Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the Chief Court of Lower Burma (June 14, 1910) reversing a judgment and decree of that Court in its original civil jurisdiction (February 16, 1909), and from an order of the Chief Court (September 2, 1910) rejecting a petition for review. The suit was instituted by the respondent against the appellant, his eldest daughter, claiming that under Burmese Buddhist law he was solely entitled to the estates of his two younger daughters Mah Nhin Ghine and Mah Nhin Boo, both deceased, and in the alternative for an inquiry as to the share to which he was entitled, and for consequential relief. The respondent by his first marriage had the three daughters above referred to, the appellant being born about 1865. Their mother died when the appellant was about eight years old, and the respondent married again. The respondent had traded at Rangoon in cocoanuts, and upon his retiring from business his three daughters commenced to trade on their own account. They lived at home with the respondent and his second wife and family until 1899, when they bought a house out of the profits they had made, and subsequently they lived together and apart from their father, the respondent. Mab Nhin Ghine died in May, 1905, and Mah Nhin Boo in June, 1906, and the suit was commenced by the respondent on October 81, 1906. The defendant pleaded that under Burmese Buddhist law she was sole heiress to her sisters; she alleged that she and her two sisters left the respondents house in 1899 and that he had not assisted her deceased sisters; she also alleged that a partnership had existed between her and her sisters, and she alternatively claimed the estates by survivorship. The suit was heard by Robinson J., who delivered judgment on February 16, 1909. After reviewing the decided cases, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the respondent, as father, was entitled to succeed in priority to the appellant, but he dismissed the suit on the ground that the respondent bad been guilty of " desertion and intentional and deliberate neglect of the ordinary duties of affection and kindred," which lie held to be an answer to the claim. The learned judge also held that no partnership was proved except as to three cargoes of Nicobar nuts. Both parties appealed. The learned judge also held that no partnership was proved except as to three cargoes of Nicobar nuts. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court (Hartnoll and Parlett JJ.) by its judgment, delivered on June 14, 1910, affirmed the decision in favour of the fathers prior right of inheritance, but reversed the decision that he had by his conduct lost that right, holding that the evidence did not warrant the finding. It was also held that no partnership existed. Upon the question as to the right of inheritance Hartnoll J. said "The rules as to the devolution of property according to Buddhist law in the absence of direct descendants have been the subject of considerable judicial discussion. The last case in Lower Burma relating to the subject seems to be that of Maung Shwe Bo v. Maung Pya (( 1899) Printed Judgments ( 1893- 1900) 524.), in which it was held that there is abundant weight of authority for the preference of parents to brothers and sisters and the ruling in the case of Maung Chit Kywe v. Manny Pyo(( 1895) 2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1892- 1890) 184; 1 Chan. Toon L. C. 388.) was quoted with approval. That ruling was The Buddhist law is opposed to the ascent of inheritance, but when it cannot go by descent the inheritance is allowed to ascend, first to the father and mother, and failing them, to the first line of collaterals and, m the absence of heirs in that degree, to the grandfather and grandmother and the next line of collaterals. The last case in Upper Burma seems to he that of Ma Po Hmon v. Maung Kan (( 1899) 2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897- 1901) 157.), in which the authorities were again considered and it was held that on the death of a person who leaves no surviving husband, wife, or direct descendants his parents succeed to his estate in preference to all other relatives. The texts in the Dhammathats are conflicting on the point. The texts of the Dhammathats are summarized in ss. 296 and 311 of the Digest. I have again fully considered them. I have also considered the position in which Burmese Buddhist parents and children stand with relation to each other. Sects. The texts in the Dhammathats are conflicting on the point. The texts of the Dhammathats are summarized in ss. 296 and 311 of the Digest. I have again fully considered them. I have also considered the position in which Burmese Buddhist parents and children stand with relation to each other. Sects. 24, 25, 27, 28, and 97 all go to show what the relation has been, even though some of the rules laid down in those sections would not be followed now. Where the Dhammathats give parents such power over their children, it seems to be only natural that, where their children have no heirs, they should have the first claim to their estate. Again it seems to me that the claim of the first line of collaterals can only come through the parents. It appears to be unnecessary to again discuss the Dhammathats as they have been discussed in the two most recent cases I have referred to. The texts differ; but in my opinion the preponderating weight of authority is in favour of holding that, where the deceased has no direct descendants, and leaves no surviving husband or wife, the parents should inherit to the exclusion of all other relatives.” Parlett J., in agreeing with the above view, said "Most of the texts bearing upon the point are collected in ss. 310 and 311 of the Digest. The general rule is there repeatedly reiterated that i failing descendants, the parents are entitled to inherit/ One or two of the texts suggest that where the deceased leaves brothers and sisters, his parents are not his sole heirs, but I find only one by which brothers and sisters could be held to exclude the parents altogether, and a few by which younger brothers exclude elder brothers and parents." The Court accordingly set aside the decree and entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff. The present appellant subsequently filed a petition to review the judgment upon questions connected with the alleged partnership. On September 