sapinda relationship ceases in the case of relationship through the father after seven degrees, and through the mother after five degrees. This limitation may be arbitrary, but it has come down from ancient times Manu III., 5; Gautama IV., 2 to 5 ; Apastamba II., 11,15,16 ; Vasistha VIIL, 1 and 2. The limit of seven degrees in the gotra is specifically applied to inheritance by the Mitakshara, c. II., s. 5; the limitation of five degrees through the mother is equallyapplicable. Modern commentators of weight have all assumed that the limitation of five degrees through the mother applies to inheritance Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed./pp. 690—692, 786, 787; West and Buhler, 3rd ed., pp. Modern commentators of weight have all assumed that the limitation of five degrees through the mother applies to inheritance Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed./pp. 690—692, 786, 787; West and Buhler, 3rd ed., pp. 121,488, 489; Jollys Tagore Lectures, 1885, p. 214, n. The respondents contention is also supported by the decisions in Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai (( 1876) 1. L. R. 2 Bomb. 388, at p. 426;. ( 1880) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 212.); Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand (I. L. R. 6 Calc. 119.) ; Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram (I. L. R. 22 Calc. 339.) ; Bhyah Ram Singh v. Bhyah Uger Singh. (( 1870) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 373.) [Dattaka Mimansa VI. (10.) was also referred to.] Against this weight of authority there is only a suggestion put forward in Sastris Hindu Law, the writer of which is living and could have been called at the trial, but was not. It is said that the rule leads to an absurdity since in the present case the appellants sons claiming through their father would be within the limit while the appellants themselves are not. The rule, however, undoubtedly applies to the prohibition of marriages where the same results follow. In the time of Manu and prior thereto bandhus were not recognized as heirs at all Apastamba XIV., 1 to 5; Gautama XXVIIL, 21; Vasistha XVII., 79 and 81; nor did they perform funeral ceremonies Manu III., 215, 216. Yajnavalkya, 500 years later than Manu, first introduced bandhus as heirs, and he also first mentions the offering of a cake to maternal ancestors. The two rights grew concurrently and were subject to the same limits. It is clear that the pinda was only offered to the three ascendants of the mother, making five degrees. Although by Mitakshara times inheritance had come to depend upon blood connection the right to offer the funeral cake influenced the right of inheritance. This appears from the retention of the terms sapinda and samanodaka Mitakshara, c. II., s. 2 (6.). The connection is recognized in Soorendronath Roy v. Mussamat Heeramonee Burmoneah 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 123 (( 1868) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 81, at p. 96.), Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhinarayan Chuckerbutty (( 1868) 2 Beng. L. R. (F. B.) 28, at p. 39.), and in Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 123 (( 1868) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 81, at p. 96.), Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhinarayan Chuckerbutty (( 1868) 2 Beng. L. R. (F. B.) 28, at p. 39.), and in Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai. (( 1876) I. L. R, 3 Bomb. 388, at p. 427) It is also recognized by Viramitrodaya, ss. 157, 158, the high authority of which is referred to in Gridhari hall Roy v. Bengal Government (4) It has no doubt been held that the members of each class of relatives entitled to inherit referred to in Mitakshara, e. II., s. 6, are illustrative and not exhaustive, but it has never been suggested that the classes mentioned are not exhaustive Gridhari Lall Roy v. Bengal Government (12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 448, at p. 466); Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunambedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar (( 1896) L. R. 23 Ind. Ap. 83.); Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhinarayan Chuckerbutty (2 Beng. L, R. (F. B.) 28.); Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 688. De Gruyther, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI The suit that has given rise to the present appeal was brought by the plaintiffs in the Court of the District Judge of Balaghat, in the Central Provinces of India, for possession of certain properties which originally belonged to one Lakshman Rao, whose next of kin or bandhus they claim to be under the law of the Mitakshara. Lakshman Rao died in 1851, leaving him surviving his widow Jankibai and a daughter Chitkoobai, both since deceased. The defendant Venkatesh is Chitkoobais husband. On Lakshman Raos death without male issue his inheritance devolved on Jankibai. She held possession of the properties in suit as a Hindu widow until her death in 1888, when Chitkoobai succeeded to her fathers estate. She died on May 7, 1894, leaving the first defendant, her husband. The second defendant is a son adopted by him after Chitkoobais decease. The present action was not instituted until March, 1906. The plaintiffs claim that the inheritance to Lakshman Rao opened to them on the death of Chitkoobai, and that they are entitled to recover possession of the properties from the defendants who have no right of succession to Lakshman Raos estate. The present action was not instituted until March, 1906. The plaintiffs claim that the inheritance to Lakshman Rao opened to them on the death of Chitkoobai, and that they are entitled to recover possession of the properties from the defendants who have no right of succession to Lakshman Raos estate. The following genealogical table will explain the relative position of the parties and the exact nature of the claim — Timaji | || Sadasheo(son) Sheoram | (son) || || Krishnarao+Radhabai Lakshman Rao + | Jankibai || || Sakobai Chitkobai + (daughter) Defandent1 | (daughter) || || Rangoobai Venkatesh 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 124 (daughter) (adopted son, | defandant2) | | | Ramchandra Balchandra Krishna (son) (son) (son) plantiff1 plantiff2 plantiff3 The defendants resisted the claim mainly on two grounds; they alleged, first, that the ancestors of the parties had migrated to the Central Provinces from Asirgarh, situated within the Mahratta country, where the law in force conferred on the daughter succeeding to her fathers inheritance an absolute estate descendible to her own heirs; that the family of Timaji was still subject to that law, and that accordingly the estate which Chitkoobai had acquired passed on her death without issue to the first defendant, her husband. In the second place, they urged that the plaintiffs had no heritable right or interest in Lakshman Raos estate as they did not come within the category of bandhus entitled to succeed to his inheritance. The Courts in India have overruled the first plea, and have held that on settling in the Central Provinces the family of Timaji adopted the lex loci and are now governed by the rules of the Mitakshara generally in force there. But they have given effect to the defendants second contention; they have held in substance that the Mitakshara lays down a well denned limit where the kinship entitling bandhus to succession ceases, and that the plaintiffs are beyond that limit. They have accordingly dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs have appealed to His Majesty in Council, and the case has on both sides been argued with considerable ability and learning. They have accordingly dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs have appealed to His Majesty in Council, and the case has on both sides been argued with considerable ability and learning. In dealing with the arguments addressed to this Board on behalf of the appellants their Lordships cannot help noticing one circumstance, namely, that in the Courts below, so far as appears from the record, it was not denied that there was a limit to the heritable right of bandhus, the only contention being whether it was seven degrees from the common ancestor or five as urged by the defendants. Before this Board, on the other hand, it has been strenuously contended that there is no limit to the succession of bandhus. Their Lordships do not wish, however, to draw any inference from this change of ground, for what they have to determine in this appeal is whether the term bandhu is to be construed as the plaintiffs argue in the broadest sense, or whether it is subject to any limitation, and in the latter case what that limitation is according to the law by which the parties are governed. In the Hindu law the succession of heirs individually specified does not present much difficulty; the controversies and divergences amongst Hindu lawyers are chiefly concerned with collateral succession. Manu, the ancient sage, whose identity is lost in the mist of ages, but whose word is regarded as divine, after giving the rules regarding the succession of lineal male descendants and male ascendants, declares " The property of a near sapinda shall be that of a near sapinda." (Chapter IX., v. 187. This is the translation given by Norris and Banerjee JJ. in Babu Lal v. Nank u Ram, I. L. B. 22 Calc. 339, at p. 346,) Sir William Jones in his translation of Manus Institutes has rendered the passage somewhat differently, but for the purposes of the present judgment this difference is of little importance. It is upon this enunciation that all the schools base the right of collaterals to succeed to the inheritance of a deceased person. This refers only to the succession of one male to another, for females inherit by 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 125 express rules. It is upon this enunciation that all the schools base the right of collaterals to succeed to the inheritance of a deceased person. This refers only to the succession of one male to another, for females inherit by 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 125 express rules. The right of collaterals, there fore, is dependent on the existence of the sapinda-relationship between the propositus and the claimant. The contest that has arisen in the several schools is with regard to the meaning to be attached to the term sapinda, in other words, what does sapinda relationship imply, and what is the true test for determining whether a particular person is a sapinda to the deceased or not ? Jimutavahana, the author of the Dayabhaga, the guiding authority in the Bengal or Gauriya School, considers it to mean "community in the offering of funeral oblations." He draws his argument from the word pinda, which literallysignifies a ball of rice offered at the performance of obsequial rites. Mr. Lowndes is probably right, that in early times the right of inheritance was dependent on the right to participate in the offering of funeral oblations, a doctrine which is part and parcel of the Dayabhaga rules. But it is also clear that Vijnaneswara, the author of the Mitakshara, who appears to have flourished towards the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth century of the Christian era, some five centuries before Jimutavahana, abandoned the ancient doctrine, and construed sapinda-relationship to arise from community of blood, or, to use the quaint language of Hindu writers, " community of particles of the same body." His legal conception in this respect will appear clearly from a passage of the Mitakshara, book I., chapter on Marriage, not included in Mr. Colebrookes translation. To this passage their Lordships will have to refer later on in the course of this judgment. Messrs. Colebrookes translation. To this passage their Lordships will have to refer later on in the course of this judgment. Messrs. West and Buhler in their Digest of the Hindu Law, the merit and authority of which has been recognized by eminent Hindu lawyers, have examined in detail the doctrines of the Mitakshara on this point, and their general conclusion as to Vijnaneswaras legal conception of sapinda-relationship is summed up in the following words, that he based it " not on the presentation of funeral oblations but or descent from a common ancestor, and in the case of females also on marriage with descendants from a common ancestor." Mr. Colebrooke in his rendering of the Mitakshara has paraphrased sapinda as a relation " connected