JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent to recover the sum of Rs. 11,000 as damages “on account of defamation and mental and moral suffering” as stated in para. 14 of the plaint. At p. 25 of the paper-book, the learned Subordinate Judge has described it as “an action in libel, pure and simple.” It has arisen out of the following circumstances: The parties are members of the Vaish Agarwal caste resident at Benares. This community is divided into two sections tailed “Tars,” the Purbia or Eastern “Tar” and the Pacham or Western “Tar.” The parties belong to the Purbia Tar. Each Tar or section has a separate panchayat managing its own affairs. Matters of minor importance are decided by what is called a baithak, i.e., a small meeting, but major matters are only dealt with at a full meeting of the panchayat. This panchayat may be attended by all or any members of the section. The meeting is convened by the Chaudhris of the section who. In the customary way, send round barbers to the residences (which are said to be registered) of the families which constitute the caste or section. The subject-matter of the meeting is discussed and the resolution is duly recorded in a register. 2. This community has been divided, like many other similar communities in India, into two parties over what is called the sea voyage question. One party, which calls itself the advanced or progressive party, maintains that there is nothing in the Hindu faith or its sacred books, forbidding the crossing of the seas, that rather the sacred books distinctly contemplate it as permissible and that when a Hindu has done it, he may be taken back into caste after performing the purificatory ceremonies laid down. The other party, which may be called the orthodox party, maintains that it is not permissible but contrary to their dharma or faith, and that once a Hindu has done it, he cannot be taken back into caste even on the performance of the purificatory ceremonies. The plaintiff is a member of the advanced party. The defendant is a member of the opposite party and also one of the two Chaudhris of the Purbia Tar. 3. The plaintiff is a member of the advanced party. The defendant is a member of the opposite party and also one of the two Chaudhris of the Purbia Tar. 3. It is an admitted fact that some members of this community have left Indie for foreign countries and have been and still are out casted. One Babu Ram Krishan alias Nanhe Babu went to England in 1888, returning in 1891. In 1892 he again went to England returning in 1895. The caste appears to have been slow to act in this first case as Nanhe Biibu was not apparently outcasted until his second voyage, i.e., about 1894. The exact date of his out-casting is not clearly given. Then Babu Ajhudia Das, Bar at Law, went to England and was outcasted by a resolution of the panchayat dated Magh Sudi 3rd Sambat 1955. 4. The present trouble between the parties is an off-shoot from the case of the third member of this caste, B. Lakshmi Chand, who went to England about 1907 and returned some time in May 1910. He is or rather was a member of the Pacham or Western Tar and when he left for England before his return, he was outcasted by the panchayat of his Tar and all social dealings with him were forbidden: vide Ex. L, dated Baisakh Badi 2, Sambat 1967=26th April 1910. But on his return, he went through the purificatory ceremonies and certain members of the caste dined with him. Among these were the plaintiff's sons and nephews. This was at the end of April or the beginning of May 1910. A storm at once arose over this, an anonymous leaflet was printed and circulated discussing the whole subject from the view of the advanced party. 5. This was followed by what may be described as (and what in substance really is) a declaration of faith published by the orthodox party and circulated to the members of the caste for signature in token of their approval. It is Ex. B(6) printed at p. 9 of the appellant's book. 5. This was followed by what may be described as (and what in substance really is) a declaration of faith published by the orthodox party and circulated to the members of the caste for signature in token of their approval. It is Ex. B(6) printed at p. 9 of the appellant's book. It sets out that there is a rumour that young members of the community had brought about the performance of the Prashehit (purificatory ceremony) of an “England returned” person (evidently Lakhmi Chand) and had dined with him contrary to the dharma and old traditions of the brotherhood, that there can be no “Prashehit” of an “England-returned” man etc., etc. 6. It concludes thus: “Therefore even now, we are not willing to act against the old usage, the dharma, the traditions of the brotherhood, the Bevastha of Gopal Mandir and the path marked out by our forefathers, i.e., we do not want to associate in any way with people who have returned from England and those who mix with them. In witness whereof we on the testimony of our dharma, etc., affix our signatures below.” 7. The exact date on which this was published and circulated is not known, but from the evidence of the defendant it must have been early in May 1910. The document bears the signatures of a large number of persons. 8. Here we may point out that whatever may be the case in other cities and parts of India, in Benares at least and its two appurtenant towns, Chunar and Mirza-pore, the old orthodox party are greatly in the ascendant as far as numbers are concerned. This is evident from the evidence of Babu Gokul Das, the plaintiff's own witness, who is a Professor of Science at the Holkar College, Indore. He saks: “We dined with Babu Lakshmi Chand as a protest in order to stop excommunication by the brotherhood. We knew that the general sense of the community was against us.” This gentleman is connected by marriage with the plaintiff and on matters of casts has very broad and heterodox views, as his evidence shows, and desires that those views should generally be adopted, but he has candidly admitted that they are only held by a minority. We knew that the general sense of the community was against us.” This gentleman is connected by marriage with the plaintiff and on matters of casts has very broad and heterodox views, as his evidence shows, and desires that those views should generally be adopted, but he has candidly admitted that they are only held by a minority. Though he has been outcasted, he has been more candid in this respect than others of the plaintiff's witnesses who-would suggest that they are the views of the majority. This has been done with a view to casting doubts on the good faith of the defendant in what subsequently happened. 9. The issue and circulation of the declaration of faith was followed by the issue of the leaflet dated 16th May 1910 over the signatures of the present plaintiff, his brother Bhagwan Das and other persons. It is to be found at p. 128 of the respondent's book. It sets out that discussion is going on in regard to social intercourse (bartao) with persons who have returned from foreign countries, but that they hear that the matter is being confined to the case of Lakshmi Chand, that they (the signatories) think that if the brotherhood wants to devote its attention to such matters, a sifting inquiry should be made info the cases also of those who had dined with B. Ajhudia Das for the last twelve years and also into the cases of those who had become Theosophists, Radha Swamis, Freemasons and Arya Samajists and that if this were not done, it would be unjust and others would say that action had been taken through enmity. This document clearly roused the feelings of the community. Under the guise of an appeal for justice and an extended inquiry it really covered a taunt (which perchance may have been well merited) that there were many other black sheep in the fold among those who were thirsting to excommunicate the friends and associates of B. Lakshmi Chand. 10. The learned Subordinate Judge calls it an appeal to the community to take back Lakshmi Chand and he fails to see in it what he calls “defamation of the caste,” though it clearly implies that the members of the caste are mixing socially with many persons who are unfit to be in caste. 11. 