JUDGMENT Mookerjee and Chapman, JJ. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs in a suit for declaration of title to land and for ejectment of the Defendants therefrom. The case for the Plaintiffs is that the disputed lands were included in a revenue paying estate owned by themselves and by their co-sharers and that the Defendants held them as a tenure under the co-sharers to whose exclusive share they had been assigned by private partition. Thereafter, on a partition of the entire estate by the Collector under the Estates Partition Act, these lands were allotted to the Plaintiffs, but they were unable to obtain possession thereof, as the Defendants set up their right to hold them as their tenure. The Plaintiffs accordingly instituted this suit to establish their title and to eject the Defendants on the ground that their tenure was operative, not upon the lands assigned to the Plaintiffs, but upon those assigned to their grantors. The Defendants denied the truth of the allegation of a prior private partition amongst the proprietors and asserted that as their tenure was held under all the co-sharers, the Plaintiffs were not competent to avoid it. On these pleadings, the issue was raised whether there was a private settlement among the proprietors as regards the possession of the lands of the original estate as stated in the plaint. The trial Court found on the evidence that there was a private settlement among the co-sharers of the estate whereby each of them came to be in separate possession of distinct parcels of land. The Court also found that the tenure was held, not under the entire body of co-sharers but under some of them only and that of the share owned by the Plaintiffs one-twelfth had been derived from the grantors of the tenure. The Court-thereupon held that the Plaintiffs were entitled to eject the Defendants from the remaining share of the lands. On appeal by the Defendants, the Subordinate Judge affirmed the findings of the first Court that there was a private division of the lands to which all the joint proprietors had agreed and upon which they had all acted. The Court-thereupon held that the Plaintiffs were entitled to eject the Defendants from the remaining share of the lands. On appeal by the Defendants, the Subordinate Judge affirmed the findings of the first Court that there was a private division of the lands to which all the joint proprietors had agreed and upon which they had all acted. In this view the Subordinate Judge held that the partition by the Collector had not affected the tenure, as the Defendants were not and could not be parties to the partition proceedings and that the Plaintiffs had taken the lands allotted to them subject to the tenure held by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court against the decree of dismissal made by the Subordinate Judge and have contended that u/s 99 of the Beng. Act V of 1897 the lands in their hands are not subject to the tenure set up by the Defendants In support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the decision in Joy Sankari Gupta v. Bharat Chandra Bardhan ILR (1899) Cal. 434. 2. Section 99 of the Estates Partition Act is in these terms: "if any proprietor of an estate held in common tenancy and brought under partition in accordance with this Act, has given his share or a portion thereof in patni or other tenure or on lease or has created any other encumbrance thereon, such tenure, lease or encumbrance shall hold good as regards the lands finally allotted to the share of such proprietor and only as to such lands." It is hence essential, to make the section applicable, that the estate should be held in common tenancy. On behalf of the Appellants, it has been contended that an estate must be deemed held in common tenancy so long as any incident thereof, for example, the liability to pay Government Revenue, continues joint, although the lands may have been divided and are held in severalty. This contention is opposed to the decision in Abdul Latif v. Amanuddi (1911) 15 C.W.N. 426; there it was held that the words "estate held in common tenancy" are used in contradistinction to an estate held in severalty among the proprietors themselves by private arrangement, as is clear from the examination of Sections 5, 7, 63, 76 and 79 of the Estates Partition Act. This decision is in conformity with the earlier case of Hriday Nath v. Mohobutnessa ILR (1892) Cal. 285 which interpreted the corresponding section of an earlier statute (Section 128 of Act VIII of 1876. B.C.). An examination of the decision in Hridoy Nath v. Mohobutnessa ILR (1892) Cal. 285 shows again that the view there taken was in accord with a long line of authorities decided under the corresponding provisions of Regulation XIX of 1814: Ahmedoollah v. Ashraf Hossain (1870) 13 W.R. 447, Obhoy charan v. Hari Nath ILR (1881) Cal. 72, Juggesur v. Bissessur (1882) 12 C.L.R. 281. The position, therefore, is that under the Estates Partition Act, 1876, this Court, on an elaborate review of the previous state of the law, came to the conclusion, in Hridoy Nath v. Mohobutnessa ILR (1892) Cal. 285 that the principle embodied in Section 128 was applicable only where, the lands of the estate were not held in severalty. The legislature in 1897 proceeded, presumably with full knowledge of