Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (September 23, 1910) reversing a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Poona (July 31, 1906). The suit was instituted by the appellants to establish the validity of the adoption of the fourth appellant, Jagannath Vasudeo, as the son of Vasudeo Harihar Pandit, deceased (known as Baba Maharaj), and to obtain ancillary declarations. Baba Maharaj, who was a Brahman by caste, died on August 7, 1897, possessed of considerable ancestral property, and leaving a widow, Sakvarbai, then about sixteen years of age, and three daughters. By his will he appointed live named persons (the three first appellants and two others) as trustees to carry on the management of his estates after his death. The will provided that if his widow Sakvarbai did not give birth to a son, or if a son should be born but should be short-lived, then "with the vichare" (i.e., the advice or consent) "of the above-named gentlemen " (namely, the persons named as trustees) "a boy should be given as often as may be necessary in adoption on the lap of my wife in accordance with the shastras." One of the five named trustees declined to act, but the other four took over the management of the estates in accordance with the will. The appellants, three of the trustees and Jagannath, by their plaint alleged that on July 27, 1901, the last named was duly given and received on the lap of Sakvarbai in adoption, and that she executed a deed of adoption and signed a letter to the boys father agreeing to receive him. The defendants were the widow, the remaining acting trustee, and the first respondent, a son subsequently adopted by Sakvarbai. The widow by her written statement denied the adoption and alleged that she was induced to sign the documents by the threats and coercion of the first two appellants. The other defendants adopted these defences. A number of issues were settled, of which one was " whether the plaintiff No. 4 is the validly adopted son of Baba Maharaj." No issue was framed as to undue influence or coercion. The widow died before the trial, and the present second respondent, her daughter, was substituted for her. The fourth appellant, the alleged adopted son, belonged to the gotra of the deceased Baba Maharaj. The widow died before the trial, and the present second respondent, her daughter, was substituted for her. The fourth appellant, the alleged adopted son, belonged to the gotra of the deceased Baba Maharaj. The nature of the evidence, most of which was given on commission, appears from the judgment of their Lordships. The first and second appellants were examined and cross-examined, but no question was put to them as to the alleged threats or coercion, nor was this defence put forward at the trial. The Subordinate Judge found on the evidence that the corporeal giving and taking of the fourth appellant in adoption was proved; he held that no religious ceremonies were legally necessary, since the boy was of the same gotra as his adoptive father and the adoption was intended to be complete without them. The High Court (Chandavarkar and Heaton JJ.) reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge, holding that there had not in fact been any giving and taking of the boy in adoption, and that in any case the adoption had been brought about by undue influence exercised upon the widow by the first and second appellants. The learned judges, therefore, did not find it necessary to consider the question as to whether the datta homam, or other religious ceremony, was essential to the validity of the adoption. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., Sir William Garth, and Parikh, for the appellants. The finding of the Subordinate Judge that the boy was given and received on the lap of the widow was in accordance with the evidence. No doubt coercion or undue influence, if pleaded and proved, would be a defence Bayabai v. Bala. (( 1866) 7 Bomb. H. C. App. 1, p 1.) There was, however, no issue framed as to either coercion or undue influence, and the trustee appellants were not cross-examined to establish either of those defences. The undue influence found by the High Court was not pleaded, nor was it suggested at the trial; this defence should, therefore, not have been entertained upon appeal Abdool Hoosein Zenail Abadin v. Turner. (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 111.) The trustee appellants were not personally interested in the transaction, and the evidence shows that the widow desired to make an adoption. The giving and receiving of the boy upon the lap was sufficient to validate the adoption, without any further ceremony. (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 111.) The trustee appellants were not personally interested in the transaction, and the evidence shows that the widow desired to make an adoption. The giving and receiving of the boy upon the lap was sufficient to validate the adoption, without any further ceremony. In Madras it has been expressly decided that even among Brahmans the datta homam is not essential to the legal validity of an adoption Singamma v. Vinjamuri Venkatacharlu (( 1868) 4 Madr. H. C. 165.) ; Stranges Hindu Law (1830), vol. 1, pp. 96 and 97. In any case the datta homam is not essential, nor indeed applicable, where the adopted son is of the same gotra as the adoptive father Govindayyar v. Dorasami (( 1887) I. L. R. 11 Madr. 5.); Ranganayakamma v. Alivar Setti (( 1889) I. L. R. 13 Madr. 214.) ; Atma Ram v. Madho Rao (( 1884) I. L. R. 6 Allah. 