10. The learned Subordinate Judge calls it an appeal to the community to take back Lakshmi Chand and he fails to see in it what he calls “defamation of the caste,” though it clearly implies that the members of the caste are mixing socially with many persons who are unfit to be in caste. 11. It however clearly gave great umbrage and on 19th June 1910 two Panchayats were held, one of the Eastern Tar and one of the Western Tar. We are concerned in this case chiefly with that of the Purbia Tar, but sight must not be lost of the fact that both sections held panchayan at the same time though at different houses and they met to consider the conduct of those persons who had signed the leaflet of 16th May 1910. At each panchayat it was decided that the families of those members of the section who had signed this leaflet and had refused to sign the declaration of faith should be temporarily excluded from all social intercourse until those persons appeared before the panchayat and cleared themselves. 12. The resolution of the Eastern Tar Panchayat was as follows: “That, since B. Gobind Das and B. Bhagwan Das publicly circulated among the Biradris and non-Biradaris a pamphlet about the Biradri contrary to the custom thereof, and not attend the panchayat on being called upon to do so, and these facts show that these gentlemen circulated the pamphlet simply to disgrace the Biradri, and their not signing the Chitha (i.e., the declaration of faith) shows that their views are against the panchayat therefore it is ordered that until B. Gobind Das and B. Bhagwan Das come and clear themselves the family of B. Madho Das be “bartao band”’ i.e., social dealing with them be stopped. 13. Communication. There were other resolutions passed but we are not concerned with them. According to the rules of the caste, the Chaudhri of each section has to communicate to the Chaudhri of the other section and to the Chaudhris at Chunar and Mirzapore the resolutions passed at panchayat. The defendant Bishambar Das therefore sent the following information in respect to the above resolution: “Today the bari panchayat was held and the panches arrived at a decision as follows: 14. The defendant Bishambar Das therefore sent the following information in respect to the above resolution: “Today the bari panchayat was held and the panches arrived at a decision as follows: 14. That social dealings with the family of B. Madho Das be stopped until B. Gobind Das and B. Bhagwan Das come and clear themselves.” 15. A similar resolution was passed at the Panchayat of the Western Tar in respect to the families of these members of that Tar who had joined with the plaintiff and his brother in signing the leaflet of 16th May 1910, and a similar communication was sent to the defendant-Chaudhri by the Chaudhris of that section. 16. On 8th July 1910, the plaintiff and his brother sent a registered letter, vide p. 7, appellant's book, to the effect that they had heard of the resolution and that he (the defendant) proposed it, they therefore asked him whether he had proposed it and to let them know what 5 explanation was required and when and where and to whom it was to be submitted. 17. On 16th July 1910, a baithak was convened and it was decided that the letter should be placed before a full Panchayat to enable the plaintiff and his brother to attend and make any inquiries they liked. 18. A panchayat was held on 22nd August 1910. The plaintiff did not attend nor did any one on his behalf attend and it was decided that no reply should be sent to the letter. 19. Then the present suit was launched. 18. A panchayat was held on 22nd August 1910. The plaintiff did not attend nor did any one on his behalf attend and it was decided that no reply should be sent to the letter. 19. Then the present suit was launched. The plaintiff's case as set out in the, plaint is as follows: (1) That the defendant had for a long time been bearing ill will against plaintiff and his family; (2) that the defendant had made, an unsuccessful attempt to excommunicate Lachmi Chand; (3) that the family of the plaintiff by reason of its lofty status in the community was exempted from all appearance before the Chaudhri and the panchayat; and moreover that it was the Chaudhri's duty to wait upon any member thereof to take his explanation if necessary; (4) that on 19th June 1910 the defendant, without formulating any charge against him, without any valid reason and without giving him an opportunity of defending himself, called a meeting at his own house of a few of his friends who were under his influence and recorded the following resolution: “As long as B. Gobind Das does not coma and get his position cleared, so long should the social dealings with the, family of B. Madho Das remain stopped;” (5) that the defendant published the above by communicating it in writing to the Chaudhri of the Pacham Tar and generally amongst the brotherhood by directing them to stop social intercourse with him, and also generally published to the world that the plaintiff had been outcasted. In para. 8 of the plaint the plaintiff says that, owing to the said writing which was unlawful and owing to its publication, he has been disgraced and has suffered material damage in various ways in that he has been falsely notified as an outcaste. 20. The amount claimed is Rs. 11,000 and the cause of action is said to have accrued on 19th June 1910 and on every subsequent date on which the defendant notified his expulsion from caste. 21. It is clear from the above that the plaintiff's case was that the defendant out of malice convened a bogus panchayat and without formulating any charge or giving the plaintiff an opportunity of defending himself, formally recorded an order of excommunication and falsely published, in writing that the plaintiff had been outcasted, and had therefore libelled him. 22. 21. It is clear from the above that the plaintiff's case was that the defendant out of malice convened a bogus panchayat and without formulating any charge or giving the plaintiff an opportunity of defending himself, formally recorded an order of excommunication and falsely published, in writing that the plaintiff had been outcasted, and had therefore libelled him. 22. It will be seen that in the course of the hearing the plaintiff also attacked the defendant's claim to be the Chaudhri or head of the Purbia Tar. The defendant in his reply set forth the constitution of the Agarwal community Benares and the rules of the panchayat, the customary method of convening meetings thereof and communicating its resolutions to those concerned and to the Agarwals of Chunar and Mirzapore. He denied that resolutions of the so called Vaish Conference are binding on the community at Benares which has always refused to accept them. He alleged that Lachmi Chand had been duly excommunicated for having crossed the seas as others had been; that the plaintiff and his brother had published the leaflet of 16th May 1910 contrary to custom and to bring the community into contempt, and had also refused to sign the declaration of faith; that to consider these matters panchayats were convened by both sections of the community to consider the conduct of those who had signed the leaflet and refused to sign the declaration of faith. 23. That the panchayat of the Purbia Tar was convened in the customary manner by sending round barbers to the registered addresses of the families which constituted the section, that information was duly sent to the plaintiff's family of both of the meeting and the objects with which it had been convened. 24. That as no one appeared on behalf of the plaintiff's family, the panchayat paased the resolution mentioned to stop all social dealings with the plaintiff's family until he and his brother appeared before the panchayat to clear themselves of the charges. 25. That he, the defendant, was the Chaudhri of the Purbia Tar and as such it was his duty to communicate the resolution to the Chaudhris of the Pacham Tar and of the caste at Chunar and Mirzapore and that he accordingly did do so. He denied that the plaintiff's family was exempt from attendance at panchayats. 