JUDGMENT Coxe, J. - The property in suit originally belonged to one Rukmini. She mortgaged it, and the mortgagee in the end sold it in execution of a decree on the mortgage. It was purchased by a predecessor-in-interest of the Plaintiff. The Defendants are successors-in-interest of Rukmini's brothers to whom she is said to have transferred the property. The Plaintiff has sued for possession. The suit has been dismissed by the Courts below, partly on the ground that the Plaintiff has not made out his title, and partly on the ground that the Defendants have acquired a title by adverse possession. The Plaintiff appeals. On the first point, I think that the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed. The Courts below hold that he has not succeeded in proving that Rukmini's mortgage was made for legal necessity. But the Defendants are not the reversioners. The alienation, if made without legal necessity, was voidable, but not void. Until the reversioner, including in that term the Crown, if there is no nearer reversioner, decides to avoid it or to treat it as a nullity, it stands good. This, I think, is the result of the decisions in Madhusudan v. Rooke 11 C. W. N. 424 (1907) and Bejoy Gopal v. Krishna Mahishi I. L. R. 25 Cal. 1 (1897). 2. As to the question of adverse possession, it is argued that the Courts below have wrongly applied Art. 142 instead of Art. 144 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. So far as regards the kamal land, it does not appear to me that this question really arises on the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts. The Defendants have always claimed adversely to the Plaintiff and his predecessors since long before 1882. In that year it was decided that the Plaintiff's predecessors were entitled to possession during Rukmini's lifetime. It was not decided, whether or not they were entitled to possession afterwards. They obtained, however, formal delivery of possession. But the District Judge finds, and it is a finding of fact, with which we cannot interfere, that although the Plaintiffs predecessor "got symbolical possession through the Court in 1883 in pursuance of the order of the District Judge, it is quite certain that he never got actual possession. They obtained, however, formal delivery of possession. But the District Judge finds, and it is a finding of fact, with which we cannot interfere, that although the Plaintiffs predecessor "got symbolical possession through the Court in 1883 in pursuance of the order of the District Judge, it is quite certain that he never got actual possession. Now of course the formal delivery of possession, as no doubt the learned District Judge was well aware, is conclusive evidence between the parties that possession was delivered. It is perhaps somewhat of a legal fiction in many cases, but it is a very valuable one as it affords a starting point for limitation. But it cannot be denied that it is often little more than a fiction, and it is not in the least conclusive evidence that the possession so delivered continued. There may be a presumption that such possession would continue until the contrary was proved, but that is all. The District Judge's finding that the Plaintiff's predecessors never got actual, as distinguished from symbolical, possession, can only mean that the possession delivered did not continue at all, and that the Defendants, except for the unimportant interval while possession was being formally delivered, remained in actual occupation of the land. Such a finding of fact is fatal to the mere presumption referred to above. Such possession could not but be adverse. There is no reason to suppose that the Defendants have ever changed their claim, and where possession is exercised by the actual cultivation of the ground, the Plaintiff, who admittedly has never been in possession of the kamat land, must necessarily have known that the possession of the Defendants was adverse. 3. Now as regards the land held by raiyats, limitation is saved, in my opinion, by the rent decrees obtained by the Plaintiff's predecessor in 1901. The Defendants in those suits are admittedly tenants of the land. It was finally decided in those suits that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between them and the Plaintiff's predecessor. That being so, I do not see how it can be said that the Plaintiff's predecessor was not then in possession. The tenants were admittedly in possession, and their possession was his possession. The Respondents have not shown that those decrees were fraudulent and collusive. Indeed, it was found in those suits that the tenants were colluding with the present Respondents. The tenants were admittedly in possession, and their possession was his possession. The Respondents have not shown that those decrees were fraudulent and collusive. Indeed, it was found in those suits that the tenants were colluding with the present Respondents. If the tenants had attorned to the Plaintiff, their possession would have been his possession. It seems to me that the same result must follow, if it is decided in a suit between the parties that they are his tenants. The appeal will accordingly be allowed in part. The Plaintiff will get a declaration of his proprietary right in the land, covered by the rent decrees of 1901, but otherwise the suit will fail. D. Chatterjee, J. I agree.