276.); Valubai v. Govind Kashinath (( 1899) I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 218.); Steeles Law and Custom ( 1868), pp. 46 and 184 j Stranges Hindu Law (1830), vol. 2, pp. 89, 104, 219. Sir R. Finlay, K.C , De Gruyther, K.C., and Lowndes, for the first respondent. The evidence did not establish that there was a giving and receiving with intent to adopt; the oral evidence of the appellants was inconsistent with the documents. The findings of fact of the High Court were right. Further, the adoption was invalid since the datta homam was not performed. Among Brahmans that ceremony is essential to the validity of an adoption Mitakshara, ch. 1, s. 1, vv. 13 et seq.; Dattaka Mimansa, s. 2, v. 51; Dattaka Chandrika, s. 2, vv. 16 and 17, s. 6, v. 3. In Bombay the datta homam has always been held to be essential among Brahmans, except upon the adoption of a daughters son or a brothers son, an exception founded upon a text of Yama Huebut Rao v. Govind Rao ((1823) 2 Borr. (1825 ed.), p. 75.); Valubai v. Govind Kashinath (I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 218.); West and Buhler ( 1884 ed.), pp. 1082 to 1084, pp. 1123 to 1125. An exception in favour of an adoption in the same gotra has never been recognized in Bombay, and is inconsistent with the above exception, since a daughters son belongs to a different gotra. 218.); West and Buhler ( 1884 ed.), pp. 1082 to 1084, pp. 1123 to 1125. An exception in favour of an adoption in the same gotra has never been recognized in Bombay, and is inconsistent with the above exception, since a daughters son belongs to a different gotra. The decisions in Madras are wrong and were largely based upon an obiter dictum in Sootrugun Sutputty v. Sabrita Dye. (( 1864) 2 Knapp, 287, at p. 290.) That case shows that in any event the absence of the datta homam gives rise to great suspicion as to the factum of adoption. [Mahashoya Shosinath Ghose v. Krishna Soondari Dasi (( 1880) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 250,at p. 255.) and Ganga Baksh v. Janki Singh (( 1887) Oudh Rulings ( 1874- 1893), 81.) were also referred to.] Dunne and Syed Abdul Majid, for the second respondent. We adopt the arguments on behalf of the first respondent. Further, the will required that all five of the named trustees should assent to an adoption. In any case only the four acting trustees were consulted as to the adoption of the fourth appellant, and the evidence shows that one of those four, Nagpurkar, dissented. The adoption was consequently not in accordance with the authority given and was invalid. The subsequent adoption of the first respondent was also invalid since the trustees did not assent to it. No reply was called for. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated September 23, 1910, which reversed the decree of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Poona, dated July 31, 1906. The main question to be determined on the appeal has reference to the validity of the adoption by the widow of the late Shri Vasudeo Harihar Pandit, alias Shri Baba Maharaj, of a son to her late husband. The appellant Jagannath claims to be the duly adopted son. This claim is resisted by the defendants and forms the issue in the case. e The adoption is challenged substantially upon three grounds —first, that it was never completed in fact. This in argument was reduced to the proposition that the whole transaction had been left at the stage of a proposal to be afterwards carried into effect. This claim is resisted by the defendants and forms the issue in the case. e The adoption is challenged substantially upon three grounds —first, that it was never completed in fact. This in argument was reduced to the proposition that the whole transaction had been left at the stage of a proposal to be afterwards carried into effect. As to the adoption itself, it is maintained that there was never a complete giving and taking of the child, and in particular that he was not taken upon the lap of the adoptive mother. Secondly, that the religious ceremony of datta homam, namely, the sacrificial burning of the clarified butter in accordance with the practice of the Hindu religion, was an essential requisite, and was not performed, and that on this ground also the adoption remained inchoate. These grounds of challenge affect the completion and formalities of the ceremony itself. The third ground, however, is one of general law. There are difficulties on the pleadings and arguments in placing it within any definite category, and to this allusion will afterwards be made. But it may at least be said that almost every known ground of challenge is imported into the case by suggestion. Allegations amounting to or compounded of fraud, circumvention, coercion, and undue influence are all mixed together. The disentangling of these separate and separable grounds of defence must undoubtedly have caused certain difficulties in the Court below. But the challenge appeared to their Lordships to preserve even at the Bar of the Board this mixed or jumbled character. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are these The late Baba Maharaj was a first-class sardar of the Deecan. He died at Poona on August?, 1897, leaving a young widow, Sakvarbai, also called Tai Maharaj. At the date of his death he made a will appointing five gentlemen as his trustees. One of these, Rao Sahib, declined to act; the other four obtained probate of the will on December 2, 1897. These were the appellants, Messrs. Tilak, Khapardo, and Kumbhojkar; the fourth, Mr. Nagpurkar, while remaining a trustee, after a time dissociated himself in action from his three colleagues, and was properly convened as a defendant in the suit. One of these, Rao Sahib, declined to act; the other four obtained probate of the will on December 2, 1897. These were the appellants, Messrs. Tilak, Khapardo, and Kumbhojkar; the fourth, Mr. Nagpurkar, while remaining a trustee, after a time dissociated himself in action from his three colleagues, and was properly convened as a defendant in the suit. The suit itself was brought in defence of the validity of the adoption (the adopted child being, of course, one of the plaintiffs), and for the administration of the estate in terms of the will. In the will the clause material to the questions of adoption and succession is as follows " My wife, Saubhagyavati Shri Sakvarbai, is now pregnant. If she does not give birth to a son, or if the son after birth is short-lived, then, for the purpose of continuing the name of my family, with the vichare of the above-mentioned gentlemen, a boy should be given as often as may be necessary in adoption on