Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (May 1, 1907) reversing a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr (June 30, 1904). The question for determination in the appeal was whether the appellants were entitled to set aside a sale of a certain share in a zamindari for arrears of Government revenue. The property sold was the ijmali (joint) or residuary share of a zamindari which consisted in all of 860 villages. The zamindari had been broken up by numerous sub-divisions caused by the opening of separate accounts under ss. 10 and 11 of Bengal Act XI of 1859. These sub-divisions were liable to constant change upon transferees of the interests of individual co-sharers opening separate accounts. Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 79 ( 1914- 1915) Maharajah Sir Raveneshwar v. Baijnath Ram Goenka 2 It frequently happened that villages or groups of villages in respect of which separate accounts had been opened were themselves the subject of further sub-division. In these cases, upon an application being made, a fresh separate account would be opened in respect of one of the subdivided portions, the remainder, which had previously formed a separate account, falling back into the ijmali or residuary share. At the date of the sale there were 148 separate accounts opened in respect of parts of the zamindari. The revenue in respect of the ijmali share being in arrear, notifications of sale were published under Bengal Act XI. of 1859. In the notification appearing in the Calcutta Gazette the property to be sold was described in the fifth column thus 11 Ijmali share which cannot be specified, excluding the separate accounts " ; a list of the 148 accounts followed and the words " all other shares besides that specified are excluded from the sale." Notifications were affixed in the Collectors office and in the Court of the judge of the district, which were substantially in the above form, although slightly different versions of the vernacular were given. In the seventh column of the notifications the sudder jama of the ijmali share was stated to be Rs.2615. The ijmali share was sold on September 9, 1901, to the first respondent for Rs.33,500. The Collector rejected an application by the appellants to set aside the sale upon the ground that the notifications were insufficient, and this decision was affirmed by the Commissioner. The ijmali share was sold on September 9, 1901, to the first respondent for Rs.33,500. The Collector rejected an application by the appellants to set aside the sale upon the ground that the notifications were insufficient, and this decision was affirmed by the Commissioner. The appellants commenced the present suit in September, 1902, claiming that the sale should be set aside and that possession of the property with mesne profit be awarded to them. The Subordinate Judge set aside the sale. He was of opinion that under Act XI of 1859 and the rules of the Board of Revenue there had been no proper specification of the property to be sold; that the notifications did not enable bidders to know what properties were comprised in the ijmali share. He further held that the value of the ijmali share was far in excess of the price realized, and that the inadequacy of price was the result of the failure to specify the property in the notices. The High Court reversed this decision. The learned judges in the course of their judgment said " Sects. 6 and 13 of Act XI. of 1859 do. not require that the names of the villages of the share should be specified. They only require that the share to be sold should be specified, but do not explain what details are essential to its due specification. It would therefore seem sufficient if the share to be sold were specified, so that it can be identified and that it can be understood by intending bidders what is about to be sold. This has been laid down in the well-known judgment of Wilson J. in Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Pershad Singh (( 1886) I. L. R. 13 Calc. 208.), in which it is said that all that is necessary is that the notification should specify the estate or shares in the estate to be sold, and that in selling a share in an estate it is unnecessary to specify the shares or mauzas of which the share is composed. . . . It is impossible, we consider, for any intending purchaser justly to say that he was misled by the description of what was to be sold. . . . It is impossible, we consider, for any intending purchaser justly to say that he was misled by the description of what was to be sold. It will be seen that it is described as the ijmali share, from which were to be deducted the shares for which separate accounts had been opened, as shown in the separate sheet appended to the notification. The other columns of the notice were fully and correctly filled up. No exception is taken to the entries in any of them. The name of the mahal, its taujih number, the Government revenue of the estate and the proportionate Government revenue of the share to be sold, and the amount of the arrears due for that share are all correctly entered in them. Now we think that, in these circumstances, the notice specified the share to be sold and gave intending purchasers sufficient notice of what was to be put up to auction, for it was perfectly easy to examine the separate sheet and see what was not to be sold, and so to understand that what was to be sold was what remained of the estate." The learned judges did not agree with the Subordinate Judges valuation of the property and found upon the facts that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the price Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 79 ( 1914- 1915) Maharajah Sir Raveneshwar v. Baijnath Ram Goenka realized was inadequate, but that if it were inadequate there was no evidence that this was due to the non-specification of the mauzas in the notice. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Dunne, for the appellants. The specification of the property to be sold did not satisfy the provisions of ss. 6 and 13 of Bengal Act XI of 1859, or the form contained in the Manual of Revenue and Patni Sales Law, published in 1902 by the Board of Revenue in Bengal. Column 5 in that form is headed " if only a share is to be sold, specification of such share." The specification must be such that intending bidders have reasonable information as to what is to be sold. Where separate accounts have been opened of geographical divisions of the property, as opposed to fractional shares, the subject of the sale should be particularized so that it can be identified. [Hem Chandra Chowdhry v. Sarat Kamini Daayai (( 1900) 6 Calc. Where separate accounts have been opened of geographical divisions of the property, as opposed to fractional shares, the subject of the sale should be particularized so that it can be identified. [Hem Chandra Chowdhry v. Sarat Kamini Daayai (( 1900) 6 Calc. W. N. 526.) and Ismail Khan v. Abdul Aziz Khan ((( 1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 502.),) were referred to.] The observations of Wilson J. in Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Pershad Singh (I. L. R. 13 Calc. 208.) had reference to cases where separate accounts had been opened under s. 10 of the Act and not to cases, like the present, where there were separate accounts under s. 11 of the Act. Each case must depend upon its own particular facts, and in the present case the specification was insufficient owing to the complicated character of the ijmali. The view of the High Court upon the facts as to the value of the ijmali share was wrong, and that of the Subordinate Judge correct. [Tastaduk Rasul Khan v. Ahmad Husain (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind Ap, 176.) was also referred to.] De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the respondents. The specifications in the notifications were sufficient. The whole information as to details of the property was in the Collectors books and was open to proposing bidders. The general principle is that the estate to be sold is to be specified, but that it is not necessary to give details showing what the estate consists of. [Ismail Khan v. Abdul Aziz Khan (( 1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 502.), Dilchand Mahto v. Baijnath Singh (( 1903) 8 Calc. W. N. 337.), Amirunessa Khatoon v. Secretary of State for India (( 1884) I. L. R. 10 Calc. 63.), Bengal Act VII. of 1868, s. 6, and Bengal Act VII. of 1876, s. 4, were referred to.] The observations of Wilson J. in Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Pershad Singh (Q) referred to cases where separate accounts had been opened whether under s. 10 or s. 11 of Act XI of 1859. The High Court rightly held that in any event there had been no substantial injury. The learned judges based the valuation of the ijmali share upon the road cess return made under Bengal Act IX. of 1880, s. 20. That return furnishes the best evidence of value. The High Court rightly held that in any event there had been no substantial injury. The learned judges based the valuation of the ijmali share upon the road cess return made under Bengal Act IX. of 1880, s. 20. That return furnishes the best evidence of value. Even if the specification were irregular and the auction price below the true value, there was no evidence that the insufficiency of price was due to the irregularity rather than o the sale being a forced sale. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Bengal, dated May 1, 1907, and the question for determination relates to the validity of a sale for arrears of revenue, held under Act XI of 1859, of a share of an estate called Mahal Bisthazari situated in the district of Monghyr. The case offers an illustration of the extreme complexity of the land system existing in Bengal. A 15 annas 6 dams share of Mahal Bisthazari seems to have been in existence as an independent fiscal unit for a considerable time. It includes 360 villages, and in the Collectors register is entered as bearing taujih No. 336, which marks its position as a separate revenue-paying estate. As is usually the case in Bengal and elsewhere in India, a large number of persons possess proprietary Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 79 ( 1914- 1915) Maharajah Sir Raveneshwar v. Baijnath Ram Goenka 4 rights in this mahal; they own specific shares, some in one village only, others in several villages. Ordinarily the whole estate held in this wise is liable to be put up for sale for default in the payment of Government revenue. But Act XI of 1859, which lays down the rules for the realization of the revenue payable to the State, provides (by s. 10) that " a recorded sharer of a joint estate held in