JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is preferred by the Plaintiff landlord. He bought a village in Chota Nagpur in the year 1905. In 1907 settlement proceedings were begun in the village, and the record-of-rights was published finally in December 1909. The entry recorded therein is that " the rent is in kind with small cash payments in addition." Then the tenants applied for commutation of the rent in kind. On the 18th March 1911, the Plaintiff- Appellant filed his plaint for a declaration that the rent was payable wholly in cash and not partly in cash and partly in kind. On 24th July 1911, he filed a petition for the amendment of his plaint, because on 5th July the Revenue Officer had commuted the rent into a cash rent, and he asked that the order of commutation should be set aside as being illegal and made without jurisdiction. The Court of first instance decreed the suit, holding that the entry in the record-of-rights was wrong and the order of commutation was ultra vires. On appeal by the tenant Defendants the learned District Judge reversed the findings of the lower Court and dismissed the suit. 2. The suit is governed by the provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. 3. The learned Vakil who appeared for the Appellant, after his leader had read the judgments of the lower Courts with running comments, said that his contentions were as follows :--(1) that the rent has been found in certain rent suits to be a cash rent, and therefore the Settlement Officer was not competent to enter in the record-of-rights that the rent was payable partly in cash and partly in kind; (2) that, for the same reason, the Revenue Officer was not competent to make an order of commutation; (3) that the Civil Court had ample jurisdiction to make an alteration in the record-of-rights; (4) that the lower Appellate Court had erred in reversing the decision of the Court of first instance as regards those Defendants who had not joined in preferring an appeal. 4. Of these points the first and third are disposed of by the learned Judge's finding that the entry in the record-of-rights is correct. 4. Of these points the first and third are disposed of by the learned Judge's finding that the entry in the record-of-rights is correct. The reasons for this conclusion are stated in detail, and in addition there is the fact that the Plaintiff's Pleader admitted before the District Judge that the first Court's finding that the rent was not payable partly in kind was untenable. It is idle to discuss the contentions in view of this finding of fact. 5. As to the second point the learned. Judge's finding that the entry in the record-of-rights was correct, renders the contention of no practical interest. The argument, however, is that at the time at which the order was passed, there was a dispute between the parties as to whether the rent was really payable in kind, and that because of this dispute the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to make an order of commutation. It appears to me that sec. 61 (8) provides for opposition of all kinds. The record-of-rights gave the tenants a right to apply under sec. 61 (2). Under cl. (8) the landlord was entitled to oppose the application and it was for the Revenue Officer to consider whether, under all the circumstances, he should grant or refuse the application. That being so, I cannot see that the institution of a suit in the Civil Court took away the Revenue Officer's jurisdiction. 6. For the above reasons I hold that the first three contentions advanced on behalf of the Appellant cannot be sustained. 7. Before referring to the last point I ought to say that the learned Vakil who appeared for the tenant Respondents supported the Judge's view that the suit was barred by sec. 139 (2). I think that view is correct. The matter depends not so much upon the meaning of the word " determine" as upon the words that follow it, and I regard the words " determination of the rent payable " as meaning the ascertainment of the existing rent. This view is borne out by comparing the use of the word determination in secs. 40 and 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 8. The last contention is that the learned District Judge was wrong in reversing the decision of the Munsif as against all the Defendants, when less than half of them joined in the appeal. Or. This view is borne out by comparing the use of the word determination in secs. 40 and 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 8. The last contention is that the learned District Judge was wrong in reversing the decision of the Munsif as against all the Defendants, when less than half of them joined in the appeal. Or. XLI, r. 4, however, gives the Appellate Court the power to reverse the decree in favour of all the Defendants, even though the appeal is preferred by only some, when the decree proceeds on any ground common to all of them. It is not denied that the decree proceeds on grounds common to all the Defendants, so the lower Appellate Court was competent to reverse the decree in favour of all the Defendants. No reason is assigned for holding that he erred in exercising his discretion under this rule. 9. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs, hearing fee is assessed at two gold mohurs. We agree with the judgment of Mr. Justice Walmsley which we have read through. We must dismiss the appeal with costs.