the lap of my wife in accordance with the shastras, and the above-mentioned panch should, on behalf of that son, carry on the management of the immovable and movable estate until he attains majority." On January 18, 1898, the widow gave birth to a son, but he died within two months thereafter, namely, on March 9. The circumstances for giving effect to the testators intentions by his widow performing an act of adoption thus arose. It is an admitted fact in the case that for a period of over three years she and the four acting trustees made frequent inquiries and numerous efforts towards the securing of a suitable boy. The circle of relations was considerable, but for various reasons, none of which bear upon the present case, a suitable adoptee could not be found in the Kolhapur or Poona branches of her husbands family. On June 18, 1901, a meeting of the trustees was held, at which Tai Maharaj was present, and the facts which were otherwise spoken to by the witnesses are recorded in the minute, the substance of which was that there were no boys available in the Kolhapur family, that of all those available in the Poona family none were approved. On June 18, 1901, a meeting of the trustees was held, at which Tai Maharaj was present, and the facts which were otherwise spoken to by the witnesses are recorded in the minute, the substance of which was that there were no boys available in the Kolhapur family, that of all those available in the Poona family none were approved. The minute in this particular is of importance, because it shows that an anxious search had been made, that deference was paid to the wishes of the widow , and that objection is made to certain suggested adoptees on the ground that they were too old. One boy, the youngest named, of eleven years, is, however, stated to be in point of age suitable, although delicate. The minute then proceeds " The only family which remains, therefore, is that descended from the brother of Shri Siddeshwar Maharaj at Babre. It is not yet known whether there is a boy or not in that family. But if there is a boy of that family, fit in point of age, &c., for adoption, it is our unanimous opinion that one should not be taken from any other family. And Shri Tai Maharaj is of the same opinion. Shri Tai Maharaj suggests that Messrs. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Ganesh Shrikrishna Khaparde should both go to Babre, select boys, and return after settling as regards that family. Shri Tai Maharaj should go, see boys, and approve." It should be mentioned that the trustees were, and had been since the testators death, duly administering the testators estate. What followed upon the proceedings of June 18 was that Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde accompanied the widow to Aurangabad, where the widow remained} the two trustees proceeded to Nidhone, a place near the Babre village, and selected five boys within the circle of relationship, and they came back, accompanied by their parents, to Aurangabad. The boys stayed with the widow for several days, being entertained and kept under observation. Certain astrologers, including Durga Shastri, who was one of her suite who had accompanied her to Aurangabad, cast the horoscopes of the children. These proved favourable to the appellant, Jagannath ; and her personal likings appeared to point in the same direction. The boys stayed with the widow for several days, being entertained and kept under observation. Certain astrologers, including Durga Shastri, who was one of her suite who had accompanied her to Aurangabad, cast the horoscopes of the children. These proved favourable to the appellant, Jagannath ; and her personal likings appeared to point in the same direction. All this course of conduct pointed to the entire acquiescence on the part of the widow in the testators wishes and directions, and so far there is no substantial suggestion to the contrary. As to what happened at Aurangabad it is sufficient to say that, in their Lordships opinion, the sworn testimony is abundant, is clear, and is overwhelming. It amounts to this. The widows desire, the arrangement of all parties, and the horoscopes of the astrologers all pointing in one direction, on June 27 a meeting of the shastris and of other persons in Aurangabad was summoned. The father of the boy being present, it was announced by the trustees that the boy had been selected. The father was taken to the widow; in pursuance of the familiar procedure she asked him to give her his boy in adoption, and he agreed. The fact of the arrangement was announced to the assembled guests, and there and then duplicate deeds of adoption were drawn up, the one being impressed with a moghlai, and the other with a British stamp, and both intended to be signed and attested by the widow. This deed was in due form and bore that the father gave the son in adoption. The second document was a letter from the widow addressed to the father and agreeing to take the boy in adoption. So far as giving and receiving of the child these documents were prepared for and pointed to actual adoption in fact. The preparation of the documents, however, occupied time, and the hour being late the proceedings were stopped, but were resumed early next morning. A gathering was accordingly again held early on the 28th. So far as giving and receiving of the child these documents were prepared for and pointed to actual adoption in fact. The preparation of the documents, however, occupied time, and the hour being late the proceedings were stopped, but were resumed early next morning. A gathering was accordingly again held early on the 28th. The deeds of adoption and the letter were duly executed, the boy was given in fact by his natural father to his adoptive mother, he was received in fact by her on her lap in performance of the requisite essential in this caste of Hindus on occasion of adoption, and—all being completed—the formal ceremonies and festivities were postponed, to take place afterwards at Poona, and the widow left Aurangabad. The Subordinate Judge of Poona has gone into the