common tenancy," or (by s. 11) " a recorded sharer of a joint share whose share consists of a specific portion of the land of the estate," may apply to the Collector to open a separate account for the payment of his share of the revenue separately from the others. These separate accounts in respect of separate shares ensure that no share of an estate other than the one in respect of which the default had occurred should be exposed to sale (s. 13) until and unless the highest offer for that share does not equal the amount of the arrear (s. 14), when the whole estate becomes liable to be put up for sale. In accordance with the provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of Act XI of 1859, 148 owners of specific but undivided shares in Mahal Bisthazari applied for and obtained from the Collector separation of accounts. This left, however, a large residue, commonly called the ijmali or joint share, the owners of which remained jointly liable for the revenue due in respect thereof. In August, 1901, this ijmali share was found to be in arrears for the March and June kist or instalment of Government revenue, amounting to Rs.604, and it was advertised for sale on September 9, 1901. An application appears to have been made to the Collector for postponement of the sale, which, however, was refused, and the sale was held on the advertised date, when the property was purchased by the defendant respondent, Baijnath Goenka, for a sum of Rs.33,500. An appeal to the Commissioner of the division, preferred by the owners of the ijmali share, under s. 25 of the Act, having been dismissed, the plaintiffs brought their suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr for the annulment of the sale. The grounds on which they base their action are exactly the same as those they urged before the Commissioner. These grounds are set forth with sufficient distinctness in paragraph 18 of the plaint, sub-clause (e), which is in these terms " That the description of the ijmali share given in column 5 of the said notification was incorrect, insufficient, and misleading, and, having regard to the nature of the interests included in the said ijmali account and to the fact that it was constantly fluctuating, a fuller and more specific description thereof, with particular reference to the villages and the diverse interests making it up, should have been given, all materials for the same being available to the Collector in his office. The omission to give such detailed description of the ijmali account has largely affected the sale and value of the property sold." Shortly stated, the points at issue resolve themselves into two questions, one of law and the other of fact (1.) Whether, having regard to the purpose in view, the specification of the property in the sale notification was in accordance with the provisions of the law; and (2.) whether, in case the requirements of the law had not been complied with, the plaintiffs, by reason of the irregularity, had sustained substantial injury. The trial judge found both questions in favour of the plaintiffs. He held in effect that the specification was insufficient and defective, and that in consequence thereof the property was sold at a gross undervalue. He accordingly made a decree annulling the sale. The High Court, on appeal, came to a directly opposite conclusion on both points, and, reversing his judgment, have dismissed the plaintiffs action. In these circumstances it becomes necessary, in their Lordships opinion, to consider carefully the description or specification which the trial judge holds to be insufficient and irregular, and which the High Court, on the other hand, regard as sufficiently complying with the requirements of the law. Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 79 ( 1914- 1915) Maharajah Sir Raveneshwar v. Baijnath Ram Goenka 5 Act XI of 1859 is a stringent enactment for the realization of arrears of revenue; at the same time it provides certain safeguards for the protection of the interests of the defaulter so that he may not be unnecessarily prejudiced. Among these safeguards are the provisions of ss. 5 and 6 for the issue of notifications of sales specifying the properties to be sold, and their due publication in accordance with the law7. An exact compliance with the requirements of the Act is considered so important by the Government that the Board of Revenue has issued special rules, with forms of notification necessary in the case of estates or shares of estates advertised for sale. The object of the law requiring specification of the properties to be sold, as well as of the Boards rules, is clearly to enable likely purchasers among the public to know exactly what is going to be sold, and to ensure thereby reasonable competition. The object of the law requiring specification of the properties to be sold, as well as of the Boards rules, is clearly to enable likely purchasers among the public to know exactly what is going to be sold, and to ensure thereby reasonable competition. When an estate is advertised for sale it is not difficult to specify it; in the case of shares of estates the work of specification requires care and attention. No hard and fast rule can be laid down with regard to its sufficiency, for it must vary according to the facts of each particular case. In the present case the notification under ss. 6 and 