25. That he, the defendant, was the Chaudhri of the Purbia Tar and as such it was his duty to communicate the resolution to the Chaudhris of the Pacham Tar and of the caste at Chunar and Mirzapore and that he accordingly did do so. He denied that the plaintiff's family was exempt from attendance at panchayats. He denied that he bore any ill will towards the plaintiff or that he acted with any improper motive. He pleaded that he acted in good faith in execution of his duties as a Chaudhri and that he had published no false statement but a true one; that the panchayat had been duly and properly convened and was a genuine meeting of the brotherhood; that the caste had full power to manage its own concerns and that its actions could not be called in question in a civil Court. 26. The learned Subordinate Judge framed sixteen issues. 27. With the first two we are not concerned in this appeal. We equally are not concerned with the 15th. It runs as follows: “Is going to England against the Shastras and does it entail loss of caste? Is the custom prohibiting sea voyage valid?” The Subordinate Judge has written a judgment covering some 68 pages of the printed book. Six are devoted to setting forth the facts and pleadings and the issues. Of the remaining 62 pages as many as 46 are devoted to this one issue. It is admitted before us that it is one which does not arise in the case at all; but the result of its framing has been that an enormous mass of irrelevant evidence has been brought upon the record and the learned Subordinate Judge, whose sympathies are clearly all the one way, has held that a sea voyage is valid and that taking Mlecheha's food is an expiable sin and one who takes it does not become unfit for social intercourse, that it is illegal to outcaste one who associates with him and that under the Hindu law an illegal outcasting was a crime punishable by the King. He held therefore that the defendant was a dandya or person who ought to be punished. This view, in our opinion, has tainted the whole of his judgment. He decided issues 3, 5, 6 and 9 together. These are: 3. He held therefore that the defendant was a dandya or person who ought to be punished. This view, in our opinion, has tainted the whole of his judgment. He decided issues 3, 5, 6 and 9 together. These are: 3. Has the defendant done any act which constituted malicious defamation of the plaintiff? 5. Whether there was any panchayat held on 19th June 1910? 6. Is the defendant; personally liable for the resolution passed by the panchayat? 9. Whether the defendant maliciously published the words of the resolution complained of? He held: 1. That there was a bona fide meeting of the panchayat, but that no notice thereof was given to the plaintiff personally nor was he informed of the charge preferred against him. 2. That the defendant having been present at the panchayat was as much liable for the resolution as any other member who was present. 3. That he published the resolution in that he communicated it to the Chaudhris of the Pacham Tar and of the community at Chunar and Mirzapore. 4. That the language of the resolution was defamatory as it laid down that the plaintiff was not entitled to social privileges. 5. That it was malicious defamation in that the plaintiff had received no notice of the panchayat or of the offences charged against him and the defendant was liable. 28. In regard to the question whether the defendant had acted from positive ill will against the plaintiff, he held that it was not necessary to come to a finding, though he points to the evidence on the subject and adds that there is abundant evidence to show that his conduct had been such as would be consistent with the fact that he was not acting with any good motive or out of a sense of duty to his caste. 29. Issue 4 was: Has the plaintiff done any act which would justify the panchayat in passing the resolution of 19th June 1911? Three grounds are given in the resolution of the panchayat for the order passed: 1. That the plaintiff had signed and circulated the leaflet of 16th May 1910. 2. That he had refused to sign the declaration of faith (called a Chitha) 3. That he and his brother had not appeared before the panchayat. Three grounds are given in the resolution of the panchayat for the order passed: 1. That the plaintiff had signed and circulated the leaflet of 16th May 1910. 2. That he had refused to sign the declaration of faith (called a Chitha) 3. That he and his brother had not appeared before the panchayat. The Court held that the first was no offence against the caste; that the plaintiff was nob guilty of the second as no opportunity had been given to him of refusing and lastly that he was not guilty of contempt of the panchayat because he was absent from Benares on 19th June 1910 and could nob possibly have appeared as notice was only given on that date. In connexion with the last finding the Court also found on Issue 7 that the plaintiff and his family were exempt from personal attendance ab the panchayat. 30. Issue 8 was: Has the plaintiff bean, expelled from the Biradri? If not, what is the effect of the resolution of 19th June 1910? The Court held that the plaintiff was virtually finally expelled from the caste because one of the conditions laid down for his re-entry was impossible of fulfilment. Having found this, the Court in its judgment points out that the plaintiff ought be have demanded a meeting of the panchayat as the resolution left him a, loophole to come in (presumably into caste) if he liked. 31. Issue 9, was: Whether the defendant published maliciously the words of the resolution complained of? On this the judgment runs thus: “It was the duty of the Chaudhri to publish the resolution and there is no malice in such publication. The legal malice consisted in not giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to defend himself and in passing that order behind his back. The publication of the order cannot be called, malicious.” 32. Issue 10 was: Whether there was any notice given to the plaintiff of the meeting of the panchayat? The Court found that the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff in the usual manner, i.e., according to the custom of the caste a barber was sent to the registered family address; but it held that notice was legally insufficient because the plaintiff was himself the accused and ought to have had a proper opportunity of defending himself. 33. The Court found that the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff in the usual manner, i.e., according to the custom of the caste a barber was sent to the registered family address; but it held that notice was legally insufficient because the plaintiff was himself the accused and ought to have had a proper opportunity of defending himself. 33. On Issue 11 the Court held that the resolution of 19th June 1910 was not communicated to the plaintiff, but that it was not the defendant's duty to send it to him and that the plaintiff showed his utter disrespect for the defendant Chaudhri by sending to him a registered letter and demanding a copy. The issue, in our opinion, was an unnecessary one. 34. On Issue 12 the Court found that the plaintiff was absent from Benares on 19th June 1910; that B. Bhagwan Das, his brother, was absent from Benares on that date; but it did not come to a clear finding as to whether or not he (Bhagwan Das) had returned from Ghazipcre at the hour when the panchayat met; it held that B. Sita Ram, a third brother, was present in Benares but was not aware of the panchayat; that though for ordinary purposes, the notice of the meeting issued was sufficient still in the present case as there was a personal charge against the plaintiff personal notice should have been given. 35. On Issue 13 the Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff had a cause of action but (only a sentimental one) in that be had been outcasted. 36. Issues 14 and 16 (of which the former was unnecessary and really included in the latter) related to the amount of damages and the Court held that in the circumstances the plaintiff was entitled to only nominal damages which after deciding issue 15 it finally assessed at Rs. 220. It decreed the claim to this extent. 