Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (December 9, 1910) affirming a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Thana (April 2, 1910). The respondents (plaintiffs) were the administrators of the estate of Pallonji Dadabhoy, deceased, and the deceaseds heirs according to the Parsi Intestate Succession Act, 1865. The appellants (defendants) were the brother of Pallonji Dadabhoy and the formers son. The claim in the suit was (inter alia) that the rights and interests of the parties in the estate might be ascertained and partitioned. The question for determination depended upon the construction and effect of the will of one Dadabhoy Byramji, a Parsi and the father of Pallonji Dadabhoy and of the first appellant. The material provisions of the will, which was dated August 6, 1866, are set out in the judgment of their Lordships and appear shortly from the head-note. The testator died on August 21, 1866, and the entire estate had since been in the possession and under the management of the first appellant as provided by the will. The appellants pleaded that Pallonji, the deceased, had in his lifetime taken Byramji, the second appellant, as his palak, this adoption being confirmed according to the customs of Parsis after his death, and that as the testators palak the second appellant was entitled under the will to a moiety of the testators estate. The Subordinate Judge held that Pallonji and Jehangir each took absolute estates in one half of the estate of the testator, that there were no words of gift in favour of a palak, and that, if there were, the gift was void under s. 111 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865. He also held that the deceased had not adopted Byramji as his palak during his lifetime, and that among Parsis adoptions of this kind were obsolete, the only practice at the present time being the appointment of a palak on the third day after death for purely religious purposes; he also held that the Parsi Intestate Succession Act, 1865, did not recognize an adopted son as heir. He accordingly made a preliminary decree under Order xx., r. 13, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The High Court (Rao and Batchelor JJ.) affirmed this decision. He accordingly made a preliminary decree under Order xx., r. 13, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The High Court (Rao and Batchelor JJ.) affirmed this decision. Rao J. was of opinion that the effect of the will was to make the absolute gift to Pallonji defeasible in the event of his having a son and that son attaining his majority, but as that event had not occurred the absolute gift became indefeasible. The learned judge rejected the contention that there was an executory devise in favour of Byramji as palak which took effect upon Pallonjis death, holding that there were in the will no words of gift in his favour, either as a persona designata or as a palak son. He held further that even assuming that there was an executory bequest to the second appellant as palak, it would be void under s. 111 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865. Upon this point he said "The bequest to the palak son is to take effect upon the happening of an uncertain event, namely, if no son is born to Pallonji. No time is mentioned in the will for the occurrence of this event. The bequest would therefore be void unless this event happened before the period of the payment or distribution of the fund bequeathed. So long as Pallonji was alive there was a possibility of his having male issue, and until his death there was no chance of Byramji becoming a palak son. It follows therefore that the event on the happening of which the legacy to Byramji was to take effect did not occur before the testators death, which would ordinarily be the period of payment on distribution of the fund bequeathed." The learned judge rejected the contention that the period of distribution in the present case was either the time when the natural born son of Pallonji came of age, or the death of Pallonji, and held that it was the testators death; Batchelor J. was of the same opinion for the same reasons. De Gruyther, K.C., and Horace Miller, for the appellants. Upon the true construction of the will Pallonji took only a defeasible interest in the testators estate, and in the events which have happened his interest passed upon his death to his nephew Byramji, the first appellant. De Gruyther, K.C., and Horace Miller, for the appellants. Upon the true construction of the will Pallonji took only a defeasible interest in the testators estate, and in the events which have happened his interest passed upon his death to his nephew Byramji, the first appellant. The will was written in the Gujerathi language by the testator himself, and should be construed liberally so as to give effect to the intention of the testator Hunoonmanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (( 1856) 6 Moo. Ind. Ap. 393, at p. 411.); Chunilal Parvatishunkur v. Bai Sambath (( 1914) I. L. R. 38 Bomb. 399.); Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Parthasarathy Appa Row ( 1914) L. R. 40 Ind. Ap. 51, at p. 71.) The testators object was to preserve the whole estate in the male line and that in default of Pallonji having a son the first appellant should in every respect be substituted for one. There could be no other object in using the words " all the clauses of this my will are applicable to the said adopted son." Among Parsis there is a well-recognized custom of nominating a son or palak. Although this custom bears no relation to adoption in Hindu law, the testator would be familiar with the principle of adoption as a substitution for a natural son. [History of the Parsees, by Dosabhoy Framjee (London, 1858), Act