by funeral oblations," which resulted in virtually obliterating one of the main distinctions between the Benares and the Bengal schools. But it is now recognized that his paraphrase was erroneous, and that the true theory of sapinda-relationship propounded by Vijnaneswara was based on community of blood. It is on this theory of Vijnaneswara that the learned counsel for the appellants place their chief reliance. The plaintiffs, it is urged, are unquestionably related to Lakshman Rao by tie of blood; they are, therefore, his sapindas, and consequently, in the absence of nearer kinsmen, entitled to his inheritance. It is to be remarked, as has been observed in previous cases before this Board, that the Hindu law contains its own principles of exposition, and that questions arising under it cannot be determined on abstract reasoning or analogies borrowed from other systems of law, but must depend for their decision on the rules and doctrines enunciated by its own lawgivers and recognized expounders. The Mitakshara purports to be a commentary on the work of Yajnavalkya, who is supposed to have lived about the second century of the Christian era, about a thousand years before Vijnaneswara. In the Mitakshara he is spoken of in terms of deep veneration; and his doctrines, developed by Vijnaneswara, certainly shew a marked advance over the legal conceptions of his predecessors. So far as their Lordships have been able to ascertain, the bandhus, or distant kinsmen related to the deceased through females, make their appearance as heirs first in Yajnavalkyas enunciations. Mr. So far as their Lordships have been able to ascertain, the bandhus, or distant kinsmen related to the deceased through females, make their appearance as heirs first in Yajnavalkyas enunciations. Mr. Borrodaile, in the first volume of his reports of the Bombay Sudder Dewany Adalut decisions, has given a translation of the index to the Mitakshara, which furnishes a general idea of the scheme of this great and important work of Hindu law. It consists of two books ; the first called the Acharadhyayu " On Established Rules of Conduct or Ordinances " ; the second the Vyavaharadhyayu " On the Laws and Customs of the People." Both books, however, are so interrelated that the rules of the one can scarcely be construed without reference to the other. 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 126 It is to be noted that in the Vyavastha Chandrika the book on "Established Rules of Conduct" is cited as the Achara Adhyaya (" Chapter or Book on Established Rules of Conduct"), whilst in the decisions of the Indian Courts and recent works on Hindu law it is referred to under the name of the Achara-kanda ("Division or Part relating to Established Rules of Conduct"). In the third chapter of the Achara-kanda Vijnaneswara lays down the rules relating to the forbidden degrees of kindred, and here he defines his theory of relationship. A translation of this passage is to be found in the Digest of Hindu Law, by West and Buhler (3rd ed. ( 1884), vol. I., p. 120.), and also in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai (I. L. R. 2 Bomb. 388.), which came on appeal to Her Majesty in Council and was affirmed by this Board. (L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 212.) That passage runs thus " He should marry a girl who is non-sapinda (with himself). She is called his sapinda who has (particles of) the body (of some ancestor, &c), in common (with him). Non-sapinda means not his sapinda. Such a one (he should marry). Sapinda-relationship arises between two people through their being connected by particles of one body. Thus the son stands in sapinda-relationship to his father because of particles of his fathers body having entered (his). Non-sapinda means not his sapinda. Such a one (he should marry). Sapinda-relationship arises between two people through their being connected by particles of one body. Thus the son stands in sapinda-relationship to his father because of particles of his fathers body having entered (his). In like (manner stands the grandson in sapinda-relationship) to his paternal grandfather and the rest, because through his father particles of his (grandfathers) body have entered into (his own). Just so is (the son a sapinda-relation), of his mother, because particles of his mothers body have entered (into his). Likewise (the grandson stands in sapinda-relationship) to his maternal grandfather and the rest through his mother. So also (is the nephew) a sapinda-relation of his maternal aunts and uncles, and the rest, because particles of the same body (the paternal grand father) have entered into (his and theirs); likewise (does he stand in sapinda-relationship) with paternal uncles and aunts, and the rest. So also the wife and the husband (are sapinda-relations to each other), because they together beget one body (the son). In like manner brothers wives also are (sapinda-relations to each other), because they produce one body (the son), with those (severally) who have sprung from one body (i.e., because they bring forth sons by their union with the offspring of one person, and thus their husbands father is the common bond which connects them). Therefore one ought to know that wherever the word sapinda is used, there exists (between the persons to whom it is applied) a connection with one body, either immediately or by descent." Then after refuting certain objections to his explanation of the word sapinda, Vijnaneswara proceeds thus (West & Buhler, vol. I., p. 121.) " In the explana tion of the word asapindam (non-sapinda, verse 52), it has been said that sapinda-relation arises from the circumstance that particles of one body have entered into (the bodies of the persons thus related) either immediately or through (transmission by) descent. I., p. 121.) " In the explana tion of the word asapindam (non-sapinda, verse 52), it has been said that sapinda-relation arises from the circumstance that particles of one body have entered into (the bodies of the persons thus related) either immediately or through (transmission by) descent. But inasmuch as (this definition) would be too wide, since such a relationship exists in the eternal circle of births, in some manner or other, between all men, therefore the author (Yajnavalkya) says— Verse 53 After the fifth ancestor on the mothers and after the seventh on the fathers side.