JUDGMENT Teunon, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiff in a suit for rent. It appears that in respect of the mahal in question a record-of-rights was prepared under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that under sec. 105 of the Act a fair rent was settled for a holding comprising according to the record 4 plots of land, measuring in the aggregate 4 bighas 6 cottahs of land. The fair rent settled was Re. 10-14-3. 2. Plaintiff is the tenure-holder and sues for rent at that rate for the years 1313 to 1315 and the first 3 quarters of 1316. The defence is that Defendant's holding under the Plaintiff consists of only one plot (plot No. 2) measuring 1 bigha 18 cottahs and that the other 3 plots are her lakheraj or rent-free lands. The Defendant further alleges that the rent payable in respect of her holding was and is Re. 1-15-10 gandas, and that this is a rent fixed in perpetuity, that she was ignorant of the proceedings under sec. 105, and that the order under that section had been fraudulently obtained. In the Court of first instance the Munsif held that he could not go behind the record-of-rights and the decision of the Revenue Officer under sec. 105 and accordingly decreed the Plaintiff's claim. On appeal the Subordinate Judge has held that entries in the record-of-rights and the decision of the Revenue Officer under sec. 105 are not conclusive, and that it is open to the Defendant in this proceeding to show that of the 4 plots in question 3 are her rent free lands and that the rent payable in respect of the remaining plot is Re. 1-15-10 gandas only. He has therefore remanded the suit to the Munsif for re-trial and for determination on evidence of all the questions arising between the parties. excludes the right of the Civil Court. It is an extremely dangerous proposition to say that whenever a statute gives a person a right to go, if he thinks fit, to a special tribunal that necessarily excludes the Plaintiff appeals to this Court and the only question that has been urged before me is whether apart from the question of fraud the learned Subordinate Judge is right in holding that notwithstanding the entries in the record-of-rights and the decision of the Revenue Officer under sec. 105 it is open to the Defendant to show that she is not bound to pay at the rate fixed by that officer. 3. Now it is conceded that the Plaintiff's application under sec. 105 was made and decided after Bengal Act, III of 1898, but before Bengal Act, I of 1907, came into force, that is to say, before the enactment of the present sec. 105A. Now in the cases of Shambhu Chandra Hazra v. Purna Chandra Pal (I. L. R. 35 Cal. 176 (1907)) and Pandab Dowari Das v. Ananda Kisun Chakrabutty (14 C. W. N. 897 (1910)), it has been held by this Court that in proceedings taken on application by the landlord under sec. 105 prior to the enactment of sec. 105A it was not open to the tenant to question the correctness of the entries in the record though it was open to him to do so by a suit under sec. 106 or by a declaratory suit in the Civil Court. 4. The contention of the Appellant then amounts to this that not having instituted a suit in either the Civil or Revenue Courts, the question that would have been open to the tenant in such a suit may not be raised by him in the defence to a rent suit No authority in support of this contention has been cited before me and in my opinion it is not well-founded on principle. Under sec. 103B the entries only give rise to a presumption and neither the Defendant's failure to take proceedings for the purpose of annulling or rebutting that presumption nor a decision under sec. 105 prior to the enactment of sec. 105A can avail to make them conclusive. 5. A second branch of the Appellant's conten-jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts of the country. I think that it does not so exclude, and that the words of sec. 106 are merely permissive, and, in my opinion, the decisions in the two cases These are Pandab Dowari Das v. Ananda Kisun Chakrabutey, 14 C. W. N. 897 (1910) and Shashi Bhusan Hazra v. Srimati Dinamoyee Dassi, 19 C. W. N. 638n (1914) that have been cited to us by the learned Vakil for the Respontion then is that, no matter what the real area of the holding or the real status of the tenant, by virtue of the provisions of sec. 105 and sec. 105 and sec. 107, the yearly rent payable has been finally determined to be Rs. 10-14-3. In support of this contention I am referred to the decision of a Divisional Bench of this Court in Second Appeal No. 2574 of 1910 decided on the 20th November 1912 (see supra p. 637, foot-note), but that decision, if an authority for the contention now put forward, appears to be in conflict with the decisions of this Court in Shambhu Chandra Hazra v. Purna Chandra Pal (I. L. R. 35 Cal. 176 (1907)), and Pandab Dowari Das v. Ananda Kisun Chakrabutty (14 C. W. N. 897 (1910)), and I regret that I am unable to follow it. If it is eventually found that the tenant is merely an occupancy raiyat and that the holding does comprise 4 plots with an are of 4 bighas 6 cottahs, then the rent of that holding may be taken to have been conclusively determined. But if it is found that the tenant holds at a fixed rent, that decision will override the decision based on the assumption that he is merely an occupancy raiyat, but whether the holding comprises fewer plots and a lesser area, whether the rent previously payable continues to be payable, or whether in determining the rent now payable the Court should proceed in the manner indicated in the proviso to sec. 109A (14 C. W. N. 897 (1910)) or sec. 113 may depend on the question whether the essential portion of the Revenue Officer's decision is applicable to the holding as it may be found to exist. The decision itself apart from entry and the principle on which it was arrived at have not been placed before me and this question must dents are more in accordance with not only principle but the plain words of sec. 106 than that which Dr. Ghose has relied upon. That being so, it is manifest that there is nothing in the proceedings that have taken place before the Revenue Court or the omission of the Plaintiffs in these suits to resort to the Eevenue Court that would take away the rights that the Plaintiffs allege they have in the lands as against the darputnidar. Ghose has relied upon. That being so, it is manifest that there is nothing in the proceedings that have taken place before the Revenue Court or the omission of the Plaintiffs in these suits to resort to the Eevenue Court that would take away the rights that the Plaintiffs allege they have in the lands as against the darputnidar. It seems to me to be an alarming proposition to put forward that a person because he went to the Civil Court instead of going to the Eevenue Court is liable to be deprived of his rights to the property which he may have purchased or inherited from his ancestors. I agree with the decision of my learned brother in the case that has been handed over to us by the learned Vakil for the Respondents, and, I think, that the judgment arrived at by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court is correct. The appeals, therefore, fail and must be dismissed with costs. Teunon, J. I agree.