Judgement Appeals from two decrees of the High Court (September 5, 1911) affirming decrees of Beaman J. (April 11, 1910). 67 Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 44 ( 1914- 1915) Hamabai Framjee Petit V. Secretary of State 168 The appeals depended upon the determination of substantially the same question and were heard together. The suits were instituted by the respondent in the High Court to recover possession of certain lands situated upon Malabar Hill, Bombay. The land in suit in the first appeal had been leased by the East India Company in 1854 for a term of ninety-nine years with a proviso that " in case the said Company shall for any public purpose be at any time desirous to resume possession of the premises" they should be at liberty to re-enter, subject to giving the notice and compensation thereby provided. The land in suit in the second appeal was granted by a sanad in 1839 at a small annual rent subject to a stipulation, " the said ground to be at any time resumable by Government for public purposes " upon notice and payment of compensation. In 1908 the Government of Bombay gave notice that they desired to resume possession of the land held under the lease and sanad for a public purpose, stating in reply to an inquiry as to the purpose intended that they proposed to utilize the land for the residence of Government officers. The compensation payable tinder the lease and sanad respectively was duly ascertained. The respondents, however, refused to accept or agree to the valuations, and declined to give up possession. The suits were thereupon instituted. Both suits were tried before Beaman J. At the trials evidence, which was common to both suits, was given that the intention of the Government was to erect residences on the land and to offer them at moderate rents to Government officers; that owing to the dearth of suitable houses in Bombay and the high rents demanded officials were reluctant to accept appointments there, and that this was prejudicial to the efficiency of the various public services. No order or resolution of the Government was put in evidence. The learned judge delivered judgment for the plaintiff (respondent) in both suits and made decrees for delivery of possession. The High Court (Chandavarkar and Batchelor JJ.) affirmed these decisions. No order or resolution of the Government was put in evidence. The learned judge delivered judgment for the plaintiff (respondent) in both suits and made decrees for delivery of possession. The High Court (Chandavarkar and Batchelor JJ.) affirmed these decisions. De Gruyther, K.C., and McCardie, for the appellant in the first appeal ; De Gruyther, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the appellants in the second appeal. The purpose for which it is proposed to use the land is not a public purpose within the meaning of the lease and sanad. The true test is that there must be an intention to change the nature of the occupation from a private to a public occupation, and to render the land available to the public at large. Every act of Government, as a Government, is for a public purpose, but in this lease and sanad the expression must be given a more limited meaning. If this is not so the lease, which purports to be for ninety-nine years subject to the proviso, would in effect be determinable at will. To resume possession with the object of raising the rents and increasing the public revenue would be a public purpose in the wide sense, but it would not be a public purpose within the meaning and intention of the grants as appearing from their terms. [Land Acquisition Act (I. of 1894), s. 6, and Shastri Ramchandra v. Ahmedabad Municipality (( 1909) I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 600.) were referred to.] Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Dunne, for the respondent in both appeals, were not called upon. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by 67 Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 44 ( 1914- 1915) Hamabai Framjee Petit V. Secretary of State 169 LORD DUNEDIN. The same general point is raised in these two appeals. The first appellant was lessee under the Government as successors of the East India Company under a lease of date April 18, 1854, which lease contained a power of resumption in favour of the lessor if " the Company, their successors or assigns, shall, for any public purpose, be at any time desirous to resume possession of the premises granted" upon certain terms as to notice and compensation. The second appellants are holders of land under Government in virtue of a sanad originally granted to one George King on April 6, 1839, by the said East India Company, which declares the ground given in occupation is to be " at any time resumable by Government for public purposes " upon certain terms as to notice and compensation. The Government gave notice in both cases to resume for a public purpose. On being challenged as to what that public purpose was, they explained that they wished for the ground in order to erect dwelling-houses, which they could offer to Government officials at adequate rents for their private residence. Suitable houses for Government servants are not easily obtainable in Bombay; but it is not said that obtaining quarters of some kind is an impossibility. The whole question, therefore, is Is such a scheme a "public purpose" within the meaning of the contracts contained in the lease and the sanad? The learned judge of first instance in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay and the Appeal Court of the same Court have both held that it is. The learned judges in the Courts below have, in deference to citations made before them, elabo rately considered many of the decisions which construed the words "public purposes/ as used in the Statute of Elizabeth with reference to exemptions from rating. In the end, however, they came to the conclusion that those decisions afforded no help as to the proper construction to be put on the words of these contracts, and in that conclusion their Lordships unhesitatingly agree. The argument of the appellants is really rested upon the view that there cannot be a " public purpose" in taking land if that land when taken is not in some way or other made available to the public at large. Their Lordships do not agree with this view. The argument of the appellants is really rested upon the view that there cannot be a " public purpose" in taking land if that land when taken is not in some way or other made available to the public at large. Their Lordships do not agree with this view. They think the true view is well expressed by Batchelor J. in the first case, when he says " General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase public purposes in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned." That being so, all that remains is to determine whether the purpose here is a purpose in which the general interest of the community is concerned. Prima facie the Government are good judges of that. They are not absolute judges. They cannot say " Sic volo sic jubeo," but at least a Court would not easily hold them to be wrong. But here, so far from holding them to be wrong, the whole of the learned judges, who are thoroughly conversant with the conditions of Indian life, say that they are satisfied that the scheme is one which will redound to public benefit by helping the Government to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From such a conclusion their Lordships would be slow to differ, and upon its own statement it commends itself to their judgment. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that on the general point the view of the Courts below was right. A special point was taken in the second case as to sufficiency of notice. It is enough to say that the view of the Courts below was clearly right in this matter. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the appeals, but there will be no costs to either party before this Board.