JUDGMENT : 1. A complaint was made by one Bansi against the applicant Mangat Rai, patwari of his village, containing allegations which, if proved, would undoubtedly serve to establish the commission of an offence punishable under S. 218 of the Penal Code, 1860, if not also an, offence under the forgery sections of the Penal Code, 1860. After an inquiry which on the face of it appears to have been somewhat cursory, the Magistrate passed an order of discharge without even examining the accused. The matter was taken to the Sessions Judge in revision, and he has ordered a commitment on the record as it stands. I find that his order has since been complied with and Mangat Rai stands committed to the Court of Session on a charge drawn up prior to the filing of this application in this Court. The principles applicable to the conduct of a Magistrate when inquiring into the commission of an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session and to the exercise of the discretion vested in the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judges by the provisions of Section 436 of the Cr PC, have been very clearly laid down in the case of Fattu v. Fattu, (1904) 26 All. 564 : 1 A.L.J. 292 : 1904 A.W.N. 125 : 1 Cr. L.J. 519, with which I find myself in the fullest-possible agreement. I regard the present case as a somewhat unfortunate one. The inquiry by the Magistrate in the first instance seems to have been perfunctory and unsatisfactory in several respects. Moreover, the Magistrate apparently entertained; an opinion that Bansi's denial on oath of the genuineness of certain writing purporting to be his signature was of no evidential value unless that denial was corroborated. 2. The Sessions Judge has, on the other hand, so framed his order that he would almost appear to have been under the impression that the Magistrate was bound to commit the accused for trial merely because the evidence given by Bansi, if believed, would justify conviction. The impression left on my mind by an examination of the record is that the case was one in which the learned Sessions Judge would have exercised a sounder discretion if he had ordered further inquiry to be made, instead of ordering commitment on the record as it stands. The impression left on my mind by an examination of the record is that the case was one in which the learned Sessions Judge would have exercised a sounder discretion if he had ordered further inquiry to be made, instead of ordering commitment on the record as it stands. At the same time it cannot be denied that the Sessions Judge's order was within his discretion, and the ruling to which I have just referred is in favour of the principle that this Court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of the very wide discretion with which Sessions Judges have been invested under the provisions of Section 436 of the Cr PC. Another point for consideration in this case is that there has now been an order of commitment, which it would not be proper for this Court to quash except on a point of law. On the whole as the case now stands, I think it better that the trial of Mangat Rai should proceed in accordance with the commitment order. I dismiss this application.