Judgement Petition for an order substituting the petitioner for the deceased appellant, and for an order for revivor of the appeal. The deceased appellant, on August 1, 1907, instituted a suit in the High Court claiming a declaration that the adoption of the second respondent by the first respondent, a Hindu widow, was invalid and did not affect his reversionary interest. The circumstances appear fully from their Lordships judgment. The first respondent pleaded that she had authority to adopt under her deceased husbands will; the Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 125 ( 1914- 1915) V. Venkatanarayana Pillai V. V. Subbammal 29 appellants case was that a later will had the effect in law of revoking this authority. The trial judge held that the authority to adopt was not revoked, and dismissed the suit. The High Court in its appellate jurisdiction affirmed this decision and granted leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The appeal was entered on November 6, 1913, and on November 19, 1913, the appellant died. The present petitioner, Kuppusami Pillai, a grandson of the deceased appellant, was his sole heir and representative, and upon his (the appellants) decease became the next presumptive reversioner. Sir R. Finlay, K.C. and Dube, for the petitioner. If the appeal is not revived and prosecuted the petitioner and all other reversioners will be bound by the decree of the High Court as res judicata against them Chirovolu Punnamma v. Chirovolu Perrazu. (( 1905) L L. R. 29 Madr. 390.). That decision of the Full Bench is right and the later decision in Arunachalam Pillai Minor v. Vellaya Pillai (( 1912) 23 Madr. L. J. 719.) is erroneous. De Gruyther, K.C.9a,n&Kenworthy Brown, for the respondents. The decision reported 23 Madr. L. J. 719 is right. The earlier case reported I. L. E. 29 Madr. 390 was decided upon its special facts; the learned judges who decided it were parties to the decision in the former case. Upon the death of the appellant the suit and proceedings abated; the decree is not res judicata against the petitioner. In Hindu law a reversioner has only a spes successionis; he claims as direct heir and not as successor to any other reversioner. Under s. 43 of the Specific Belief Act, 1877, the decree is only binding upon the parties and persons claiming through them. [Sect. In Hindu law a reversioner has only a spes successionis; he claims as direct heir and not as successor to any other reversioner. Under s. 43 of the Specific Belief Act, 1877, the decree is only binding upon the parties and persons claiming through them. [Sect. 42 and illustrations (e) and (/) under that section were also referred to.] Order xxii, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not apply, as the right of the plaintiff to sue does not survive; the petitioners right is a different right. The petitioner is not the " legal representative " within the meaning of s. 2, sub-s. 11, of the Code so far as relates to the claim in the suit. It is well established that a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that an alienation by a Hindu widow is invalid abates upon the death of the plaintiff and that a decree in a suit of that character is not res judicata against the other reversioners Sakyahani Ingle Rao Sahib v. Bhavani Bozi Sahib (( 1904) I. L. R. 27 Madr. 588. Bhagwanta v. Sukhi (( 1899) I. L. R. 22 Allah. 33.); Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal (( 1904) I. L. R. 28 Madr. 57.) ; China Veerayya v. Lakshminarasamma. (( 1914) I. L. R. 37 Madr. 406.) This view is supported by dicta of the Board Tekait Doorga Persad Singh v. Tekaitri Doorga Konwari (( 1878) L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 149, at p 163.); Isri Dutt Koer v. Mussamat Hansbutti Koerain. (( 1883) L. R 10 Ind. Ap. 150, at p. 157.) The same principles apply to a reversioners suit to set aside an adoption. The petitioner could not have been joined as a plaintiff Rani Anund Koer v. Court of Wards (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 14, at p.22.); there was no just cause of action within Order n., r. 3, of the Code of 1908. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., in reply. The Court has a discretion to allow a reversioner other than the next reversioner to be joined; Order n., r. 3, does not prevent that course. There is a distinc tion between suits to set aside an adoption and suits to declare a widows alienation invalid. In any case the petitioner as legal representative is entitled to revive the suit to relieve the estate from the orders as to costs. There is a distinc tion between suits to set aside an adoption and suits to declare a widows alienation invalid. In any case the petitioner as legal representative is entitled to revive the suit to relieve the estate from the orders as to costs. [Muthusami Mudaliar v. Masilamani (( 1909) I. L. R. 33 Madr. 342.) and Order i., rr. 6 and 8, were referred to.] The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI. The question for their Lordships decision arises upon a petition for substitution of the petitioner in place of the deceased appellant, Venkatanarayana, who has died since the filing of his appeal to His Majesty in Council. Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 125 ( 1914- 1915) V. Venkatanarayana Pillai V. V. Subbammal 30 Venkatanarayana brought a suit, on July 29, 1907, in the High Court of Madras in its ordinary civil jurisdiction to obtain a declaration that the adoption of the second defendant by Subbammal, the first defendant, was invalid, and did not affect his (Venkatanarayanas) reversionary interest in the ancestral estate of one Venkatakrishna, deceased. Subbammal, in her answer, alleged that the adoption which the plaintiff sought to set aside was made by her under the authority of her husband given under a will. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the authority so given was revoked by a subsequent will. The Courts in India have held on the construction of this document that it did not amount to a revocation. Venkatanarayana, after the decision of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction dismissing his suit, applied for the usual certificate to appeal to His Majesty in Council, which was duly granted, and an appeal was filed and was pending when he died on " November 19, 1913. The petitioner Kuppusami Pillai applies to be substituted in the place of the deceased appellant and for an order for revivor of the appeal and for leave to prosecute it "in the usual way." He alleges that Venkatanarayana in his lifetime was a member of a joint undivided Hindu family consisting of himself, two sons, and two grandsons, one of whom was the petitioner; and that he was now the sole surviving member thereof, and entitled to the reversionary interest in Venkatakrishnas ancestral properties. The application is opposed on the ground that, as the petitioner is not the legal representative of Venkatanarayana in respect of the reversionary right claimed by him to the estate of Venkatakrishna, he cannot be substituted in place of the deceased appellant. It is contended on the authority of certain decisions of the High Court of Madras that where a transaction by a Hindu female taking a limited estate in the inheritance of the last male owner is impugned by the next or presumptive reversioner as invalid and beyond her competency, any adjudication against him does not operate as res judicata against the contingent reversioners, and consequently on the death of the presumptive reversioner the others have each, in order of succession, a separate right of suit, and cannot claim to prosecute an action brought by the deceased reversioner as they do not derive their right through him. Their Lordships think this argument proceeds on an obvious fallacy. Under the Hindu law the death of the female owner opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to possession. In her lifetime, however, the reversionary right is a mere possibility or spes successions. But this possibility is common to them all, for it cannot be predicated who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. The Indian law, however, permits the institution of suits in the lifetime of the female owner for a declaration that an adoption made by her is not valid, or an alienation effected by her is not binding, against the inheritance. The two articles of the Indian Limitation Act (IX. of 1908) which deal with these two classes of suits differ widely in their language ; art. 118, Sched. I., contains no restriction as to the person entitled to sue; whilst in art. 125 the suit is contemplated to be by the person " who, if the female died at the date of instituting the suit, would be entitled to possession." But it does not follow from these words that the suit brought in the latter case by the nearest reversioner is for his personal benefit, for the object is to remove a common apprehended injury to the interests of all the reversioners, presumptive and contingent alike. Of course, the two classes of suits covered by these two articles are distinct in their scope and character one relates to status and involves the adjudication of a right in rem ; the other raises a question of mere justifiable necessity. But in both "the right to sue" is based on the danger to the inheritance common to all the reversioners which arises from the nature of their rights. In the present case Venkatanarayana sued for a declaration that the adoption of the second defendant was invalid. Such a suit brought by the presumptive reversioner is in a representative capacity and on Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 125 ( 1914- 1915) V. Venkatanarayana Pillai V. V. Subbammal 31 behalf of all the reversioners. The act complained of is to their common detriment just as the relief sought is for their common benefit. On the death, therefore, of the presumptive reversioner the next presumable reversioner would clearly be entitled to continue the action instituted by the deceased plaintiff, unless there is anything in the procedure law of India to preclude him from so doing. The Madras High Court has drawn a distinction between a suit brought to challenge an adoption and one to declare an alienation by a qualified owner as not binding beyond the lifetime of the alienor. In the first class of cases it has been recognized that the presumptive reversioners suit is in a representative character; in the other, however, chiefly on the ground that the adjudication relating to an alienation in the suit of the presumptive reversioner does not operate as a res judicata against the contingent