—On the mothers side in the mothers line, after the fifth, on the fathers side in the fathers line, after the seventh (ancestor), the sapinda-relationship ceases ; these latter two words must be understood ; and therefore the word sapinda, which on account of its (etymological) import (connected by having in common) particles (of one body) would apply to all men, is restricted in its signification, just as the word pankaja (which etymologically means "growing in the mud," and therefore would apply to 9,11 plants growing in the mud, designates the lotus only) and the like; and thus the six descendants, beginning with the son, and ones self (counted) as the seventh (in each case), are sapinda-relations." The rendering of the above passages by Pandit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, though apparently more free, 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 127 is certainly instructive and interesting, and deserves quotation as shewing what a learned Hindu scholar considered was in the mind of Vijnaneswara when defining the word sapinda. "The Mitakshara then explains the following words in the next verse of Yajnavalkya, beyond the fifth and seventh degrees on the mothers side and the fathers side respectively. It has been already explained, that the relation of sapinda exists by reason of the connection of the parts of the same body, both directly and indirectly. But such a relationship is possible everywhere, in some way or other, between all men in this wide, wide world without a beginning. So the definition would be too wide. It has been already explained, that the relation of sapinda exists by reason of the connection of the parts of the same body, both directly and indirectly. But such a relationship is possible everywhere, in some way or other, between all men in this wide, wide world without a beginning. So the definition would be too wide. It is for this reason that the sage limits it thus, Beyond the fifth, &c. "The meaning is on the mothers side, i.e., in the line of the mother, after the fifth degree on the fathers side, i.e., in the line of the father, after the seventh degree, the relation of sapinda ceases. "Although the word sapinda, therefore, may be applied in its etymological sense almost to all men it is, there can be no doubt, limited in its signification to certain definite individuals ; just as the word mud-born is applied only to a lotus. "Thus the father and the other ascendants are six sapindas; and the son and the other descendants are six; and the man himself is the seventh. In case of the division of a line also, the enumeration should be made until the seventh degree, commencing from whence the direction of the line changes. This rule should be applied in every case." (Sarvadhik aris Tagore Law Lectures, 1880, pp. 603, 604.) Their Lordships have no manner of doubt that in the passages quoted above Vijnaneswara was laying down rules for the limitation of sapinda-relationship generally. It has been suggested in argument that this limitation is with regard to marriage only; that it defines the prohibited degrees within which a man cannot marry. A similar contention was put forward in Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai. (I. L. R. 2 Bomb. 388,) The observations on this point of the learned judges, one of whom was the distinguished jurist West J. (co-author of the Digest, and afterwards Sir Raymond West), appear to their Lordships as extremely apposite to the present case. A similar contention was put forward in Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai. (I. L. R. 2 Bomb. 388,) The observations on this point of the learned judges, one of whom was the distinguished jurist West J. (co-author of the Digest, and afterwards Sir Raymond West), appear to their Lordships as extremely apposite to the present case. Westropp C.J. in that case (at p. 426) said as follows " It has been contended for the plaintiffs that in the above extracts from the Achara-kanda and the Sanskara Mayukha the respective authors were dealing with sapinda-relationship in its ceremonial aspect only, and that, when they wrote upon sapinda-relationship with reference to inheritance, they may be regarded as viewing sapinda-relationship in the same light as the author of the Dayabhaga and certain other commentators on Hindu law. But we think that the burden rests upon the plaintiffs to show that Vijnaneswara and Nilakantha regarded sapinda-relationship as resting on a different basis for the purpose of inheritance from that on which, dogmatically perhaps, but most distinctly, the one has placed it in the Achara-kanda and the other in the Sanskara Mayukha. We do not think that the learned counsel for the plaintiffs have given any good reason for assuming that the authors intended to make any such difference, nor is it likely that they did. " The religious and ceremonial law of the Hindus as prevailing amongst castes, or in particular localities, is, generally speaking, almost inseparably blended with thir law of succession in the same castes or localities, an opposite condition being exceptional." As a matter of fact, as Messrs. West and Buhler point out, Vijnaneswara expressly says " wherever the word sapinda is used there exists (between the persons to whom it is applicable) a connection with one body either immediately or by descent.” 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 128 In Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand (I. L. R. 6 Calc. