JUDGMENT : 1. This was a suit for a declaration of title, or in the alternative fee recovery of possession, in respect of a certain plot of land, and also for damages with regard to a sugar-cane crop standing on the said land which is alleged to have been wrongfully removed by the defendants. The Court of first instance decreed the claim for damages and apparently intended to find for the plaintiffs on the question of title, but somewhat curiously remarked that it was unnecessary to give the plaintiffs any further relief inasmuch as the plaintiffs' Pleader had made a statement to the effect that his clients were actually in possession. The result naturally was that both parties appealed to the Court of the District Judge. That Court found against the plaintiffs on the question of title and also with regard to the claim for damages; it, therefore, dismissed their suit altogether. Inasmuch, however, as the learned District Judge had two appeals before him there have been two appears filed by the plaintiffs before this Court. When this appeal came before me for hearing in the month of June last, I found it necessary to remit an issue to the lower Appellate Court. This issue came for decision before another learned Judge, not the one who decided the appeal in the first instance, and it is not altogether easy to reconcile the finding returned on the remanded issue with certain findings recorded by the learned Judge whose decree is now under appeal. It seems to me, however, that I am bound in second appeal to give effect as far as possible to the findings of fact originally recorded by the lower Appellate Court as well as to the finding returned upon the remanded issue. 2. I take it accordingly to be established that the plot of land in suit was at one time held rent free by Puranwasi Hajjam upon a service tenure. The right enjoyed by him has since descended by inheritance, assuming that its descent is governed by the ordinary Hindu Law, to the plaintiffs Musai and Chaturi. Musai has mortgaged one-half share with possession to the plaintiff Jokhan Chaubey. The right enjoyed by him has since descended by inheritance, assuming that its descent is governed by the ordinary Hindu Law, to the plaintiffs Musai and Chaturi. Musai has mortgaged one-half share with possession to the plaintiff Jokhan Chaubey. These plaintiffs obtained possession over the plot in suit and were in possession at any rate during the years 1313, 1314 and 1315, Fasli, that is to say, for a period which came to an end in the month of September, 1903. Their possession was constructive, the land being an the actual occupation of their sub-tenant, Jita. I must take it that this sub-tenant was ejected by the defendants-respondents, who are zemindars of the village, somewhere about the end of the year 1908 A.D. and that the sugar-cane crop in respect of which damages were claimed was actually grown by these defendants-respondents, or some of them. The plaintiffs Jokhan and Chaturi took formal proceedings in ejectment against Jita during the year 1909, obtained a decree against him, to which the present respondents were not parties, and were put in formal possession in the month of March, 1910, after having been made to pay to Jita Rs. 30, as compensation on account of the sugar-cane crop already mentioned. They have brought the present suit on the ground of interference on the part of the defendants-respondents with their right to actual possession. I must take it that their cause of action accrued after the close of the year 1315 Fasli, that it to say, after the month of September, 1903. 3. The first question which has been argued before me to-day is whether the plaintiffs Masai and Chaturi were in fact entitled to succeed to the rights of Paranwasi Hajjam, the rent-free holder of the land in suit. This involves the question whether succession to Puranwasi's right is governed by the ordinary Hindu Law or by the special provisions of Section 22 of the Tenancy Act (Act II of 1901). That section applies only to various classes of tenants, and by definition a tenant does not include a rent-free grantee, and a rent-free grantee does include a person who holds land on a service tenure. I must, therefore, accept the finding of the lower Appellate Court on the remanded issue and hold that Puranwasi's right devolved in accordance with the ordinary Hindu Law, and, therefore, passed to the plaintiffs Chaturi and Musai. I must, therefore, accept the finding of the lower Appellate Court on the remanded issue and hold that Puranwasi's right devolved in accordance with the ordinary Hindu Law, and, therefore, passed to the plaintiffs Chaturi and Musai. The present possession of the defendants-respondents, I must hold to have been violent and unlawful. It has been contended on their behalf, in the first place, that a service-tenure is in its essence non-transferable, so that the mortgage in favour of Jokhan is unlawful, and further, that the plaintiffs should in no case be given a decree for recovery of possession as service-tenure-holders, seeing that in their plaint the plaintiffs do not claim title as such but described the land in suit as forming a haqiat mutfarrika, whatever that expression may be understood to mean. I find that in the plaint the land in suit was described as ancestral muafi of Puranwasi Hajjam. I am not prepared to hold that the mere fact that the plaintiffs did not admit themselves to be entitled to possession of the land in suit as a service-tenure, that is to say, subject to certain conditions of service, should disentitle them to a decree for recovery of possession as service-tenure-holders, provided that such right is established on the evidence. The question of the transfer in favour of Jokhan does not, in my opinion, affect the determination of the present suit. It applies in any case to one-half of the land in suit only. The transfer by way of mortgage would leave the original tenure-holders still liable for, and capable of rendering, the service subject to which the tenure was granted. In any case, even supposing that by reason of the transfer in favour of Jokhan, or of the devolution of Puranwasi's rights by inheritance through the female line, the zemindars of the village were no longer able or willing to receive from Musai and Chaturi, as tenure-holders the services for the sake of which the rent free holding was originally granted, that circumstance would not entitle them to enter into possession of the land in suit otherwise than by means of a suit for resumption. The rent-free-holders are, in my opinion; entitled to be re-instated in possession as such, because their right to such possession has not been terminated by the means provided by law. The rent-free-holders are, in my opinion; entitled to be re-instated in possession as such, because their right to such possession has not been terminated by the means provided by law. I am, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession. I cannot give them a decree for damages in view of the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court with regard to the sugarcane crop in dispute. That is a finding of fact and no valid ground has been shown for disturbing it in second appeal. The plaintiffs may have been unfortunate in this respect, in so far as it would appear that they were actually made liable to pay compensation for this crop to Jita; but that order was passed in a suit to which these defendant-respondents were not parties and is not binding upon them. The result is that I so far accept this appeal that I decree the plaintiffs' alternative claim for recovery of possession in respect of the land in suit, and dismiss the rest of their claim. The parties will pay and receive costs throughout in proportion to failure and success.