2, 1910, the Court dismissed this petition. The partnership question, and the alleged conduct of the respondent which was held by the trial judge to disentitle him from inheriting, became immaterial to the decision; and the facts and arguments relative to these questions are omitted from this report. F. J. Coltman and H. Houston, for the appellant. On September 2, 1910, the Court dismissed this petition. The partnership question, and the alleged conduct of the respondent which was held by the trial judge to disentitle him from inheriting, became immaterial to the decision; and the facts and arguments relative to these questions are omitted from this report. F. J. Coltman and H. Houston, for the appellant. The decision of the Chief Court, that under Burmese Buddhist law a father succeeds to the estate of a daughter in preference to the sister, is erroneous at any rate in the case where the sisters are living together apart from the father. An analysis of the texts of the Dhammathats dealing with the rights of parents to inherit, as appearing in U Gaungs Digest of Burmese Law, vol. 1, ss. 310 and 311, shews that out of thirty-six texts only ten deal specifically with the claim of a brother or a sister as opposed to that of a parent. Of the ten texts which deal with this specific question six or seven support the right of the brother or sister, if it is observed that the term "co-heirs" includes brothers and sisters (Digest, s. 11). There is no Dhammathat which gives the preference to the parents where the children are living apart. The Manu Kyay, s. 19, as translated in s. 311 of the above Digest, says as follows "The general rule is that relatives of previous generations shall not inherit the property of their descendants. But if a person dies leaving neither wife, children, brothers nor sisters, his parents become his sole heirs." The translation of s. 19 in Richardsons Manu Kyay, 3rd ed., 1891, is probably more literal; the second sentence is there rendered "....if the parents be alive and the deceased has no other relations, they shall inherit his property "; and "relations," as appears from ss. 17, 19, 22 and 25, is used as meaning brothers and sisters. The Manu Kyay has always been treated as of the highest authority and its clear statement of the law in favour of the appellant is not contradicted by any Dhammathat. The Rajabala and other texts in clear language confirm the Manu Kyay. There is no judicial decision adverse to the appellant, though there are dicta which appear to be against her contention. The Rajabala and other texts in clear language confirm the Manu Kyay. There is no judicial decision adverse to the appellant, though there are dicta which appear to be against her contention. The actual decision in Maung Chit Kywe v. Maung Pyo (( 1895)2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1892— 1896) 184; Chan Toon L. C. 388.), referred to in the judgments in the Chief Court, was that brothers and sisters of the father of the deceased are preferred to a step-father. The learned judge in the course of his judgment said The Burmese law is opposed to the ascent of inheritance, but when it cannot go by descent the inheritance is allowed to ascend, first to father and mother, and failing them to the first line of collaterals, and in the absence of heirs in that degree to the grandfather and grandmother and the next line of collaterals." The decision was based upon s. 19 of the Manu Kyay, but if by the above dictum it was intended to exclude brothers and sisters, the dictum is contrary to the terms of that section. In any case it was obiter. It was, however,followed in Ma Sa Bwin v. Ma Thi (( 1898) 2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897— 1901) 111; 1 Chan Toon L. C.446.) as an affirmative statement of the law and it was also followed in Maung Skive Bo v. Mating Pya (( 1899) Printed Judgments ( 1893— 1900) 524; 1 Chan Toon L. C. 476.), in which the judgment was again founded on s. 19 of the Manu Kyay, and in Ma Po Hmon v. Maung Kan. (( 1899) 2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897— 1901) 157; 2 Chan Toon L. C. 87.) None of these decisions, however, were relevant to the present question. In the last-named case it was held that a mother is preferred to a stepbrother or stepsister of the deceased. A stepbrother or stepsister, however, stands upon a different footing to a full brother or sister, since they are not "heirs" within s. 10 of the Digest or "co-heirs" within s. 11, and the decision is consequently distinguishable. In the last-named case it was held that a mother is preferred to a stepbrother or stepsister of the deceased. A stepbrother or stepsister, however, stands upon a different footing to a full brother or sister, since they are not "heirs" within s. 10 of the Digest or "co-heirs" within s. 11, and the decision is consequently distinguishable. [The following were also referred to Mi A Pruzan v. Mi Chumbra (( 1874) 1 Chan Toon L. C. 180.) ; Mi San Hla Me v. Kya Tun (( 1894) Printed Judgments ( 1893— 1900) 118; 1 Chan Toon L. C. 279.); Ma Gun Bon v. Maung Po Kywe (( 1897)2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897- 1901) 66; 1 Chan Toon L. C. 406.); Ma E Dok v. Maung Ngwe Hlaing (( 1898) 2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897— 1901) 109; 1 Chan Toon L. C. 445.); and ss. 24, 25, 27, 28, 97, 320—323 of U Gaungs Digest.] The preponderating weight of authority in the Dhammathats, more especially that of the Manu Kyay, is in the appellants favour, and there is no relevant decision which supports the respondents right of inheritance. De Gruyther, K.C., and Eddis, for the respondent. The Buddhist law in Burma is founded on the Institutes of Manu, the Dhammathats being equivalent to the Dharmashastras in Hindu law Burges Colonial and Foreign Law, ed. 1907, vol. 1, p. 59. As a consequence, the law of inheritance in Burma is substantially the same as among Hindus. The Chief Court was right in the view that though there are some Dhammathats which appear to support the appellants contention the preponderance is in favour of the respondent. An examination of the texts referred to in the Digest supports this. The three texts of greatest authority are the Dhammavilasa, the Manu Kyay, and the Manu Wunnana, of which the first named is the oldest. According to the translation in Jardines Notes on Buddhist Law, VII. Inheritance, p. 9, s. 26 