13 of the Act was affixed in the Collectors office and in the Court of the judge of the district; and as the revenue payable in respect of the ijmali share exceeded Rs.500, it was also published in the Calcutta Gazette, which is the official gazette prescribed in the Act. In this notification, which bears date August 7, 1901, what purports to be a specification of the share to be sold is in these terms " Ijmali share which cannot be specified excluding the separate accounts number . . . ."; then follows a long list of the 148 separate accounts already referred to, and at the end the following words occur " all other shares besides that specified are excluded from the sale." In the sale notification issued on August 6, 1901, which was apparently the one affixed in the Collectors office, the entry in column 5 (the specification column) is as follows " The ijmali share cannot be particularized owing to separate accounts having been opened. The share to be sold are those, (sic) given in a separate sheet after excluding the share in respect of which the separate accounts have been opened." The learned judges of the High Court have given in their judgment a translation of the vernacular words in the notice. It is not necessary to consider whether their rendering is quite correct, for the fact remains that admittedly there was no specification of the share to be sold beyond what has already been stated. The intending purchaser was left to gather for himself by going through an elaborate process of elimination the property that was advertised for sale, and for which he was expected to bid. The intending purchaser was left to gather for himself by going through an elaborate process of elimination the property that was advertised for sale, and for which he was expected to bid. It is to be observed that the publication of the notice in the Calcutta Gazette is prescribed with the object of inviting purchasers from other quarters and thus not confining the bidding to speculative money-lenders and mukhtars of the neighbourhood, which is likely to be the case where, as in this instance, the notification gives little or no particulars in respect of the property advertised for sale. The cases to which their Lordships attention has been invited give, in their opinion, no assistance in the determination of the point at issue here. As already observed, each case must depend on its own particular facts ; what has to be considered is whether, having regard to all the circumstances, the specification was sufficiently definite and clear to induce likely buyers to appear and bid at the sale. It is not enough that they may go and obtain the requisite information from the Collectors office. In their Lordships opinion the particulars in the notice should be sufficient in themselves to tell purchasers what they are invited to bid for. Their Lordships, therefore, have no hesitation in agreeing with the trial judge that the notification in this case was insufficient and irregular and not in compliance with the requirements of the law. Sect. 33 provides that no sale should be set aside on the ground that it was made contrary to the Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 79 ( 1914- 1915) Maharajah Sir Raveneshwar v. Baijnath Ram Goenka 6 provisions of the Act, unless the plaintiff proves that he has sustained " substantial injury" by reason of the irregularity complained of. The trial judge found that the property was worth a lakh of rupees., and that in consequence of the irregularity in the sale notification the defendant was enabled to buy it for one-third of its value. The learned judges of the High Court, after an elaborate calculation, thought that, considering the mortgages on the pro perty, it had fetched at the sale a fair value. The learned judges of the High Court, after an elaborate calculation, thought that, considering the mortgages on the pro perty, it had fetched at the sale a fair value. In view of this divergence of opinion their Lordships have examined the evidence for themselves, and they have come to the conclusion that the view of the trial judge, both as regards the value and the fact that the lowness of the price was due to the defectiveness of the notice, was well founded. With respect to the value, the weight of evidence is clearly on the side of the plaintiffs ; whilst a reference to the bid-sheet and the testimony of Balmakand and Korban Ali leave little room for doubt that the low figure at which the property was knocked down was directly due to the paucity of genuine or substantial bidders in consequence of the absence of proper specification in the sale notification. Their Lordships cannot help regretting that the Commissioner did not annul the sale on the appeal preferred to him, which would have saved a long and harassing litigation extending over twelve years. Their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment and decree of the High Court ought to be set aside and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored, save and except as to villages Matasi and Mirzaganj, in regard to which the claim is permitted to be withdrawn, with liberty to the appellants to institute a fresh suit in respect thereof, if so advised. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal and of the appeal in the High Court. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.