the judicial interpretation of Section 128, to reproduce its provision without any variation as Section 99 of Act V of 1897. The inference seems irresistible that the judicial interpretation of Section 128, to which we have referred, correctly represented the intention of the Legislature; for it is a well settled principle of construction that the Legislature is presumed to know, not only the general principles of law but the construction which the courts have put upon particular Statutes. In the words of Lord Campbell C.J. in Mansell v. Queen (1857) 8 E. and B. 54, 73 and James L.J. in Ex parte Campbell (1870) L.R. 5 ch. App. 703, "where a section of an Act, which has received a judicial construction, is re-enacted in the same words, such re-enactment must be treated as a legislative recognition of that construction." The inference is therefore perfectly legitimate that the Legislature has, in the new Act of 1897, adopted the settled judicial construction which is thereby sanctioned and intended to be continued in force: Jogendra Chandra Roy v. Shyam Das ILR (1909) Cal. 543, 546. We hold accordingly, on the authority of the decision in Hridoy Nath v. Mohobutnessa ILR (1892) Cal. 543, 546. We hold accordingly, on the authority of the decision in Hridoy Nath v. Mohobutnessa ILR (1892) Cal. 285 which has been accepted as good law applicable to Act V of 1897 in Aimanaddi v. Nabin Chandra (1909) 11 C.L.J. 95, and Abdul Latif v. Amanuddi (1911) 15 C.W.N. 426, 428, that Section 99 applies only where the lands are held jointly by the proprietors and not in severalty in pursuance of a private arrangement between the parties. This view is not opposed to the decision in Joy Sankari v. Bharat Chandra ILR (1899) Cal. 434, where the lands were held, not in severalty but in common tenancy. In these circumstances it was ruled, on the authority of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Byjnath v. Ramoodeen (1873) L.R. 1 IndAp 106, that when on partition by the Collector, any land of an undivided joint estate which had been encumbered by any co-sharer was allotted to any other co-sharer, the latter took it free from the encumbrance so created. But we may observe that the decision in Ahmedoolah v. Ashraf Hossain (1870) 13 W.R. 447 which was followed in Hridoy Nath v. Mohobutnessa ILR (1892) Cal. 285, is not, as is assumed in Joy Sankari Gupta v. Bharat Chandra Bardhan ILR (1899) Calc. 434, inconsistent with and has not consequently been over-ruled in effect by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Byjnath v. Ramoodeen (1873) L.R. 1 I.A 106. As explained in Hridoy Nath Mohobutnnessa (1892) ILR 20 Calc. 285 which was not brought to the notice of the Court in Joy Sankari v. Bharat Chandra (1899) ILR 26 Calc. 434 the lands in Ahmedoollah v. Ashraf (1870) 13 W.R. 447 were held in severalty, while the lands in Byjnath v. Ramoodeen (1873) L.R. 1 I.A 106 were held in common tenancy. This distinction explains the cases of Venkatarama v. Esumsa (1909) ILR 33 Mad. 429, Shaikh Nura v. Baikuntha Nath Roy (1913) 21 C.L.J. 596, Brojo Nath Saha v. Dinesh Chandra Neogi (1910) 21 C.L.J. 599, Tarini Kanto v. Iswar Chandra (1912) 21 C.L.J. 603 where the decision in Joy Sankari v. Bharat Chandra (1899) ILR 26 Calc. 434 was followed. This distinction explains the cases of Venkatarama v. Esumsa (1909) ILR 33 Mad. 429, Shaikh Nura v. Baikuntha Nath Roy (1913) 21 C.L.J. 596, Brojo Nath Saha v. Dinesh Chandra Neogi (1910) 21 C.L.J. 599, Tarini Kanto v. Iswar Chandra (1912) 21 C.L.J. 603 where the decision in Joy Sankari v. Bharat Chandra (1899) ILR 26 Calc. 434 was followed. In the case before us, the Courts below have concurrently held that the lands were, under private arrangement, held in severalty and not in tenancy in common ; consequently Section 99, Act V of 1897, has no application. The inference follows that the plain tills have taken the disputed lands subject to the tenure of the Defendant and are not entitled to eject them. 3. It has been finally argued that the Defendants should not be allowed to defeat the claim of the Plaintiffs when it has been found that their allegation is untrue on the facts in our opinion there is no force in this contention. No doubt, as was laid down in the cases of Shibkristo v. Abdool (1879) I.L.R.5 Calc. 602, Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy (1887) ILR 14 Calc. 791, 793 and Balmukund v. Bhagwandas (1912) 15 Bom. L.R. 209, a Plaintiff cannot be allowed to abandon his own case, adopt that of the Defendant and claim relief on that footing. Here, however, what has happened is that each party failed to realise the legal effect of the facts alleged by him ; the parties went to trial on the substantial issue in the case, namely, whether or not there had been a private partition of the lands prior to the partition by the revenue authorities and whether the tenure of the Defendants was created by the entire body of landlords or by some alone of the shareholders in respect of specific lands allotted to them. This question has been answered against the Defendants and in favour of the Plaintiffs, but that does not prevent the Defendants from contending that even on the facts found the claim for ejectment cannot be sustained. 4. The result is that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.