of the Dhammavilasa says "if a man dies without children or grandchildren let his mother and father get his property; in the absence of mother and father let the younger or elder brother get it." Sect. 58 of this text (p. 17 of the above Notes) strongly supports the same view. Sect. Inheritance, p. 9, s. 26 of the Dhammavilasa says "if a man dies without children or grandchildren let his mother and father get his property; in the absence of mother and father let the younger or elder brother get it." Sect. 58 of this text (p. 17 of the above Notes) strongly supports the same view. Sect. 45 of the Manu Wunnana, as appears from Jardines Notes on Buddhist Law, V., p. 19, reproduces and confirms s. 26 of the Dhammavilasa. There is no passage in the Manu Kyay which says that brothers and sisters exclude the parents if living, or which contradicts the rule as laid down in the Dhammavilasa and the Manu Wunnana. [Richardsons translation of the Manu Kyay, ss. 1, 15, 18, 19, 22, 29,32 and 56, was referred to.] The texts of the Dhammathats have been considered in several cases in Burma in which the present question was relevant, and the Courts have come to the conclusion that the weight of authority supports the view that the parents take in priority to a brother or sister of the deceased. In the present case the judgments shew that the Chief Court again considered the various texts and did not merely follow the previous decisions. [The cases referred to in the argument for the appellant were discussed.] The decision in Ma Po Hmon v. Mating Kan (2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897— 1901) 157.) is directly in point since the fact that it related to stepbrothers and not to full brothers had no bearing upon the actual decision. [Chan Toons Principles of Buddhist Law, pp. 15 and 16, and Forchhammers Essay on the Sources and Development of Burmese Law, pp. 36, 96, 104 and 108, were also referred to.] Coltman in reply, Whatever may be the law as to the devolution of ancestral property, the brother and sister, when living apart from the parents, take before the parents in the case of self-acquired property. Sect. 29 of the Manu Kyay is an exception in favour of the parent and confirms the appellants reading of s. 19. If the decision in Maung Chit Kywe v. Mating Pyo (2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1892— 1896) 184.) be examined it will be found not to be consistent with b. 58 of the Dhammavilasa, but consistent with s. 19 of the Manu Kyay. If the decision in Maung Chit Kywe v. Mating Pyo (2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1892— 1896) 184.) be examined it will be found not to be consistent with b. 58 of the Dhammavilasa, but consistent with s. 19 of the Manu Kyay. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Chief Court of Lower Burma. The judgment is dated June 14, 1910, and it reverses a decree of the same Court in its original civil jurisdiction dated February 16, 1909. The appeal is also from an order dated September 2, 1910, which rejected the appellants application for a review of the decree first mentioned. The question to be afterwards dealt with is one of widespread importance, affecting the rights of succession in Burma. It is, however, necessary to state the circumstances, which are few and plain, in such a way as to shew the limits of the decision which is about to be pronounced. These will appear as the narrative proceeds. The respondent, U Shwe Gone, had three daughters by his first marriage. These were Mah Nhin Bwin, the eldest, Mah Nhin Boo, about two years younger, and Mah Nhin Ghine, about six years her junior. The eldest, Mah Nhin Bwin, is the appellant in this case. She was born about the year 1865. These three sisters lived together apart from their father. They traded in cocoanuts in the Municipal Bazaar at Rangoon. This state of matters lasted for many years, and one of the outstanding facts in the case is the complete separation of these ladies from their father, who had married again. They were, in fact,, independent traders. In later years their business appears to have been of considerable importance. One part of it, for instance, mentioned in the proceedings, is three cargoes of Nicobar nuts, of which one of the ladies was consignee, and the combined value of which amounted to a large sum. In the year 1899 the three sisters bought a house in Rangoon with money derived from the profits of their trading, and they thereafter always lived there together. What were the exact relations in the eye of the law as between these three ladies need not be determined in this case. In the year 1899 the three sisters bought a house in Rangoon with money derived from the profits of their trading, and they thereafter always lived there together. What were the exact relations in the eye of the law as between these three ladies need not be determined in this case. Whether they were all, or any two of them, in full partnership or in joint adventure with each other does not require to be decided in view of the events of death which happened, and of the opinion on the legal point of succession which is afterwards to be announced. In May, 1905, Mali Nhin Ghine died. Her sister, Mah Nhin Boo, took out letters of administration and took possession of her property. Their father, the respondent, however, made a claim thereto, and threatened proceedings, but nothing further was done. In June, 1906, Mah Nhin Boo died of plague. Of the three sisters, the appellant was thus the sole survivor. Should it accordingly be determined, as the respondent contends, that he, being the father of these two deceasing ladies, is entitled by the law of Burma to succeed to their property as their heir in preference to their surviving sister, then the corpus of the estate, whether it originally belonged to the one sister or the other, or to both, will go to him. If, on the other hand, as the appellant, the surviving sister, contends, it be the case that she is entitled as such to succeed as heir to her sisters, then again the entire corpus of the estate of both will pass to her in preference to her father. The point to be determined in this case is which of those two contentions is correct according to Burmese Buddhist law. A subsidiary question was raised in the appeal. It was founded upon allegations of commercial partnership existing between the appellant and her sister Mah Nhin