37. The judgment ends with an expression of thanks to the learned advocates and vails for their help ani assistance in the case during a protracted trial lasting several months. We would point out that the trial was quite unnecessarily protracted. The Court and the parties seem to have treated the case as a struggle on the question of the validity or invalidity of a sea voyage in the eye of Hindu religion ani law. We would point out that the trial was quite unnecessarily protracted. The Court and the parties seem to have treated the case as a struggle on the question of the validity or invalidity of a sea voyage in the eye of Hindu religion ani law. The battle raged chiefly round this point and a mass of evidence relating thereto was brought upon the record and two thirds of the judgment devoted to it. The facts of the case as stated above and the pleadings of the parties show that the issue did not arise and there has been a considerable waste of public time and money in the hearing of the case. 38. The defendant has appealed against the decree. 39. The plaintiff has filed objections claiming the balance of Rs. 11,000 which the lower Court has disallowed and also pointing to an error in the costs calculated in the lower Court's decree as due to him. 40. In regard to these objections we would point out that they were not pressed. No attempt was made to point to any special damage incurred and the learned Advocate for the respondent said that he left the amount of damages entirely to the Court. 41. In regard to errors of calculation in the decree they will be corrected when the decree of this Court is drawn up. 42. In regard to the defendant's appeal it is necessary to first arrive at clear and definite conclusions as to the actual facts before we can decide as to the liability or otherwise of the defendant for the damages claimed. Prima facie to say that a man has been outcasted is to defame him. The libel, of which complaint is made in this suit is the communication by the defendant made in writing to Babu Krishna Chander Chaudhri of the Pacham section that the Panchayat of the Purbia section bad resolved that as long as B. Gubind Das did not come and get his position cleared so long would social dealings with the family of Babu Madho Das be stopped: vide plaint paras. 7 to 8. 43. The first question for decision is whether or not there was a genuine meeting of the panchayat duly convened according to the custom of the caste or whether there was only a bogus meeting consisting of only a few friends of the defendant. 7 to 8. 43. The first question for decision is whether or not there was a genuine meeting of the panchayat duly convened according to the custom of the caste or whether there was only a bogus meeting consisting of only a few friends of the defendant. If the latter be the true fact then it is clear that the communication made by the defendant must have been false to his knowledge and his liability clear beyond question. 44. The Court below has held and we fully agree with it that there was a genuine meeting of the panchayat duly convened according to the custom of the caste. It is unnecessary as we agree with the Court below to go at length into the evidence on the point. That the community was really in twain over the question of Lala Lachmi Chand and the attempt to take him back into caste admits of no doubt that the plaintiff and certain others had issued the leaflet of 16th May 1910 is an admitted fact and the evidence leaves it beyond doubt that what we have designated the declaration of faith had been circulated for signature. There was not and could hardly have been any secrecy is the matter. The evidence of the barber and the defendant and his witnesses as wall as that of Babu Baleawar Pershad, late Secretary to the Board of Revenue shows clearly that it was a regular panchayat duly convened by the defendant according to the custom of the caste. The plaintiff has attempted to attack the regularity of the convention by alleging that the defendant is not a legally appointed Chaudhri but only a self-constituted Chaudhri and by claiming that notice of the panchayat ought to have been sent to him and his brothers separately at their separate residences (which admittedly was nob done). On the first point he has not been supported by his own witnesses, e.g., Narain Dasand Vidya Nath Das. Another witness has also admitted that the order passed against the plaintiff was passed by the Chaudhri with the consent of the Biradri in general. In our opinion there can be no doubt that the defendant is the Chaudhri of the community for the Parbia section and duly recognized and acknowledged as such. 45. Another witness has also admitted that the order passed against the plaintiff was passed by the Chaudhri with the consent of the Biradri in general. In our opinion there can be no doubt that the defendant is the Chaudhri of the community for the Parbia section and duly recognized and acknowledged as such. 45. In regard to the notice of the Panchayat it is proved beyond doubt that in the customary way a barber was seat round to the registered addresses of the families which constitute the community. The plaintiff and his brothers are the sons of B. Madho Das. The defendant's evidence (and it dose not stand alone) shows that their family is registered in the Padchayat's list as the family of B. Madho Das, the registered address of which is “Lakhi Chabutra, Benares,” and that notice was given at that house by the witness Mahadao Barker to one Dabi Prashad, also a member of the caste, who is the agent of all the brothers. The plaintiff did not dare to put Dabi Prashad into the witness-box, but he pleaded that as he and his brothers are now all separate and live in separate houses, separate notices should be sent to each of them. In the first place he has to admit that though the brothers may not be, strictly speaking, members of a joint Hindu family, inasmuch as they have specified their shares, still their business and affairs are carried on jointly and that Dabi Prashai is a joint servant and manages their joint affairs at Lakhi Chabutra, a house which is the joint property of the brothers and is the old family residence. 46. In this respect we would refer to the evidence of B. Baleshwar Prashad again where at the bottom of p. 3 of the appellant's book he tails how his own family is treated in this matter. He and his brothers are actually separate in business and residence, but in “Biradri” matters are treated jointly, the family standing in the Chaudhri's list in the name of his father and grandfather. The barber when going round to give notice calls at the family home in which the witness' younger brother alone lives. He and his brothers are actually separate in business and residence, but in “Biradri” matters are treated jointly, the family standing in the Chaudhri's list in the name of his father and grandfather. The barber when going round to give notice calls at the family home in which the witness' younger brother alone lives. “Bhaji presents (ha says) can be ‘one’ even if the members of the family are separate.” This is the evidence of the plaintiff's own witness, a man of good position who lately held a responsible, good post. Part of the plaintiff's own evidence (vide p. 95 of the respondent's book) also strongly points to the correctness of this evidence. It also shows how the house at Lakhi Chabutra was used at times for general family purposes: sea also the evidence of his brother Sita Ram. We have no hesitation in accepting the defendant's evidence and holding that the Panchayat was a real bona fide convention of the Purbia section of the caste, duly and regularly called according to custom. We would point to the fact that the Pacham section also but that same evening for exactly the same purpose. The plaintiff's plea that it was a bogus meeting of a few of the defendant's friends falls to the ground. 2. That the resolution to temporarily exclude the plaintiff's family from social intercourse until he and his brother appeared before the Panchayat to clear themselves, was passed is equally beyond doubt. It is not so much the plaintiff's case that no such resolution was passed as that it was a bogus and not a genuine Panchayat which passed it. That the defendant did publish it is also an admitted fact. He has pleaded that it is his duty to publish all such resolutions to the members of his section and to the Chaudhris of the other section. That this is his duty is not seriously contested before us. It is proved not only by the evidence of himself and several of his witnesses but also out of the mouths of soma even of the plaintiff's own witnesses, e.g., Vidya Nath Das and Babu Baleshwar Prashad already mentioned above and Babu Moti Chand. The first in his cross-examination says: “The order passed by the Panchayat of our sub-division is communicated to the Panchayat of the other sub-division and the Chaudhri informs he members of his sub-division.” 