JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal arises in a suit brought by the plaintiffs-respondents for sale upon a mortgage executed on 6th September 1895 by one Amir Singh, his four sons and his wife, in favour of Mewah Lal and Lachmi Narain plaintiffs. Prior to the execution of that mortgage another mortgage had been executed in favour of the Akhara Panchaiti in 1893. A suit was brought by the prior mortgagees and a decree was obtained by them under a compromise to which the present plaintiffs were also parties. After this compromise was made the plaintiffs on 29th March 1900 brought a suit on the basis of their mortgage deed for a simple money decree, and they did not seek to enforce their right to bring the mortgaged property to sale. In that suit a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs, but as the amount of the decree was not paid the plaintiffs brought the suit out which this appeal has arisen to enforce the mortgage. Various pleas were set up in defence, but they were overruled by the Court below and a decree was made in the plaintiffs' favour for sale of the mortgaged property. The decree however provides that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to a decree absolute for sale unless they relinquished all their rights under the money decree obtained by them. 2. The defendants, who are the mortgagors, and members of their family have preferred this appeal, and the first contention raised on their behalf is that in view of the provision of O. 2, R. 2 of the CPC the plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain this suit. The contention has, in our opinion, been rightly repelled by the Court below. 3. The answer to it is furnished by the provisions of O. 34, R. 14 of the Code. That rule provides that if a decree is obtained under mortgage, the property comprised in that mortgage will not be sold in execution of such a decree unless the mortgagee obtained a decree for sale of the property, but O. 2, R. 2 shall be no bar to the maintenance of a suit for sale. 4. It cannot be contended that the first suit brought by the plaintiffs for a money decree could not be maintained. 4. It cannot be contended that the first suit brought by the plaintiffs for a money decree could not be maintained. It is true that O. 2, R. 1, provides that all suits should be so framed as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them. The penalty for not following the directions contained in that rule is provided by R. 2. Ordinarily, if R. 1 was violated, R. 2 would preclude the plaintiff from bringing a second suit, but in the case of a mortgage we have the distinct provision in O. 34, R. 14, which permits of a suit being brought for sale upon the mortgage in spite of the provisions of O. 2, R. 2. Therefore it is manifest that the rule last mentioned is no bar to the present suit. It is urged that the bar is afforded by the fact that in their plaint in the previous suit the plaintiffs stated that they relinquished their right to enforce the mortgage. If this statement be regarded as an agreement releasing their rights as mortgagees, that agreement being without consideration cannot be enforced. The mere averment in the plaint that the plaintiffs gave up their right under the mortgage for the purpose of that suit cannot be regarded as an extinguishment of the mortgagee rights. 5. It is next contended that Section 11 of the CPC, is a bar to this suit. The matter now in dispute was never directly or otherwise in issue between the parties in the former suit and it was not a matter which could have formed the ground of attack for the relief claimed in that suit. Therefore in our opinion S. 11 or any of the explanations to that section has no application to the present case. 6. The next contention was that the present claim was barred by limitation. As to this we may only point out that in the written statement filed in the previous suit the mortgage in question was admitted. So that there was an acknowledgment of liability under the mortgage before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and a fresh start for the commutation of limitation accrued to the plaintiffs from the date of the acknowledgment. So that there was an acknowledgment of liability under the mortgage before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and a fresh start for the commutation of limitation accrued to the plaintiffs from the date of the acknowledgment. In the written statement mentioned above the allegations in the plaint were admitted including an allegation as to the mortgage and the amount payable under the mortgage being due, and the only contention raised was that the stipulation as to interest was hard and unconscionable. We think that the Court below came to a right conclusion in holding that the claim was not time-barred. The acknowledgment having been made by the manager of the joint Hindu family was in our opinion, binding on the other members. It is not suggested that there was any fraud or collusion in connexion with the acknowledgment. 7. The next contention is that in the money decree which was passed in the former suit the Court stated that “the plaintiff would not be entitled to bring to sale the property mortgaged in the bond sued on.” This provision in the decree we understood to mean that under the decree which was passed by the Court the decree-holders would have no rights to bring the mortgaged property to sale, that is to say, that the mortgagees would not be allowed to violate the provisions of Section 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court evidently thought it possible that the plaintiffs might try to put the property to sale Contending that they had relinquished their right to enforce the mortgage, and therefore it considered it desirable that it should be clearly provided in the decree that they would not be allowed to do so. We do not think that the Court intended to order or ordered that there would never be a suit for sale of the mortgaged property. 8. A further contention was raised that the plaintiff should not be allowed interest at a higher rate than that allowed by the decree to which we have referred. As to this we may mention in the first place that no such contention was raised either in the Court below or in the memorandum of appeal to this Court. 8. A further contention was raised that the plaintiff should not be allowed interest at a higher rate than that allowed by the decree to which we have referred. As to this we may mention in the first place that no such contention was raised either in the Court below or in the memorandum of appeal to this Court. Further as the plaintiffs are entitled to sue upon their mortgage they have a right to claim interest at the stipulated rate up to the date fixed for payment. This part of the defendant's case is as untenable as the rest. 9. As to the costs of the previous suit in regard to which a contention was put forward on behalf of the appellants' we may observe that the plaintiffs will not be entitled to recover these costs having regard to the terms of the decree passed in this case by the Court below. The costs of the present suit were incurred by the plaintiffs because they did not discharge the money-decree which was passed against them, and the plaintiffs have therefore in our opinion, been rightly awarded the costs of the present litigation. 10. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs including in this Court fees on the higher scale. We extend the time for payment for six months from this date. Interest at the stipulated rate will run to the extended date. No further interest will be allowed after such date.