Boo. Separate issues, which in appropriate circumstances might come to be of great importance under the law of Burma, were raised as to the rights of a surviving partner, on the one hand in a full partnership, and on the other in a limited partnership or co-adventure. Separate issues, which in appropriate circumstances might come to be of great importance under the law of Burma, were raised as to the rights of a surviving partner, on the one hand in a full partnership, and on the other in a limited partnership or co-adventure. These questions have not been lost sight of, but they are superseded by the conclusion to which their Lordships have come as to the right of succession in law by the father on the one hand, or by the sister on the other. The right of succession being determined in favour of the surviving sister carries with it and covers subsidiary rights of partnership as among the sisters inter se. No pronouncement accordingly is necessary in regard to the separate case under this head. A still further question has been argued, and it is well illustrated by the course which the case took in the Courts below. The learned judge in the Court of first instance held that by Burmese Buddhist law the respondent, the father, was entitled to succeed to the estate of his two deceased daughters in preference to the appellant, their sister. But he also held, however, that the father by his conduct, which in the opinion of the Court amounted to " desertion and intentional and deliberate neglect of the ordinary duties of affection and kindred,” had forfeited the right of succession which would otherwise have opened to him, and that for this reason the suit, which was to declare such a right of succession, must fail. On this latter point the Appellate Court came to a different conclusion, holding that the respondents conduct had not been so grave and reprehensible as to justify forfeiture. Accordingly agreeing as it did with the Court of first instance, that the father fell to be preferred as the heir entitled to the succession to his daughters estate, they affirmed that right and gave decree in his favour. Accordingly agreeing as it did with the Court of first instance, that the father fell to be preferred as the heir entitled to the succession to his daughters estate, they affirmed that right and gave decree in his favour. But the Appellate Court, in reaching their conclusion as to the import of the appellants conduct, shewed very clearly by their judgment that, so far as actual separation in life of the daughters from their father was concerned, this had been established beyond doubt; and in short it may be taken as a salient fact in the present case that the life lived for years by these ladies was lived as a life separate from and independent of their father. The need for this fact being pointedly alluded to is that their Lordships are desirous that the present case should not be held as dealing with or affecting parental rights in cases where the family continues to live together. The rights of a parent in Burma in such circumstances appear, according to their traditions and text-books, and to Eastern patriarchal ideas, to be of a high order; and they indeed recall to the mind various drastic rules of the earlier Roman law with regard to the scope of the patria potestas. Many illustrations arise in the books, but one may suffice. It is mentioned in even the Manu Kyay, the authority of which is the subject of separate treatment here after, that an impoverished parent could sell his children into slavery. These observations are, of course, not made to give any colour to the view that rights to such an extent still remain in modern Burmese law or practice, but to indicate tha the idea of the powers of a parent in his patriarchal capacity over an undivided household may lead to conclusions which hold no place in rules of succession to the estate of children who have left the fathers establishment and become separately settled in life. On the broad, distinct, and simple issue now to be determined, it might have been thought that the recorded traditions and legal institutes of the country would have been clear. Unfortunately, it is very far from being so. This may no doubt be accounted for to some extent by the fact alluded to by Burge (Colonial and Foreign Law, vol. On the broad, distinct, and simple issue now to be determined, it might have been thought that the recorded traditions and legal institutes of the country would have been clear. Unfortunately, it is very far from being so. This may no doubt be accounted for to some extent by the fact alluded to by Burge (Colonial and Foreign Law, vol. 1, p. 60), that litigation was appealed to "when the parties refuse such compromises as may be suggested by relations and village elders." This salutary practice of compromise has the disadvantage, however, that its results do not enter the records or procure the scamp of authority for a guide in future cases. So far as these results or the decisions of local native tribunals are concerned, they appear to have failed to find a place in the chronicles of the people. There were, however, as there are still, documents that could be appealed to, all of them authoritative, but varying in the weight of their authority. These are the Dhammathats, usually reckoned as thirty-six in number. They form the expositions of (inter alia) customs and juridical rules, their dates of issue varying sometimes by many hundreds of years. It is no doubt true that with regard to them a certain evolution can be traced, and it seems by those who have written on the subject also to be admitted that they differ from the ordinary legal institutes in this sense, that a change of dynasty was sometimes accompanied by a fresh composition in the shape of a new and, it might be, a comprehensive Dhammathat, which, while not removing or extinguishing its predecessors, appeared upon the scene clothed with the authority of the fresh Government and containing the latest revisal of accepted juridical doctrine. It appears to be acknowledged that the laws, or rules, contained in the earlier Dhammathats were in their remotest origin derived from the laws of Manu, which reached Burma by way of Southern India. But with the establishment of Buddhism and the spread of Buddhist doctrine came, in the course of time, the not unnatural desire to strengthen the sanctions of juridical