circumstances with the utmost minuteness and detail, he has weighed and considered every argument presented, and he has come to the conclusion that the adoption was in fact completed. Notwithstanding the judgment of the learned judges of the High Court of Bombay, their Lordships have no hesitation whatever in entirely agreeing with the judge of first instance, Reference in a little time will be made to the reasons assigned by the High Court for differing from him. But in the meantime it may be said that it appears to their Lordships that, viewed as a matter of evidence, no other conclusion was possible than that come to by the Subordinate Judge. Their Lordships do not stop to examine the oral testimony in detail. It is really all one way. Upon the crucial question of whether the boy was received by being taken on the lap of the adoptive mother there can be no doubt. Witness after witness speaks of it. It would be very strange if it had not taken place, because it is conceded that it is among the very elements of the ceremonial of adoption, and entirely familiar. It is not only that Hindus of various classes were present and saw it, but it has to be borne in mind what the nature of the challenge of the transaction now is. It is not only that Hindus of various classes were present and saw it, but it has to be borne in mind what the nature of the challenge of the transaction now is. It has come to be one in which the trustees, men of high position, and some of them of learning and legal training, are accused of conspiring by fraud, duress, undue influence, and nearly everything that is improper, to have procured from the widow this act of adoption. It is not to be believed that if such a scheme were afoot, if deeds had been signed, horoscopes taken, and meetings gathered, the scheme would have failed because of the omission of that which was elementary to the knowledge of everybody, namely, the taking of the child upon the mothers lap. It must, however, be borne in mind that against a body of evidence of ten or twelve witnesses, five witnesses are produced for the defendants. It is sufficient to say of this evidence that most of it was entirely irrelevant to any issue in the case, and such of it as was not was disbelieved by the judge of first instance, a verdict with which the High Court saw no ground for interesting. Tl may be added that when the party returned to Poona, Mr. Tilak wrote out a full account of the transaction, which was recorded in the minutes, and the trustees who had not taken part in the mission to Aurangabad were communicated with, to the effect that the adoption was complete. The sworn evidence is entirely in accordance with what has now been stated. Here and there, there are expressions in the letters out of which it may with ingenuity be possible to suggest a doubtful meaning ; for instance, that the words "selected " and " decided" refer to something in the future. It is also undoubtedly true that both the minutes of the trustees, and the letters, date the adoption as the 27th, whereas in point of fact, as has been seen, it began upon the 27th and was concluded on the 28th. But so far as oral evidence goes, their Lordships see no reason to doubt that it represented the truth, and that the fact of adoption was by it proved. But so far as oral evidence goes, their Lordships see no reason to doubt that it represented the truth, and that the fact of adoption was by it proved. The Subordinate Judge says " Here there was a clear direc tion of the husband to this wife to adopt, the wife after his death was anxious to carry out the direction. There is no evidence to prove that any effort or cajolery was practised upon her, or that there was any suppression or concealment of facts from her; the plaintiffs had no personal interest whatever," In another passage of his judgment he remarks " The evidence clearly shows, and it is undisputed, that on the 27th here was selection and verbal gift, and acceptance, and preparation of necessary documents. On the 28th there was execution of documents under corporeal acts of giving and taking." In their Lordships view these conclusions are well justified. It is an admitted fact in the case that neither the trustees nor any of the witnesses for the plaintiffs had any interest whatsoever in the subject-matter of the suit, and that no motive can reasonably be suggested for them maintaining or testifying that the adoption of the boy mentioned was made, except that this truly represented that which occurred. It is in these circumstances that their Lordships have viewed with surprise the charge which is made not only against the trustees, but against the whole body of the plaintiffs witnesses, ten or twelve persons in all. " The account unquestionably, to my mind," says Chandavarkar J., "given by the witnesses appears to be a true account of many of the series of events, and a false account of at least one, and that the most important." This event is the taking of the child on the lap. Later on in his judgment he states " We are driven to believe that a considerable number of men of good position have conspired together to give false evidence." The conclusion thus made is of the most serious character, amounting to a plain judicial finding of conspiracy and of perjury. Their Lordships will presently refer to one or two circumstances accompanying this verdict, but meantime they will only observe that they do not think that one word of it is justified by the evidence in the case. Referring to Messrs. Their Lordships will presently refer to one or two circumstances accompanying this verdict, but meantime they will only observe that they do not think that one word of it is justified by the evidence in the case. Referring to Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde, Chandavarkar J. observes that " they were men of mature years, of exceptional education and mental qualities, lawyers and men of affairs of great repute and good standing, and both men of dominating personality." Some of the witnesses who gave evidence for the plaintiffs are also persons of