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 128 In Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand (I. L. R. 6 Calc. 119, at p. 126.) the learned judges of the Full Bench (one of whom was a Hindu judge of great eminence) express themselves on this point in the following terms— " Having taken great pains in accurately defining the word sapinda in the beginning of his work, and having said in clear words in the passage in question that one ought to know that wherever the word sapinda is used there exists (between the persons to whom it is applied) a connection with one body either immediately or by descent,’ it is hardly reasonable to suppose that the author used the word in another part of the same work in a different sense. It is a well understood rule of construction amongst the authors of the Institutes of Hindu Law, that the same word must be taken to have been used in one and the same sense throughout a work unless the contrary is expressly indicated.” Nor have the learned counsel for the appellants been in a position in this case to refer to any authority excepting one, which their Lordships will notice later on, in support of their proposition that the limitations of Vijnaneswara on sapinda-relationship are confined to marriage, impurity, and exequial rites, and do not relate to inheritance. The law of inheritance in the Mitakshara translated by Mr. Colebrooke occurs in book II. and forms chapter VI. of that part of the work. It is entitled " dayuvibhagu," or " partition of heritage." It is unnecessary to refer to chapter I. of Mr. Colebrookes translation, or to the earlier sections of chapter II., as they deal with subjects which do not come within the purview of this judgment. It is with ss. V., VI., and VII. of chapter II. that their Lordships are principally concerned. The rendering of the word sapinda as " relations connected by funeral oblations " runs throughout Mr. Colebrookes translation. His arrangement of the matter is also different from the original where the subject of inheritance appears to be dealt with in a consecutive form in chapter VI. Mr. Colebrooke has split it up into two chapters, divided into sections. (This circumstance is noticed in the Bombay judgment.) Chapter II., s. 5 (in Mr. Colebrookes translation. His arrangement of the matter is also different from the original where the subject of inheritance appears to be dealt with in a consecutive form in chapter VI. Mr. Colebrooke has split it up into two chapters, divided into sections. (This circumstance is noticed in the Bombay judgment.) Chapter II., s. 5 (in Mr. Colebrookes translation), deals with the succession of the gotraja, on failure of " brothers sons." Although gotraja is explained by the term gentiles borrowed from the Roman system, to which no doubt the Hindu system bears a remarkable analogy, it would be more convenient to adhere to the definition given in the Mitakshara itself. Omitting the English equivalents introduced into the translation, and retaining the Sanskrit expressions, the paragraphs run as follows " 3. On failure of the paternal grandmother, gotraja-sapindas, namely, the paternal grandfather and the rest, inherit the estate. For bhinna-gotra sapindas are indicated by the term bandhu. " 4. Here, on failure of the fathers descendants, the heirs are successively the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandfather, the uncles and their sons. "5. On failure of the paternal grandfathers line, the paternal great-grandmother, the great-grandfather, his sons and their issue, inherit. In this manner must be understood the succession of the samanagotra sapindas. "6. If there be none such, the succession devolves on samanodakas, and they must be understood to reach the seven degrees beyond sapindas, or else as far as the limit of knowledge and name extend. Accordingly, Vhrat Menu says, The relation of the sapindas ceases with the seventh person, and that of samanodakas extends to the fourteenth degree, or, as some affirm, it reaches as far as the memory of birth and name extends. This is signified by gotra. " 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 129 Their Lordships have preferred to adopt for the purposes of this judgment the translation which was before this Board in Lallubhais Case. (I. L. R. 2 Bomb. This is signified by gotra. " 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 129 Their Lordships have preferred to adopt for the purposes of this judgment the translation which was before this Board in Lallubhais Case. (I. L. R. 2 Bomb. 388, at p. 431.) It is to be observed that the rule in paragraph 3 is thus stated in the Viramitrodaya (Sastri Sark ars Translation(Calcutta, 1879), p. 199.) " on failure of the paternal grand mother, the paternal grandfather and the other sapindas of the same gotra are heirs; since the sapindas (or persons connected through the pinda or body) of a different gotra are included under the term bandhu or cognates. " The earliest expounders appear sometimes to have used the term bandhu to signify a sapinda without any idea of including cognates. This is clear from a passage of the Viramitrodaya, where, after quoting the rule as to the succession of collaterals given by Vishnu, who places the bandhus immediately after brothers sons, it says as follows (Sastri Sark ars Translation, p. 142.) " Here the term bandhu (kinsman) signifies a sapinda, and the term sakulya (distant kinsman) means a sagotra, or one descended from a common ancestor in the male line (other than a sapinda); if by the term bandhu the cognates of the father were comprised, then there would be a conflict with the order mentioned by Jogiswara, the Contemplative Saint, i.e., Yajnavalkya. Yajnavalkya himself employs the expression indiscriminately in various places to signify connections and friends. But in chapter II. of his Dharmasastram he distinctly introduces bandhus as acquiring a heritable right on failure of the gotraja. The passage in Rao Vishwanath Mandliks translation (Mandlik s Hindu Law (Bombay, 1880), p. 220.) is as follows—" The wife, daughters, both parents, brothers, and likewise their sons, gotrajas (gentiles), bandhus (cognates), a pupil and a fellow-student. But in chapter II. of his Dharmasastram he distinctly introduces bandhus as acquiring a heritable right on failure of the gotraja. The passage in Rao Vishwanath Mandliks translation (Mandlik s Hindu Law (Bombay, 1880), p. 220.) is as follows—" The wife, daughters, both parents, brothers, and likewise their sons, gotrajas (gentiles), bandhus (cognates), a pupil and a fellow-student. Of these, on failure of the preceding, the next following in order is heir to the estate of one who has departed for heaven leaving no putra (lineal male descendants)." Learned counsel for the respondents urges that this inclusion of bandhus or cognates forms a marked extension of the right of inheritance to people who until then were