rule by associating its foundations, the Dhammathats themselves, with the religious sentiments of the people, and in the later Dhammathats the commands, precepts, and principles are represented as truly being emanations from the spirit of the Buddha himself. This state of matters must have made the administration of justice still dependent on a comparison of Dhammathat with Dhammathat and a balancing of the weight of their authority. It cannot be said that at the present moment such difficulties have disappeared. Traces of them, indeed, are plain enough in the present case, and one cannot peruse the judgments under review without noting the care with which the learned judges of Burma address themselves to this task. There are two views which may be taken. Either the subject is dealt with sufficiently by a single clear or governing authority or the Dhammathats as a whole must be collated, and judgment determined by the best balance which can be framed as the result of their dicta. The judges of the Court below have adopted the latter course, and with regard to it their Lordships are not satisfied that even on such a collation the balance has been correctly struck. But the importance of the subject induces their Lordships to put on record how this matter stands according to all the Dhammathats, if the version contained in the Digest of the Burmese Buddhist Law concerning inheritance and marriage, prepared by Mr. U Gaung, be taken. Mr. Gaung was a member of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor, and the Digest was prepared under the authority of the late Judicial Commissioner and is published with the sanction of the Government of Burma. As shewing the variety and conflict of the Dhammathats, reference may be made in particular to ss. 310 and 311 of vol. 1 of the Digest of Burmese Buddhist Law on the subject of inheritance. Sect. 310 refers to " relatives of previous generations who are not entitled to inherit," and the rule of the Manu Kyay is thus cited " The rule whereby elder relatives are debarred from inheritance is as follows—The co-heirs live apart from one another; one of them dies without leaving a wife or a husband or a child; his or her estate shall be partitioned among his or her younger brothers and sisters, but not among the elder co-heirs." The point of the citation is as to the significance of the word "co-heirs” in this passage and that is illustrated by s. 311, where Mr. Gaung quotes from the Dhammara" The five kinds of co-heirs are the following, namely, ones elder and younger brothers, elder and younger sisters, and their children." It would thus appear that it was not within the conception of the Manu Kyay on this particular s. 310 to reckon the parent as having a preferred right to the co-heirs. The co-heirs came first, namely, the brothers and sisters of the deceased; and the point of the section is that as among these it was the younger brothers and sisters that were preferred to the elder co-heirs. As stated, the introduction of the parent as to be preferred to brother and sisters as a class and as a whole is completely negatived. But their Lordships recognize that the real difficulties of the case—and that the difficulties are real is established not only by the consideration given to the matter by the learned judges in the present case, but by the course of Burmese decisions to which they refer—arise from the construction of s. 311. That section deals with "relatives of previous generations who are entitled to inherit." The conflict had better be exhaustively set forth, and the forces on either side stand in this way— On the side of preferring the parents and ignoring the brothers and sisters, the Dhammathats stand as follows Manu.—" On the death of a person leaving not even a casually adopted son, his or her parents may inherit." Various other Dhammathats are cited by Mr. Gaung to the same effect as this extract from Manu. Vilasa.—" In the absence of descendants the parents are entitled to inherit." This is repeated—almost literally —in Dhammathat Kyaw, in Nandaw, and in Wunnana. Raza that.—" If the deceased person leaves no wife, children, grandchildren, or other descendants, his parents, grandparents, or other relatives of previous generations are entitled to succeed to the estate." To the same effect is the extract from Varulinga, namely, " In the absence of sons, including those publicly or casually adopted, the parents are entitled to inherit." Finally comes Kyannet.—" In the absence of wife and children, the parents are entitled to inherit the estate of their son." It is plain that these extracts do not proceed upon the principle of express exclusion of a right of succession by brothers and sisters. The brothers and sisters are omitted or ignored in the statement of the succession. The brothers and sisters are omitted or ignored in the statement of the succession. On the other side, the same section (s. 311) cites later Dhammathats which give very ample warrant not for ignoring, but for recognizing, and for placing in priority to parents, the rights of succession on the part of brothers and sisters. The historical light in which these later Dhammathats should be viewed will be remarked upon later. But meantime this observation may be made. The opinion appears to be entertained that the Burmese Empire was in the eighteenth century of the Christian era one of the greatest empires of the Eastern world. But it is at least certain that in the middle of that century a strong attempt was made to put the jurisprudence of Burma into a settled and more easily referable form. In the reign of Alompra, one of his ministers, a judge, completed a prose Dhammathat, known as the Dhamma, and the citation from the Dhammathats affirmatory of the right of succession on the part of brothers and sisters as in preference to parents becomes thereafter fairly clear. These citations are as follows The Dhamma.—" If a deceased person has neither co-heirs nor descendants, his or her parents shall inherit the estate." It has been already made clear that co-heirs include brothers and sisters, and the exclusion of a right of succession by the parents if such brothers or sisters are alive is thus plain. The Manu Kyay.—" The general rule is that relatives of previous generations shall not inherit the property of their descendants. The Manu Kyay.