47. The first in his cross-examination says: “The order passed by the Panchayat of our sub-division is communicated to the Panchayat of the other sub-division and the Chaudhri informs he members of his sub-division.” 47. In this respect also the Court below has held “that it was the duty of the Chaudhri to publish the resolution complained of and there is no malice in such publication.” 3. The third question is whether the defendant throughout this matter has acted bona fide or from some improper motive. It is the plaintiff's case that some ten years or more prior to this suit the defendant's brother was prosecuted for a technical breach of the Municipal rules. He had apparently omitted to inform the Municipal authorities of the death of the person in whose name the family house had been registered by the Municipal Board. The case was sent for trial to the Bench of Honorary Magistrates, and it came before a Bench of which the plaintiff was a member. It is admitted that the defendant's brother admitted the breach of the rules and was fined the small sum of Rs. 5. The plaintiff states that the defendant approached him and he asked him to acquit the brother, but he replied that it was impossible to decide the case otherwise than honestly. This, it is urged, gave, great umbrage to the defendant. 48. In regard to this we would point out that the defendant admits that there was such a case and that his brother pleaded guilty, but he totally denies on oath that he ever approached the plaintiff on the subject. The matter was a very trivial one, a breach (and that only a technical one) of municipal Rules to which no stigma of moral turpitude attached in any way, and in respect to which the accused admitted his fault. We fail to see that there was any sufficient ground for any person Wen to approach one member of a Bench of Magistrates to secure an acquittal, and we have grave doubts is to the truth of this allegation. 49. Next the plaintiff states that the feelings of the defendant began to be inimical to him when he (the plaintiff) gradually ceased to give help financially to the Chaudhris. 49. Next the plaintiff states that the feelings of the defendant began to be inimical to him when he (the plaintiff) gradually ceased to give help financially to the Chaudhris. In cross-examination he reduced his general statement to this that he used to pay a sum of money monthly to one Ganesh Das: Chaudhri and he admitted that he had not paid money at any time to any other Chaudhri. He had to admit that his account books could show no entry of any such payment; that the son of, Ganesh Das, one Sarju Das, had a running account with him and that there “might” have been a partnership between his father and Ganesh Das in some transactions; that he had sued Sarju Das on his account (when he, Sarju Das, went over to the opposite party), and that he lost his suit on a point of limitation. It is not clear why all this should have roused feelings of hostility in the breast of Bishambar Das, the present defendant, except that he has succeeded Ganesh Das and Sarju Das in the office of Chaudhri and Ganesh Das, no doubt was his uncle but was entirely separate from him and he was not in any way financially affected. In his cross-examination the plaintiff has given Chaudhris in general and one deceased Chaudhri in particular a very bad character, accusing them of using their position and power to extort money from members of the estate on threats of expulsion, and he charges the defendant with rage in that he knew that he could not extort money from him (the plaintiff). A witness has been called to state that the defendant had asked him what he was going to get out of the matter when there was a talk of settling the dispute over the question of excommunication on the sea voyage question. In the state of bitter feelings which evidently exist between the two parties we cannot place any trust on such vague evidence. There is nothing in the evidence to cause us to believe that the defendant personally overused his position to extort money either from the plaintiff or others. The sins of Ganesh Das and his son Sarju Das cannot be rested on the defendant's head. 50. Next there is the matter of what is called the. There is nothing in the evidence to cause us to believe that the defendant personally overused his position to extort money either from the plaintiff or others. The sins of Ganesh Das and his son Sarju Das cannot be rested on the defendant's head. 50. Next there is the matter of what is called the. Sauri affair which the plaintiff states occurred some years after the conviction of the defendant's brother in the municipal matter. According to the plaintiff he had unwillingly performed a ceremony too early in respect to his daughter-in-law who had been confined, and there was a meeting of the casts and an order of excommunication was passed against his family. This led to a split in the community, many of the members of which were against the unjust order passed in the matter. This lei to the formation of what might be called “Parbia Panch Bhais.” At that time Sarju Das was the Chaudhri and not the defendant, but it is the plaintiff's case that the latter was at the bottom of it all and that his own father and others asked him to apologies to the defendant and all would be well. This he refused to do. The split continued for some years, but finally the matter was either settled or compromised itself and the Purbia Punch Bhai community became dormant or ceased to exist shortly before the present dispute are in the caste. In regard to the excommunication order Dassei over the Sauri matter, the defendant has sworn that he was, as a matter of fact, not in Benares when it was passed and had no hand in passing it. He may have taken sides in the matter and probably did do so, supporting the party which stood out for strict observance of all rules. The plaintiff, who is a man of advanced ideas, thinks nothing of the formalities which are observed strictly by members of the old school. 51. At the utmost this matter was a dispute very much like the present one over the question of sea voyage, though not of such general importance to the community. It evidences the clash of ideas between the progressive and the conservative parties in this as in other communities. It is hardly evidence of enmity and ill-feeling. 51. At the utmost this matter was a dispute very much like the present one over the question of sea voyage, though not of such general importance to the community. It evidences the clash of ideas between the progressive and the conservative parties in this as in other communities. It is hardly evidence of enmity and ill-feeling. It has been attempted to show the state of defendant's feelings by the production of a few witnesses who have stated that the latter boasted to them of what he had done and that he had done it out of revenge. Kalka Prasad, a Khatri by caste, has stated that the defendant had told Him that he had hid revenge on Gobind Das, and when questioned refused to state what the old enmity was. The witness is a man of by no means great position and is considerably indebted. No other witness has been called to support his statement and Bishambar Das has denied the truth of it on oath. His (Kalka Prasad's) evidence (vide his examination-in-chief) is vague and wanting in detail and singularly unconvincing. He pretends to be a friend of the defendant, but his cross examination shows that he has fully identified himself with the plaintiff and his party. 