not regarded as heirs, and he contends that it is hardly likely this remarkable change should have been made without any limitation, considering that the sapinda-relationship was subject to a limit. To determine how far this contention is well founded, it is necessary to examine a little more closely the doctrines of the Mitakshara relating to the succession of collaterals. Vijnaneswara in reality seems to have shaped the rules which govern this branch of the law of inheritance in force in the Benares school. In s. 5 (3.) (Colebrookes Translation), in describing the gotraja-sapinda or consanguineous relations sprung from the same stock, he emphasizes the fact of their being members of the same family by the specific statement that the sapindas belonging to a different family (gotra)—the bhinna-gotra—are included under the designation of bandhus. This is clearly borne out by the passage of the Viramitrodaya already referred to. Henceforth the word bandhu, therefore, has, in the system of the Mitakshara, a distinctive and technical meaning, in other words it signifies the bhinna-gotra sapindas. In paragraph 5 for the Word gotraja-sapinda is substituted the more definite term of samanagotra sapinda. With regard to this West and Buhler (3rd ed., vol. Henceforth the word bandhu, therefore, has, in the system of the Mitakshara, a distinctive and technical meaning, in other words it signifies the bhinna-gotra sapindas. In paragraph 5 for the Word gotraja-sapinda is substituted the more definite term of samanagotra sapinda. With regard to this West and Buhler (3rd ed., vol. L, p. 129.) observe that " The substitution of samanagotra for gotraja, as well as the employment of bhinna-gotra to designate the opposite of the term, both show that Vijnaneswara took gotraja in the sense of belonging to the same family." Commenting on the passage relating to the succession of the gotraja sapinda, the Viramitrodaya, which is regarded as one of the most important commentaries on the Mitakshara, says " similarly to the seventh (degree) the sapindas of the same gotra take the estate of a person without male issue." (Sastri Sark ars Translation, p. 199) 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 130 This limitation of the seventh degree appears in Yajnavalkyas Institutes, chapter I., verses 52, 53, in these words (Mandlik s Translation (Bombay, 1880), p. 167) "He who has not lost his chastity, let him marry a girl ....who is not a sapinda of him .... who is descended from one whose gotra and pravara are different from his; and who is removed five degrees on the mothers and seven on the fathers side." The comment of Vijnaneswara on this text of Yajnavalkya has already been given in extenso in a previous part of this judgment, but the following lines may be quoted again with advantage " On the mothers side, in the mothers line after the fifth; on the fathers side, in the fathers line, after the seventh (ancestor) the sapinda-relationship ceases." (West and Buhler, 3rd ed., vol. L, p. 121; Maynes Hindu Law (7th ed.), p. 691, par. 516.) The translation by Sastri Golapchandra Sarkar (Hindu Law, p. 54.) of the passage in which these words occur is important, as he is the authority on whose expositions the appellants chiefly rely. L, p. 121; Maynes Hindu Law (7th ed.), p. 691, par. 516.) The translation by Sastri Golapchandra Sarkar (Hindu Law, p. 54.) of the passage in which these words occur is important, as he is the authority on whose expositions the appellants chiefly rely. It runs thus " While explaining the term non-sapinda, the sapinda-relationship is stated to be directly or mediately through connection with one body, but that relationship of all persons may, in one way or other, be traced with all other persons in this world of eternal transmigrations of the soul with its minute body, and so it would include persons that are not intended to be included, hence it is ordained— and is beyond the fifth and seventh from the mother and from the father (respectively). The purport is that sapinda-relationship ceases beyond the fifth from the mother, i.e., in the mothers line, and beyond the seventh from the father, i.e., in the fathers line." It is quite clear, therefore, that the limitation of the seventh degree with regard to the samanagotra sapindas given by Mitra Misra in the Viramitrodaya is taken from the rule enunciated by Vijnaneswara on Yajnavalkya in the Achara-kanda in respect of the cessation of sapinda-relationship. Now, a bhinna-gotra sapinda is a bandhu according to Vijnaneswara. The classification contained in chapter II., s. 6 (Colebrookes Translation), shews clearly who the bandhus are whom Vijnaneswara treats as bhinna-gotra sapindas entitled to succession on failure of the gotraja. The passage as translated by Mr. Colebrooke runs thus "1. On failure of gentiles, the cognates are heirs. Cognates are of three kinds ; related to the person himself, to his father, or to his mother ; as is declared by the following text, ‘The sons of his own fathers sister, the sons of his own mothers sister, and the sons of his own maternal uncle, must be considered as his own cognate kindred. The sons of his fathers paternal aunt, the sons of his fathers maternal aunt, and the sons of his fathers maternal uncle, must be deemed his fathers cognate kindred. The sons of his mothers paternal aunt, the 30ns of his mothers maternal aunt, and the sons of his mothers maternal uncles, must be reckoned his mothers cognate kindred. " 2. The sons of his fathers paternal aunt, the sons of his fathers maternal aunt, and the sons of his fathers maternal uncle, must be deemed his fathers cognate kindred. The sons of his mothers paternal aunt, the 30ns of his mothers maternal aunt, and the sons of his mothers maternal uncles, must be reckoned his mothers cognate kindred. " 2. Here, by reason of near affinity, the cognate kindred of the deceased himself are his successors in the first instance, on failure ofthem, his fathers cognate kindred, or if there be none his mothers cognate kindred. This must be understood to be the order of succession here intended." Here Mr. Colebrooke renders the word gotraja into gentiles, and bandhus into cognates. He also paraphrases the three classes under which Vijnaneswara groups the technical bandhus, namely, the atma bandhus, the pitri bandhus, and the matri bandhus, as " cognates related to the person himself, to his father, or to his mother." Their Lordships have little doubt, reading these passages by the light of the comments in the Viramitrodaya (Sastri Sark ars Translation, p. 200.), that Vijnaneswara was using the term bandhu in a restricted and technical sense, as implying a relation belonging to a different family but united by sapinda-relationship. In fact he expressly says so in chapter II., s. 5 (3.). 