—" The general rule is that relatives of previous generations shall not inherit the property of their descendants. But if a person dies leaving neither wife, children, brothers nor sisters, his parents become his sole heirs." The Wunnana has been already cited as ignoring the rights of brothers and sisters in one passage, but in another the situation is expressed thus "Failing children, the parents or brothers and sisters of the deceased are entitled to inherit." The Rajabala.—" In the absence of husband or wife, children, and brothers or sisters, the parents are entitled to inherit." The Manu.—"If children living apart from their parents die leaving neither heirs nor co-heirs, their parents inherit the estate." Cittra.—" In the absence of heirs, parents, grandparents, or other relatives are entitled to inherit." Kyetyo.—" In the absence of other relatives, the parents are entitled to inherit." It will be subsequently shewn that by the use of the phrase, "in the absence of other relatives," is meant simply "in the absence of brothers and sisters." This would necessarily appear to be so. And it is from this body of authority quite manifest that the right of parents is not only not preferred, but is on the contrary very plainly postponed to the rights of succession on the part of brothers and sisters. With regard to the Dhammathats as a whole it has to be admitted that the figurative language so frequently employed becomes little helpful in expiscating the idea of inheritance. "It is natural," says Razathat," for sea-water to flow back into the ocean after entering rivers and streams"; and in another passage, "" When lakes are full, the overflow is returned to rivers and streams, and tidal water always flows back to the ocean." In later centuries the mind of the commentators was still struggling with these figurative expressions; as, for instance, in the Manu Wunnana "In the absence of wife and children, the parents inherit. Why so? Why so? Because of the water which flows into the sea a portion returns up the river." The figure which earlier appears is the simple one of water which cannot find an outlet being borne back to its source ; but as the Dhammathats develop it is found that the source of the returning water cannot be reached until the intervening inlets and creeks have all been filled up, and there appears to be the conception accordingly, not of at once reaching to the source, namely, the parent, without having exhausted the collaterals, namely, the brothers and sisters. These struggles with figurative language appear even in the decisions in recent times in the Courts in Burma, and, as is not obscurely indicated in some of these judgments, they rather perplex than help the mind. In their Lordships opinion the balance of the authority of the Dhammathats is upon the side of the sisters and brothers of the deceased being preferred to the parent. It has been already noted that there 13 nowhere throghout any of the Dhammathats a specific exclusion of brothers and sisters, and it may further be added that the language of the earliest Dhammathats, where collaterals are, as has been stated, either omitted or ignored, seems not to be analyzed or explained or the omission accounted for in the later Dhammathats holding the same view, and the concurrence is a mere repetition. Their Lordships incline to the opinion—and a special reason therefor will be immediately given—that a clearer note is struck by the Dhammathats from the time of the twelfth century of the Burmese, or from about the middle of the eighteenth century of the Christian era. Brothers and sisters as such, co-heirs as such, and relatives as such, are all dealt with and find a place in the discussion, and wherever they appear as a class they appear in the first rank, that is to say, in the rank preferred to parents. But these views of their Lordships are fortunately confirmed by another and an historical consideration. There can be little doubt that in the middle of the eighteenth century of the Christian era the conquest and subjugation of the country by Alompra was accompanied by a serious attempt by him and his high functionaries of State to place the jurisprudence of the country in a position of fresh and settled authority. There can be little doubt that in the middle of the eighteenth century of the Christian era the conquest and subjugation of the country by Alompra was accompanied by a serious attempt by him and his high functionaries of State to place the jurisprudence of the country in a position of fresh and settled authority. One of his ministers, supposed to be a judge, issued under the Royal authority one Dhammathat in prose, known briefly as the Dhamma. Another, "in charge of the Moat of the City of Shwebal," and taken by Dr. Forchhammer to have been Alompras Minister of War, compiled in prose the Manugye or Manu Kyay Dhammathat, and it is this document last mentioned which was issued by Royal authority in 1756, and which obtained the commanding position which it seems to have occupied for a succeeding period of nearly 170 years. What was the attitude of the British Government in respect to these particulars constituting the foundations of Burmese law? A period of about a century in the case of Lower Burma and a period of about 130 years in the case of Upper Burma intervened between the Alompraic code and the British occupation. During this intervening period the Burmese jurisprudence had existed on the footing just described. It would have been, of course, open to the British Government to adopt the ancient practice of issuing a fresh and authoritative code. But it was more in accord with the genius and practice of the extension of British rule and of the incorporation of various races and populations within the British Empire to accept the native laws in their main elements in so far as they contained a working system of jurisprudence which was in accord with the traditions and habits of the people. This latter course was adopted. An instance to hand may be cited In 1892, after the overthrow of King Theebaw and the establishment of settled order in Upper Burma under the British rule, a circular was issued " for the assistance of the Courts in dealing with questions of Buddhist law." The circular issued a translation of the letters patent in use under the Burmese Government for the appointment of judges. A list of Dhammathats was appended to it, but, as shewing the complexity of the subject, the