JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant is one Gokul Chand. He holds a decree against the respondent Bhika which he obtained on 28th August 1909. He does not appear to have attempted to take out execution proceedings until 5th February 1913. The decree would therefore be barred by limitation. But the decree-holder in his application for execution has inserted the following words: “The period of limitation for the execution of the decree was up to 28th August 1912. However the judgment-debtor paid to the decree-holder a suns of Rs. 20 on account of interest on 27th January 1912 within three years of the date of the decree and Naubat, judgment-debtor, endorsed the payment of the decree in his own handwriting and affixed his signature. With effect from the aforesaid data the decree-holder is entitled to compute a fresh period of limitation and the decree is within time.” 2. It is worth noting in connexion with this that the application for execution does not follow the language used its R. 11, O. 21 of the CPC. That rule requires the decree-holder to note whether any, and if so, what payment or other adjustment of the matter in controversy has been made. The application as it stands has at the heading only the words, “whether any adjustment has been made,” and the entry in the column intended for that purpose simply says no adjustment was made. Bhika, the respondent, denied that any payments had been made. 3. The Court of first instance tried the issue whether the payment of Rs. 20 had been made. It found that Bhika had paid Rs. 20 to the decree-holder on 27th January 1912. Bhika appealed and the District Judge of Meerut refrained from deciding this particular issue. He held that this payment has not been certified by the decree-holder to the Court, and that O. 21, R. 3 of the CPC, prevented any Court executing the decree from recognizing a payment which had not been certified. Thus holding, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the application for execution. In appeal here it is contended that the decision of the lower appellate Court of this point is wrong. The decree-holder was not bound by any period of limitation and the present application for execution in which the payment was mentioned was a sufficient certificate of such payment within the meaning of O. 21, R. 2. 4. In appeal here it is contended that the decision of the lower appellate Court of this point is wrong. The decree-holder was not bound by any period of limitation and the present application for execution in which the payment was mentioned was a sufficient certificate of such payment within the meaning of O. 21, R. 2. 4. It appears to me that the action of the decree-holder in the form in which it has been made in the present case is not such a certificate of payment as was intended by the Code. Looking at the application, I hold that the application was what it represented itself to be, namely an application for execution of the decree. The omission of the fact of payment from the column in which it ought to find a place, and in which we expect to find it, would stand in the decree-holder's way, and the introduction of payment at an unusual place is a mere afterthought on his part and is not, in my opinion, a certificate of payment. It is true that no form is prescribed for a certificate. But the wording of R. 2, O. 21, signifies that a decree-holder shall come forward and in some special well-defined speech or writing certify to the Court that money payable under his decree has been paid out of Court. The rule goes on to say that on the decree-holder so certifying, the Court shall record the same accordingly. All this points to a definite proceeding with a petition on the part of the decree-holder and a formal act by the Court. Nothing of that kind occurred in the present case, and I agree with the lower appellate Court in holding that the Court was bound not to recognize this mention of payment slipped in this quasi clandestine manner. I therefore dismiss this appeal with Costs.