considerable standing. It is a priori difficult to understand how these men, with no object to gain and no interest to serve, could be supposed to have entered into the conspiracy and committed the perjury which the High Court judgment found. Their Lordships think the conclusion come to by the learned judges to be entirely unwarranted on the facts. Their Lordships find themselves constrained to observe upon certain procedure in the case, the result of which was to introduce into it large masses of irrelevant matter. It should be mentioned that, subsequent to the adoption at Aurangabad, the widow, upon returning to Poona and after having been a party to certain communications naturally following the adoption which had been made, fell under other influences, and in the month of July expressed a change of mind. On August 19 she went through the form of another adoption, namely, of Bala Maharaj, a married man older than herself, as her son. It is unnecessary to make any observations upon his claim. The widow, who, while she was a litigant, maintained that adoption, died on September 30, 1903. Her daughter, who was, on her death, admitted to the suit as defendant, challenges not only the first adoption, but the second adoption also—her interest being to maintain that the provisions of the testators will with regard to adoption had failed, that the widow became the owner of the estate as heiress to her infant son who had died, and that the property passes in this way to her heir. It appears that the widow and Bala Maharaj left no stone unturned in the way of litigation. In July proceedings were begun to revoke the probate granted to the trustees, and subsequently criminal proceedings were instituted in respect of perjury. It appears that the widow and Bala Maharaj left no stone unturned in the way of litigation. In July proceedings were begun to revoke the probate granted to the trustees, and subsequently criminal proceedings were instituted in respect of perjury. Their Lordships regret to observe that not only are the circumstances with regard to the criminal proceedings referred to in the present litigation by the parties, but that the depositions therein become matter apparently of materiality in the judgment of the learned judges of the High Court. In the opinion of the Board this was an irregularity of a somewhat serious character. They refer particularly to the depositions in the criminal case, which seem to have been imported in bulk into the present. There is a risk by such procedure of justice being perverted. A civil cause must be conducted in the ordinary and regular way, and judged of by the evidence led therein. Under s. 83 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding in a criminal trial is relevant for the purpose of proving in a subsequent proceeding the truth of the fact which it states, but this only, as the section proceeds, "when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way," or under the other circumstances there stated. Not one of these circumstances was proved in the present case, and the depositions could not have been used with propriety even to support the evidence of the plaintiffs, which they appear to have done. But there appears to have been no warrant whatsoever for using them for the purpose of either contradicting or discounting the evidence of the witnesses given in this suit, unless the particular matter or point had been placed before the witness as one for explanation in view of its discrepancy with the evidence then being tendered. It was stated to their Lordships that the prosecution for perjury had in the end completely failed. With that their Lordships have nothing to do. The judgment now given is pronounced irrespective of the result of the criminal suit. Successful or unsuccessful, the introduction and use in this civil action of these criminal proceedings, as above described, were illegitimate. A further mischance in point of procedure must now be mentioned. With that their Lordships have nothing to do. The judgment now given is pronounced irrespective of the result of the criminal suit. Successful or unsuccessful, the introduction and use in this civil action of these criminal proceedings, as above described, were illegitimate. A further mischance in point of procedure must now be mentioned. As already stated, the testimony of the plaintiffs witnesses is not contradicted orally, and is internally a consistent body of evidence. But various minutes and documents are the subject of minute analysis, observation, and comment by the learned judges of the High Court with a view to rebutting it. Their Lordships think it right to observe that, in view of the serious nature of the verdict of the High Court, they have considered it within their province themselves to peruse the documents. Having done so, they are of the opinion that, taken G together, they completely confirm the case made in the witness-box, and that there is no ground, in fact, for the conclusion that they either contradict the testimony or cast any reasonable doubt upon it. But they must also record their dissent from the view that the use made of these documents in this case was justified by law. On general principles it would appear to be sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath he should be given the opportunity, if documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the particular point of ambiguity or dispute. This is a general, salutary, and intelligible rule, and where a witnesss reputation and character are at stake the duty of enforcing this rule would appear to be singularly clear. Fortunately the law of India pronounces no uncertain sound upon the same matter. This is a general, salutary, and intelligible rule, and where a witnesss reputation and character are at stake the duty of enforcing this rule would appear to be singularly clear. Fortunately the law of India pronounces no uncertain sound upon the same matter. By s. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is provided that " A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to the matters in question without such writing being shown to him or being proved ; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him." Their Lordships have .observed with regret and with surprise that the general principle and the specific statutory provisions have not been followed. The verdict of the High Court is an inferential verdict—none the less sweeping on that account—but an inferential verdict actually of perjury. What are the pre mises upon which this inference proceeds? In no inconsiderable degree they consist of documents, statements, even turns of expression, which are used to confound the spoken word. Had the safeguards set up by the law with respect to the use of documents been observed? Not at all. Not only have documents been used for the purpose of contradicting witnesses without obeying the injunctions prescribed by law, but the inference thus derived, and improperly derived, from these documents has resulted, as stated, in an inferential verdict of perjury. Heaton J. deals elaborately with this portion of the case, and one example taken from his judgment will suffice. One letter out of many is taken, passages are cited from it, and a minute argument proceeds as to the expressions used, and why this was mentioned and that other omitted. Mr. Tilak was for five days under cross-examination before the Subordinate Judge; but not one of these things was put to him; and he was not asked in the witness-box to give one singles, explanation with regard to any of those expressions or omissions which are now alleged to compromise him. On this point of the case no more need be said. One other matter of procedure may be mentioned. One of the trustees, Mr. On this point of the case no more need be said. One other matter of procedure may be mentioned. One of the trustees, Mr. Nagpurkar, dissociated himself from his colleagues, and in July appears to have written a minute of doubt or dissent with regard to certain proceedings. A letter from him resiling from this position is also produced. The learned judges have come to a conclusion which would be in some respects in accord with the so-called dissent. It is a striking circumstance that Mr. Nagpurkar, a relevant witness, intimately acquainted with what had gone on, and with the position both of the trustees and” widow as regards adoption, and a party in the case aware of the charges launched against his colleagues, does not appear as a witness to explain the one or to support the other. In result, their Lordships are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court on this part of the case. The next argument is that the adoption was void because it lacked the ceremonial of datta homam, which ceremonial is declared to be essential to its legal validity. Datta homam is the service of the burning of clarified butter, which is offered as a sacrifice by fire by way of religious propitiation or oblation. It is admitted that in this case the ceremony was not performed, and it seems to be fairly clear that it was one of those things which it was intended afterwards to carry out at Poona as part of the general ceremonial and festivities which were to be carried through there. In certain circumstances the point might be the subject of a prolonged and very conflicting argument, as the authorities, ancient and modern, are not in accord on the point as to whether this is a legal as well as a religious requisite. There is a danger, on the one hand, of not paying due respect to those religious rites which are observed and followed among large classes of Indian belief, while, on the other hand, the danger must also be avoided of carrying these, except when the law is clear, into the legal sphere, so as to affect or impair personal or patrimonial rights. The subject of the requisites for adoption has, in recent years, been the matter of not infrequent consideration by this Board, and their Lordships refer, in especial, to the elaborate examinations of the authorities made by Lord Hobhouse in Sri Balusu Gurulengaswami v. Sri Balusu Ramalakshmamma. (( 1889) L. R, 26 Ind. Ap. 113.) That appeal had reference to the validity of the adoption of an only son.From the religious point of view this is, in many writings of great authority, forbidden. There was, however, in India, considerable difference in the view as to whether the religious and legal injunctions on the subject were co-exten-sive. It must be admitted that if one has recourse to the ancient writings when Brahmanical influence was most predominant one finds the ceremonial part of adoption the subject of highly elaborate detail; and it is beyond all question that in the course of ages many of these details have disappeared as essentials within the legal sphere. As Lord Hobhouse observes, "The further study of the subject necessary for the decision of these appeals has still more impressed them with the necessity of great caution in interpreting books of mixed religion, morality, and law, lest foreign lawyers, accustomed to treat as law what they found in authoritative books, and to administer a fixed legal system, should too hastily take for strict law precepts which are meant to appeal to the moral sense, and should thus fetter individual judgments in private affairs, should introduce restrictions into Hindu society, and impart to it an inflexible rigidity never contemplated by the original law-givers." The case resulted in the decision that the adoption of an only son is not null and void under the Hindu law. The question whether the datta homam is a legal requisite in Bombay for adoption among the three twice-born classes does not, however, in the view of their Lordships, broadly arise in the present case. It is in no way necessary to canvass or call in question any dicta upon that general point, nor does the question arise whether, for instance, the principle extends to India at large of the decision of the Madras Pull Bench in Govindayyar v. Dorasami (I. L. R. 11 Madr. 5.) or of the Madras High Court in Singamma v. Venkatacharlu (4 Madr. 5.) or of the Madras High Court in Singamma v. Venkatacharlu (4 Madr. H. C. 