52. The witness, Narain Das, the plaintiff's own first cousin, also states that the defendant said to him: “I have today wreaked old vengeance upon B. Gobind Das and have excommunicated him,” and that this was utterer in the presence of others just after the panchayat. The witness cannot give the, names of the others who were presents and no other witness is called to corroborate him. This witness also would have us believe that the defendant used to openly say that the plaintiff in his pride at being an Honorary Magistrate had fined his brother Rs. 5 without any reason and that God would some day give him an opportunity of taking his revenge. The witness is one of those who signed the declaration of faith though he says he did so because he feared excommunication if he refused. The fact that he signed it and even amended its wording shows that the matter was not a secret. This evidence does not impress us favorably. The witness is one of those who signed the declaration of faith though he says he did so because he feared excommunication if he refused. The fact that he signed it and even amended its wording shows that the matter was not a secret. This evidence does not impress us favorably. It is easy for a witness to make statements of this sort and leave little scope for cross-examination, as no other witnesses are called to corroborate him. This witness, though he testifies that the Sab family, i.e., his and the plaintiff's family, are exempt from the panchayat, states that he does not know whether or not matters relating to the brotherhood are decided by the panchayat, is fact he stated that he did not know what a panchayat was, an obvious untruth. When asked if he had actually attended the very panchayat in question at the house of the defendant, he said he could not remember. He says he thinks he went to the house of Rai Krishnaji, where the panchayat of the Pacham met, to see the fun. He pretends that he does not know the meaning of the term “kharij” and that he is not a friend or enemy to the plaintiff. He says in his evidence that he has been on bad terms with his cousin for seven years because of the Chaudhri, yet pretends that he has recently been attempting to obtain wives for the plaintiff's sons. No one who reads the evidence of this man in cross-examination could for a moment designate him a straightforward, candid witness on whose word any reliance could be put. 53. The third witness on this point is one Sankata Prasad, a Khatri. He is a person who has been working jointly with the plaintiff in advocating broad views on social matters, and his story is that the defendant once, some nine or ten months before his evidence was given, exultingly told him that he had excommunicated the plaintiff who had in consequence become infamous (“nakku”). He is the sole witness to the fact. His evidence is of little value to show that in this matter the defendant had been moved by feelings of ill will and malice. The defendant has denied on oath the alleged conversation. The plaintiff's brother, Sita Ram, does not testify to she alleged enmity. He is the sole witness to the fact. His evidence is of little value to show that in this matter the defendant had been moved by feelings of ill will and malice. The defendant has denied on oath the alleged conversation. The plaintiff's brother, Sita Ram, does not testify to she alleged enmity. The other brother, Bhagwan Das mentions the fining of the defendant's brother and the dispute over the Sauri affair and alleges that his own deceased gumastha, Ganesh Das, had told him that the defendant was annoyed because the witness' family did not show proper submission to him and make presents to him as to previous Chaudhris. This latter portion of his evidence was quite inadmissible. 54. Another method in which the plaintiff has attempted to show the bad faith of the defendant is the adducing of a good deal of evidence to show that some 25 years or more ago, the defendant himself in his younger days held broader views on the subject of the sea voyage in that he used to dine not only with Nanne Babu but also with Musalmans and others. Even granting this we fail to see that it shows bad faith on the defendant's part in the present matter. It is open to a man to change his views in perfect good faith as many a celebrated man has done before, and was cannot accept this fact, even if true (it has been totally denied by the defendant), as indicating that in the present dispute the defendant has been actuated by Some ulterior motive or by personal ill will towards the plaintiff and his family. The evidence does not convince us that the defendant has been actuated by ill will arising over the fining of his brother (a very old and trivial circumstance) or because he has nob been subsidized as Chaudhri by the plaintiff's family. The alleged, subsidizing of former Chaudhris, the relatives of the defendant, has by no means been established. The fact that the defendant in the Sauri dispute took a view hostile to the plaintiff's interest is not a sufficient indication of ill will, for it is clear that the caste was divided on the point. 55. The alleged, subsidizing of former Chaudhris, the relatives of the defendant, has by no means been established. The fact that the defendant in the Sauri dispute took a view hostile to the plaintiff's interest is not a sufficient indication of ill will, for it is clear that the caste was divided on the point. 55. But it is urged that the defendant has shown considerable bias in his conduct of the present dispute in the caste which indicates the state of his feelings; that the plaintiff and his family are exempt from all appearance before the panchayat; that it was the defendant's duty as Chaudhri either to attend in person on the plaintiff or to depute someone else to take his answers to the charges preferred against him, that he not only did not do this but did not even give the plaintiff an opportunity of appearing before the panchayat to answer the charges. This brings is to the question of the alleged exemption and whether the defendant has been guilty of any breach of duty in the matter in his capacity as Chaudhri. 56. The Court below has held that the alleged exemption has been proved prima facie from the very nature of the constitution of a caste, every member whereof is subject to the authority of panchayat and would be bound to appear either in person or by a representative to answer any charge of a caste offence brought against him. The plaintiff's plea is that all members of the Sah family are exempt from attendance to answer a charge. He says, “I have no first hand knowledge of panchayat procedure.” Further on he says: “I have been told that when a member of the Sah family is accused, then either the Chaudhri himself comes over or sends a duly accredited representative from the panchayat or sends a letter to make inquiries and get an explanation. It has never happened to me so. I can give no instance. I heard this from my elders. I heard this from my father and from the late Chaudhri Ganesh Das Khazachi, who used to be a constant visitor at my father's (house)……My father told it me several times during the last 30 years.” 57. It has never happened to me so. I can give no instance. I heard this from my elders. I heard this from my father and from the late Chaudhri Ganesh Das Khazachi, who used to be a constant visitor at my father's (house)……My father told it me several times during the last 30 years.” 57. He nowhere in his evidence gives any reason for this exemption and in the plaint the only reason given is that it has arisen by reason of the high status of the family. It is nowhere explained why or how the family has such a high status. It is wealthy no doubt, but in the country a family may be of “high status” even though it be comparatively poor. The basis for the plaintiff's knowledge is that his father and Ganesh Das told him and that Ganesh Das used to visit his father. His brother B. Bhagwan Das, has also stated that Ganesh Das used to consult his father in caste matters. This Ganesh Das is the Chaudhri to whom the plaintiff has given so bad a character and who had money dealings in the way of business with his father. 