JUDGMENT Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Teunon, by whom it has been held that the lower Courts have erroneously regarded certain judgments and decrees as constituting res judicata. At the same time he felt that he must affirm the decree of the lower Appellate Court, on the ground that the wakfnama to which the decree related, was not before him and that he had no means to form an opinion as to whether or not it was a void and invalid wakf as the Court had decided in a previous litigation. 2. We are in the same predicament. But there is another aspect of the case by which we are influenced and it is this. From the judgment of the Munsif, it appears that the validity or invalidity of the wakf was a matter that came before the High Court and was a subject of adjudication in the High Court. We have been told in the course of the argument that the invalidity of the wakf was affirmed on legal grounds. The result then is that there is an adjudication by the High Court on the invalidity of the wakf which is based on legal grounds, and ordinarily we should feel bound, not on the principle of res judicata but out of the deference which is due to a previous decision of the High Court, to follow that authority. Before finally deciding the case on that ground, we give the appellant before us an opportunity of producing the judgment of the High Court before us within a month from this date. If he fails to do so, this appeal will stand dismissed, but without any order as to costs. JUDGMENT Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. 3. We must affirm the judgment of Mr. Justice Teunon, though possibly not precisely on the ground which commended itself to him. 4. We are of opinion that the former adjudication as to the invalidity of the wakf is, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, conclusive for the purpose of the present litigation. 5. We have, however, been invited to take a different view of the matter out of deference to the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act of 1913. 4. We are of opinion that the former adjudication as to the invalidity of the wakf is, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, conclusive for the purpose of the present litigation. 5. We have, however, been invited to take a different view of the matter out of deference to the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act of 1913. It has been contended that the remedial operation of that Act relates to the past as well as to the present and future and that it was intended to be a declaration that the Privy Council pronouncement as to the law of wakf was erroneous. I do not wish to express any opinion as to the limits of the Indian Legislature's powers. But I am doubtful whether the Governor-General in Council would make a legislative pronouncement that the repeated decisions of the Privy Council were erroneous, though from its knowledge of the requirements of the country the Legislature may think that in future the law should be otherwise administered. That I think is what has happened in this case. The preamble may perhaps give some colour to the argument that the operation of the Act is retrospective as well as prospective. On the other hand the title of the Act seems, if anything, to have an opposite tendency. But both are of ambiguous value. At the same time the terms of Section 3 clearly point to futurity. And this, I think, is most likely to have been in accordance with the intention of the Legislature on general consideration as also on the particular considerations to which I have alluded. This is my view of the Act and I hold on the special circumstances of this case that the previous conclusive decision on which the respondent is entitled to rely has not been affected by the provisions of the Act. I have the satisfaction of knowing that this is in accordance with the view of Mr. Justice Chaudhuri [Rahimunissa Bibi v. Shaikh Manik Jan 27 Ind. Cas. 96; 19 C.W.N. 76] which gives me greater confidence in the probability of this being the true view of the intention of the Legislature. 6. The result is that the appeal is dismissed. As there is no appearance on the part of the respondent, we dismiss the appeal without costs. N.R. Chatterjea, J. 7. I agree.