165.), both decisions being of value as containing a careful study of the authorities, and .affirming that the ceremony of datta homam is not essential to a valid adoption among Brahmans in Southern India. For in the opinion of the Board the necessity does not arise where the child to be adopted belongs to the same gotra as that of the adoptive father. It is an admitted fact that this was so in the present case. Their Lordships have come clearly to the conclusion that where this is so in fact, then the law of India is that the celebration of the ceremony of datta homam is not an essential to the legal validity of an adoption. It is conceded in argument that certain exceptions to the alleged general rule do exist, but it is maintained that these exceptions are limited to the case of the adoption of a brothers son, or of a daughters son. In decided cases this may have been the relationship in fact, but the principle of all the decisions, and, in their Lordships opinion, of all the authorities, is that within the same gotra the ceremony is unnecessary. They agree with what, in their opinion, is the full and careful judgment of Jenkins C.J. in the case of Valubai v. Govind Kashinath (I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 221.), the decision being to the effect that among Brahmans in the Presidency of Bombay the performance of the datta homam ceremony is not essential to the validity of the adoption of a brothers son. An examination of the judgment shows that it was not based upon the narrow particular degree of relationship, but upon the broad ground of the identity of gotra. Mr. Colebrookes annotation upon Mitakshara, ch. 2, s. 5, is as follows “Gotraja or persons belonging to the same general family (gotra) distinguished by a common name, these answer nearly to the gentiles of the Roman law." A good illustration of the point has reference to the law applicable to the Sudra caste. The use of the datta homam is not necessary for adoption within that caste, and why? The explanation is given in a sentence by Strange in his Hindu Law (vol. The use of the datta homam is not necessary for adoption within that caste, and why? The explanation is given in a sentence by Strange in his Hindu Law (vol. 2, p. 89) in which it is laid down that " Ceremonial adoption cannot be necessary in the case of a Sudra, since by the datta homam the adopted son is offered from the stock (gotram) of the natural to that of his adopted father; and Sudras have no gotra." It may be added that in the treatment in the same volume, p. 104, of the celebration of the Upanayana rite, or the investiture with the sacred thread, this is laid down " With respect to the non-eligibility of a person for adoption on whom the Upanayana rites have been performed, it is much disputed. The more reasonable opinion would appear to be that he is eligible if of the same gotra (family); non-eligible if of a different gotra from the adopter; that if of the same gotra the datta homam, though proper, is not necessary." Their Lordships do not pursue the investigation of the authorities further, adopting, as they do, the survey made in the last-mentioned judgment of the learned Jenkins C.J. In their opinion accordingly this part of the respondents case also fails. What remains is the attack which was made upon the transaction of the adoption itself, an attack in which the various grounds of rescission applicable to contracts in general were alluded to.« Their Lordships hold that it is impossible to discover what it is that is really put forward by the defendants. Under the contract law of India, as well as by ordinary principles, coercion, undue influence, fraud, and misrepresenta tion are all separate and separable categories in law. It is true that they may overlap or may be combined. But in the present case it is impossible to discover what ground or grounds are really taken up. There is a well-known rule of pleading expressed in the frequently quoted language of Lord Selborne (See Wallingford v. Mutual Society ( 1880) o App. Cas. It is true that they may overlap or may be combined. But in the present case it is impossible to discover what ground or grounds are really taken up. There is a well-known rule of pleading expressed in the frequently quoted language of Lord Selborne (See Wallingford v. Mutual Society ( 1880) o App. Cas. 685, at p. 697.) that " With regard to fraud, if there be any principle which is perfectly well settled, it is that general allegations, how ever strong may be the words in which they are stated, are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice." The law of India is in no way different from this, and it has been decided over and over again, e.g., in Gunga Narain Gupta v. Tiluckram Chowdhry. (( 1888) L. R. 15 Ind. Ap. 119.) It is, in their Lordships opinion, much to be regretted that the rule is not more strictly observed, and their Lordships are of opinion that in the present case much confusion and contention have been caused, together with much expense to the parties, in consequence of its neglect. No definite issue upon any one of the well-known categories of attack was settled for trial, the only issue on the subject being whether the plaintiff, No. 4, is a validly adopted son of Baba Maharaj. From time to time, in the course of this case, it is clear that specific pleadings in Indian procedure have been abandoned altogether. In short, several of the careful prescriptions of the law and of the Legislature, all of which were intended to bring litigation within definite compass and to make articulate and clear the points of difference between the parties, have been lost sight of. Their Lordships, however, are unwilling, confused though the charges be, to dismiss this part of the case on such a ground. The position upon the facts was this The will of the testator prescribing an adoption was clear; the wish of the widow and the trustees alike to follow it was clear ; the trustees, so long as the testators wishes were carried into effect, had no interest of any kind as to who the adoptee should be. The position