IX. of 1857, and the Parsi Intestate Succession Act (XXI. of 1865) were referred to.] The gift to Byramji may be regarded as being to him as a persona designata, and not as depending upon the effect of the adoption as a palak. The will is governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1865, but s. 111 of that Act has no application. That section applies where it is uncertain whether the event contemplated will take place before or after the period of distribution. In this case the event contemplated was Pallonji succeeding to half the estate but dying without a son, and that event could not happen until after the death of the testator. Sect. 111 does not invalidate a defeasance to take place upon an event which must happen after the testators death. [Edwards v. Edwards (( 1852) 15 Beav. 357.), O Mahoney v. Burdett (( 1874) L. R. 7 H. L. 388.22), and Jarman on Wills, 1910 ed., pp. Sect. 111 does not invalidate a defeasance to take place upon an event which must happen after the testators death. [Edwards v. Edwards (( 1852) 15 Beav. 357.), O Mahoney v. Burdett (( 1874) L. R. 7 H. L. 388.22), and Jarman on Wills, 1910 ed., pp. 452, 2209, were referred to.] Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi (( 1895) L. R. 23 Ind. Ap. 18.) is distinguishable, as the facts in that case clearly came within s. 111, 111ustration b. Sir Robert Finlay, K.C., and Lowndes, for the respondents. Upon the true construction of the will Pallonji took an absolute interest, which descended to the respondents as his heirs under the Parsi Intestate Succession Act, 1865. Unless Pallonji predeceased the testator neither his natural son nor his nephew took any interest. But even if upon the true construction there is a defeasance in favour of Pallonjis possible natural son, the position of the palak is different. The general words in clause 11 by which the clauses of the will are made applicable to a palak are followed by an express devise to Pallonjis son, but there are no words of gift to a palak. But if there is a devise to Byramji, either as palak or as a persona designata, it is void under s. 111 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, since the event upon which it was to take effect did not take place before the death of the testator. That section applies to all contingent bequests whether by an executory devise or by substitution Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi. (L. R. 23 Ind. Ap. 18.) There could not be a palak until -three days after Pallonjis death, and if the palak were not of full age he could not take till later; therefore s. 111 applies equally whether the period of distribution is the death of the testator or the death of Pallonji. De Gruyther, K.C., in reply referred to Sreemutty Kristoromoney Dossee v. Maharajah Norendro Krishna (( 1888) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 29) and Bai Motivahoo v. Bai Mamoobai. (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 93.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated December 9, 1910. Ap. 29) and Bai Motivahoo v. Bai Mamoobai. (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 93.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated December 9, 1910. The High Court affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Thana, dated April 2, 1910. The case has reference to the construction of a will executed by one Dadabhoy Byramji on August 8, 1866. By this will the testator narrated that of his three sons then living he has given one in adoption to a paternal uncle. His other two sons were named Pallonji and Jehangirji. The material portions of the will disposing of the estate are these " The said two sons are proprietors, half and half alike, and in equal (shares), of my whole estate, outstandings, debts, title, and interest.....Both the heirs are to take care of the said estate and look after it, and both the heirs living together, are duly to enjoy the balance which may remain after payment of the Sarkars assessment. ... In this my testamentary writing, I the testator have appointed my two sons as (my) heirs." The will then states that Pallonji, the elder, a man then of about thirty-nine years of age, was in a confused state of mind, and that the other son Jehangirji was accordingly entrusted with the management of the estate "by his true and pure integrity, and both the heirs are to equally enjoy half and half alike the whole estate with unanimity with my elder son Pallonji in such a way as not to injure his (Pallonjis) rights." Up to this point in the will there can be no doubt whatsoever that the property of the estate was effectually and equally divided between these two sons. There then follow, however, the clauses which are said to create difficulty. They are these " At present my elder son Pallonji has no male issue of his body. (He) has only a daughter. Therefore, if my elder son Pallonji gets a male issue, half of the estate is to be made over to him, on his attaining (his) full age." And it may be proper that the eleventh clause of the will should be quoted in full. (He) has only a daughter. Therefore, if my elder son Pallonji gets a male issue, half of the estate is to be made over to him, on his attaining (his) full age." And it may be proper that the eleventh clause of the will should be quoted in full. It reads thus "I, the testator, have in the second clause of this will appointed my two sons Pallonji and Jehangirji as my heirs. The wife of Pallonji, the elder of them, has now gone to her fathers house. On her return, if she, by instigating her husband, or by any (other way) cause to be mortgaged, sold, given in gift, charity, etc., or disposed of, whatsoever in any way to any one, any immoveable and moveable estate