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 131 It is not disputed that the plaintiffs do not come within the three categories mentioned above. But it is urged on the authority of Gridhari Lall Boy v. Bengal Government (12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 448.) that the enumeration is not exhaustive but merely illustrative. In that case the question for decision was whether a maternal uncle not being specifically included in the enumeration of bandhus in the Mitakshara was excluded from succession. Answering that question in the negative, and holding that although not expressly mentioned he was entitled to succeed as a bandhu, this Board observed that the text did not purport to be an exhaustive enumeration of all bandhus " who are capable of inheriting," nor was it cited as such for that purpose by the author; and that it was used simply as a proof or illustration of his proposition that there are three kinds or classes of bandhus. These remarks hardly warrant the contention, which is attempted to be based on them, that the classes specified by Vijnaneswara can be added to. In the present case, however, it does not seem necessary to their Lordships to enter upon the determination of the question whether the classes can be extended, for the point at issue can be decided on other grounds. The limitation of five degrees clearly applies, and can only apply, to the bhinna-gotra sapindas. But it is contended that this limitation is confined to prohibition in respect of marriage. As has already been observed, a part of the limitation appears to have been applied to the succession of samanagotra sapindas; their Lordships are unable to see on what principle it can be said that the other part relative to kinsmen, who are equally sapindas but belong to a different gotra or gens, must be restricted to matrimonial affinity. Considerable reliance has been placed on the statement of the law by Sastri Golapchandra Sarkar in his work on Hindu Law. Great respect is due to the opinions of that learned lawyer. But it seems to their Lordships that their weight is considerably discounted by his desire, in order to prevent the deceaseds property becoming so to speak derelict and thus escheating to the Crown, to bring in the caste-people of the deceased also as bandhus, and the somewhat uncertain note of his conclusion, where he says (at p. 74) " The conclusion, therefore, which appears to legitimately follow from the foregoing consideration, is, that the word bandhu in the Mitakshara means and includes either all cognate relations without any restriction, or at any rate, all cognates within seven degrees on both the fathers as well as on the mothers side." Again, his attempt to widen the signification of the word sapinda by employing the English equivalent of relation does not seem to be supported by the definition of sapinda-relationship in the Mitakshara itself. Reference has also been made to certain passages in Rao Vishwanath Mandliks valuable work, in which he says that the sapinda-relationship for inheritance is not always the same as for marriage or impurity (arising from birth or death). Reference has also been made to certain passages in Rao Vishwanath Mandliks valuable work, in which he says that the sapinda-relationship for inheritance is not always the same as for marriage or impurity (arising from birth or death). That may or may not be; but in one part of his work to which the Judicial Commissioner has referred in his judgment the learned translator of Yajnavalkya distinctly says that sapinda connection in general is " co-extensive with that for marriage purposes." Nor in this connection, their Lordships think, can the following passage in the Viramitrodaya be overlooked " And the text, ‘The sapinda-relationship, however, ceases in the seventh generation’ is to be explained consistently with the text of Yajnavalkya, namely after the fifth and the seventh from the mother and the father (respectively) to mean that it remains in the seventh but ceases in the eighth generation. Hence, as in the case of the unmarried females, the sapinda-relationship extending over three generations, as is declared in the chapter on impurity (occasioned by death, &c.,) is con sidered to be 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 132 with reference to that alone; so it is to be deemed that this sapinda-relationship (extending to the fourth degree) is relative to succession alone." (Sastri Sark ars Translation, pp. 156 and 157.) In the absence of any authoritative text their Lordships do not see their way merely on abstract reasoning to displace a view of the law which has received the recognition of the Courts in India, and which the District Judge, an officer of great experience and learning, says is accepted by " public opinion/ As has already been observed, the right of inheritance is founded on sapinda-relationship, which, under the Mitakshara, means consanguinity, in a distinct legal sense clearly explained by the author. This bond comes to an end with the fifth degree when the descent is through a female. It seems difficult to conceive that the right to inherit should continue after the relationship on which it is founded, and which gives it birth, has come to an end. In the case of Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand(l) one of the tests employed for determining whether the defendant in that case was a sapinda of the propositus was the mutuality of sapinda-relationship. In the case of Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand(l) one of the tests employed for determining whether the defendant in that case was a sapinda of the propositus was the mutuality of sapinda-relationship. The doctrine of