upon the facts was this The will of the testator prescribing an adoption was clear; the wish of the widow and the trustees alike to follow it was clear ; the trustees, so long as the testators wishes were carried into effect, had no interest of any kind as to who the adoptee should be. It was also clear that the testators will indicated that a minor should be adopted, because express provision was made for the management of the estate till that minor should come of age. It was manifest that every consideration pointed to the advantage of keeping, if possible, within the gotra, and it was further clear that the trustees, in advising the widow, should pay due regard to her wishes, and that, so far as this could be accomplished, they and she should act together. It is in these circumstances a strange situation that the adoption should be challenged upon the ground, nebulously stated as it is, of fraud. There is no evidence, says the Subordinate Judge, to prove that any fraud or cajolery was practised upon her or that there was any suppression or concealment of facts from her. With this judgment it does not appear that the High Court differs, and their Lordships entirely agree with it. It was for some reason, however, held that the general issue above quoted did include allegations of coercion and undue influence. Coercion is by admission out of the case. There is nothing of the sort; and this is not now maintained. What remains accordingly is the judgment of the High Court to this effect, that " The question here is difficult, she was indeed willing to adopt, but was she a free agent when she adopted the fourth plaintiff, assuming that she adopted him, or was she forced into it against her will by unconscientious means used by the first two plaintiffs, that is, Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde, and unfair advantage taken by them of her ignorance and youth, and of other fiduciary relations between them ? " The citation just made is from the notes of Chandavarkar J. With much respect to the learned judge, it is, notwithstanding the protracted argument before their Lordships, even now somewhat difficult to gather what are the legal categories under which the attack upon this transaction is made. Unconscientious means are mentioned and unfair advantage is mentioned. " The citation just made is from the notes of Chandavarkar J. With much respect to the learned judge, it is, notwithstanding the protracted argument before their Lordships, even now somewhat difficult to gather what are the legal categories under which the attack upon this transaction is made. Unconscientious means are mentioned and unfair advantage is mentioned. It is needless to ask whether this implies fraud because their Lordships are of opinion that no sort of unconscientiously means was employed by these trustees from beginning to end of the transaction, and that no unfair advantage was either taken or meant throughout its whole course. It is true that the adoptive mother was a young widow, probably easily guided, and that the trustees are admitted to have been men of great influence and strong personality, but their Lordships are of opinion that these were used in no respect unduly, but with propriety and entirely in the interests of the proper administration of the estate. Their Lordships cannot approve of the idea that in India the law would make the possession of reputation or high standing an element of suspicion. If it were so, then the result in India would be to import pro tan to a disqualification and disability into the position of reputable men. A reference is made in the High Court to the fiduciary relations in which the trustees stood to the widow, and in one part of the judgment impropriety of conduct upon the part of the trustees is alleged to lie in this, that they failed in their duty of informing her as to her rights. Upon inquiry as to what was meant by this, their Lordships were informed that the reference was to this effect, that if the widow had failed to adopt, then by doing so she would herself have come into the position of being heiress to her infant deceased child. The meaning of this is accordingly as follows Among Hindus the ceremony of adoption is held to be necessary not only for the continuation of the line of the childless father, but as part of the religious means whereby a son can be provided who will make those oblations and religious sacrifices which would permit of the soul of the deceased passing from Hades into Paradise. The widow in the present case is said to have been injured because she had not been informed that she could win for herself his temporal estate by violation of her husbands dying wishes, and at the price of sacrificing his souls happiness. Their Lordships are not of opinion that it was any part of the duty of the trustees to suggest this infamous alternative to her mind. Their duty was to give effect to his wishes, and his wishes were in accord with the religious belief of Hindus in regard to adoption. It is to be recorded further that the widow herself did not put forward, during her life, any plea or suggestion of this sort; she was as anxious as the trustees that an adoption should be made. Only a word need be said as to the argument put forward on behalf of the daughter, that neither the first nor second adoption was valid. The only separate point relied on was to the effect that the trustees1 consent had not been unanimous, one trustee out of five having declined to act. In their Lordships opinion his consent in these circumstances was not required. Of the acting trustees it was said that one, Nagpurkar, dissented. Whether he did so or not, the question would remain as to the action of the majority of the trustees; but in their Lordships opinion that question does not arise ; because he did in fact not dissent, but consent. His dissent, or alleged dissent, was subsequently made under circumstances into which it is not necessary to inquire. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored. The appellants will have their costs here and in the Courts below.