Judicial Commissioner adds that he "will be glad of information regarding any copies that may be extant of any of these Dhammathats other than the more commonly known ones." After a recital of many resounding titles of the Sovereign, including that of "Mighty Fountain of Justice/ the circular proceeds thus “Now with respect to the office of judge, it is on this wise In the kingdom of which we are the sovereign ruler our numerous subjects must not be permitted one to oppress another, and the judges must admonish and chastise, repress, and judge. In case of dispute they must, in accordance with the Dhammathats, enquire into the causes of the people and decide between them. And for this purpose they are appointed to the Courts as judges." This is the general rule, involving as it does that judicial task the difficulty of which has been already mentioned. To recur to the Manu Kyay, which for so long had been recognized as the leading guide in the administration of justice. Professor Forchhammer, in his Treatise on the Sources and Development of Burmese Law, thus describes it "This law book is written in plain Burmese with very little Pali intermixed. It is not really a code or a digest of law, but rather an encyclopedia record of existing laws and customs and of the rulings preserved in former Dhammathats. Manu Kyay does not attempt to arrange the subject-matter or to explain or reconcile contradictory passages; religious elements are freely introduced; unjust judges shall suffer punishment in hell with head downwards; a man to whom deposits are made must be st strict performer of his religious duties; a person guilty of perjury will be visited by preternatural punishments." After having dealt with the development of Burmese jurisprudence and made a division of it into three periods, Dr. Forchhammer concludes thus " The Manu Kyay incorporates the contents of the law books of the first and second periods and records laws and customs existing among the people of his time. It deals with the religious laws and usages of the Brahmins and the monastic rules of the Buddhist clergy. Forchhammer concludes thus " The Manu Kyay incorporates the contents of the law books of the first and second periods and records laws and customs existing among the people of his time. It deals with the religious laws and usages of the Brahmins and the monastic rules of the Buddhist clergy. It allows the Buddhist element to predominate and draws largely from the Buddhist scriptures." It is not seriously disputed that the authority of this textbook, where it is clear, as among the Dhammathats, is of the highest rank. And accordingly, when British rule was extended over Burmese territory, the recommendation to the judicial officers substantially accepted this situation as it was found. In the words of Dr. Forchhammer " The Manu Kyay is to this day the most widely read and studied law book in Burma, and after the British had taken possession of this province the natives pointed to this Dhammathat as containing the body of laws by which they had been governed." Much has been done during the last thirty years to extend the knowledge of the various Dhammathats; and the labours and encouragement of the Judicial Commissioner, Sir John Jardine, have greatly assisted this extension. The Manu Kyay itself has been textually translated by Dr. Richardson, and is in familiar use as a work of reference; and their Lordships do not understand that the pre-eminent authority of this Dhammathat has been lowered by the labours of other authors or the translation of other Dhammathats. On the point in issue in the present case, the Digest of Mr. Gaung represents the dicta of the Manu Kyay thus "The general rule is that relatives of previous generations shall not inherit the property of their descendants. But if a person dies leaving neither wife, children, brothers nor sisters, his parents become his sole heirs." There does not seem to be any room for ambiguity here. Both classes are dealt with. The one class—wife, children, brothers, and sisters—are specifically and exclusively preferred to the other class, namely, parents. In the 10th book, chapter 19, of Dr. Richardsons translation, the text reads thus "Though this is the law (that property shall not ascend)," why is it also said the father and mother of the deceased have a right to his property? The one class—wife, children, brothers, and sisters—are specifically and exclusively preferred to the other class, namely, parents. In the 10th book, chapter 19, of Dr. Richardsons translation, the text reads thus "Though this is the law (that property shall not ascend)," why is it also said the father and mother of the deceased have a right to his property? Because if the parents be alive and the deceased has no other relations, they shall inherit his property.” In short, the Manu Kyay is clear that the property cannot ascend to parents unless there be no other relations, and "relations," it should be added, are, as appears clearly from chapters 17, 19, 22 and 25 of the same book, synonymous with brothers and sisters. Their Lordships do not think it necessary accordingly to pursue the inquiry further. In this Dhammathat, which still remains of the highest authority, the succession of brothers and sisters in preference to parents is established beyond doubt. This being so, the other Dhammathats do not require to be appealed to clear up any ambiguity. Were that appeal to be made, it would, in the opinion of their Lordships, as already stated, lead to the same result. The doubt, however, thrown upon the subject by the judgments of the Courts below can be explained to some extent by a brief glance at the development of authority on the subject. The sense of the Manu Kyay and the authority of its rule, as above expounded, seem to have been accepted in Burma until the year 1894. On November 12 of that year there occurred the case of Mi San Hla Me v. Kya Tun (Printed Judgments ( 1893- 1900) 116.), and the narrative is observable "The two lower Courts have held that according to Buddhist law property cannot ascend where there are collateral heirs, and they have awarded plaintiffs claim. The general rule that property shall not ascend is laid down in the Manu Dhammathat, Book 10, sections 1, 18, 19, but the rule is not without exceptions." (It may be noted that the "Manu Dhammathat" here referred to is simply the Manu Kyay.) The