JUDGMENT 1. The Opposite Party in this rule made an application to the Court below to set aside a decree passed by consent in an appeal to which he was the Respondent. It is found by the learned District Judge that the Appellant, the Petitioner in this Court, got the service of the notice of the appeal suppressed and had a false and fraudulent vakalatnama, and a petition of compromise filed, and that the Opposite Party came to know about the compromise decree only after process in execution of the decree was taken out. The learned Judge accordingly set aside the compromise decree and ordered that the appeal be heard. The Petitioner thereupon obtained this rule, and it is contended on Ids behalf that a decree by consent can be set aside only by a regular suit, and that at any rate the decree could not be set aside upon an application under Or. 41, r. 19, of the Civil Procedure Code. Reliance is placed upon the case of Gulab Koer v. Bad-shah Buhadur 13 C. W. N. 1197: s. c. 10 C. L. J. 420 (1909). in which the questions whether a decree by consent can be set aside by an application for review or by way of motion, or whether a regular suit is the only, at any rate the most appropriate, remedy, have been elaborately discussed. It is unnecessary however to consider the broad questions or the authorities discussed in that case. In the present case, according to the finding of the Judge, there was no consent given by the Opposite Party to the decree : he did not appear in the appeal at all, and in fact had no notice of the appeal and had nothing to. do with the vakalatnama or the petition of compromise. It is therefore not a case where a party gives his consent and afterwards seeks to impeach it on the ground that his consent was obtained by fraud. do with the vakalatnama or the petition of compromise. It is therefore not a case where a party gives his consent and afterwards seeks to impeach it on the ground that his consent was obtained by fraud. In Gulab Koer's case 13 C. W. N. 1197 : s. c 10 C. L. J. 420 (1909)., the learned Judge in distinguishing the case of Annoda Debi v. Stevenson 22 W. R. 290 (1874) (where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that it was competent to the Court to set aside on review a decree against an infant who was not represented before the Court, and on whose behalf there was no assent to the compromise by any competent person) observed :--" This case is manifestly distinguishable on the ground that it was in essence an application by a person to vacate a decree which was made in her absence and without her consent. She asked to be relieved from the effects of a decree to which in substance she was not a party--a condition of things entirely different from what we find in the class of cases where a person who is a party to a suit assents to a consent decree which he subsequently seeks to impeach on the ground that his assent was obtained by fraud. 2. The decree in the present case therefore could be set aside on review. It is pointed out however that the decree has been set aside upon an application under Or. 41, r. 19. That rule relates to setting aside an order of dismissal of an appeal for default, and can have no application to the present case. It appears that the application to set aside the decree was originally made under Or. 47, r. 1 (the review section), but by a subsequent petition was amended so as to be an application under Or. 41, r. 19, of the Civil Procedure Code. If, however, the Court had the power to set aside the decree, we should not interfere merely because it was set aside under a wrong section, and as for the contention that the proper Court-fee payable upon an application for review had not been paid, it could be met by our ordering (under sec. If, however, the Court had the power to set aside the decree, we should not interfere merely because it was set aside under a wrong section, and as for the contention that the proper Court-fee payable upon an application for review had not been paid, it could be met by our ordering (under sec. 12 of the Court Fees Act) the Opposite Party to pay the necessary Court-fee, if we were of opinion that the Court had no power to set aside the decree except by an application for review of judgment. We are of opinion, however, that under the circumstances found by the learned District Judge the Court had an inherent jurisdiction to set aside the decree. Not only has the Court power, but it is its duty, to set aside a decree obtained by fraud practised upon the Court, when apprised of it. We agree with the following observations made in a case in the Bombay High Court, in which a decree by consent was set aside in a summary manner upon an application by the Defendant :--'' What the Defendant says is that there was a suit against him, and that the suit was declared to have ended by reason of a decree passed with his consent. He never consented, and the result has been that there has been fraud committed upon the Court. The Court was persuaded to sign a decree to which the Defendant had never consented and that upon the representation that he had consented to it. Therefore once the Court is asked to go back upon its own procedure, it is not a question whether there is any section in the CPC to warrant the action of the Court amending its proceedings. It is an inherent power of every Court to correct its own proceedings where it has been misled". [See Basangowda v. Churchigingowda I.L.B. 34 Bom. 408 (1910).] 3. We are accordingly of opinion that the order of the Court below though passed under a wrong section should not be set inside. 4. The learned Pleader for the Petitioner invited us to hold that the findings of the learned Judge are incorrect, but we cannot in revision go behind the findings arrived at. 408 (1910).] 3. We are accordingly of opinion that the order of the Court below though passed under a wrong section should not be set inside. 4. The learned Pleader for the Petitioner invited us to hold that the findings of the learned Judge are incorrect, but we cannot in revision go behind the findings arrived at. As for the contention that the Petitioner may be prejudiced if any proceedings are taken against him upon the findings arrived at by the Judge, all that we need say is that there will be a fresh and independent enquiry if any such proceedings are taken against him. The rule must be discharged with costs one gold mohur.