mutuality is based on the rule enunciated by Manu, and is fully explained by Rajkumar Sarvadhikari in his Lectures au p. 690. Another well-known Hindu writer of the present day speaks thus of the above rule " It is to be observed here that the wealth of a sapinda is taken by his nearest sapinda, according to the well-known text of Manu. From that text it follows that the relation of sapindaship must be mutual. Among agnates the relation of sapindaship is always mutual; but among cognates it is not so in a few cases. In order to determine whether any persons are heritable cognates of the propositus it is necessary to see whether they are related as sapindas to each other Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand. (I. L. R. 6 Calc. 119.); Unless sapindship is mutual, one cannot be the heir of the other." (Commentary on Hindu Law by J. N. Bhattacharyya, p. 459) In Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram (I. L. R. 22 Calc. 339) the rule of the Mitakshara enunciated in the Achara-kanda relative to sapinda-relationship in respect of marriage is assumed as applicable to inheritance. In fact the judgment proceeds on that basis ; and the order of sapinda-relationship with its limitations in Rajkumar Sarvadhikaris Tagore Law Lectures is adopted as representing a correct exposition of the Mitakshara law. The doctrine or mutuality is also explained in clear terms " Again, a sapinda of the propositus to be capable of inheriting must satisfy a further condition, namely, that he must be so related to the propositus, that the propositus is also a sapinda of him either directly or through the father or the mother. This mutuality of sapinda relationship between the propositus and his heritable sapindas is assumed as a necessary condition in the case of Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand(I. L. R. 6 Calc. 119.) and the authority for this is to be found in the text of Manu (chapter IX., 187) cited in the Mitakshara, chapter II., s. 3 (8.), as interpreted by Balambhatta and Visweswara Bhutta, the two leading commentators on the Mitakshara. 119.) and the authority for this is to be found in the text of Manu (chapter IX., 187) cited in the Mitakshara, chapter II., s. 3 (8.), as interpreted by Balambhatta and Visweswara Bhutta, the two leading commentators on the Mitakshara. The text according to these commentators means this, the property of a near sapinda shall be that of a near sapinda. From this it is clear that a man in order to be a heritable sapinda of the propositus must be so related to him that they are sapindas of each other." These two decisions of the Calcutta High Court have been challenged on the ground that they represent Dayabhaga views rather than the doctrines of the Mitakshara. To their Lordships the objection seems hypothetical and without any basis excepting the criticisms of Golapchandra Sastri. One of the learned judges who decided Babu LaVs Case (I. L. R. 22 Calc. 339.) was the distinguished judge and erudite Sanskrit scholar, Mr. Justice Gurudas Banerjee, who was not likely to allow his mind to be confused by Dayabhaga conceptions in determining a case under the Mitakshara law. The general conclusion to which a close examination of the authorities leads their Lordships may be 20 Law. Rep. 41 Ind. App. 290 ( 1913- 1914) Ramchandra Martand Waikar V. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar 133 briefly stated as follows (a) that the sapinda-relationship, on which the heritable right of collaterals is founded, ceases in the case of the bhinna-gotra sapinda with the fifth degree from the common ancestor; (b) that in order to entitle a man to succeed to the inheritance of another he must be so related to the latter that they are sapindas of each other, which is only a paraphrase of Manus rule. In the present case the plaintiffs are Lakshman Raos paternal grandfathers sons daughters sons. They are his bhinna-gotra beyond the fifth degree, and, as the District Judge points out, the element of mutuality is wanting between them and Lakshman Rao. Two considerations were strongly pressed on behalf of the appellants to induce their Lordships to extend the application of the sapinda-relation in the case of bandhus beyond the fifth degree mentioned in the Mitakshara. It was urged that it is hardly likely Vijnaneswara would give a right of inheritance to a spiritual preceptor or guru before kinsmen, however remotely connected. Two considerations were strongly pressed on behalf of the appellants to induce their Lordships to extend the application of the sapinda-relation in the case of bandhus beyond the fifth degree mentioned in the Mitakshara. It was urged that it is hardly likely Vijnaneswara would give a right of inheritance to a spiritual preceptor or guru before kinsmen, however remotely connected. This argument appears to ignore the peculiar and intimate relationship which their Lordships understand exists in the Hindu system between the pupil and the guru who has to initiate him into the mysteries of the Vedic laws and rites, and under whose roof he has to pass many years of his life. It is easy to suppose that in such circumstances the mystical relationship between a spiritual preceptor and a pupil should be regarded as creating a far closer tie than remote relationship of blood. As regards the other consideration which is based on the possibility of the Crown becoming a claimant in the presence of remote bhinna-gotra, their Lordships need only observe that, whether such a claim would be justified or even be likely to be advanced, it does not seem necessary to express an opinion in the present case. Here the defendant is in possession of Lakshman Raos estate claiming as heir to his wife, Lakshman Raos daughter. The plaintiffs suit is an action in ejectment, and they must, in order to succeed, strictly prove their title. It is a matter of satisfaction to their Lordships that they find themselves in complete agreement with the learned judges in the Courts below. The District Judge is himself a Hindu, versed in Sanskrit, and has examined the authorities in original. His decision is entitled to great weight and consideration. Their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The appellants must pay the costs of this appeal.