58. An examination of the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses on the point will show that they have stated merely that the exemption is well known and that they have heard of it. B. Baleshwar Prasad has stated that he thinks he heard of it from the plaintiff's father. None of them can give the cause of exemption nor do they attempt to state how or when it arose. No resolution of the community on the subject is quoted and there is no documentary evidence on the point. Vague evidence of this description is of no value. The lower Court has not attempted to discuss the nature of this evidence. It contents itself by saying that the volume is large and outweighs that given by the defendant, even that of one member of the Sah family itself, who has testified that there is no exemption. Their non-attendance does not give a right of exemption nor could the subservience of Ganesh Das Chaudhri on his mere dictum do so. As for its being the duty of the Chaudhri to attend upon the accused member of the Sah family and take his explanation there is a still less feeble basis for such an assertion. Their non-attendance does not give a right of exemption nor could the subservience of Ganesh Das Chaudhri on his mere dictum do so. As for its being the duty of the Chaudhri to attend upon the accused member of the Sah family and take his explanation there is a still less feeble basis for such an assertion. No rule or order of the caste is quoted and no instance. 59. On 8th July 1910 the plaintiff and his brother sent a registered letter to the defendant after the decision of the panchayat. In it they asked what explanation was required from them and where and when and in whose presence they were to submit it. Thereis no complaint that they were exempt from appearance and that the Chaudhri had, failed in his duty in not attending on them and taking their explanation. In our opinion the so called exemption has not been established nor has it been satisfactorily established that the Chaudhri has failed in his duty in this respect. 60. Next comes the question as to whether the plaintiff had an opportunity of appearing before the panchayat and whether in this respect the defendant has acted in an irregular and: improper manner. The plaintiff has it must be remembered, treated the panchayat as a bogus meeting of the defendant's friends, but we have held that if was a genuine panchayat duly and regularly called. 61. There can be little doubt that on the date of the panchayat the plaintiff himself was not in Benares and could: not personally have attended it. His brother Bhagwan Das had gone to Ghazipore on that date, but could easily have returned that same evening. If is alleged by witnesses that he had returned and was in a neighbour's house while the panchayat was being held. He has not denied that he did return to Benares that evening. The panchayat lasted from about 8 p.m. till past daybreak the next day. Babu Sita Ram, the third brother, was in Benares on that day. He has stated that he received no information of the meeting. It is difficult to believe this. It is proved to our satisfaction from the defendant evidence and that of Mahadeo barber that the latter was sent round in the morning to the registered address at Lethi Chabutra and that hegave full information to Lala Dabi Prashad, the family gumashta. He has stated that he received no information of the meeting. It is difficult to believe this. It is proved to our satisfaction from the defendant evidence and that of Mahadeo barber that the latter was sent round in the morning to the registered address at Lethi Chabutra and that hegave full information to Lala Dabi Prashad, the family gumashta. It is dearly proved that Lala Dabi Prashad attended the panchayat. Though he is the plaintiff's own servant he has not been called to state that no such notice was given. We have no hesitation in holding that it was given and no doubt that B. Sita Ram knew of the meeting and it is probable that Bhagwan Das was informed of it on his return. 62. The plaintiff pleads that notice ought to have been separately sent to him. The question is whether the defendant acted in bad faith and in an irregular-manner. The evidence of the plaintiff's own witness B. Baleshwar Prashad shows, that he acted in accordance with the regular custom and gave notice at the family residence. The community deals with the families which constitute it and a list is maintained of families with their addresses, and no irregularity or bad faith in this respect is established. 63. In the result we hold that the defendant is not shown to have been actuated be any ill will or ulterior or improper motive, that he has acted in good faith in the execution of his duty as a Chaudhri according to the recognised rules and customs of the community, that the resolution of the panchayat was passed by a meeting of the community duly and regularly convened and that in communicating the resolution to others in fulfilment of his duties as Chaudhri the defendant made a statement that was true in fact. 64. 64. But it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the order of manat or temporary exclusion from social intercourse was quite illegal in that the plaintiff had not Committed any caste offence and the panchayat had acted contrary to natural justice, in not giving the plaintiff an opportunity of defending himself, that therefore the expulsion being illegal plaintiff was still legally in caste and to say that he had been expelled was to defame him and though the defendant may have acted in good faith had published the defamatory statement and was legally liable in damages to the plaintiff. 65. In regard to whether the charges preferred against the plaintiff at the panchayat are or are not caste offences, i.e., whether the panchayat would have jurisdiction to expel from caste one who had been guilty of them, we are unable to hold that they were matters outside the jurisdiction of that body. They were two in number: (1) that the plaintiff had in conjunction with others issued the leaflet of 16th May 1910 and (2) that he had refused to sign the declaration of faith. 66. The former the panchayat looked upon as bringing the community into disgrace in the public eye in that it imputed that it mixed socially with persons who were unfit to remain in caste. 67. In regard to the latter, there was a momentous question for decision, some members wished to follow one rule and some, the other. Declarations of faith had been circulated by both sections of the community. They contained the views of the old orthodox party. Those who refused to sign it were of the opposite view and the community had to see which view it would accept. That it was a vital and important matter and closely concerned the social affairs of the community no one can doubt. It is still a burning question in many of the caste communities in India today. If a majority of the caste wished to adhere to the old view it clearly was open to them to refuse to mix socially with those who refused to follow the rule laid down by the panchayat for the conduct, of its members in this matter of sea voyage. It is a social question closely concerning the community and one well within their jurisdiction. It is a social question closely concerning the community and one well within their jurisdiction. It is pleaded that the plaintiff was not guilty of either charge, in that he had no intention of bringing the community into contempt in the public eye and because he had no opportunity of signing the declaration of faith. He has admitted that he would not have signed it been if it had been put before him. Evidence has been adduced by the defendant of witnesses who state that they took it to him for signature and that he refused. Be that as it may the Courts of this country have always refused to interfere with the automony of the caste, provided that it does not act in a manner contrary to natural justice and we do not propose to sit as a Court of appeal from the decision of a panchayat on the pure question of fact before it. The Courts cannot interfere, provided the matter was one within the jurisdiction of the panchayat and the latter has not acted in a manner contrary to natural justice. We find it impossible to hold that the panchayat had no jurisdiction to consider the conduct of the plaintiff and his brother in the matter. 