reversioners, it has been held that these have no right to continue an action brought by him. Although, no doubt, as their Lordships have already remarked, there is great difference in the character of the two classes of suits, the position of the plaintiffs in both instances when closely examined will be found, so far as the point for decision is concerned, to be the same. The test of res judicata applied by the Madras High Court seems, therefore, to be irrelevant to the inquiry whether the petitioner is entitled to continue the action commenced by his grandfather. The test of res judicata applied by the Madras High Court seems, therefore, to be irrelevant to the inquiry whether the petitioner is entitled to continue the action commenced by his grandfather. What has to be considered is whether “the right to sue," in the words of the statute” survives," and if it does, who can continue the action to obtain the relief that is sought. For the purposes of this application it must be assumed that the facts stated in the petition, which their Lordships note are not controverted, are true, and that Venkatanarayana was the nearest reversioner when he brought his suit, and that the present petitioner was at the time only a contingent reversioner. In the case of Rani Anund Koer v. Court of Wards (L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 14.) this Board gave expression to the principles applicable to suits by reversioners to impugn the validity of transactions by Hindu females. They said "As a general rule such suits must be brought by the presumptive reversioner, that is to say by the person who would succeed if the widow were to die at that moment." But in laying down this broad rule their Lordships pointed out in clear terms that under certain circumstances the " next presumable reversioner would be entitled to sue." There is nothing to preclude a remote reversioner from joining or asking to be joined in the action brought by the presumptive reversioner, or even obtaining the conduct of the suit on proof of laches on the part of the plaintiff or collusion between him and the widow or other female whose acts are impugned. It is the common injury to the reversionary rights which entitles the reversioners to sue. Apart, therefore, from the question whether " the next presumable heir " is " the legal representative " of the deceased presumptive reversioner, there remains the outstanding fact of identity of interest on the part of the general body of reversioners, near and remote, to get rid of the transaction which they regard as destructive of their rights. Order xxii, r. 1, in the new Civil Procedure Code of India (Act V. of 1908), which corresponds with s. 361 of Act XIV. Order xxii, r. 1, in the new Civil Procedure Code of India (Act V. of 1908), which corresponds with s. 361 of Act XIV. of 1882, declares that " the death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives." Rule 3, clause 1, provides that "Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit," The words " legal representative " have for the first time been defined in s. 2, sub-s. 11, of Act V. of 1908, which runs thus— " Legal representative means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 125 ( 1914- 1915) V. Venkatanarayana Pillai V. V. Subbammal 32 the death of the party so suing or sued." Sub-s. 11 was embodied in Act V. of 1908 with the object of putting in statutory language the result of the decisions of the Indian tribunals on the meaning of the words " legal representative "; but it is not clearly worded and has already been the subject of criticism by at least one of the High Courts in India. The phraseology of sub-s. 11, in their Lordships opinion, is fairly open to the contention that the suit was brought by the deceased plaintiff as representing, in his reversionary right, the estate of the last male owner, and that on his death such right devolved on the petitioner. They think, however, that his right to be substituted in place of the deceased appellant rests on a broader ground. They think, however, that his right to be substituted in place of the deceased appellant rests on a broader ground. Order i., r. 1, of Act V. of 1908, which brings the Indian practice into line with the English rule, provides as follows "All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction, or series of acts or transactions, is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise." It seems to their Lordships that under this rule the contingent reversioners may be joined as plaintiffs in the presumptive reversioner’s suit. The right to relief on the part of the reversioners exists severally in order of succession, and arises out of one and the same transaction impugned as invalid and not binding against them as a body; and the dispute involves a common question of law, namely, the validity or invalidity of the act challenged as incompetently done. If the contingent reversioners may be joined as plaintiffs in the presumptive reversioners action, it follows that on his death the “next presumable reversioner " is entitled to continue the suit begun by him. Their Lordships are of opinion that in this case the right to sue survives, and that the petitioner is clearly entitled to the order asked for. The costs of this application will be costs in the appeal.