JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal arises out of proceedings taken to execute a decree obtained on May 22nd, 1901, by the respondents, who were at the time and still are minors. Their guardian made several applications for execution of the decree which were granted, the last of them being made on February 6th, 1912, and ultimately dismissed on December 3rd, 1912. The present application was presented on May 27th, 1913, i.e., a few days after the expiration of 12 years from the date of the decree. One of the grounds on which the application was contested, and the only ground with which we are concerned now was that further execution of the decree is barred by Section 48 of the CPC. The Munsif decided this question in favour of the judgment-debtors-appellants but the Additional Subordinate Judge decided it against them, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Moro Sadashiv v. Visaji Raghunath, (1892) 16 Bom. 536. In the case cited the Bombay High Court pointed out that Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877 served only to extend, for the benefit of minors, periods of limitation provided by that Act, but they held that Section 230 of the CPC must give way to the general principle that time does not run against a minor. In Jhandu v. Mohan Lal, (1894) 128 P.R. 1894, the Punjab Chief Court declined to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court and quite recently in Ramana Reddi v. Babu Reddi, (1913) 18 I.C. 586 : 37 Mad. 186., in a case arising under Section 6 of the Limitation Act of 1908 and Section 48 of the CPC of 1908, the Madras High Court followed the Punjab decision and declined to follow that of the Bombay High Court. I prefer the view taken by the Punjab and Madras Courts. Section 6 of the present Limitation Act, like Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877, serves only to extend, for the benefit of minors, periods of limitation provided by the Act itself, indeed strictly speaking it refers only to periods of limitation prescribed by the first Schedule to the Act. Section 48 of the present CPC, like S. 230 of the Code of 1882, recognizes certain exceptions to the general rule, which it lays down, but it makes no exception in favour of minors. 2. Section 48 of the present CPC, like S. 230 of the Code of 1882, recognizes certain exceptions to the general rule, which it lays down, but it makes no exception in favour of minors. 2. I know of no general law, apart from Section 6 of the Limitation Act, which lays down that minority is a ground of exemption from the operation of the Law of Limitation. As Sir Meredyth Plowden said in the Punjab case, the present question may be a casus omissus, but if so, it is the business of the Legislature, not of the Courts, to provide for it. Apart from the actual wording of Section 6 of the Limitation Act there are great difficulties in engrafting on Section 48 of the CPC the rule laid down in the Limitation Act. If any extension of the period of 12 years is to be allowed, how much is to be allowed and from what date is the extension to be calculated? An extension of three years only will not meet all cases and yet the Limitation Act does not allow an extension of more than three years after the minor attains his majority. It appears to me that it would be pure legislation to hold that Section 48 of the CPC does not apply to this case or to hold that minors, situated as the present respondents are, can claim an extension of the period prescribed by it sufficient to enable them to take out execution after they attaia their majority. 3. For the reasons given by the lower Appellate Court it is impossible to hold that the present application for execution is one to restore or revive the last previous application. Indeed the respondents put forward no such contention before me. 4. In my opinion the respondents' present application for execution should have been dismissed. I allow this appeal, reverse the decision of the lower Appellate Court and restore the order of the first Court dismissing the application. The respondents will pay the appellants' costs in all three Courts.