68. The lower Court has held, and we agree, that notice was issued according to the rule and custom of the caste to the family of the plaintiff, and that B. Sita Ram at least could, according to the rules of the panchayat, have attended and represented the family and applied for an adjournment pending the plaintiff's return. It however accepted Sita Barn's statement that he received no information. With this we are unable to agree. It is impossible to believe that he was ignorant of the fact that both sections of the community ware meeting that evening of 19th June 1910. There can be no doubt that the barbers had been sent round and that Mahadeo had delivered his message at the family house. 69. With this we are unable to agree. It is impossible to believe that he was ignorant of the fact that both sections of the community ware meeting that evening of 19th June 1910. There can be no doubt that the barbers had been sent round and that Mahadeo had delivered his message at the family house. 69. The Court below however has held that even assuming that B. Sita Ram was well aware of the meeting, though the rule of the panchayat which deals with family units and not with individual members of a family, is a most reasonable and practical rule and a notice to any member of the family is sufficient for ordinary purposes, still in the present case a particular member of a family was accused of having done wrong and personal notice should have been served on him. 70. The learned Subordinate Judge loses sight of the fact that in all cases it is some one or more particular member or members of a family who are guilt of a breach of rules or of caste offence and that in each case it is the family which is called upon to explain the actions of its members. The panchayat deals with the family as a unit and any member of the family can appear on its behalf and defend. It is difficult to say that this procedure is contrary to natural justice. In the present case it is not the plaintiff personally with whom social intercourse has ceased. It is the family of B. Madho Das. 71. The lower Court has held that by reason of this absence of personal notice to the plaintiff, the proceeding was contrary to natural justice and the order, therefore, illegal and improper. It has gone into the question of the plaintiff's guilt or innocence and has found him innocent. It has held that the order of “amanat” is really a permanent exclusion from caste, because one of the conditions on which the caste has agreed to take back the plaintiff's family is impossible of execution. It has concluded that the plaintiff having been illegally excluded from caste, the defendant has been technically guilty of malice and libel and has awarded a trivial sum as damages. 72. It has concluded that the plaintiff having been illegally excluded from caste, the defendant has been technically guilty of malice and libel and has awarded a trivial sum as damages. 72. Now the communication made by the defendant to the members of the caste was that the panchayat had resolved that until B. Gobind Das and his brother did appear before the panchayat and explain their conduct, all Social dealings with the family of B. Madho Das should be suspended. 73. This on the face of it is nothing more than a temporary conditional odes of suspension. It admits the right of the plaintiff to be heard in his defence. We have seen the attitude which the plaintiff and his brothers have taken up towards the panchayat and its authority by their claim for exemption from attendance. 74. The above resolution was passed on three grounds: (1) because the plaintiffs and others had signed and published the leaflet of 16th May 1910 among members of this and other castes. (2) because no appearance had been made on their behalf or by them though notice had duly issued. (3) because they had failed to sign the declaration of faith. 75. The panchayat had before it evidence of the service of notice and that Sita Ram was present in Benares, i.e., that an appearance could have been made. It, no doubt, considered that its authority was being flaunted and it temporarily suspended the family pending the appearance of the plaintiff and his brother before the panchayat to explain their conduct. There was no denial of justice in this. As the lower Court has pointed out and as the evidence proves, (even of the plaintiff's own witnesses) the plaintiff could have demanded an immediate convention of the Biradri and placed his case before them. The resolution distinctly contemplates this. But this he did not attempt to do. He sent a registered letter ostensibly asking what the charges were and to whom and at what time and place he had to submit his explanation. This was placed before the panchayat which decided that no reply should be seat to it as the plaintiff and his brother could, if they liked, appear before the panchayat. One thing is clear, and that is that the plaintiff and his brother did not intend to submit to the panchayat. 76. This was placed before the panchayat which decided that no reply should be seat to it as the plaintiff and his brother could, if they liked, appear before the panchayat. One thing is clear, and that is that the plaintiff and his brother did not intend to submit to the panchayat. 76. The Court below has held that the order passed was virtually one of complete expulsion because one of the conditions for reinstatement was impossible of fulfilment. It refers to an incident mentioned in the evidence of the witness, Colonel Bindeshri Prasad Singh Chief Secretary to the Maharaja of Benares, who was deputed by his master to try and bring the parties to terms. Certain members of the caste, of whom the defendant was one, met him and discussed the matter. It was not a meeting of the panchayat. Peelings apparently ran high and one person present suggested that the plaintiff would be forgiven if he vowed not to cut with those of the caste who had gone to England and if the marriage contract between the daughter of B. Bhagwan Das and the son of Rai Bahadur Ramnaj Diyal were broken off. It is this latter condition which could not be fulfilled. But this was not a condition laid down by the panchayat. It was the suggestion of one member and it cannot be said that the panchayat's decision had been in any way amended or altered by this suggestion made by a single member at an informal meeting between a few members and the Colonel. The matter has not, as a matter of fact, been yet placed before a panchayat. The first resolution was, no doubt, passed because the family of Madho Das had been guilty of contempt of the panchayat by not appearing but it distinctly, as we have already said, offered an opportunity to the plaintiff to appear and defend and the lower Court has distinctly said that it would have been wiser and better if he had demanded a fresh meeting of the panchayat. 77. We are unable to hold in the circumstances that the panchayat acted contrary to natural justice and that therefore the temporary exclusion from social dealings was a permanent exclusion or illegal order and that the defendant in publishing the order, in execution of his duties as Chaudhri, has rendered himself liable to damages for libel or defamation. 77. We are unable to hold in the circumstances that the panchayat acted contrary to natural justice and that therefore the temporary exclusion from social dealings was a permanent exclusion or illegal order and that the defendant in publishing the order, in execution of his duties as Chaudhri, has rendered himself liable to damages for libel or defamation. We have already held that he has acted throughout in good faith. We therefore hold that he is not liable to the plaintiff in damages. 78. While we sympathies with the plaintiff in his attempt to broaden the views of his fellow castemen and to improve his caste socially and mentally, we consider that the present suit was misconceived unless it was his main object (which it appears to have been) to get the pronouncement of the learned Subordinate Judge, who is a Sanskrit scholar of grant reputation, on the vexed question of sea voyage. If this were his object he has attained it at the cost of a great deal of public time and money. It was an issue that did not arise in the case. 79. We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and dismiss the suit with costs in both Courts including in this court-fees on the higher scale. The objections are disallowed with costs including fees on the higher scale.