JUDGMENT Carnduff, J. - This Appeal arises out of a suit for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. The suit was dismissed by both the Courts below, and one of the Plaintiffs appeals to this Court. The land originally belonged to the Plaintiffs. It was sold in execution of a decree against them, and purchased by one Peary Lal Rai. Peary Lal Rai then conveyed it to the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who are father and son. The Plaintiffs' case was that these Defendants executed a kobala for the sale of the property to them for Rs. 250, but that the instrument was not registered or delivered and had since disappeared. They sought, therefore, for a decree requiring the execution and registration of a fresh kobala. 2. The Court of first instance found that the contract alleged had been entered into, but held that it was not a contract which should be enforced by a Court of Equity because it had been obtained by undue influence, the chief consideration for it was opposed to public policy, the price fixed by it was grossly inadequate, and the Plaintiffs had been guilty of unfair practice and had taken advantage of the Defendants. The lower Appellate Court has disposed of the case by assuming, though not finding, the factum of the agreement and affirming the decision of the first Court that specific performance ought not, in the circumstances, to be decreed. 3. It appears that a charge of some sort had, at the instance of the Plaintiffs, been brought against the second Defendant in respect of his conduct as record keeper of the Court of the District Judge, and that a departmental enquiry into the matter by one of the Subordinate Judges had been ordered. While this was in progress, the second Defendant and his father were approached by the Plaintiffs who were anxious to recover the land and promised to "hush up the enquiry" which they had been instrumental in initiating, if they would execute a conveyance in their favour. 4. The learned Vakil for the Appellant contends that these facts do not bring the case within the scope of the provisions of sec. 4. The learned Vakil for the Appellant contends that these facts do not bring the case within the scope of the provisions of sec. 16 of the Contract Act, which deal with "undue influence." He further contends that it is impossible to say that the agreement to hush up the enquiry into the conduct of the second Defendant was opposed to public policy when there is nothing on the record to show what the charge or complaint against that Defendant was. He argues that, although the jurisdiction of a Court to decree specific performance is discretionary, the discretion, which is expressly given by sec. 22 of the Specific Relief Act of 1879, must be exercised judicially, that is to say that in this country, in connection with a matter of contract, the Courts should be guided by the rules laid down in the Indian Contract Act of 1872, and by those alone. There remains, then, only the ground of the grossly inadequate price fixed, and that is not sufficient unless the inadequacy was so gross as to lead to an inference of fraud. 5. It seems to me, however, that there may be cases which cannot be brought within the four corners of any of the provisions of the Indian Contract Act as to the invalidity or voidability of agreements, but are nevertheless cases in which a Court of Equity may properly refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under the Specific Relief Act. Sec. 22 of the latter enactment itself shows that this is so : and both principle and authority appear to point to the same conclusion. Sec. 22 of the latter enactment itself shows that this is so : and both principle and authority appear to point to the same conclusion. There are--see Fry on Specific Performance, 5th Ed., p. 195--"many instances in which, though there is nothing that actually amounts to fraud, there is nevertheless a want of equality and fairness in the contract which are essential in order that the Court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in specific performance." "In judging of the fairness of a contract"--see ibid, page 200--"the Court will look not merely at the terms of the contract itself, but at all the surrounding circumstances;" and "it is enough, generally speaking, to induce the Court to refuse performance, that there are any circumstances about the making of the contract which render it not fair and honest to call for its execution." I think, therefore, chat the proposition for which the learned Vakil contends, if not one that can be accepted; and, having regard to all the circumstances of the case before us, I think that the Courts, below were right in holding that the contract was one of which specific performance ought not to be decreed. I would, consequently, dismiss this appeal; but, in view of the conduct of the Defendants, who pleaded, first, that there had been no contract at all, and, secondly, that it had been induced by undue influence and so forth, and of the circumstance that they did not venture into the witness-box, I would make no order as to costs. Richardson, J. I agree.