etc. appertaining to the half share during the lifetime of my son Pallonji or, after his death, which God forbid, my son Pallonji or his wife, or daughter, or any (other) person (shall) as stated in the third clause of this will have no authority, power and right so to do. If my son Pallonji does not get a son, my son Jehangirji is to give away his son as Pallonjis palak (or his adopted son). All the clauses of this will are applicable to the said adopted (son). If a son be born of the body of Pallonji he (shall) on his attaining (his) full age be the owner of half share in the whole of the immoveable and moveable estate belonging to me. My heir (and) vakil (or executor) Jehangirji, or his heirs shall raise no objection to give him the share. If they raise any objection, the responsibility arising therefrom is on their heads. All the clauses written in this will are applicable to the said son of (his body)." The material facts of the case are that the testator having executed this will on August 8, 1866, died within a fortnight thereafter, namely, on August 21, 1866. He was survived by his two sons. Pallonji, the elder, was of weak intellect as the will indicates. Jehangirji entered upon the management of the whole estate, having obtained probate of the will in 1867. This state of matters lasted for 30 years, namely, till 1897, when Pallonji died. Pallonji was twice married but had no son. He was survived by his two sons. Pallonji, the elder, was of weak intellect as the will indicates. Jehangirji entered upon the management of the whole estate, having obtained probate of the will in 1867. This state of matters lasted for 30 years, namely, till 1897, when Pallonji died. Pallonji was twice married but had no son. He left a widow and other representatives who are respondents in] this appeal and are his heirs according to the Parsi Intestate Succession Act, 1865. The nature of the suit by these heirs is 3 for an account, for an ascertainment of the rights and interests of the parties in the estate, and for partition, and the claim is grounded on the right of Pallonji as, it is contended, the owner of one half of the estate from the date of the testator Dadabhoys death. One other fact may now be mentioned, namely, that it is alleged that on December 3, 1886, Pallonji adopted, as his palak, Byramji his nephew, the son of Jehangirji. Jehangirji and his son Byramji (the present appellants) resist the suit, maintaining that Byramji as palak, or adopted son of Pallonji, succeeds in terms of the settlement to the half of the estate which Pallonji so long enjoyed. It is, of course, also maintained that under the terms of the settlement Pallonji never was owner of the one half of the estate, or, as it would be expressed in English phraseology, the terms of the will were such as to prevent vesting in Pallonji. The learned judges of the Court below have not only dealt with this question but with certain others, including the special situation of Byramji as palak of his uncle. The points among others discussed were (1.) whether such a palak could ever take under the will, looking to the fact that it remained uncertain until Pallonjis death that the condition of a palak taking could ever be purified, namely, that Pallonji should die without a son, and (2.) the peculiar point as to the office of a palak to a Parsi becoming effectual only three days after the adoptive fathers death. (3.) A further question was keenly argued, namely, whether the will contained in itself sufficient words of grant or gift to the palak. (3.) A further question was keenly argued, namely, whether the will contained in itself sufficient words of grant or gift to the palak. In the view taken of this case by their Lordships these questions, however interesting, are not necessary for the decision about to be pronounced. For their Lordships are clearly of opinion that under the terms of Dadabhoy Byramjis will one half of the estate conveyed vested in Pallonji a morte testatoris. The result of the argument presented would be that if Pallonji had had a son who reached twenty-one during his father Pallonjis life, then in that event that son would have taken so as to cut out Pallonji from all rights under this will. The right of Pallonji would accordingly be restricted to that of enjoyment, not even for life, but until the majority of his own son. Their Lordships cannot agree with such a construction. The destination over to a son who should take upon attaining twenty-one years of age would appear to their Lordships to be language appropriate to the events of the death of Pallonji during the lifetime of the testator and of his having left a son, the situation also being provided for of that son being at that period of time under twenty-one. But when the father Pallonji himself survived the testator it does not appear to their Lordships that there are any words in the will sufficient to cut down the right of Pallonji to one half of the estate to a life interest therein, or for a less period, according to the argument. On the contrary, the words employed seem to fit the case of the entire estate being on the testators death divided into two portions, and of each portion becoming then the absolute property of one of the two sons. While these are the general principles which would be applicable in the construction of such a will, in their Lordships opinion the same result is precisely reached by the application of s. 111 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865. Their Lordships agree with the view that has been taken as to the applicability of that section in the Courts below. No further question, this being so, need be dealt with. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and the appellants will pay the costs.