JUDGMENT Carnduff, J. - This is an Appeal against an appellate decree giving the Respondents joint possession along with the Appellants, their co-sharers, of certain land appertaining to the estate which they hold in common. I have had soma difficulty in ascertaining what are the precise facts found. For in the Court of first instance the findings are not consistent, while the learned District Judge in the Court of Appeal below has not stated with any fulness his own findings or expressly declared how far he accepts those of the Subordinate Judge. The appellate judgment is, however, one of affirmance, and I think that a careful study of it along with the judgment of the first Court will show that the following are the facts which have been found, and with which we have now to deal. 2. The land in dispute forms part of what was once a marsh. The marsh was occupied by the co-sharers in common, the Respondents receiving from the fishermen who fished in it their share of the jalkat rent. Subsequently the process of silting began, and the land now in suit became culturable. Of it the Appellants at once proceeded to take entire possession by settling tenants upon it and recovering from them the whole rent. They admitted that they had done so, and their contention was and is that they were within their rights as co-owners, specially in view of the circumstance, as found, that there are other parts of the joint estate in the separate possession of one co-sharer or another. They further asserted, but failed to prove, that they had reclaimed the land at their own expense or spent any money in protecting the common title or inducting tenants. 3. The first Court found that there was no ouster because the Respondents "were never in actual possession of the disputed land" and have "never before this suit claimed to be admitted into possession," of it. 3. The first Court found that there was no ouster because the Respondents "were never in actual possession of the disputed land" and have "never before this suit claimed to be admitted into possession," of it. But it had already found it "established beyond doubt that they had always received their share of their jalkar rent, and were still in receipt of such rent; and this can mean only one thing, namely, that before the silting process commenced, they were in joint possession of the marsh, receiving their share of the only rent then recoverable, and that they are even now obtaining their share of the jalkar rent in respect of so much of the original marsh as is still unculturable. Consequently the first Court's findings as to possession must be taken to refer to the land since it appeared above water, and all that they amount to is that the Respondents have never been in possession of the land in is culturable state. That is, of course, exactly the Respondents' case : for what they complained of is the action of the Appellants in pouncing upon the land as soon as it emerged and securing through tenants possession of it in its altered condition for themselves alone and to the exclusion of the Respondents. 4. The question is whether this was an ouster or not. In my view it was. True it is that it has been found that there is no evidence that the Appellants ever came upon the land save as the co-owners of the Respondents, or that they ever set up any other title. But the fact remains hat they disturbed the Respondents' joint possession, and that seems to me to be ouster, almost exvitermini. The Respondents were the injured party, and I fail to appreciate the contention that they ought, if they find that they are now left with less than their proper share, to seek a remedy in a suit for partition. But the fact remains hat they disturbed the Respondents' joint possession, and that seems to me to be ouster, almost exvitermini. The Respondents were the injured party, and I fail to appreciate the contention that they ought, if they find that they are now left with less than their proper share, to seek a remedy in a suit for partition. Before the land became culturable the parties appear to have been contented with joint possession of the marsh and separate possession of some of the lands outside it, and it seems to me that, from the point of view of justice, equity and good conscience, statu quo ought to be restored and the Respondents relegated to a suit for partition, if they are dissatisfied with what they seem to have been satisfied with before. 5. Several cases have been cited before us, but they are all distinguishable. That which most nearly resembles the present case is, I think, Surendra Narain v. Hari Mohan ILR 33 Cal. 1201 (1906), where it is held that a co-sharer cannot seize any land newly added by accretion to the present joint estate and occupy it to the exclusion of his co sharers. The facts connected with Basanta Kumari v. Mohesh Chandra 18 C.W.N. 328 (1913), on which the Appellant has chiefly relied, are very different from those, before us now. In the later each of the co sharers concerned was admittedly in sole occupation of khamar land appertaining to the joint property, and one of them commenced to build on the land he occupied. No substantial injury by reason of this was alleged, and it was held that his conduct was not inconsistent with the joint ownership of the property as a whole, and that, in the circumstances, there had been no ouster. 6. I would dismiss this Appeal with costs. Richardson, J. The fact that the Plaintiffs and the Defendants are in separate possession of other parts of the joint property has, as in appears to nothing to do with the matter. The question is what are the rights of the parties in respect of the lands in dispute and whether in respect of those lands, the Defendants have so acted as to justify the Plaintiffs in bringing a suit in the nature of a suit for ejectment. The question is what are the rights of the parties in respect of the lands in dispute and whether in respect of those lands, the Defendants have so acted as to justify the Plaintiffs in bringing a suit in the nature of a suit for ejectment. Now it is clearly found that the improved value of the lands is not due to any expenditure of labour or capital on the part of the Defendants but is due to the operation of natural causes. It is not suggested that the lands are in any sense an accretion to lands of which the Defendants were previously in possession, or that before the lands became valuable and productive, the Defendants had any more possession over them than any other co-sharer. On the contrary, I concur in the view which has been expressed that the findings arrived at by the lower Courts must be taken to include a finding that the Plaintiffs had some possession of the lands in the original state by the exercise of fishery rights. In my opinion upon the facts as they appear to have been found there has clearly been an ouster of the Plaintiffs by the Defendants, and that being so, I agree that the Appeal should be dismissed.