JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit which has been described as a suit for possession of a wife or for restitution of conjugal rights. The first defendant is the wife of the plaintiff and the second defendant is his father-in-law. The parties are Laungs, a semi-aboriginal tribe who are governed by many customs peculiar to themselves. One of their marriage customs is that the parents of the girl find a husband for her and take him to their house as a member of their family: the offsprings of the marriage enter the clan of the mother. The defendants place reliance upon this custom and contend that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for possession of his wife and for her removal from the residence of her father, as it is incumbent upon him to reside in the family of his father-in-law. They allege that the plaintiff is always welcome in the household of his father-in-law where he may have free access to the society of his wife. The Subordinate Judge has held that this custom cannot be disregarded in a Court of law and that the plaintiff is consequently not entitled to succeed in this litigation. On the present appeal it has been argued that the Lalungs are Hindus governed by the Hindu Law, and that the plaintiff is, under that law, entitled to possession of his wife, regardless of the custom, which, it is said, is, if not immoral, at least clearly opposed to public policy, as it serves to restrict the personal liberty of the husband. 2. It is not disputed that as was ruled in the case of Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh 28 C. 751 : 5 C.W.N. 673 the duty imposed upon a Hindu wife to reside with her husband wherever he may choose to reside is a rule of Hindu Law and not merely a moral duty, and that, consequently, an ante-nuptial agreement on the part of the husband that he will never be at liberty to remove his wife from her paternal abode would defeat that rule of Hindu Law and is invalid on that ground as well as on the ground that it is opposed to public policy. It is also not disputed that under the Muhammadan Law a condition that the wife shall, though adult, be at liberty to live in the house of her parents is void, though this question is by no means settled by authority, as is clear from the decision in Hamidunnessa Bibi v. Zohir-ud-din Sheik 17 C. 670. But there is nothing to show that the Lalungs are, governed by the Hindu Law, in all respects. Even if it be assumed, however, that the Lalungs are Hindus, their marriage relation must be governed by custom which prevails amongst the tribe, provided that the customs are neither immoral nor opposed to public policy. The case before us is clearly not of an immoral custom such as came before the Courts in Reg. v. Karsan Goja; Reg v. Bai Rupa 2 B.H.C.R. 117 Reg. v. Manohar Raiji 5 B.H.C.R. 17 Uji v. Hathi Lalu 7 B.H.C.R. 133; Khemkor v. Umiashankar Ranchhor 10 B.H.C.R. 381; Narayan v. Laving 2 B. 140 : 2 Ind. Jur. 319; Koraga v. Queen 6 M. 374 : 8 Ind. Jur. 319. We are also unable to accept the contention of the appellant that the custom alleged in this case is opposed to public policy. As Mr. Justice Burrough observed in Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 : 9 Moore 435 : I Car. & P. 241 : R. & M. 66 : 3 L.J. C.P. 265 : 27 R.R. 603 : 130 E.R. 542 public policy is a very unruly horse and when once you get astride of it you never know where it will carry you. These weighty words were adopted and approved by Lord Esher, M.R. in Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association (1892) 1 Q.B. 147 : 16 L.J.Q.B. 128 : 66 L.T. 220 : 40 W.R. 230 : 56 J.P. 180. To the same effect are the observations of Cave, J., in Official Receiver, Ex parte, Mirams In re (1891) 1 Q.B. 594 : 60 L.J.Q. B. 397 : 64 L.T. 117 : 39 W.R. 464 : 8 Mor 59. 'Judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders of what is called public policy." We do not see that there is anything opposed to public policy" or the policy of the law", as Kekewich, J., puts it in Hope Johnstone v. Hope Johnstone (1904) 1 Ch. 'Judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders of what is called public policy." We do not see that there is anything opposed to public policy" or the policy of the law", as Kekewich, J., puts it in Hope Johnstone v. Hope Johnstone (1904) 1 Ch. 470 : 73 L.R. Ch. 231 : 90 L.T. 253 : 20 T.L.R. 282 in a tribal custom which requires a son-in-law to reside in the family of his father-in-law; the plaintiff is also entitled to free access to his wife, if he chooses to go to the house of his father-in-law. It is worthy of note that the Courts have recognised the validity of a custom or contract whereby the wife is to remain in her parents' house till puberty is established; Kateeram v. Gendhenee 23 W.R. 178; Suntosh Ram Dass v. Gera Pattuck 23 W.R. 22 In the matter of the petition of Dhurozidhur Ghose 17 C. 298; Surjyamoni Dasi v. Kali Kanta Das 28 C. 37 : 5 C.W.N. 195; Arumuga Mudali v. Viraraghava Mudali 24 M. 255 : 11 M.L.J. 69 though a different view is possibly indicated in Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai 10 B. 301. We are clearly of opinion that the Court should not assist the plaintiff to violate the tribal custom and to remove his wife from the home of her father. We are not prepared to say that it is injurious to the public interests, that is, to the interests of the tribe to which the parties belong, nor is it in conflict with any express law of the Ruling Power: Hirbae v. Sonabae (1847) P.O.C. 110 : 4 I.D. 100; Howard v. Pestonji (1852) P.O.C. 535 : 4 I.D. 488 Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.R. 50 Bhau Nanaji Utpat v. Sundrabai 11 H.C.R. Bom. 249; Mathura v Esu 4 B. 545; and we are not bound by any rule of public policy to disregard this custom, subject to and with full knowledge of which the plaintiff married the first defendant. 3. The result is that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.