JUDGMENT John Wallis, C.J. 1. I should have been prepared to adopt the judgment of Munro, J., in Parthasarathi Naikan v. Lakshmana Naicken 9 Ind. Cas. 791 : 35 M. 231 : (1911) M.W.N. 201 : 9 M.L.T. 399 : 21 M.L.J. 466, which was followed in Allahabad in Nandan Singh v. Jumman 17 Ind. Cas. 632 : 34 A. 640 : 10 A.L.J. 278 and approved by the Full Bench of that Court in Raj Nath v. Narain Das 24 Ind. Cas. 997 : 36 A. 567 : 12 A.L.J. 982, and was itself in accordance with the Calcutta decision in Aimadar Mandal v. Makhan Lal Dey 10 C.W.N. 904 : 33 C. 1015, if it were not this last decision has been questioned in Nandkumar Dobey v. Ajodhya Sahu 11 Ind. Cas. 465 : 14 C.L.J. 292 at p. 298 : 16 C.W.N. 351 and not followed in Bireshwar Samanta v. Periya Sakhi Debi 28 Ind. Cas. 917 where the opposite view taken by Abdur Rahim and Ayling, JJ., in an earlier case in this Court, Ramasawmi Chetti v. Ponna Padayachi 9 Ind. Cas. 28 : 36 M. 87 : (1911) 1 M.W.N. 209 21 M.L.J. 397 : 9 M.L.T. 264 was accepted as being in accordance with the decisions of the Privy Council in Prannath Roy Chowdry v. Rookea Begum 7 M.I.A. 323 : 4 W.R.P. C. 37 : 1 Suth. P.C.J. 367 : 1 Sar. P.C.J. 692 : 19 E.R. 331, Karan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan 5 A. 1 : 9 I.A. 99 : 4 Saraswatis P.C.J. 382. Before dealing with these decisions, I may say we have not been referred to any English authority for the position that a mortgagee whose right to possession has not accrued may be debarred from suing by possession adverse to his mortgagor commencing after the date of the mortgage. Under the Statute of 21 Jac. 1, C. 16, what was barred was the right of entry or right of taking possession, and time did not begin to run until that right accrued, and then only when the possession of the occupier was adverse. So too under Sections 2 and 3 of the English Real Property Limitations Act, 1833, in suits by persons entitled to possession under an instrument, time only begins to run from the date when the right to possession accrues. So too under Sections 2 and 3 of the English Real Property Limitations Act, 1833, in suits by persons entitled to possession under an instrument, time only begins to run from the date when the right to possession accrues. It is well settled that these are the sections applicable to a mortgagee, Doe d. Roylance v. Lightfoot 8 M. & W. 553 : 151 E.R. 1158 : 11 L.J. Ex. 151 : 5 Jur. 966 : 58 R.R. 813, though there are other provisions giving a fresh starting point from the date of part payment. Under an ordinary English mortgage the mortgagee was entitled to possession at any time and could bring ejectment against the mortgagor who only held at his pleasure, Keech v. Hall 1 Dougl. 21 : I. Sm. L.C. 511 : 99 E.R. 17, but the possession so taken by him would be the onerous possession of a mortgagee accountable for the profits to the mortgagor, and it was held that on foreclosure a fresh right of action arises for possession as owner, Pugh v. Heath 7 A.C. 235 : 51 L.J.Q.B. 367 : 46 L.T. 321 : 30 W.R. 553. Under the English Statutes, it seems to me to be immaterial whether possession commencing after the date of the mortgage was or was not adverse to the mortgagor and the recent decision in Nisbet Potts Contract In re (1906) 1 Ch. 36 : 75 L.J. Ch. 238 : 54 W.R. 286 : 94 L.T. 297 : 22 T.L.R. 234 is in accordance with this view.