exception referred to in that case had reference to the separation of one from his adoptive brothers and sisters, and to an adopted son living with his adoptive mother. It is manifest that this so-called exception has nothing to do with the present broad and general case. And it is also clear that the law as above laid down was held to be the general law of Burma. Thereafter, however, a certain mischance arose by way of what is reported as an obiter dictum in the case of Maung Chit Kywe v. Maung Pyo (2 Upper Burma Killings ( 1892- 1896) 184.) in the year 1895. The substantial question in the case is described as "whether the brothers and sisters of the father of the deceased, Mah Pean, who was unmarried, have, under the rules of inheritance in the Dhammathats, a title to the estate of Mah Pean superior to any title of the defendant as stepfather living with deceased." Here it is also quite clear that the broad and simple question now to be determined was not before the Court. The stepfather was held to have no equitable claim, but in the course of the judgment there occurs this sentence " The Buddhist law is opposed to the ascent of inheritance, but when it cannot go by descent the inheritance is allowed to ascend, first to the father and mother, and failing them, to the first line of collaterals, and in the absence of heirs in that degree, to the grandfather and grandmother and the next line of collaterals." By " the first line of collaterals " is here meant the line of the father and mother, and it will be observed from this sentence that the true line of collaterals, namely, the sisters and brothers of the deceased themselves, appears to be excluded from the succession, although on each of the higher lines they are included; that is to say, uncles and aunts would be preferred to the grandfather, although brothers and sisters would not be preferred to the father. Whatever may be said of this reasoning, at all events it is probably sufficient to observe that it is not applicable to the question in the present case, and it was not necessary to that decision. In 1898, however, the case of Ma Gun Bon v. Maung Po Kywe (2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897- 1901)66.) was tried, determining that the estate of a. deceased step-parent or grandparent goes by descent to the step-children or grandchildren in preference to collateral relatives by blood. In 1898, however, the case of Ma Gun Bon v. Maung Po Kywe (2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897- 1901)66.) was tried, determining that the estate of a. deceased step-parent or grandparent goes by descent to the step-children or grandchildren in preference to collateral relatives by blood. Again it must be observed that the broad and simple question now to be determined was not before the Court. Many citations are made from the Dhammathats, and, as generally happens these texts appear to be somewhat inconsistent with each other, but whether they are so in reality or not is difficult to say. After examination the learned judge says "From these various authorities and from the other Dhammathats of which there are printed translations, it is clear that, when the ascending line and the descending line fail, the collateral line succeeds, and probably brothers and sisters would be preferred in certain instances to parents." No indications are given of what this probability is, and it may be sufficient with regard to this authority to say that it does not cover the simple point now to be determined. The case of Ma E Dok v. Mating Ngwe Hlaing (May 18, 1898) (2 Upper Burma Rulings ( 1897- 1901)109.) was referred to. It was a case with reference to adoptive parents. Various texts were cited, concluding with s. 211 of the Attathanyepa Vannana, which says " Where there is no younger brother or sister, then the property may revert or ascend to the elder members of the family, such as elder brothers, elder sisters, parents, or grandparents." The learned judge said "Although the last-quoted text throws some doubt on the subject, there seems to be good authority for the rule that parents are entitled to inherit in the absence of direct descendants. There has been no argument on the point." The "good authority" here referred to appears to have been the cases just cited, and in their Lordships judgment the last named case does not advance the proposition in any respect. There has been no argument on the point." The "good authority" here referred to appears to have been the cases just cited, and in their Lordships judgment the last named case does not advance the proposition in any respect. Reference was also made to the case of Maung Shwe Bo v. Maung Pya (February 27, 1899) (Printed Judgments ( 1893- 1900) 524.), the head-note of which is this " The Buddhist law is opposed to the ascent of inheritance, but when it cannot go by descent the inheritance is allowed to ascend, first to the father and mother, and, failing them, to the first line of collaterals, and in the absence of heirs in that degree to the grandfather and grandmother and the next line of collaterals." It is to be noted that "the respondents in this case were not represented by counsel and were unable to afford the Court any assistance in dealing with the difficult point of law involved." In those circumstances the judge, perhaps not unnaturally, accepted the Chit Kywe case as a guide, and with that their Lordships have already dealt. It is manifest that the clear and broad issue now to be determined has never been the subject of judicial decision, and that no series of precedents can be relied upon in justification of the judgments of the Courts below. Out of respect to the judges, and in view of the embarrassments produced by the cases cited and by the conflict among the Dhammathats, as well as of the importance of the general question being authoritatively settled, their Lordships have thought it right to make an independent investigation so as, if possible, to clear up the whole question. In the result they are of opinion that the right of the respondent, the father of the deceased, cannot be maintained as against the right of the appellant, her sister. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the judgment of the Court below be reversed, and that the suit stand dismissed, the plaintiff-respondent to pay to the appellant the costs of the proceedings here and in the Courts below.