JUDGMENT Sadasiva Aiyar, J. 1. The contentions argued in this appeal are (a) that the learned Judge below ought to have held that the statements in the mortgage-deed Exhibit I, about one of the properties having been purchased by Rangammal and the other property by Sundar Grainmani, Bangammal and their sons were unreliable (7th ground of the appeal memorandam): (b) that the learned Judge did not give due might to the legal presumption that properties in the name of one of two dancing-girl sisters are the common property of both and (c) that he did not give sufficient weight to the oral evidence on the plaintiffs side. 2. I think that the statements in the mortgage-deed, Exhibit I, which are admissible in evidence under Section 32, Clause 7, read with Section 13 of the Evidence Act (Rangammal being dead) were rightly treated as reliable by the learned Judge, as they are corroborated by the oral evidence of the defendants side showing that Bangammal and her sons solely received the rents of one of the properties and by the evidence of one of the witnesses on plaintiffs side, who says that the Grammani who kept Rangammal for several years was a rich man. As regards the legal presumption, though these dancing girls have been held to be governed by the Hindu Law relating to co-parcenary, as if there were made members of a Hindu co-parcenary, the analogy should not, in my opinion, be pushed too far as we know that from the nature of their profession, it could not be expected that sisters would ordinarily live together long and club their separate earnings or that their property would usually consist of what they got ancestrally (from their female ancestors) with the addition made by the natural increase of those properties through the receipt of interest on investment or receipt of mesne profits. 3. I am not prepared to dissent from the learned Judges appreciation of the oral evidence, on the plaintiffs side having regard to the probabilities of the case. 4. 3. I am not prepared to dissent from the learned Judges appreciation of the oral evidence, on the plaintiffs side having regard to the probabilities of the case. 4. It is unnecessary for me to express an opinion in this case on the question of the fact of plaintiffs adoption or on the question of its validity (if it was a fact) or on the question whether any presumption at all exists that the properties in the name of a dancing girl belong to her and her sisters and her mother and to all such female agnates (so to say). I need only say that having read the judgment of the learned Judge with the greatest respect, I do not see sufficient reason to go back from the view I expressed in Guddati Reddi Obala v. Ganapati Kandanna 17 Ind. Cas. 422 : 12 M.L.T. 467 : 23 M.L.J. 493 : (1912) M.W.N. 1138 as to the validity of an adoption by a dancing girl. 5. In the result I would dismiss the appeal with costs. Napier, J. 6. I concur with my learned brother that the plaintiff has not made out her case even if she is entitled to call in aid the presumption, a point on which I express no opinion.